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Abstract
This thesis compares criminal defences of insanity and idiocy between 1660 and 
1830 in northern England and southern Scotland, regions which have been 
neglected by the historiographies of British crime and “insanity defences”. It is 
explained how and why English and Scottish theoretical principles differed or 
converged. In practice, however, courtroom participants could obtain to alternative 
conceptions of accountability and mental distraction. Quantitative and qualitative 
analyses are employed to reveal contemporary conceptions of mental afflictions and 
criminal responsibility, which provide inverse reflections of “normal” behaviom*, 
speech and appearance.
It is argued that the judiciary did not dictate the evaluation of prisoners’ mental 
capacities at the circuit couifs, as some historians have contended. Legal processes 
were determined by subtle, yet complex, interactions between “decision-makers”. 
Jurors could reach conclusions independent from judicial coercion. Before 1830, 
verdicts of insanity could represent discord between bench and jury, rather than the 
concord emphasised by some scholars. The activities of counsel, testifiers and 
prisoners also impinged upon the assessment of a prisoner’s mental condition and 
restricted the bench’s dominance.
Despite important evidentiary evolutions, the courtroom authentication of 
insanity and idiocy was not dominated by Britain’s evolving medical professions 
(including “psychiatrists”) before 1830. Lay, communal understandings of mental 
afflictions and criminal responsibility continued to inform and underpin the 
assessment of a prisoner’s mental condition. Such decisions were affected by social 
dynamics, such as the social and economic status, gender, age and legal experience 
of key courtroom participants. Verdicts of insanity and the development of Britain’s 
legal practices could both be shaped by micro- and macro-political considerations. 
This thesis opens new avenues of research for British “insanity defences”, whilst 
offering comparisons to contemporary Continental legal procedures.
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Heard you not lately o f a Man,
That went besides his Wits:
And naked thro ’ the Streets he ran,
Wrapt in his frantick Fits,
My honest neighbours it is I,
Hark how the people flout me.
See where they cry the “Mad Man comes ”, 
With all the boys around me,
... Tom Bedlam’s but a sage to me 
For more strange Visions I  do see.
Then he in All his Madness.
Anon., The Madman’s Marlce. (London, c.1740)
“Former Ages railed such as wrote ill, but ours against such as write well; they 
were sometimes so unjust as not to reward merit; but we are so malicious as to 
persecute it: Thus we can neither want new Books, nor deserve them; And it hath 
been well observed, that it would seem now, that none but mad men write or 
censure.”
Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, Pleadings in some remarkable Cases, 
Before the supreme Courts of Scotland. Since the Year. 1661. To which, the 
Decisions are subiovn’d, (Edinburgh, 1704 edition), f.Al
“[Captain Thomas Wilcocks] began again to think that my brain was disturbed, 
of which he gave me a hint, and advised me to go to bed in a cabin he had provided. 
I assured him that I was well refreshed with his good entertainment and company, 
and as much in my senses now as ever I was in my life ... He added, that his 
suspicions were much increased by some absurd speeches I had delivered at first to 
the sailors, and afterwards to him self... as well as by my odd looks and behaviour 
while I was at supper”.
Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels. (1726), “A Voyage to Brobdingnag” Ch. 
VIIIpp.133-134.
Introduction
'Of all human afflictions, madness is the greatest: ‘tis the death o f our intellect and 
virtue; leaving the mere frame extant ^
Historical study of social, medical and legal aspects of insanity and idiocy in 
Europe has dilated over the past thirty years. Historians have revealed and 
explained contemporary perceptions and experiences of mental afflictions, 
stimulated by broader academic interest in the lives of persons who were 
“marginalized” by traditional historical focuses. Thus, the “lower orders” of society 
and gender interactions have become important subjects for study, as scholars seek 
to understand how the institutions and fabric of society shaped people’s lives on a 
daily basis.^ “New” social histories have embraced different methodological 
approaches from inter-related social sciences, such as economics, anthropology and 
sociology. This dissertation employs quantitative and qualitative analysis to explain 
how insanity and idiocy were understood and experienced during the “long 
eighteenth century”, a term that here denotes the period between 1660 and 1829.^
This thesis investigates the composite relationships between mental afflictions 
and legal theories, practices and institutions, with reference to interconnected 
literary, “lay” and medical conceptions. The terms “insanity”, “idiocy” and 
associated phrases (ranging from the vernacular “crack’d in the brain” to the legal
’ L.T. Rede York Castle in the Nineteenth Century: Being an account o f  all the principle offences 
committed in Yorkshire, from the year 1800 to the present period: with the lives o f  the capital 
offenders ... (1831) p.l60.
 ^R.A. Houston Madness and Society in Eighteenth-Centurv Scotland (2000) pp. 1-3.
 ^R. Porter Mind Forg’d Manacles. A History o f Madness in England from the Restoration to the 
Regency (1987) uses the term “long eighteenth century” to represent the period c.1660 to 1820.
formulary '"non compos mentis’^ ) are treated as broad socio-cultural categories of 
description. They related to a diversity of mental afflictions; Burton’s Anatomy of 
Melancholy (1621) contained references to over forty individual “causes” of 
insanity and a wide variety of symptoms, for instance."*
Perceptions and experiences of mental abnormality were coloured by society 
and culture.^ This thesis rejects notions that madness and imbecility were purely 
social or cultural constructs; contemporaries perceived mental afflictions to be real 
and truly disturbing pathologies.^ Stanley Jackson and Roy Porter have concluded 
that modern ideological paradigms relating to mental afflictions should not be 
imposed arbitrarily upon the past.^ A persuasive historical analysis must be based 
upon contemporary interpretations of mental maladies. The terms “insanity” and 
“idiocy” were not employed merely to characterise all persons who acted 
“differently”, or who sometimes behaved unconventionally.^ Mental afflictions 
could be enigmatic, but these terms were used specifically to describe persons who 
displayed perpetual or conspicuous paragons of socially redundant, abnormal or 
unacceptable conduct.^
Many studies of insanity and idiocy are based upon prescriptive materials 
created by medical professionals or persons who were engaged with the “trade in
R. Burton, The Anatomy o f  Melancholy. (1621).
 ^Houston Madness p.2.
 ^Porter Mind Forg’d pp. vii-xi. Houston Madness pp. 1-4, 14 and 39. Houston “Class, Gender” p.45. 
 ^ S. Jackson, Melancholia and Depression from Hippocratic times to modern times. (1986) passim. 
Porter Mind Forg’d p. ix.
 ^Porter Mind Fore’d pp. viii-xi. Houston Madness p.2.
 ^Idem.
lunacy”. Historians have investigated a variety of documentation, from medical 
notes through to diaries and asylum admissions, to weave a rich historiographical 
tapestry.** Roy Porter’s work has piloted research into less charted regions, 
revealing the commonplace observations of Britain’s “laity” (persons with no 
occupational association with either the specialist mad-trade or generic medical 
professions) and how they witnessed, experienced, described and understood 
insanity.*  ^ This comparison of English and Scottish insanity and idiocy defences 
between 1660 and 1829 broadens the history of mental afflictions “beyond the 
asylum”. Legal processes are investigated to discover what sort of persons 
authenticated mental distraction. These criminal hearings offer valuable impressions 
of how “lay”, “legal” and “medical” persons perceived mental afflictions and how 
these perceptions altered over time.
A sophisticated historiogiaphy has emerged concerning British criminal 
defences of insanity and idiocy. Nigel Walker’s seminal work provides lucid 
comparisons between English, Scottish and European philosophies of legal 
responsibility, alongside penetrative analysis of the practical procedures that
Houston Madness p.3.
” See notably, K. Jones, Lunacy, law and conscience. 1744-1845. The social history o f  the care o f  
the insane. (1955). W.L. Parry-Jones, The trade in lunacy: a study o f nriyate madhouses in England 
and Wales in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1971). A. Digby, “Changes in the asylum; the 
case o f  York, 1777-1815” Economic History Review 36. 2, (1983). Ibid, Madness. Morality and 
medicine: a study o f  the York Retreat. 1796-1914 (1985). J. Andrews, “Case notes, case histories, 
and the patient’s experience o f insanity at the Gartnavai Royal Asylum, Glasgow, in the nineteenth 
century”. Social History o f  Medicine. 11 ,2 , (1998). J. Andrews and A. Scull, Undertaker o f  the 
Mind. John Monro and Mad-Doctoring in Eighteenth-Century England. (2001). Andrews and Scull, 
Customers and Patrons o f  the Mad-Trade. The Management o f  Lunacy in Eighteenth-Century 
London. With the Complete Text o f  John Monro’s 1766 Case Book. (2003).
Porter, Mind Forg’d. Ibid, A Social History o f  Madness. Stories o f the Insane. (1987). Ibid, 
“Introduction” and “Laymen, doctors and medical knowledge in the eighteenth century. The 
evidence of the Gentleman’s Magazine”, in Porter (ed.) Patients and Practitioners. Lav Perceptions 
o f Medicine in pre-industrial Society ( 1985).
underpinned insanity defences.*^ Walker’s analysis has been developed expansively 
by Joel Eigen in an English context, who has focused upon defences which were 
entered after 1760 at the Old Bailey (for crimes committed in London and 
Middlesex).'"* Eigen’s work has dismantled simplistic assumptions about crime and 
insanity, such as Frank McLynn’s loose generalisation that the identification of 
insanity and idiocy in eighteenth century England’s criminal courts relied upon 
“medical experts”.'^
Historical interest has extended beyond atypical criminal defences of insanity, 
like James Hadfield’s famous insanity defence for shooting treasonably at King 
George III in 1800.*  ^ Hadfield’s crime and ti'ial were highly politicised and 
publicised, unlike most insanity defences. Hadfield’s case was also of legal interest, 
because the defence counsel’s contentious argument that the prisoner was 
“delusional”, or insane upon one point of reason, was upheld in court. By contrast.
N. Walker, Crime and Insanity in England. Volume I: The historical perspective. (1968) passim. 
See also N. Walker and S. McCabe, Crime and Insanity in England. Volume two: New Solutions and 
New Problems. (1973).
R. Moran, “The Origin o f  Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason o f James Hadfield 
(1800)”, LSR. 19, 3, (1985). J.P. Eigen, “Intentionality and insanity: what the Eighteenth Centuiy 
juror heard”, in W Bynum et al, The Anatomy o f Madness, vol. II, (1986). Ibid, “Delusion in the 
Courtroom: The Role o f  Partial Insanity in Early Forensic Testimony”, MH. 35, (1991). Ibid, “I 
answer as a physician: opinion as fact in pre-McNaughtan insanity trials”, in Clark and Crawford 
(eds.). Legal Medicine in History. (1994). Ibid, Witnessing Insanity. Madness and Mad-Doctors in 
the English Court. (19951. Ibid, “Criminal Lunacy in Early Modern England -  Did Gender Make a 
Difference?”, International Journal o f Law and Psychiatry. 21. 4, (1998). S. Landsman, “One 
Hundred Years o f  Rectitude: Medical Witnesses at the Old Bailey, 1717-1817”, LHR. 16, 3, (1998). 
M.J. Weiner “Judges v. Jurors; Courtroom Tensions in Murder Trials and the Law o f  Criminal 
Responsibility in Nineteenth Century England”, LHR. 17, 3, (1999). T. Ward “Observers, Advisers 
or Authorities? Experts, juries and criminal responsibility in historical perspective”, Journal o f  
Forensic Psychiatry. 12, 1, (2001). Andrews and Scull Undertaker o f the Mind contains a detailed 
account o f earl Ferrers’ insanity defence, at the House o f Lords in 1760, as well as the case of 
Margaret Nicholson who assaulted King George 111.
F. McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century England. (1991), p.41.
See Moran “Hadfield” and Eigen Witnessing pp.22 and 48-54 for accounts o f this crime 
and trial.
recent historiography has focused upon less sensational criminal defences to reveal 
commonplace contemporary perceptions of mental abnormality and to appreciate 
how criminal processes functioned during such hearings.
This thesis uses fresh materials relating long eighteenth century provincial 
British hearings. No work has been published regarding criminal responsibility in a 
northern English context. Dana Rabin has completed a doctoral dissertation which 
concerns northern English insanity defences between 1660 and 1800.'^ Rabin 
investigates the relationships between sensibility and criminal responsibility, whilst 
emphasising how prisoners were not always passive “victims” of oppressive legal 
processes.'^ Rabin’s work is here expanded upon, particularly how defendants who 
suffered from mental afflictions could influence their own hearings. By including 
trials between 1800 and 1829, this study contextualises the changes and continuities 
in legal practices and theoretical understandings of mental afflictions. Much of 
Rabin’s analysis is grounded upon pre-trial depositions which can be informative, 
yet restrictive, mines of information. A wider variety of published and unpublished 
materials are employed here to illustrate and explicate conceptions of criminal 
responsibility and the way in which the prisoner’s mental condition was evaluated 
in court.
Whilst Rabin concentrated upon the English experience, this dissertation 
compares English and Scottish defences of insanity and idiocy. British and
D. Rabin “Of Persons Capable o f  Committing Crimes”. Law and Responsibility in England 1660- 
1800” (PhD Thesis, University o f  Michegan, 1996).
'" /W p .4 0 .
Continental legal systems are also juxtaposed.'^ There has been little recent, 
published interest in Scottish criminality despite the promise of abundant historical 
material.^^ Scottish child-murder and witchcraft prosecutions have been scrutinized, 
but the study of fatuity and furiosity defences has been launched only recently by 
Robert Houston.^' Houston has focused upon criminal hearings at the supreme High 
Court of Justiciary, in Edinburgh.^^ This study expands this nascent Scottish 
historiography to include criminal hearings which took place upon the southern 
circuit of Scotland’s Court of Justiciary.
For research into European insanity defences see A. Abbiateci, “Arsonists in Eighteenth Century 
France: An Essay in Typology o f  Crime”, R. Forster and O. Ranum, Deviants and the Abandoned in 
French Societv. Selections from the Annales Economies. Societees. Civilisations. 4, (trans. E.
Forster and P.M. Ranum), (1978). R.A. Nye, Crime. Madness and Politics in Modern France. (1984). 
R. Harris, Murders and Madness. Medicine. Law and Societv in the fin de siecle. (1989). G. Speak, 
“An Odd Kind o f Melancholy; reflections on the glass delusion in Europe (1440-1680)”, Historv o f  
Psvchiatrv. i, (1990). Y. Ripa, Women and Madness. The Incarceration o f Women in Nineteenth 
Centurv France, (tr. C. du Peloux Menage), (1990). M.N. Wessling, “Infanticide trials and forensic 
medicine: Württemberg, 1757-93”, in M. Clark and C. Crawford, (eds.). Legal Medicine in Historv. 
(1994). For Irish perspectives, see P.M. Prior, “Mad not bad: crime, mental disorder and gender in 
nineteenth century Ireland”, HP. 8, 32, (1997). Gibbons, Mulryan and O’Connor, “Guilty but insane: 
the insanity defence in Ireland, 1850-1995”, British Journal o f  Psvchiatrv. 170 (1997). N. Garnham, 
“The trials o f James Cotter and Henry, Baron Barry o f Santry: two case studies in the administration 
o f criminal justice in early eighteenth century Ireland”, Irish Historical Studies, xxxi, 123, (1999). 
For an “Atlantic” perspective see M.A Jimenez, Changing Faces o f Madness. Earlv American 
Attitudes and Treatment o f the Insane. (1987).
M.A. Crowther “Scotland: a country with no criminal record” Scottish Economic and Social 
Historv Review. 12, (1992). Some aging work has concerned Scottish crime and the criminal courts, 
see J.I. Smith and I. MacDonald, “An Introduction to Scottish Legal History”, Stair Societv. 20, 
(1958). Smith, “Selected Justiciary Cases 1624-1650”, Stair Societv. 27, (1972). Meston, Sellar and 
Cooper, “The Scottish Legal Tradition”, Stair Societv and Saltire Societv. (1991).
Houston Madness. Ibid, “Madness and Gender in the long eighteenth century”, SH. 27, 3 (2002). 
Ibid, “New Light on Anson’s Voyage, 1740-4: a mad sailor on land and sea”. Mariner’s Mirror. 88, 
3, (2002). Ibid, “Professions and the identification o f  mental incapacity in eighteenth-century 
Scotland” Journal o f Historical Sociologv XIV, 4, (2002). Ibid, “Courts, Doctors and insanity 
defences in 18*'’ and early 19*** century Scotland” International Journal o f  Law and Psvchiatrv. 26, 
(2003). Ibid, “The Face o f Madness in Eighteenth- and Early-Nineteenth Century Scotland” 
Eighteenth Centurv Life. 27, 2, (2003). Ibid, “Class, Gender and Madness in Eighteenth-Century 
Scotland” in J. Andrews and A. Digby (eds.) Sex and Seclusion. Class and Custodv. Perspectives on 
Gender and Class in the Historv o f  British and Irish Psvchiatrv. (2004)
^  Houston Madness considers the criminal trials o f  John Douglas (1796), James Fisher (1814-1815) 
and John Halliday (1818), which were tried initially on the southern circuit. Houston has also 
considered civil court “brieves” which originated in southern Scotland. John Halliday’s family had 
failed to have him “cognosed” as insane at a civil tribunal mere months before he was tried for the 
crime o f arson.
Scottish and English legal philosophies held to different conceptions of 
criminal responsibility. Scots Law had independent roots, influences and practices 
to England’s Common Law.^  ^ Scots Law incorporated some “Anglicised” 
processes, but Continental “Civilian” philosophies continued to have a major 
bearing upon Scottish procedures. It is investigated how England’s Common Law 
held to a narrower definition of criminal responsibility than in Scots Law and 
whether such abstract conceptions were applied universally in court. These 
alternative understandings of criminal accountability impinged upon practical 
understandings of insanity and idiocy within England and Scotland. The English 
and Scottish legal codes also shared some similar principles; it is explained how 
“intent” (also known as “dole” in Scotland) was fundamental to constructions of 
criminal responsibility in both traditions.^"*
Besides an account of legal theories, this dissertation compares how mental 
maladies were perceived during English and Scottish criminal hearings and how 
these notions altered between 1660 and 1829. Broadly-held conceptions of
J.W, Cairns “Importing our Lawyers from Holland; Netherlands’ influences on Scots law and 
lawyers in the eighteenth century” in G.G. Simpson (ed.) Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124- 
1994, (1996). Ibid, “The Civil Law Tradition in Scottish Legal Thought” in Carey Miller and 
Zimmermann (eds.) The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen Ouincentenarv Essavs, (1997). 
Ibid, “Legal theory” in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment. (2003). L. Farmer 
“Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order. Crime and the Genius o f  Scots Law, 1747 to the 
present”, in D.L. Carey and D.W. Meyers (eds.) Comparative and Historical Essavs in Scots Law. 
(1992). W.M. Gordon, “A Comparison o f the Influence o f  Roman Law in England and Scotland” in
D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmermann (eds.) The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen 
Ouincentenarv Essavs. (1997). Meston, Sellar and Cooper, “The Scottish Legal Tradition”, Stair 
Societv and Saltire Societv. (1991). W.D.H. Sellar, “The Resilience o f the Scottish Common Law” 
in D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmermann (eds.) The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen 
Ouincentenarv Essavs. (1997).
Eigen Witnessing p.3. Eigen “Intentionality” Houston Madness pp.72-90.
normality can be highlighted by the study of atypical conduct.^^ Two influential 
scholars, Michel Foucault and Roy Porter, were adamant that the history of reason 
and unreason must be concomitant/^ Roy Porter described madness as the “miiTor 
of logic”, for instance/^ Descriptions of heterotypical behaviour can transpose 
observations regaining what was perceived to be normal, acceptable conduct.
The authentication of a prisoner’s mental condition was framed and informed 
by legal procedures and structures. Defences of madness or imbecility cannot be 
understood without considering how key “decision-makers” operated and interfaced 
within the English and Scottish criminal processes.^^ In all English and most 
Scottish hearings, the criminal trial jury took the final decision regarding the 
prisoner’s mental capacities and criminal responsibility. It falls to the historian to 
unravel how the jurors reached their conclusions.^^ Following published 
assessments of British insanity defences, the courtroom interactions between 
judges, juries, legal representatives, witnesses, prisoners and prosecutors are 
examined.
Joel Eigen has suggested that judges could dictate the jury’s estimation of the 
prisoner’s mental condition at England’s Old Bailey between the 1760s and
M.S. Moore, Law and psvchiatrv. Rethinking the relationship. (1984) pp.416-419. M. MacDonald, 
“Madness, suicide and the computer” in Porter and Wear (eds.). Problems and methods in the historv 
o f medicine. (1987) pp.1-9. Houston Madness p. I and fn.2.
M. Foucault, Madness and Civilisation. A Historv o f Insanity in the Age o f  Reason, translated by 
R. Howard, (1971, 5**’ edition 1997). Porter Mind Forg’d pp.6-9. Ibid, Social Historv o f  Madness 
pp.3-4.
Porter Social Historv o f  Madness p.3.
P. King, “Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1800”, HJ, 
27, 1 Ibid, Crime. Justice and Discretion in England 1740-1820. (2000).
^  Eigen Witnessing pp. 12-18.
1840s/'* Eigen’s thesis reinforces broader interpretations of England’s criminal 
processes, presented by the likes of Douglas Hay and Thomas Green, who have 
argued that criminal hearings and verdicts were directed strongly and regularly by 
the opinions of the bench/' By the late eighteenth century, British judges were most 
vociferous where complex points of law (such as theories of criminal responsibility) 
needed clarification. However, a single focus upon the judge’s influence 
oversimplifies the legal processes. John Langbein and Peter King, for example, 
have stressed how the judge’s influence could be restricted by other courtroom 
players, including the jury.^^ With such critiques in mind, Eigen’s thesis regarding 
the importance of the judge to Old Bailey verdicts in insanity defences must be 
considered carefully. It is examined how the principal courtroom actors interfaced 
during provincial criminal hearings.
The historiography of Scottish crime and criminal processes is thin, but the 
English historiography cannot be grafted carelessly onto the Scottish scene. 
Scotland’s bench could act differently to its English cousin, owing to independent
Eigen “Intentionality” pp.34-49.
T.A. Green, “The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-Finding Traditions on the Eve o f  the 
French Revolution” in Padoa-Schioppa (ed.) The Trial Jurv in England. France and Germanv 1700- 
1900 (1987). Ibid, “A Retrospective on the Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800”, in JS. Cockbum and 
T.A. Green (eds.) Twelve Good Men and True (1988). D. Hay, “Property, Authority and the 
Criminal Law”, in D. Hay et al (eds.), Albion’s Fatal Tree Crime and Societv in Eighteenth Centurv 
England. (1975). Ibid, “The Class Composition o f  the Palladium o f  Liberty: Trial Jurors in the 
Eighteenth Century” in J.S. Cockburn and T.A. Green (eds.). Twelve Good Men and True. The 
Criminal Trial Jurv in England. 1200-1800. (1988). J. Innes and J. Styles, “The Crime-Wave: Recent 
Writing on Crime and Criminal Justice in Eighteenth Century England”, Journal o f British Studies 
25,4,  (1986).
King, “Decision-Makers”. Ibid, Crime. J.L. Langbein “Albion’s Fatal Flaws” P&P 98 (1983).
Ibid, “Shaping the Eighteenth Century Criminal Trial: a view from the Ryder Sources”, Universitv 
o f  Chicago Law Review. 50, (1983). Ibid, “The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve o f the French 
Revolution”, in A. Padoa-Schioppa (ed.) The Trial Jurv in England, France and Germanv 1700 1900. 
(1987). Ibid, “Historical Foundations o f  the Law o f Evidence: a view from the Ryder Sources”, 
Columbia Law Review. 96, 5 (1996).
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legal traditions, theories and practices. It is explained how Scottish judges, rather 
than jurors, could assess the prisoner’s fitness to stand trial between 1660 and 
1829.^  ^ But Scotland’s “assize” (jury) evaluated defences which argued that 
prisoners had been unsound mentally when committing crimes. In these latter types 
of trial, Houston suggests that the bench guided and informed the “assize”, but did 
not enforce or dictate its opinions upon the jurors.^ "^  Houston has employed a 
sophisticated approach to the courtroom interactions and thereby posited an 
alternative conclusion to Eigen’s findings for the Old Bailey. These divergent 
hypotheses for Edinburgh’s High Court and London’s Old Bailey are tested within 
the context of provincial English and Scottish circuit courts. Such analysis requires 
an appraisal of the function of the jury, as well as the judge, within Britain’s 
criminal courtrooms between 1660 and 1829.
New avenues of research are opened beyond the remit of bench and jury. The 
roles of British legal representatives (principally barristers and advocates) during 
these types of trial are compared. Published material has assumed rather than 
established the impact of counsel during British trials; this shortcoming is rectified 
in this thesis.^  ^A novel investigation of the quantitative and qualitative influences
Houston Madness passim, “Courts, Doctors” pp.339-354 and “Professions” pp.441-466.
Houston Madness pp.50-51. Ibid. “Courts, Doctors” pp.341. ID. Willock, “The origins and 
development o f  the jury in Scotland”, Stair Society, (1966) p.98 makes a similar point for Scottish 
criminal trials in general.
J.S. Beattie, “Scales o f Justice: Defence Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries”, LHR. 9, 2 (1991). D. Duman, The Judicial Bench in England 1727-1875. 
The Reshaping o f a Professional Elite. (1982). Ibid, “The English Bar in the Georgian Era”, in W. 
Prest (ed.) Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America (1981). J.B. Post, “The Admissibility o f  
Defence Counsel in English Criminal Procedure”, JLH. 5, 3, (1984). Houston “Courts” pp.245-354. 
A. Murdoch, “The Advocates, the Law and the Nation in Early Modern Scotland” in W. Prest (ed.) 
Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America. (1981).
1 1
of legally trained representatives upon Britain’s “superior” circuit courts is offered 
within the context of insanity and idiocy hearings. Defence and prosecution 
“advocates” were involved in Scottish proceedings from at least the seventeenth 
century. By contrast, counsel was not guaranteed to be present during English 
Assize hearings. Most litigants did not employ counsel, but the reasons why 
barristers began to appear during defences of insanity are explored.
Legal practice and the interactions between courtroom participants evolved 
during the long eighteenth century, particularly in England. Focusing upon Old 
Bailey trials, Stephan Landsman has suggested “Adversarial” criminal legal 
routines emerged during the eighteenth century.^^ Landsman argues that a litigious 
clash of proofs characterised such “adversarial” hearings, rather than the non- 
contentious judication which typified seventeenth century tria ls .N ew  procedural 
and evidential guidelines developed. Litigants became responsible for the 
production of testimonial proofs. Counsel became a feature of such trials, initially 
in the 1730s and increasingly after the 1760s, because of their ability to prepare and 
present sound legal cases.^  ^ Landsman has suggested that this greater focus upon 
proof and the emergence of counsel altered the role of the bench during criminal 
hearings, although the evolution of the “adversarial” courtroom was incomplete 
before 1830. Judges became less involved in the production of evidence and more
S. Landsman, “Rise o f the Contentious Spirit: Adversai y Procedure in Eighteenth Century 
England”, Cornell Law Review. 75, (1990) pp .498-603. C. Crawford “The Emergence o f  English 
Forensic Medicine. Medical evidence in common-law courts, 1730-1830” (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University o f  Sussex) pp. 160-161 refers to such procedures as “accusatory”.
Landsman “Rise” pp.500-502.
Idem.
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involved in the clarification of legal principles and precedent. These broader theses 
about the development of England’s “adversarial” courtroom demands to be tested 
in the context of Northern Assize insanity trials. An investigation of Scottish 
procedural developments provides a fascinating comparison with English practices, 
especially given the theoretical and practical impact of the “Romano-Civilian” 
traditions upon Scots Law.
The courtroom interactions during British trials are also compared with 
European legal practices and developments. Eighteenth century Continental 
practices have been characterised as being “Inquisitorial” in nature, whereby the 
judicial bench dominated trials. “Inquisitorial” benches took evidence, questioned 
witnesses and decided whether defendants were responsible for their actions. The 
bench also sentenced guilty parties. Contemporary English commentators 
distinguished Continental practices from their own. As one rhymester noted, “In 
foreign Realms, not as in This, ‘Tis there Arbitrium Judicis”. but such 
generalisations have been deconstructed intelligently by legal historians.^^ 
“Continental” law was not monolithic and that these legal systems could obtain to 
different practices and evolutions.'^® Whilst European judges were rarely restricted 
to a passive, adjudicating role, their activities could be constrained by the proofs
Anon. (Gentleman o f the Middle Temple), A northern circuit described, in a letter to a Friend: a 
poetical essay. (1751), p .15. G. Gorla and L. Moccia, “A ‘Revisiting’ ofthe Comparison between 
‘Continental Law’ and ‘English Law’ (16“* to 19*'' Century)”, JLH. 2, 2 (1981) pp.143-152. Farmer 
“Criminal Law” pp.33-39.
E.M. Becker, “Judicial Reform and the Role o f Medical Expertise in Late Imperial Russian 
Courts”, LHR. 17, 1 (1999) pp. 1-8. N.Z. Davis, Fiction in the Archives. Pardon Tales and Their 
Tellers in Sixteenth Century France. (1987). F. Lopez-Lazaro, “‘No Deceit Safe in Its Hiding Place’ 
The Criminal Trial in Eighteenth Century Spain”, LHR. 20, 3 (2002) pp.451-477. Wessling 
“Infanticide” pp.117-138.
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entered at court and the involvement of counsel/^ Continental judges orchestrated 
trials, but they did not necessarily act arbitrarily. Stereotypical generalisations 
should be avoided, but specific European procedures and developments can be 
employed usefully to contextualise English and Scottish practices.
The assessment of Britain’s courtrooms would be deficient without 
considering witnesses and testimonies. Some scholars have suggested that, after the 
mid eighteenth century, the classification of mental maladies became dominated by 
medical professionals, including specialist “mad-doctors” (who might not have 
received formal medical training).^^ Thomas Szasz, for instance, contended that 
madness was purely a social construct, invented and perpetuated by “psychiatric” 
professionals. Szasz concluded that the concepts and terms of insanity and idiocy 
were designed to label and control persons who refused to conform to norms which 
governed behaviour. Klaus Dorner has contended similarly that the “labelling” and 
incarceration of mad people was an extended means of controlling the conduct of 
society’s labouring poor.'^  ^This sort of methodology has been challenged strongly. 
Roy Porter has pointed out that the “mad-trade” ought not to be considered as a 
formal, unified “psychiatric” profession during the period before the 1820s. Porter
Farmer “Criminal Law” pp.36-39. Lopez-Lazaro “‘No Deceit Safe” p.465.
T. Szasz The mvth o f mental illness: foundations o f a theory o f  personal conduct.
(1961). Ibid, Law. Liberty and Psychiatry. An Inquiry into the Social Uses o f  Mental Health 
Practices. (1963) Ibid, The Manufacture o f  Madness. A Comparative Study o f  the Inquisition and the 
Mental Health Movement. (1971) p.l5.  Scull Museums o f  Madness. (1979) pp.l4 and 124-129.
Scull has reconsidered some o f his views, see Scull The Most Solitary o f  Afflictions. Madness and 
Society in Britain 1700-1900 (1993) and “Museums o f  Madness Revisited” Social History o f  
Medicine 6, 1, (1993).
K. Domer, Madmen and the Bourgeoisie. A Social History o f Insanity and Psychiatry. (1969, tr. 
Neugroschel and Steinberg 1981) pp.l, 37 and 67. See Porter Mind Forg’d p.9 for a synopsis o f this 
historiography.
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argued further that the “mad-trade” could not have evolved as a viable concern 
without the financial support of affluent “patients” and their households. Persons 
belonging to society’s elites and middling sorts could also suffer from mental 
distraction and be supervised, treated and interned.
“Anti-psychiatric” methodology and its critics can be evaluated within the 
milieu of criminal hearings. Published research has suggested that medical and 
specialist testimonies did have a greater impact upon insanity defences after 1760 in 
England.'^ '* Also, medical witnesses were more involved in Scottish criminal 
proceedings by the early nineteenth centuryNevertheless, these studies have 
found that the courtroom identification of insanity and idiocy persisted to be 
dominated by “lay” persons and their evidences, not “expert” testimony from 
generic medical professionals or “specialists” in the identification of mental 
disturbance. The emergence of medical and expert testimony was prompted by legal 
professionals who were increasingly concerned with establishing “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt” The qualitative and quantitative impact of “lay”, “medical” 
and “expert” witnesses and their proofs are therefore ascertained in the context of 
provincial English and Scottish court cases.
It is examined how developments in the “law of evidence” affected the type of 
witness which were adduced at court and the content of their testimonies. This
Eigen Witnessing esp, pp. 18-28 and 108-160. T.R. Forbes Surgeons at the Bailev. English 
Forensic Medicine to 1878 (1985) passim. Landsman “Rectitude” p.454.
Houston Madness pp.46-49 and 141. Ibid “Courts, Doctors'’passim.
Eigen “Intentionaiity” pp.34-49. Ibid Witnessing pp. 182-189. Houston “Professions” pp.441-446.
AW “Courts, Doctors” pp.345-354.
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reveals what kinds of deponent and testimony were perceived to be persuasive (and 
why) during provincial British insanity and idiocy defences. The reader is 
encouraged to view these criminal trials through the lens of contemporary 
understandings of proof and truth, rather than distorting the records by imposing 
modern evidential standards upon the past.'^  ^ Such an investigation has not been 
attempted in the context of defences of mental incompetence, but a wide range of 
scholarship has considered the broader evidential developments which occurred 
during the long eighteenth century.'^^
Social historians have emphasised how a person’s social characteristics, such 
as their gender, occupation, socio-economic standing and age, could shape and 
determine human experience. Accordingly, it will be investigated how these 
“contingencies” impinged upon decision-making processes during British insanity 
and idiocy defences.'^  ^ These broader analyses raise further historiographical 
debates relating to the function of the criminal law and perceptions of justice and 
criminal responsibility within society. Scholars have suggested that society’s
Kllday “Maternal Monsters” makes this mistake in her analysis o f Scottish child-murder cases. 
Initially, Kilday considers the changes in evidential standards in Scotland cl750  to 1815 (pp. 158- 
160). Kilday outlines how proofs which today might be regarded as being “circumstantial” (such as 
neighbourhood gossip) were imparted by midwifes and doctors who were not “detached” or 
“impartial” witnesses (pp.161-162). Kilday slips into a modern understanding o f  legal proof when 
she opines that such evidences were “derisory” (p.l61). By contrast, this thesis recognises that these 
forms o f testimony and testifier could be persuasive (and not necessarily flawed) during long 
eighteenth century British trials.
Crawford “Emergence”. Ibid, “Legalizing Medicine: early modern legal systems and the growth o f  
medico-legal knowledge”, in M. Clark and C. Crawford (eds.). Legal Medicine in History. (1994). 
Landsman “Rise”. J.L. Langbein, “Understanding the Short History o f Plea Bargaining”, LSR. 13, 2, 
(1978/1979). Ibid, “Historical Foundations o f the Law o f  Evidence: a view from the Ryder Sources”, 
Columbia Law Review. 96, 5, (1996). S. Shapin, A Social History o f Truth. Civility and Science in 
Seventeenth Century England. (1994). B. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt. (1991). Ibid, “The 
Concept “Fact”: Legal Origins and Cultural Diffusion”, Albion. 26 ,1 , (1994). Ib id .A  Culture o f  
Fact. England. 1550-1720. (2003).
Houston Madness pp.91-107.
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propertied elites were able to manipulate the law, thereby maintaining and 
justifying their elevated status within society/® Such interpretations contend that the 
elites were therefore able to regulate the conduct of the “labouring poor” by 
imposing concepts of order and justice through the law. Recent research has 
challenged such simplistic interpretations, however.^* The lower and middling 
orders of society could participate as litigants, witnesses and decision-takers, 
thereby imparting their understandings of criminal accountability and expectations 
of justice at court. It is suggested that a broad spectrum of provincial society could 
shape hearing and that prisoners could have their mental conditions evaluated by 
persons of similar social station.
Historians have also considered how a person’s gender shaped their experience of 
crime, criminal responsibility and the courtroom. In the context of mental 
afflictions, some scholarship has argued that mental distraction was perceived and 
experienced as a “female malady” during the long eighteenth c e n t u r y I t  is 
questioned whether such a simplistic construction informed or reflected 
contemporary understandings of mental afflictions and criminal responsibility at 
Britain’s provincial courts. It has also been suggested that women played a 
restricted role in the identification of mental afflictions both within and without the
J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England (1660-1800). (1986). Green “Retrospective”. Hay 
“Property, Authority”. Hay “Class Composition”. Innes and Styles “Crime Wave”. E.P. Thompson, 
Whigs and Hunters: the origins o f the Black Act. (1975). Ibid, Customs in Common. (1991).
King, “Decision-Makers”. King Crime. J.A. Sharpe, “The People and the Law”, in Reay (ed.), 
Popular Culture in Earlv Modern England. (1985).
P. Chesler, Women and Madness. (1974) p. 16. Y. Ripa Women and Madness. The Incarceration 
o f Women in Nineteenth Centurv France. (1990) pp.l 58-160. E. Showalter The Female Maladv. 
Men. Madness and English Culture. 1830-1980. (1987) pp.3-5 (this argument is later moderated, see 
p.58).
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courtroom. These arguments contend that women who refused to conform were 
labelled as being insane by male-dominated and oppressive processes. These 
theories have also been challenged.^^ In light of insanity defences, both Eigen and 
Houston have found that perceptions and experiences of mental afflictions were 
gendered subtly. Houston has suggested that “there was no uniquely female 
construct of madness” in Scotland, a hypothesis which is echoed in the work of 
MacDonald and Eigen. '^  ^ It is therefore considered how interactions between 
courtroom participants were affected by their gender, alongside other social 
characteristics, such as age, “class” and occupation.
J. Busfield, “The Female Malady? Men, Women and Madness In Nineteenth Centuiy Britain” 
Sociology. 28 (1994) p.259-277. Ibid, Men, Women and Madness: Understanding Gender and 
Mental Disorder. (1996) pp.25-35. N. Tomes “Feminist histories o f psychiatry” in M.S. Miscal and 
R. Porter (eds.) Discovering the History o f  Psychiatry (1994) pp.348-383.
Houston “Madness and Gender” p.325. Eigen “Did gender matter?” p.419. M. MacDonald, 
“Women and Madness in Tudor and Stuart England”, Social Research. 53, 2 (1986) p.271.
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Source materials
All of the northern English trials studied took place at the criminal “Assize” 
meetings. The “Assizes” dealt with the most serious kinds of transgression and 
transgressor between 1660 and 1829, although minor offences could also be tried.* 
By the 1660s, England’s provincial Assizes were arranged into six independent 
circuits and one of them, the “Northern”, has been examined for this thesis.^ It has 
been suggested, mistakenly, that all of England’s Assizes met twice per annum 
during the long eighteenth century.^ Biannual meetings were held for the town 
Corporation of York and County of Yorkshire (both at York); but the meetings for 
Northumberland and the Corporation of Newcastle (both held in Newcastle), 
Cumberland (Carlisle) and Westmoreland (Appleby) met once per annum before 
1819 and twice-yearly thereafter. A court also met at Kingston-upon-Hull at varied 
intervals before 1799, after which trials for this locality were removed to York.'  ^
Additionally, this study includes the incomplete records for the “Palatinate” courts 
of Durham and Lancaster, the latter of which also convened biannually. Palatinate 
courts enjoyed independent histories and privileges, but they were treated as 
extensions of the “Northern Assizes” in practice.^
' J.S. Cockburn, A History o f  the English Assizes from 1558 to 1742. (1972) pp.46. King Crime 
p.39. Civil court business was also dealt with at these Assizes, but these forms o f legal hearing ai e 
not investigated at length in this thesis.
 ^Additionally, up to eight court sessions were held at the Old Bailey for Middlesex and London per 
annum. Cockburn English Assizes pp. 19-23.
 ^ R. McGowan, “‘He beareth not the sword in vain’: Religion and the Criminal Law in Eighteenth 
Century England”, ECS, 21, 2, (1987/1988), p .l92.
J.S. Cockburn, “The Northern Assize Circuit”, NH. 3, (1968) p.l28.
 ^Cockburn English Assizes pp.43-46.
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Separate legal traditions, theories and procedures existed in Scotland and 
England throughout the long eighteenth century. The Union of 1707 robbed 
Scotland of her parliament, but it also enshrined the independence of her legal 
system. In 1672, the Court of Justiciary was established as the superior criminal 
court in Scotland, with its base at the High Court in Edinburgh. In this thesis, 
important procedural changes are explained and contextualised by reference to High 
Court trials and decisions.® Scotland’s Court of Justiciary also held the power to try 
provincial criminal cases.^ There were three Justiciary circuits: north, west and 
south. These circuits were held infrequently before 1707.* The biannual Justiciary 
Court circuit meetings which took place at Ayr, Dumfries and Jedburgh are here 
investigated systematically.^ Ayr belonged originally to the western circuit, but it 
was removed to the southern in 1748. The Scottish sample also includes Ayr 
hearings from between 1708 and 1747. These southern Scottish circuit courts were 
the closest equivalent to England’s Northern Assizes and Palatinate courts. They all 
held the power to try crimes which were perceived to be most serious in nature and 
could apply the severest penalties, such as transportation or death, to those found 
guilty.*®
 ^ See Houston, Madness for High Court furiosity and fatuity defences c. 1740-1818,
 ^W.C. Dickenson “The High Court o f  Justiciary” p.41 land J.I. Smith “Criminal Procedure” pp.426- 
442, both in “An Introduction to Scottish Legal History”, Stair Society. (1958). P.Raynor, B. 
Lenman and G. Parker “Handlist o f  Records for the study o f crime in early modern Scotland (to 
1747)”, List and Index Society, (special series) (1982) pp.30-33. Willock “Origins” p.l43.
® Dickenson “High Court” p.411. The 1747 Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act, 20 Geo II c.43 
also regularised the practice o f holding two Justiciary circuits per annum.
** Much like the English Assizes, cases from specific regional jurisdictions were tried at these circuit 
courts. Ayr covered Ayrshire and Wigtonshire, Dumfries covered Dumfrieshire and the stewartry o f  
Kirkudbright, Jedburgh covered Berwickshire, Roxburghshire and Selkirkshire.
Dickinson “High Court” p.411.
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This thesis concentrates upon the “superior” criminal courts in England and 
Scotland. A contemporaneous network of local criminal and civil jurisdictions also 
existed in Britain. In England, regional Justices of the Peace presided over the Petty 
and Quarter Sessions which met more frequently than the Assizes. In Scotland, a 
“complex web” of courts co-existed, such as the Sheriff, “franchise” and “burgh” 
courts.** Some of these regional courts could also hold extensive powers of trial and 
punishment. Before they were abolished in 1747, Scotland’s “heritable” franchise 
courts of “Regality” could own similar authority to try and punish offenders as the 
Court of Justiciary, for instance. Under certain conditions, prisoners could be 
removed (“repledged”) from the Justiciary to the franchise courts for trial.*  ^ A 
selective examination of English and Scottish “local” courts confirmed that these 
“local” courts could indeed deal with criminal business, but no defences of insanity 
and idiocy were unearthed.*^ Nevertheless, further research is required to establish 
the relationship between the “circuit” and “local” jurisdictions in cases of insanity 
and idiocy.
" See Raynor, Lenman and Parker, “Handlist o f Records” for an overview o f Scottish criminal and 
civil jurisdictions.
pp. 113-114. Houston Madness p.31.
Research into Cumberland’s Quarter Sessions records revealed no criminal defences o f  insanity or 
idiocy. It seems that such defences entered rarely, if  at all, at the north-eastern and north-western 
English Quarter Sessions during this era. I am grateful to Peter Rushton for sharing his knowledge in 
this respect, saving a largely fruitless trawl through a considerable amount o f historical material. For 
further comment, see Rushton “Idiocy” and Morgan and Rushton Rogues. Research into selected 
sheriff, burgh and franchise court records found no fatuity or furiosity defences. Series searched: JC 
l /I  and 1/3 (Dumfries burgh), JP13/2 (Selkirk JP records), SC 15 (Dumfries sheriff court), SC 62 
(Jedburgh sheriff court), RH 11/19 (Bailiary o f  Cunningham).
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Legal documents form the foundation of this investigation. The official 
“minutes” and papers relating to trials were examined.*'* Generally, England’s 
Minute Books contain brief transcripts of courtroom particulars, such as the names 
of the judges, prisoners and jurors, alongside the crimes prosecuted and the verdicts 
delivered.*® This information was supplemented and duplicated in the books of 
“Gaol Delivery”,*® These “minutes” are incomplete for the northern English courts, 
however, especially during the seventeenth century. Durham and Lancaster’s 
minutes are also lacking for the period before 1750. The surviving English Minute 
and Gaol books provide a solid basis for study, but can be restrictive records.
Until the 1760s, the southern Scottish Minute Books register trials in greater 
detail than their English counterparts.*^ Clerks could include the names of witnesses 
and the principle facets of their testimony, alongside legal debates between legal 
professionals. The minutes become condensed by the 1760s, however. These 
records are incremented by “Dittay” (indictment) Books which contain abbreviated 
synopses of the prosecutor’s evidence.** The minute and “Dittay” books provide 
only a skeletal impression of court proceedings in Scotland, just as in England. A 
diverse set of historical materials were therefore employed to breathe life into these 
provincial criminal hearings.
Northern England: PL 27, A SSI44 and 45. Southern Scotland JC 26 and AD 14.
ASSI 42 (some Minute Books can also be found in the ASSI 41 series), PL 28 and DURH 16. 
ASSI 41.
"JC  2, 3, 8 ,12  and 13.
Series JC 17.18
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The historian of northern English and southern Scottish criminal trials is blessed 
by the survival of detailed written records regarding the pre-trial investigation of 
crimes. Statements from witnesses, prosecutors and the accused exist which relate 
directly to the cases studied. These records, known collectively as “processes”, 
“precognitions” or “small papers” in Scotland and “depositions” in England, 
provide vital details about the crime and the persons involved in the formal legal 
procedure. They facilitate quantitative and qualitative analysis regarding the 
deponent’s sex, age, social standing and occupation. In relation to defences of 
insanity and idiocy, these documents tender priceless illustrations of how 
contemporaries perceived mental afflictions.
These pre-trial statements did not necessarily reflect the final testimony of 
witnesses, or vocal input of litigants, at court. Testators could change the content of 
their testimony between the initial investigation and the courtroom hearing itself. 
Take the evidences provided  ^by John Wastdell relating to the murder of his brother, 
Thomas, at Staiths in Yorkshire during 1775.*  ^ In his pre-trial deposition, John 
remarked that he had discove^ç^ the murderer, James Rice, “standing in an amaze” 
near to the scene of the crimq.^ ® Jurors might have interpreted the reference to 
Rice’s “amaze” as an indication that the murderer was in a stupefied state and was 
therefore unsound mentally at the time of committing the crime. In court, however, 
John Wastdell stated firmly that Rice had been sane at the time of the crime and
ASSI 42/9. Deposition o f Joint or Westdell.
ASSI 24/32/2/139.
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omitted any reference to the prisoner’s “amaze”/* Like other witnesses from 
Staiths, John Wastdell believed that Rice ought to be found responsible for his 
actions and be hanged for his atrocious crime. Community opinion prevailed on this 
occasion and Rice was hung after being found guilty in 1 l l lP '
Official legal documents must be treated with caution, for at best these were 
second-hand accounts of what was spoken. These reports were structured and 
filtered by formal processes and legal personnelThe local office-holders who 
superintended examinations of British prisoners could be experienced, if not 
trained, in legal matters. The questions presented to prisoners were composed in a 
legal format and addressed the legal issues and terminology concerning insanity and 
criminal responsibility.^^ Examiners sought out evidence which promised 
persuasive indicators of the prisoner’s state of mind in accordance with 
contemporary evidential standards. As a result, these records could be condensed 
accounts of the information which examiners and clerks perceived to be important. 
Evidence which was deemed to be of little consequence could be omitted. At Ayr in 
1823 for instance, a “Magistrate admitted that the whole of what the declarant had 
said was not taken down” by the clerk during the examination of James 
Connacher.^® The examiners did not record Connacher’s interview because they 
deemed his ability interact verbally, by employing language rationally, had been
The Trials at Large o f  the Felons in the Castle o f York. At the Lammas Assizes. 1776 (York, 
1776) pp.4-5. Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1777) pp.9-10.
^  Knipe Criminal Chronology o f  York Castle, with a register o f  criminals capitally convicted and 
executed at the Countv Assizes 11379-18671. (1867) p.90.
Houston Madness p.356.
A. Ingram, The Madhouse o f  Language. Writing and Reading Madness in the Eighteenth Centui-y 
(1991), p.91.
JC12/35. Air Advertiser April 17“' 1823.
24
removed by his mental affliction.
Official legal materials are supplemented by contemporary printed accounts of 
trials and crimes. These provide narratives of the hearings themselves, thereby 
animating the important courtroom details which might be lost through reference to 
legal documents alone. Newspapers and pamphlets record how prisoners and 
witnesses falter, judges pass sarcastic remarks, lawyers leap rhetorically into the 
fray and spectators laugh, cry or shout out “shame”. This fabric aids our 
understanding of the processes which shaped the identification and authentication 
of the prisoner’s mental state.
Studies of crime and criminal responsibility at the Old Bailey, in London, have 
focused upon printed materials.^® Narrative reports of Old Bailey trials were 
published from the seventeenth century and continued to be sold through to 1830.^  ^
These accounts were intended for public consumption and are known collectively as 
the Old Bailev Sessions Papers (or OBSP), transcripts of which can now be viewed 
via the internet.*^ * The OBSP are useful but incomplete records of the hearings: John 
Langbein has noted that editors could exclude important legal details, such as the 
judge’s summary.^^ No comparable run of narratives exists for British provincial 
trials, but details of around one-hundred trials which were entered at York, entitled 
The Trials at Large of the Felons at York Castle, were printed by local publishers
See, for instance, Eigen Witnessing. Forbes Surgeons. Landsman “Rectitude”. Langbein 
“Shaping”.
Eigen Witnessing pp.7-10. 
www.oidbaiIeyonline.org 
Langbein “Shaping” pp.21-24.
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during the 1770s/® They mimic the style and scope of the OBSP. Two insanity 
cases, those of John Sutcliffe (July 1776) and James alias “Dutch” Michael Rice or 
Rijks (July 1775-July 1777), are included in this series. These narratives tender 
exceptional insights into northern English insanity defences of the 1770s. They 
reveal that barristers participated in these hearings, for instance.
Provincial newspapers such as the York Herald began to carry trial naiTatives 
from the 1790s onwards, alongside descriptions of noteworthy crimes. By the late 
eighteenth century, publications with “national” audiences also carried reports of 
regional criminal trials.^* Illustrations of provincial hearings can be found in 
newspapers like the London Morning Herald, the Times and the Gentleman’s. Scots 
and Edinburgh magazines. Detailed narratives were included to satisfy the interests 
and meet the heightened demands of the consumer by the late eighteenth century. 
Published accounts of crimes and criminal trials could both delight and terrify the 
audience. They also relay important details of trials to the historian of crime and the 
criminal law. Such courtroom narratives are available for forty-nine northern 
English insanity and idiocy defences between 1776 and 1829. Similarly detailed 
printed narratives exist for twenty-one Scottish cases between 1786 and 1829.
These printed accounts were designed to read like “verbatim” narratives of 
proceedings, but they could be edited heavily. Where prisoners spoke at their trials
The Trials at Large o f the Felons at York Castle ... (1775-1777), originals available at the York 
Central Library.
For a seventeenth century pamphlet-report o f infamous defence o f “furiosity” at Edinburgh, see 
the Trval o f Philip Standsfield ... (Edinburgh, 1688).
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but did so ineffectually, for instance, publications might record simply that the 
“prisoner said nothing in defence”/^ Newspapers could carry significant political 
sympathies, too. It is perhaps unsurprising that the liberal Carlisle Journal reported 
the courtroom successes of the “Whiggish” barrister, Henry Brougham, with relish. 
The politically conservative Carlisle Patriot, meanwhile, focused upon lawyers with 
known “Tory” sympathies, such as Alan Park.®® Journalists could also mould their 
reports to meet the final verdict. The Carlisle Patriot opened its report of Richard 
Routledge’s trial in 1824 with the retrospective assertion that “On being called to 
plead, he all at once assumed insanity”.®'* Other reports suggest that Routledge’s 
dissimulation was not detected until the final stages of his trial, although he was 
ultimately found guilty of his crime. The Patriot’s report reinforced the shared 
opinion of court and community that Routledge feigned insanity, thereby 
reinforcing common perceptions of normal and abnormal mental states. The 
Patriot’s report also suggested that Routledge’s insanity was apparent from the 
outset of the hearing, but this patently was not the case.
Trial documents and narratives were supplemented by the investigation of 
English and Scottish legal records pertaining to post-trial clemency.®® Unlike recent 
published research upon British insanity defences, this thesis considers applications 
for mercy, both for full pardons and reductions in sentence.®® The comparison of
Langbein “Shaping” p.24.
”  See p.392.
Carlisle Patriot August 28“* 1824.
35 England: Series HO 13 and HO 47. Scotland: Series C3. Newspapers also recorded applications 
and outcomes for clemency. Justiciary Court Minute Books also recorded instances where the judge 
applied immediate, discretionary clemency.
Eigen Witnessing. Weiner “Judges V Jurors”. Houston Madness. Walker Crime and Insanity I
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Scottish “Remissions” (formal supplications to the Crown for mercy) with the 
English pardoning processes emphasises the key differences within the English and 
Scottish conceptions of mental disturbance and criminal responsibility during this 
era.
This thesis compares broader contemporary perceptions of mental afflictions in 
England and Scotland, as well as how these may have evolved between 1660 and 
1829. It is assessed whether medical professionals governed the authentication of 
insanity and idiocy within Britain’s courtrooms. A corpus of “specialist” literature 
did exist during the long eighteenth century, which outlined the perceived causes, 
nature and cure of mental afflictions, such as John Burton’s Anatomv of 
Melancholv (1621) and George Cheyne’s English Maladv (1733).®  ^ Such extra- 
legal material can be compared with legal writings and documents, to illustrate 
perceptions and descriptions of mental afflictions. The study of insanity and idiocy 
defences must be underpinned by a comparison of English and Scottish legal theory 
and commentary. Legal texts and principles are therefore evaluated in the next 
chapter.
does compare insanity as an avenue o f  post-tria*i clemency in England and Scotland. This discussion 
is expanded upon in Chapter 8, pp.331-8 and 351-60, below.
Burton’s Anatomy o f Melancholv went through five editions between 1621 and 1638. See Burton 
Anatomy o f Melancholy ed. Jackson (1972) pp. v-xvii. Cheyne, The English Malady, or, a Treatise 
o f Nervous Disorders o f All Kinds. (Lqi^don, 1733). Andrews and Scull Customers and Patrons 
contains a transcript o f the case-notes hÿonging to the “mad-doctor” John Monro, which provide a 
fascinating comparison with medical, “specialist” and lay testimonies regarding mental afflictions.
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2,
English and Scottish theoretical principles o f  
criminal responsibility, 1660 to 1829
“In criminal causes, as felony, &c., the act and wrong o f a madman shall not be 
imputed to him; for in those causes ... he is ... without his mind, or discretion”}
In 1676 the famous Scots jurist, Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, surveyed 
Scotland’s legal literature, compared it to neighbouring European and English 
codes, and asserted glumly, “The Laws of other Nations are oppressed, but ours is 
starved”.^  When Mackenzie wrote, the legal systems in England and the Low 
Countries certainly possessed a lai’ger corpus of legal theory and commentary than 
the Scottish tradition.® Scotland’s legal scholarship expanded so that, after the 
1660s, both Scottish and English lawyers could draw upon a variety of written 
works concerning their civil and criminal laws. At the very heart of “Matters 
Criminal” lay the febrile subject of criminal responsibility, or who could be tried, 
punished and held responsible for criminal transgressions, and who could not.'* 
What concern us here are the roots, evolutions and continuities of English and 
Scottish conceptions of criminal responsibility between the late seventeenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. The theoretical premises, values and principles that 
underpinned English and Scottish criminal defences of insanity and idiocy are
' Anon. Grounds and Rudiments o f  law and equity, alphabetically digested: containing a collection 
o f rules and maxims... (1749) p .l3 .
 ^Mackenzie Pleadings in some remarkable Cases, Before the supreme Courts o f  Scotland. Since the 
Year. 1661. To which, the Decisions are subiovn’d. (Edinburgh, 1672), p. A l.
 ^Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.35-46 and 119-142. Gordon “Roman Law” pp.135-136.
Mackenzie The Laws and Customs o f  Scotland in Matters Criminal. Wherein is to be seen how the 
Civil Law and Customs o f  other Nations do agree with, and supply om s (Edinburgh. 1678).
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compared.
This chapter focuses upon legal commentaries and philosophies, rather than the 
statutory laws and practicalities of proof, although these affected British hearings in 
important ways and are discussed elsewhere. The souices of contemporary legal 
philosophy are considered firstly, including the emergence of printed texts and how 
works might be altered by successive editors with legal training. Jurists (legal 
professionals who produced legal texts) provided detailed accounts of when and 
why a prisoner’s mental incompetence might affect criminal cases. They explained 
how insanity and idiocy could postpone trial or sentence, as well as remove the 
criminal’s responsibility for their transgression. Additionally, such texts reflect 
perceptions of mental afflictions within Britain’s legal ftameworks. England and 
Scotland possessed pervasive legal cultures which influenced wider society. Legal 
conceptions of insanity and idiocy could therefore both reflect and inform “lay” and 
“medical” understandings of the mentally afflicted.
Jurists from both traditions categorised and segregated non compotes; it is 
explained how insanity and idiocy were differentiated. Research has demonstrated 
that the English and Scottish legal traditions were evolving processes, rather than 
static entities.® This chapter considers the significant changes in legal theory which 
occuired during the long eighteenth century. Perceptions of insanity and idiocy 
altered, whilst different jurists might offer alternative understandings of mental 
afflictions in relation to criminal accountability. Understandings of “partial”
Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.35-27 and 119-142.
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insanity, such as delusion and monomania, are also explicated.
Both English and Scottish jurists paid heed to what might be termed the 
“Natural Law”, or common principles which governed the conduct and activity of 
human beings.® But the criminal laws of Scotland and England obtained to 
independent influences and theoretical principles. Scots law was imbued strongly 
with “Civilian” or “Roman” law traditions and practices which prevailed in 
contemporary Europe.^ “Roman” law was a term used to describe the legal codes 
which were employed within the defunct Roman Empire, or at least the texts which 
originated in that era. Continental “Civilian” laws were based upon and evolved 
from the “Roman” codes.* Many Scots lawyers completed their legal education on 
the Continent, typically in Holland, before the late eighteenth century and imported 
European theories and practices back to Scotland.^ Although Scottish precedents 
were sought out and applied by Scots jurists, they recognised that “Romano- 
Civilian” traditions could supply suitable principles and precedents.
English lawyers, by contrast, preferred to perceive that their legal code owed 
less to Civilian and Roman influences.*® The sovereignty of the “Common Law” 
was associated intimately with English legal (and broader) identities. Recent 
research has suggested that the “Common” and “Civilian” codes could influence 
one-another, but English lawyers were more comfortable in assuming that the
“ Cairns “Civil Law Tradition” pp.201-202.
 ^Ibid  pp.191-201. Gordon “Roman Law” pp.135-136. 
® Idem.
 ^See Cairns “Importing” w.
Gordon “Roman Law” pp. 135 and 142-143.
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different traditions could adopt similai* suppositions and deductions.** Medieval 
Scotland also owned to independent “Common Law” principles, but Scottish jurors 
turned increasingly to England’s practices and principles after the Union of the 
Parliaments in 1707.*  ^ In the preface to his Commentaries (1797), the Scots jurist 
David Hume (nephew to the famous philosopher of the same name) decried the use 
of English precedent. Hume later contradicted himself by refeiring to the English 
jurist, Matthew Hale, and English cases within his formulation of criminal 
responsibility.*® English examples evidently impressed upon Scottish theorists, but 
Scots Law maintained to some conceptions of criminal responsibility which were 
alien to English “Common Law”. Whilst English jurists preferred not to cite any 
European authors or concepts, Scottish lawyers and Scots law could still influence 
English precedent and practice. Thomas Erskine’s famous defence of James 
Hadfield, in 1800, will be scrutinized in this respect.
11 Idem.
Sellar “Scottish Common Law” pp. 150-151.
Hume, Commentaries on the Law o f  Scotland, respecting the description and punishment o f  
Crimes. (Edinburgh, 1797) I pp.30-31.
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Sources
Historians have drawn upon legal tracts, collated and composed by experienced 
legal professionals, to elucidate the English and Scottish principles of criminal 
responsibility. At the heart of this corpus of legal materials stood the legal treatise, 
which offered commentary upon the key principles, case-histories and statutory 
laws that framed civil and criminal law. Thus, Scottish works such as George 
Mackenzie’s Matters Criminal (Edinburgh, 1674) and John Erskine’s An Institute 
of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1773), can be compared.*'* In an English 
context, Matthew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1736) and William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Law of England (1765-9) proffer important developments and 
continuities regarding mental instability and criminal accountability in the context 
of English “Common Law”.*®
Besides broad treatises, other kinds of legal documents were produced between 
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Some dissertations focused upon inter­
related legal themes, such as John Brydall’s Non Compos Mentis (1700), which 
considered the process of evaluating a person’s mental state at law.*® Commentaries 
upon the statutory laws were also produced, such as the anonymous Readings on
Mackenzie Matters Criminal (Edinbui-gh, 1674). Erskine, An Institute o f the Law o f  Scotland. In 
Four Books. In the Order o f  Sir George Mackenzie’s Institutions o f  that Law. (Edinburgh. 1773).
Hale, A Histoiv o f  the Pleas o f  the Crown. (1736). Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Law o f  England. (1765-1769).
Brydall, Non Compos Mentis: or. the law relating to natural fools. Mad-Foiks. and Lunatick 
Persons. (1700).
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the Statute Law (1723-1725),*^ whilst legal dictionaiies provided succinct 
definitions of legal terminologies.** Reports of important “Decisions” and case- 
studies were produced in both counties throughout this period.*^ Practical 
handbooks, in the mould of Michael Dalton’s famous text, The Countrev Justice 
(1618), also illuminated legal issues of criminal responsibility.^® Dalton’s 
authoritative definitions of insanity, idiocy and criminal accountability were .cited 
by Hale and Blackstone.
Typically, legal works were circulated in manuscript form before the late 
seventeenth century in Britain. They were designed for and restricted to an audience 
of legal professionals. Some British legal texts were printed and published in the 
sixteenth century, particularly practical handbooks such as Fitzherbert’s L’Office et 
Auctoritée de Justices de Peace (1514).^* Printed texts flourished from the late 
seventeenth century as legal works were collated and written with the express 
intention of publication. The production of published works could enhance the 
lawyer’s occupational prospects. Both Blackstone and Hume had intended their
Anon. (Gentleman o f the Middle Temple), Readings on the Statutory Law. Alphabetically 
digested wherein the most Obscure and Difficult Points are Clear’d up and Illustrated by Resolutions 
and adjudg’d Cases, Taken from the Best Authorities Extant. 5 yols. (1723-1725). See also Jacob 
The Statute-Law Common-Placed. Or a Second General Table to the Statutes (1719). For Scotland, 
see Steuart o f  Goodtrees, Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions in the Law o f  Scotland. Resolved and 
Answered. (Edinburgh. 1715).
For English dictionaries, see for instance Cowell The Interpreter or Booke containing the 
Signification o f  Words ... (Cambridge, 1607) and Jacob A New  Law Dictionary containing the 
Interpretations and Definition o f  Words and Terms used by the Law ... (1729). For Scotland, Bell A  
Dictionary o f  the Laws o f  Scotland intended for the use o f  the public at large, as well as o f the 
profession (Edinburgh 1807 and 1826).
See, for mstance, Dahymple o f  Stair The Decisions o f  the Lords o f  Council and Session, in the 
most important cases debated before them: from July 1671 to July 1681 (Edinburgh. 1687).
Dalton The Countrey Justice: containing the Practice o f  the Justices o f  the Peace, as well as out o f  
their Sessions, etc. (1618). See also Bums The Justice o f  the Peace and the Parish Officer and (in a 
Scottish context) Tait A  Summary o f  the Powers and Duties o f  a Justice ofthe Peace in Scotland ... 
(Edinburgh, 1815).
Fitzherbert L’Office et Auctoritée de Justices de Peace (1514). Originally published in (legal) 
French, this text was later reproduced in vernacular English (1538).
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legal Commentaries to be published, for instance, and were promoted subsequently 
to the bench/^ Authors could also benefit materially from their literary enterprises.
English texts were routinely printed in the vernacular by the eighteenth century, 
rather than “legal” Latin or French.*^ ® Legal French had been dispensed in England 
before the late seventeenth century. The publication of books in English reflected 
broader developments within England’s legal proceedings and fi'ameworks, 
whereby the vernacular supplanted Latin. England’s official Assize Minutes ceased 
to be recorded in shoithand Latin after 1733. Vernacular publications also had 
greater prospective markets. The advertisement to the thirteenth edition of 
Blackstone’s famous treatise, published in 1800, assumed boldly that, “The 
Commentaries on the Law of England form an essential part of every Gentleman’s 
Library”.^ '* Literacy levels varied by region, class and occupation in Britain, yet it 
seems likely that legal texts reached a broader audience by the early nineteenth 
century than had been the case two-hundred years earlier.^® Legal knowledge could 
also be disseminated orally to men and women outside of society’s elites.^® Legal 
expositions of insanity, idiocy and criminal responsibility were propagated beyond 
the English and Scottish legal professions.
^  Blackstone Commentaries (first published in four volumes between 1765 and 1769). Hume 
Commentaries (1797), see also Hume’s Trial for Crimes (1800).
Scottish texts were routinely published in Scots from the late-seventeenth centuiy onwards, 
although jurists from both ti aditions were adroit at weaving natty Latin quotations into their texts. 
Blackstone Commentaries (1800).
R.A. Houston Literacv and Education in Earlv Modern Europe. 1500-1800 (2"“ ed. 2001) passim. 
W. Prest “Lay legal knowledge in Early Modern England”, in J.A. Bush and A. Wijffels (eds.), 
Learning the Law. Teaching and the Transmission o f  Law in England. 1150-1900. (1999), p. 12.
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Copied manuscripts and printed versions of juristic works could reflect multiple 
authorial voices, rather than the articulations of the original composer. Juristic 
works were grand compilations of the legal interpretations of antecedent jurists as 
well as collections of pertinent statutes, rulings and case-studies. With the greater 
advent of printed texts, nonpareil legal commentaries could go through many 
editions and thereby evolve. The author might edit new versions of his original text. 
William Blackstone amended eight different versions of his instructive 
Commentaries between 1765 and his death in 1780, for instance.^^ Further editions 
could also be published after the composer’s death, edited by legal professionals 
who could amend and update the work at will. The lawyer Edward Christian noted 
that nineteenth century editions of Blackstone’s Commentaries bore a very 
“different character” to the original work.^^ Of cour se, as editor of the sixteenth 
(1811) edition of Blackstone, Christian’s criticisms may have been designed to 
increase the market value of his version of the famous tome. Such “textual 
evolutions” indicate how laws and principles changed, but they also reflected the 
editor’s interests and concerns. Some editions of legal texts were vilified for 
misconceiving legal principles. In 1716, for instance, the lawyer and editor Jacob 
Giles lambasted the precursant version of Hale’s Pleas of the Crown: In Two Parts 
because it was “very faulty and corrupt throughout”.
Blackstone (ed. Christian) Commentaries (16“’ ed. 1811) preface.
Idem.
Hale (ed. Jacob) Pleas o f  the Crown: In Two Parts. Or a Methodological Summary... (1716), 
preface.
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The principles presented within these texts could be challenged, rather than 
blindly accepted. The written word was not necessarily regarded as being the most 
commanding form of communication during the long eighteenth centur y. A vibrant 
oral culture persisted amongst Britain’s legal professionals.^^ Establishments such 
England’s Inns of Court and Scotland’s Faculty of Advocates provided forums for 
formal and informal legal discussion.^* Printed textbooks could provide points of 
reference for legal students, but the lecture theatre remained a prominent source of 
information and inspiration.^^ Juristic works can present a false sense of certainty, 
or at least inflexibility, to historians studying contemporary legal principles. 
Nevertheless, these jurists were cited in court and their (edited) works can offer 
important observations concerning the nature of the criminal law in England and 
Scotland between 1660 and 1829. These juristic works explain why and how 
mentally troubled persons could be exempted from trial and punishment. It is to 
these issues which we shall turn next.
For a discussion o f  the viva voce aspects o f  examinations for entry into Scotland’s Faculty o f  
Advocates, see J.W. Cairns, “Advocates Hats, Roman Law and Admission to the Scots Bar, 1580- 
1812”, JLH. 2 0 ,2  (1999). Ibid, “Affenus Varus and the Faculty o f Advocates: Roman Visions and 
the Manners that were Fit for Admission to the Bar in the Eighteenth Centuiy”, lus Commune. 
Zeitschrift flir Europdische Rechtseeshichte 28 (2001).
J.H. Baker An Introduction to English Legal Historv (1990, 3‘“ ed.) p.595. Murdoch “Advocates’ 
Cairns “Affenus Varus”.
For a printed source o f  this type, see Paton (ed.) “Baron David Hume’s Lectures, 1786-1822”, 
Stair Society 6 vols. (1939-1957).
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British defences o f insanity and idiocy
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the principal English jurists 
maintained that mad and idiotic prisoners could be punished for minor offences, 
such as misdemeanours, trespasses and “civil” injuries, which carried sentences like 
pillorying, fining and whipping.^^ Brydall’s Non Compos Mentis (1700) explained 
that this was because, in crimes which were considered to be “of an inférieur 
Nature”, England’s “law doth rather consider the Damage of the Party wronged 
than the Malice of him that was the Wrongdoer”.^ "* According to Brydall and his 
contemporaries, insanity and idiocy was only an acceptable defence for serious 
transgressions which carried statutory sentences of death.^^ England’s “Bloody 
Code” of capital offences rose from about fifty at the turn of the eighteenth century 
to around two hundred individual transgressions at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.^^ Defences of insanity and idiocy could therefore be admitted in response 
to a broader range of crimes as the long eighteenth century progressed. There is also 
evidence to suggest that later jurists conceived that the insane and idiotic could not 
be held responsible for any criminal transgression, no matter how slight. In 1767, 
Blackstone referred generally to “criminal cases” when describing how the 
“deficiency of will excuses from guilt”.^  ^ This theory reflected practice at the 
Northern Assizes where criminals indicted of misdemeanours were found to be
”  Brydall Non Compos Mentis (1700) p. 107 
^  Idem. Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.44-45.
Walker Crime and Insanity I p.44. Walker cites Hale and Coke in this instance. 
Eigen Witnessing p p . 15-17.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.24.
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insane and thereby exempted from punishment.^^ In practice, the rule regarding 
“capitals” was relaxed in northern England by the mid eighteenth century.
Scottish jurists also considered that defences of fatuity and furiosity were most 
appropriate to capital offences, even in the eaiiy nineteenth centuiy.^^ There was 
also an increase in the individual crimes which earned the death penalty in 
Scotland, although fewer capital offences existed in Scotland than in contemporary 
England."*** The Scottish jurists Mackenzie and Hume conceived that defences of 
furiosity were most readily acceptable for violent inter-personal crimes, like 
murder, which carried sentence of death. Hume suggested that, “the defence of 
madness is less suspected, and will more easily be received, against a charge of 
murder, mutilation, or other violent crime, than of those offences, like theft or 
forgery, which can hardly be executed without art and steadiness of purpose”. 
Likewise, in his capacities as a public prosecutor, Mackenzie challenged the notion 
Üiat a prisoner might enter a defence of madness in response to a charge of arson, 
but fail to do so for a charge of murder."** Similar sentiments appeared in some 
English texts, too, especially before the mid eighteenth century. In 1742, an editor 
of Dalton’s Countrev Justice chose to insert that, in “Cases of Homicide”, persons 
“wanting Discretion” were exculpated because “such Things happen by an 
invohmtary Ignorance” on the part of the actor ."*^ The intent of the actor was central
See the trial o f  Edward Sinton, Yorkshire March 1761 (ASSl 41/3 and 42/7).
See, for instance, Hume Commentaries (Edinburgh, 1799, 1819 and 1829 editions) and Hume’s 
supplementary Commentaries respecting Trial For Crimes (Edinburgh. 1800 and 1814).
Crowther “Criminal record” p.83.
See the trial o f James Douglas, at the High Court in Edinburgh in 1686, for the offences o f  murder 
and arson, JC 2/16.
(Dalton) Countrey Justice (1742) p.334.
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to British conceptions of criminal responsibility. These particular' British jurists 
suggested that a lack of intent was more likely to be found in persons who 
committed violent or passionate crimes. Subsequent chapters investigate whether 
provincial defences of insanity and idiocy were predominantly entered in response 
to violent crimes, particularly mur der.
Whilst some lawyers deemed that defences of insanity and idiocy were 
restricted to certain types of crime, jrrristic works also provided broader theories 
regarding criminal responsibility. English and Scottish theory acknowledged 
mutually that mentally incompetent persons lacked responsibility for their actions 
and therefore should not be punished. William Blackstone’s Commentaries stated 
that, “In criminal cases ... idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, 
if committed when under these capacities: no, not even for treason itself’."*^ The 
same principle was established in Scots Law, where Mackenzie directed that “... 
the Law protects furious [and fatuous] Persons from Punishment, because they want 
all Judgement”."*"* David Hume noted an atypical High Court ruling from 1704, 
where an insane prisoner called James Sommerville was acquitted of the crime of 
murder and received no corporeal punishment, but was ordered to pay an 
“assythement” (fine) to the family of the deceased in material compensation."*  ^
Sommei'ville’s fine was not approved of as a sound precedent, but it does indicate
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.24.
Mackenzie Matters Criminal (Edinburgh, 1678) 11 VIII p .l5  and Erskine Institute (Edinburgh, 
1773) I p.4 and IV pp.753-754.
Hume Commentaries (Edinburgh, 1797) I pp.30-36. Court records: JC 3/1 July through to 
December 1704; JC3/2 for Sommerville’s subsequent petitions for release from the Correction 
House in Edinburgh, upon returning to his senses.
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that contemporary juristic principles could be ignored or modified in practice.
British jurists also explained the grounds for their conceptions of criminal 
responsibility. In both England and Scotland, a crime could only be committed if a 
malicious intent to transgiess was present in the offender."*  ^ Dalton’s declaration 
that “no felony or murder can be committed without a felonious intent and purpose” 
echoed British jurists who both proceeded and preceded him."*^  The notion that guilt 
was associated not only with the commission of a crime, but also the will to do 
harm, can be found in Henri de Bracton’s thirteenth century work. De legibus et 
consuetudinibus Angliae. and has been traced back to the sixth century A.D. in 
Justinian’s Digest."*^ In Scotland, felonious intent was also known by a Latin 
derivative, “<io/e”. As the Scots jurist John Erskine declared during the 1770s, there 
was “no proper crime without the ingredient of dole, i.e. without the wilful intention 
in the actor to commit it”."*^ The will or capability to intend and inflict harm was 
common to British theories of criminal responsibility and this same paradigm 
surfaced in practice at court, too.^ **
Nigel Walker has suggested that Michael Dalton’s Countrev Justice (1618) was 
the first English legal text to equate “the will or mind to do harm” with a test of the
Hale Pleas I p.27, Blackstone Commentaries (1765-9) IV pp.21-25 and Erskine Institute (1773) IV 
p.752. Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.39-47 and p. 138-142. Smith Trial bv Medicine p.72. Eigen 
Witnessing pp.31-57. Houston Madness pp.72-90.
Dalton Countiev Justice (1618), p.215. This definition remained unchanged tlnough several 
editions to 1742.
Eigen Witnessing p.35. Justinian, The Digest o f  Roman law: theft, rapine, damage and insult. 
tiansl. C.F. Kolbeit, (1979).
Erskine Institute (1773) p.752.
Eigen Witnessing pp.31-35.
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prisoner’s “knowledge of good and evill”.^ * A person’s failure to comprehend that 
an activity was morally wrong indicated a disturbed or deficient mental condition. 
Such a test of morality was also used in Scotland, and persisted throughout the long 
eighteenth century in both countries.^^ Hume referred to the “knowledge of good 
and evil, [or] right and wrong” in his Commentaries, for example, although he 
qualified these statements by indicating how to approach such a “delicate question” 
in court .Even in the 1820s, both English and Scottish judges continued to suggest 
that the inability to distinguish between “right and wrong” could be indicative of 
mental disturbance in a prisoner.
Insanity and idiocy were most regularly entered in exculpation of punishment 
and to excuse criminal actions in both countries. Also, hearings were postponed if 
prisoners were mentally incompetent and unfit to plead at court. We may turn once 
again to Blackstone, who clarified that, “if a man in his sound memory commits a 
capital offence, and before arraignment, he becomes mad, he ought not to be 
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution 
that he ought”. The same dogma applied to Scottish hearings, where the prisoner 
might enter a defence of furiosity or fatuity “in-bar-of-trial” (postponement of the 
hearing).^"* Additionally, judgement could not be pronounced upon British prisoners 
who lost their senses “after [being] tried and found guilty”. It was also accepted that 
“if, after judgement [the prisoner] becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be
Dalton Countrev Justice (1618), p .215. Cited by Walker Crime and Insanity I p .41. 
Hume Commentaries I pp.23-24.
Idem
Erskine Institute (Edinburgh, 1773) IV p.786.
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stayed; peradventure, says the humanity of English Law, had the prisoner been of 
sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgement or 
execution”.T h e s e  citations are drawn from Blackstone, but they applied equally 
to Scots law.
In both England and Scotland, therefore, trial and sentencing could be 
suspended owing to the prisoner’s insanity or idiocy. These prisoners might have 
been sane at the time of committing offences and were therefore responsible for 
their actions. Prisoners could return to their senses after their trial was postponed 
and be tried, found guilty and punished ftilly for their offences.Where  the 
prisoner was mentally unsound at court, it was not the defendant’s responsibility for 
the crime which was investigated. Instead, it was understood that troubling mental 
conditions robbed the prisoner of tlie ability to engage rationally with legal 
proceedings or organise their defence properly. As John Erskine affirmed in a 
Scottish context, prisoners who were mad or imbecilic “cannot possibly defend 
[themselves] in a criminal trial, or even answer with judgement to that first question 
which is put to all pannels [prisoners]. Whether guilty, or not guilty?^\^^ The same 
rationale explained why insane and idiotic persons could not be sentenced. As 
Erskine continued, “one who is either void of reason, or does not enjoy the use of it, 
is incapable of correction, which is one of the great purposes of punishment”.^ ^
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV pp.24-25.
James Rice was found insane and unfit to plead at four separate Assizes before being found guilty 
o f  murder in July 1777 and being hung later that year. A S S I41/7, 22/9 and 24/32/2, Trials ... (July 
1776, March 1777 and July 1777). Knipe Criminal Chronology p.90, York Courant. March 26“’, July 
20“’ and 30“’ 1776, July 22”“ 1777.
Erskine Institute (Edinburgh, 1773) IV p.786.
Idem. Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV pp.24-25.
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Mentally troubled or incompetent persons were not alone in lacking the ability 
to employ reason correctly. British jurists recognised that infants could lack 
rationality, intent and culpability and therefore classed children alongside the 
mentally debilitated. As Robert Houston has argued, this does not mean that the 
mentally incapacitated were universally regarded as children by the law, or that 
these two “categories” of person were treated in identical ways within the legal 
processes.The study of criminal responsibility and mental affliction benefits from 
an examination of contemporary theoretical understandings of the mental capacities 
of children. In Britain, the minimum age of criminal responsibility was typically 
presented as being seven years old, an age which was associated with the passing of 
“infancy”.**** No intent could be present in infants because “where there is no 
discernment, there is no choice; and where there is no choice, there can be no act of 
the will”.^ * Persons who were afflicted by mental troubles were therefore deemed to 
own similar mental abilities to children, at least in legal terms. It was considered 
that the mental abilities of “natural” idiots had never developed beyond those of an 
infant, for instance.
British legal commentators also recognised that the mental faculties of persons 
above the age of infancy might not have fully matured, thereby rendering them both
Houston Madness p.37.
Eigen Witnessing p.36. Dalton Countrev Justice (1618) placed the upper limit o f  infancy at nine- 
years-old. P. Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull, Murdering Mothers: Infanticide in England and N ew  England 
1558-1803. (1981) p.xiii note that the age o f  infancy could be considered to extend to those o f  eight- 
years-old in Tudor England.
Blackstone Commentaries (1765-9) IV p.21. For Scotland, see Mackenzie Matters Criminal 
(1678) p .l3 . Hume Commentaries (1797) I p.46.
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incapable of entering into a legally binding contract and unaccountable for their 
criminal activity. It was suggested that an “age of discretion” existed amongst 
humans, when it might be assumed that a person of sound mind was perfectly 
capable of acting with intent, discernment and malice.^^ Jurists could disagree as to 
the precise “age of discretion”, but by the late eighteenth century it was typically set 
at fourteen for males and twelve for females.**  ^ Puberty, with the onset of physical 
and mental maturity, was closely related to this “age of discretion”. In Scotland, 
such a period between infancy and early adulthood was termed “pupilarity”.^ "* Thus 
wrote John Erskine, “Idiots and furious persons must be as incapable as pupils of 
committing crimes, since a malicious intention cannot be charged against either of 
them”.**^
Yet the prisoner’s precise age was less important to the assessment of criminal 
responsibility than might be expected. This was because criminal responsibility 
(and legal accountability or legitimacy in the civil laws) was not only concerned 
with a specific age, but involved a subjective appraisal of the “strength of the 
delinquent’s understanding and judgement”.^  ^ Jurists maintained that persons 
between the ages of eight and fourteen could be responsible for their transgressions, 
but only if it were proven that they understood the (immoral and illegal) nature of 
their actions. Persons under the age of fourteen were punishable if "capaces doli ”,
“  Eigen Witnessing p.36.
“  Idem. Houston Madness p.57.
^  Houston Madness p.57.
Erskine Institute (1773) II p.753. 
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.23.
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or the aptitude to form intent, were proven.^^ Those “within the Age of Discretion” 
were not responsible for crimes unless “by Circumstances, it appeareth [they] could 
distinguish between Good and Evil ... as if [they] hide the Dead, make Excuses, 
^ c ” 68 was a flexible concept of criminal accountability which recognised that 
there was no universal rate of physical or mental development amongst humans. It 
was the function of the judge and jury to decide whether an individual of such 
tender years had the capacity for criminal intent, just as the court decided whether 
adult prisoners were divested of the facilities to reason, control the will and intend 
their actions.
Britain’s legal theorists differentiated between those who were mentally 
immature and incapable of forming intent and those whose mental faculties had 
developed, who could form intent and were therefore accountable for their crimes. 
In practice, as Peter King has suggested, a period of “youth” was perceived to 
extend between the “age of discretion” and a person’s mid-twenties.**  ^ In both 
countries, youthful prisoners benefited fi'om mitigated sentences because it was 
perceived that they had not yet learned to control their will. As we shall see, such 
mental immaturity was not used regularly to earn complete exculpation at court, but 
was instead argued as a just cause for post-trial alleviation of punishment.^**
Alongside infants, those below the “age of discretion” and mentally disturbed
Erskine Institute (1773) IV p.753.
Hale (ed. Jacob) Pleas o f  the Crown (1716) I pp.43-44. 
King “Juvenile” p .l21 .
See pp.328-355.
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persons, British jurists presented a further category of non-compote: “he who hath 
by his own vicious act deprived himself of his memory for a time, such as a 
drunkard”/* A state of alcoholic intoxication was understood to affect a person’s 
capacity to act rationally, but English jurists argued that such “artificial, voluntarily 
contracted madness, by drunkeimess or intoxication” did not afford a sound 
criminal defence and did not remove the prisoner’s criminal responsibility/^ 
Drunkenness was a statutory offence in England which was liable to exacerbate, 
rather than alleviate, crimes/^ Prisoners who had chosen to imbibe were presumed 
to understand the consequences of their actions. They were therefore responsible for 
any offences committed whilst drunk. The voluntary nature of intoxication set itself 
apart from the involuntary affliction of insanity. Yet where severe addiction to 
alcohol alienated a person’s will (even making the act of intoxication involuntary), 
this could be regarded as a complete form of insanity and argued as a sound 
criminal defence. "^* Defences of insanity which stemmed from repetitive 
consumption of strong alcoholic beverages were entered in provincial England and 
Scotland.^^
The late seventeenth century Scots jmist. Sir George Mackenzie, held a 
somewhat conflicting view to contemporaiy English legal theorists. Mackenzie 
advocated a mitigation of punishment for persons who were drunk and lacked
Dalton Countrev Justice (1618) p.215.
Blackstone Commentaries (1764-9) IV pp.25-26.
4 Jac I c5. See also Blackstone Commentaries (1764-1769) IV p.26.
D, McCord, “The English and American Histoiy o f  Voluntary Intoxication to Negate M em  Rea”, 
JLH, 11 (1990).
James Towers, Westmoreland 1822 (ASSI 41/13). Agnes Bailie, Jedburgh 1808 (JC 12/26)
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""dole, and Malice ... especially if they were cheated, upon Design, into that 
condition by others”/^ He distinguished between the ""ebriosis” who was habitually 
drunk and thus “should be most severely punisht, both for their Drunkemiess, and 
for the Crimes occasioned by it” and those who were rarely soP  Mackenzie related 
this principle to that of “diminished responsibility” which is examined shortly/^ 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists, such as Erskine and Hume, challenged 
directly Mackenzie’s application of diminished responsibility to these intoxicated 
prisoners. Hume argued that Mackenzie had cited an inappropriate example from 
Roman Law, which applied only to drunken soldiers who harmed themselves and 
was not relevant as a general principle.H um e further claimed that Scottish custom 
utterly disowned the distinction between “habitual” and “accidental” dmnkenness.^** 
To Mackenzie’s successors, intoxication was neither a sound criminal defence in 
exculpation of crime nor a cause for mitigation of sentence, for precisely the same 
reasons presented by their English counterparts.
Imbecilic and mad prisoners must be viewed in the context of the broader 
conceptions of criminal responsibility. Guilt was based upon a moral awareness of 
the wrongfulness of illegal activities and because this was connected to the 
“strength of the delinquent’s understanding and judgement”, it followed that 
mentally debilitated persons could not be guilty of crimes.^* Idiots and the insane
Mackenzie Matters Criminal (1678), I, I, VII, p. 15. 
Idem.
^  See pp.55-63.
Hume Commentaries (1797) I pp.37-38. 
®°/6/4p.39.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.23.
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were persons of at least the age of discretion, but who were as incapable of forming 
intent as an infant, or a person who was unable to appreciate the difference between 
a morally good and evil act. We shall next turn our attentions to precisely how 
idiocy and insanity was perceived by British theorists, as well as how these 
afflictions were understood to affect a person and remove their criminal 
responsibility.
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O f persons "‘Non Compos Mentis insanity and idiocy compared
British jurists considered that insane and idiotic persons lacked the capacity to 
form intent, but legal theorists also held that madness and imbecility were 
distinctive. This section investigates how and why legal commentators 
differentiated between these persons non compos mentis in England and Scotland. 
Juristic approaches to the difficult concept of a “partially” debilitating form of 
mental affliction, which did not fully or permanently remove a person’s reason, are 
also explicated.
Citing Coke, Michael Dalton’s Countrev Justice provided three separate 
categories of “persons accompted non compos mentis’\  which were adhered to 
broadly in both England and Scotland during the long eighteenth century.^^ Firstly, 
Dalton introduced the idiot, or “foole naturall, who is so (a nativitate) from his 
birth; and in such a one there is no hope of recoverie”. The next two categories both 
concerned persons who suffered from forms of insanity. Dalton stated that a mad 
person was “once of good and sound memorie and after (by sicknes, hurt or other 
accident, or Visitation of God) loseth his memorie”. Dalton related such persons to 
“lunatics”, or persons who were “sometimes ... of good understanding and 
memorie, and sometimes non compos mentis”. British conceptions of insanity, or 
the loss of the reasoning faculties and memory, are here considered firstly.
Dalton Countrev Justice (1618) p.215.
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Insanity
English jurists employed the term “insanity” to denote a broad spectrum of 
mental afflictions which robbed adults of their aptitude to form criminal intent. The 
insane were therefore persons who were older than infants, whose ability to reason 
had matured, but whose mental capabilities were debilitated by the onset of 
“sicknes, huit or other accident, or Visitation of God”.^  ^ Appropriately, 
commentators utilised a variety of idioms (such as madness, lunacy and 
melancholy) to describe the kaleidoscopic combination of symptoms and afflictions 
which rested under the broad umbrella of “insanity”. The meaning of these words 
could alter over time. The word “melancholy” could be used to describe the global 
species of madness durmg the late seventeenth century. By the late eighteenth 
century, however, “melancholy” was most commonly ascribed to persons who 
suffered from severe depression of spirits, despair or “lowness of the mind”. 
Retrospective diagnoses ought to be undertaken cautiously, but late eighteenth 
century melancholy was similar to modern clinical depression.^"*
Scots Law also recognised the existence of mental conditions which obstructed 
“the application o f ... reason to the ordinary purposes of life”, thereby depriving the 
afflicted adult of his or her abilities to control the will.^  ^ Such afflictions were 
known collectively as “furiosity” within the Scottish legal tradition, although the 
term “insanity” was also understood in Scotland and carried the same general
Dalton Countrev Justice (1618) p.215. 
Porter Mind Forg’d Manacles p.ix. 
Erskine Institute (1773) IV p. 149.
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meaning as in England. “Furiosity” was used to describe insane persons who 
displayed manic, frenzied behaviour' as well as those who were “low-spirited” or 
melancholic.^^
Both the English and the Scottish legal traditions held that the “insane” could 
suffer from totally debilitating mental conditions which stripped them permanently 
of their reasoning faculties.D raw ing inspiration from Dalton, the anonymous 
author of the Grounds and Rudiments (1747) opined that some insane persons had 
“wholly [lost their] memory and imderstanding”.^  ^ Hale described such afflictions 
as “perfect” and “total” insanity.Likewise, the Scots jurist Mackenzie presented a 
form of “absolute furiosity” whereby the sufferer was afflicted permanently.^** Such 
enduring forms of insanity formed sound criminal defences in Britain because the 
actor was incapable of forming criminal intent. Only those who were absolutely 
devoid of reason, will and understanding were exempted from trial, sentencing or 
punishment for their transgressions. Leaning heavily upon Hale, David Hume 
reflected both Scottish and English legal theory when he affirmed that, “To serve 
the purpose, therefore, of an excuse in law, the disorder must amount to absolute 
alienation of reason ... which deprives the patient of the knowledge of the true 
position of things about him, and of the discernment of friend from foe”.*** Those
Hume Commentaries (1779) I pp.31-33. Houston “Class, Gender” p.46 suggests that melancholy 
and fatuity could carry similar interpretations at law. Future research may discover that mental 
distractions were classed by the predominant mood o f  the afflicted (Houston p.c.).
^  Walker Crime and Insanity 1 pp.36-39. Houston Madness p.74.
Anon Grounds and mdiments (1749) p.247.
Hale Pleas (1736) p.30.
^  Mackenzie Matters Criminal (1678) p. 15. Walker Crime and Insanity I p. 139. Houston Madness 
p.74.
Hume Commentaries (1797) p.23.
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who suffered from a total loss of rationality and sanity on a permanent basis were 
exempted from the rigours of England and Scotland’s criminal codes. They were 
not responsible for their criminal actions, nor were they capable of being tried or 
receiving sentence.
Insanity as a transient condition
“A total permanent want of reason”^^  acquitted defendants, but the insanity 
defences at the English and Scottish superior courts rarely involved persons who 
were devoid perpetually of reason.**^  As David Hume stated, “it is not material that 
[insanity] be total in respect of time” to serve as a sound criminal defence.**"* In both 
traditions, insanity could be a transient condition, whereby the afflicted suffered 
from periodical bouts of irrationality, but also enjoyed lengthy spells of rational 
lucidity. Blackstone’s Commentaries conceived that sufferers from mental 
afflictions might return to their senses.**^  Likewise, Scotland’s “furious” could 
benefit from lucid spells, wherein they were “frequently known to reason with 
acuteness”.^  ^ Fits of insanity might be repeated at regular intervals, but not 
necessarily so.
Hume Commentaries (1797) p.41. 
Eigen Witnessing p,38.
94 Hume Commentaries (1797) p.27.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV pp.24-25. 
Erskine Institute (1773) I pp. 149.
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Matthew Haie associated this species of impermanent insanity with the 
fluctuating periods of distraction and lucidity which epitomised tlie plight of the 
“lunatic”/^ The term “lunacy” was employed in both Scotland and England 
between 1660 and 1829. Erskine’s Institute clarified that, “Lunatics are those who 
are seized with periodical fits of frenzy”.^  ^ Seventeenth and eighteenth century 
jurists persisted to associate the onset of insanity amongst these lunatics with the 
lunar cycle. Mackenzie wrote that furiosity could be experienced in “tides, and 
Waxes and Wanes, like the Moon upon which it depends,” whilst almost one- 
hundred years later, Blackstone claimed that insanity could depend “upon the 
change in the moon”.^  ^ As late as 1800, a character witness claimed that Thomas 
Hadfield’s madness was linked to the lunar calendar.***** In 1829, the comments of 
Archer Hyland, the editor of the eighteenth edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries. 
indicate that such beliefs were treated less seriously by the late-1820s. Hyland 
lambasted Blackstone’s connection of the moon to insanity, claiming that such 
opinion was “doubted or denied by the best practical writers upon mental 
disorders”.**** Impermanent forms of insanity continued to be understood as 
“lunacy”, although some lawyers ceased to associate such madness with lunar 
cycles.
British lunatics (or sufferers from transitory forms of insanity and furiosity)
Eigen Witnessing p.37.
^  Erskine Institute (1773) I p.I49.
^  Blackstone Commentaries (1769) I p.303.
Edinburgh Evening Courant June 30‘“ 1800. This testimony was produced by Hadfield’s sister-in- 
law. Although Hadfield was found to be insane, the evidence connected to lunar cycles was not 
necessarily accepted as good proof o f  insanity at this ti ial.
Blackstone Commentaries (18“’ ed. 1829) I p.303.
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were not deemed to be responsible for any offence which they committed whilst 
non compos mentis. Just like sufferers of permanent forms of mental distraction, the 
criminal responsibility of a lunatic was negated duiing a spell of insanity because 
they had completely lost the ability to act rationally or with intent. Likewise, a 
lunatic who was pronounced insane at court could not be tried. Yet, as Blackstone 
clearly argued, “if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer 
for what he does in those intei*vals, as if he has no deficiency”.***^ If it were proven 
that a lunatic had intentionally perpetrated a crime whilst in a rational state of mind, 
then this person was fully accountable for their actions. Nevertheless, an 
impermanent form of insanity, which completely removed a person’s will or intent 
whilst the affliction lasted, was accepted as a sound legal defence by both English 
and Scottish lawyers.***^
An insanity defence usually required persuasive proofs of a history of mental 
affliction to be successful in both England and Scotland. Defences of “sudden 
phi'enzy”, where the prisoner was gripped briefly by insanity, were entered and 
sustained in Britain during the long eighteenth century. Such “sudden phrenzy” 
could be received sceptically at court, especially where the mental distraction 
“quickly subsided, and never again returned”.***"* Despite such doubts, episodic 
insanity was an acceptable defence, so long as “the utter alienation of reason” was 
proved for the time when the crime was committed.***^
Blackstone Commentaries (1765-9) IV, p.25. 
Eigen Witnessing p.37.
Hume Commentaries (1797) I p.30.
Ibid  ^ 32 .
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“Partial insanity” and Scotland’s “Rule o f Proportions ”
In contrast to English theory, a partial “degree” of furiosity was recognized as 
an apposite criminal defence in mitigation of sentence within the Scottish 
courtroom. A less than absolute form of furiosity was considered to obscure 
partially the pannel’s use of reason, thus diminishing the offender’s criminal 
responsibility.***  ^ Mackenzie, who believed that madness was “but too sticking a 
Disease, and is seldom ever cured”, illustrated this, “It may be argued, that since the 
Law grants a total Impunity to such who are absolutely furious, that therefore it 
should be by the Rule of Proportions, lessen and modérât the Punishments of such, 
as though they are not absolutely mad, yet are Hypochondrick and Melancholy to 
such a Degree, that it clouds their Reason ...”.***^ Erskine’s Institute reiterated 
Mackenzie’s position, “lesser degrees of fatuity, which only darken reason, without 
totally obscuring it, afford not a total defence to the pannels, but barely save from 
the poena ordinarid\^^^ Erskine’s comments concerning punishment were 
important, because a partial degree of insanity was only accepted in mitigation of 
sentence in Scotland, as Mackenzie’s “Rule of Proportions” suggested. A lesser 
degree of furiosity could be argued legitimately in mitigation, yet only an “absolute 
furiosity” was deemed worthy of full exculpation of sentence in Scotland, just as it 
was in England.
Unlike their Scottish counterparts, the principal English jurists did not subscribe
Walker Crime and Insanity I p. 11. Houston Madness pp.55-56.
Mackenzie Matters Criminal (1678), 1 ,1, VIII, pp. 15-16. Houston Madness p.74. 
Erskine Institute (1773) IV, p.754. See also Hume Commentaries (1797) I p.27.
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to the concept of “diminished responsibility” within their models of criminal 
accountability. It has been established that transitory, but utterly debilitating, forms 
of insanity could be accepted as a sound criminal defence by English jurists. A 
partial or lesser degree of insanity was not. Lunacy could be transient, but the 
afflicted were exculpated of their crimes because they were understood to have 
completely lost the use of their reason, will and understanding whilst the period of 
insanity lasted. English legal theorists argued that lunacy had to rob prisoners of 
their reasoning faculties (and hence ability to form intent) to be an acceptable 
criminal defence. It was therefore conceivable that an English prisoner might suffer 
from mental distraction, but that the affliction did not remove their ability to reason 
or control their will.***** According to English jurists, in contrast with Scottish 
theorists, such mentally disturbed prisoners were subject to the full penalty at law.
Whilst no “Rule of Proportions” existed in England, English jurists recognised 
that partially debilitating forms of mental distraction could exist. Matthew Hale’s 
posthumously published Pleas contained a discussion of non-compotes and the 
existence of partial insanity**** Joel Eigen has suggested that this passage was the 
first expatiatory consideration of partial degrees of insanity amongst English 
jurists.*** Hale’s work presented two distinct types of “partial” insanity. One of 
these was “partial insanity” in “respect of degrees”, which afflicted “very many, 
especially melancholy persons”. Hale stated that those who suffered from a “partial 
degree” of madness were “not wholly destitute of the use of their reason; and this
Eigen Witnessing pp.35-39. 
Hale Pleas (1736) p.30. 
Eigen Witnessing p.36.
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partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of any offence”. This 
principle which Hale offered needs to be examined and compared with Scottish 
legal theory.
Hale advised that a “partial degree” of insanity could not be accepted as a sound 
legal defence because the prisoner’s ability to foim intent was not removed. Hale 
associated such forms of insanity with “melancholy persons ... who for the most 
part discover their defect in excessive fears and griefs”.**^  Such mental afflictions 
existed, but they did not remove the person’s ability to understand the wrongful 
nature of their criminal actions. Hale offered criteria to aid the “judge and jury” 
whilst they deliberated whether the prisoner was sane enough to stand trial and 
receive sentence. Relating such cases to the broader concept of criminal 
responsibility, the Pleas stated that a person could be held criminally responsible if 
they had “ordinarily as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of 14 years 
hath”.**^  The age of fourteen was significant, because Hale considered this to be the 
“age of discretion”. Within Hale’s construct, someone who did not have the 
understanding commonly associated with the “age of discretion” was considered to 
be non compos mentis; to be totally lacking in will and intent.
In England, sufferers from “partial degrees” of insanity were observed to be 
capable of criminal intent and could therefore be found guilty of committing a 
crime. They received no mitigation of punishment. As outlined by Blackstone, less
Idem.
113 Hale Pleas (1736) p.30. Eigen Witnessing p.37 and Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.36-37.
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incapacitating forms of madness did not remove a prisoner’s “consciousness of 
doing wrong and of course discretion, or discernment, between good and evil”.**"* 
Nigel Walker has suggested that such theory had developed into a rigid and narrow 
test of insanity in England by the eighteenth century.**  ^ Later chapters will 
investigate whether courtroom participants might hold to different, more flexible, 
perceptions of insanity and idiocy in practice, with particular reference to the 
“partial verdicts” of the eighteenth century.**^
Hale’s other conception of “partial insanity” was “in respect to things”, whereby 
persons had “a competent use of reason in respect to some subjects, [but were] 
under a particular dementia in respect of some particular discourses”.**^  Hale was 
imprecise, however, as to whether such forms of insanity were fully 
incapacitating.**^ Blackstone’s Commentaries failed to elucidate upon this species 
of distraction. Nevertheless, impressions of criminal insanity had evolved in Britain 
by the 1820s to include concepts such as “delusion” and “monomania”. The term 
“delusion” was used to describe persons who appealed to be capable of rational 
thought, but who misapplied their reason and argued from false premises. This was 
very similar to the conception of insanity which had been offered by Locke as early 
as the seventeenth centuiy.**^ “Monomania” was associated with delusional 
insanity, but was typically used to describe instances where the delusion, or
Blackstone Commentaiies (1765-9) IV pp. 195-6. 
Walker Crime and Insanity I p.38.
See pp.328-342.
“ ’ Hale Pleas (1736) p.30.
Eigen Witnessing pp.37-38.
“ ^ /W p .4 9 .
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insanity, was focused upon a single subject alone, or else an array of 
interconnecting topics.
Delusional insanity was successfiilly presented at Thomas Hadfield’s famous 
trial, at the Old Bailey in 1800.*^ ** Hadfield was arrested and prosecuted for treason 
after discharging two pistols at King George III, as the monarch watched a play at 
Drury Lane. It became apparent that Hadfield had planned to shoot at (if not injure 
or kill) the monarch. It became evident also that Hadfield’s rationale had been 
perverted by a particular millenaiian religiosity, whereby he wished to usher the 
“second coming” of Jesus Christ by offering his life as a sacrifice to God. Hadfield 
did not wish to die by his own hand, for suicide was morally abhorrent and 
condemned by the Bible, but he reasoned that the perpetration of a treasonable act 
might ensure that he was hung, thereby achieving his greater goal.*^*
At court, Hadfield’s defence was led by the legendary barrister, of Scots 
extraction, Thomas Erskine. Erskine opined that Hadfield was insane, but only 
upon the subjects of his millenarian fantasy and the necessity of shooting at the 
King. This was what Hale might have described as “partial insanity” (or 
“dementia’^ ) relating to “some particular discourses”. Hadfield’s strange 
explanation for his actions smacked of the false application of reason, or a Lockean
For published commentaries o f  Hadfield’s trial see Walker Crime and Insanity I, Moran “Insanity 
as a Special Verdict”, Eigen “Intentionality”. Ibid  Witnessing. For the English development o f  the 
defence o f  “delusion” (after 1800) see Eigen “Delusion in the courtroom” and “Opinion as fact”.
See, for instance, the contemporaiy account o f  this trial in the Edinburgh Evening Courant June 
30“’ 1800. Moran “Insanity as a Special Verdict” pp.489-493.
Thomas Erskine (1750-1823) only tiained for and practiced on the English bar. DNB VI pp.853- 
861.
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conception of insanity. Erskine argued that Hadfield’s delusion precluded an ability 
to differentiate between right and wrong, which meant that the prisoner could not be 
criminally responsible. In legal terms, Erksine contended that Hadfield could not 
have chosen to shoot at the monarch, because he was incapable of controlling his 
will. Erskine further contended that Hadfield’s delusion was permanent and 
enduring. The prisoner’s delusion robbed him of self-control and the ability to 
reason correctly; thus he could not be responsible for his actions. Erskine argued 
that Hadfield’s delusional, partial insanity fulfilled the traditional criteria of insanity 
because it removed the prisoner’s ability to act voluntarily or form intent.
Despite persistent historiographic interest, Hadfield’s trial should not be 
regarded as a “landmark” trial regarding the evolution of English legal theory. 
The Criminal Lunatics and the Safe Custody Acts were provoked by Hadfield’s 
offence, trial and the legality of his subsequent incarceration. Erskine’s 
arguments were not universally or immediately accepted in England, however. The 
new statutes were added to nineteenth century editions of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, but Erskine’s concept of delusion was not included by successive 
editors through to 1829. After 1800, delusional insanity was not argued at the Old 
Bailey again until the spectacular failure of John Bellingham’s defence in 1812, for 
the murder of Spencer Perceval. Such insanity defences were not entered 
regularly during English criminal trials before 1830.’^ ^
Walker Crime and Insanity I p.81. Moran “Special Verdict” passim. Eigen Witnessing pp.48-54. 
Idem.
Eigen Witnessing pp.52-54.
'^"/Wp.51.
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Joel Eigen has suggested that Hadfield’s defence introduced the “first successful 
form of “partial insanity” into English jurisprudence”, but Thomas Erskine’s 
opening speech would actually suggest otherwise. Erskine referred to the 
precedent set by “Greenwood’s case”, where Erskine had once again been defence 
counsel in a murder trial. Erskine pointed out that this defence had been upheld 
by one of the judges who presided over Hadfield’s hearing. Like Hadfield, 
Greenwood’s insanity also focused upon a single subject; in this case that his 
brother had poisoned him and that he killed his brother in self-defence. Similar 
arguments were employed at the Northern Assizes from at least the 1770s onwards. 
Although the terms “delusion” and “monomania” were not widely employed before 
the nineteenth century, Thomas Erskine could draw upon practical precedents when 
presenting Hadfield’s defence of “partial insanity” in 1800. The defence offered in 
Hadfield’s trial was by no means the first of its kind in England.
The concept of delusion and insanity upon a specific subject were also apparent 
in southern Scottish theory and practice during the 1790s.^^  ^Archibald Gordon of 
Kinloch was tried at Scotland’s High Court during 1795 for the murder of his 
b ro th e r .T h e  similarity to Greenwood’s case is striking, for Kinloch’s insanity 
was also revealed specifically in the deluded conviction that his brother had
Eigen Witnessing p.48.
Edinburgh Evening Courant June 30*'' 1800. A search o f  the “Proceedings o f  the Old Bailey” 
(www.oIdbaileyonline.org) failed to unearth this trial. Greenwood may have been tried at a different 
jurisdiction, perhaps on circuit or at the King’s Bench.
Houston “Courts” p.351.
JC 7/50.
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administered poison to him.^^‘ By the mid-1790s, it was accepted in Scotland that 
partial insanity pertaining to a particular topic (or dementia) could form a sound 
criminal defence in exculpation of a crime. It was recognised that such insanity 
removed the will and responsibility of the prisoner.
In 1797, this Scottish practice was afforded a printed theoretical background by 
Hume’s Commentaries, which described a condition which was similar to delusion 
and referred to the Kinloch case. Hume stated that if an afflicted person (such as 
Kinloch) was “possessed with the vain conceit th a t... all about him are engaged in 
a foul conspiracy to abuse him”, he might not understand the true nature of his 
actions.B ecause this proceeded “on a false case, or conjuration of his own fancy, 
his judgement of right and wrong, as to any responsibility that should attend it, is 
truly the same as none at all’’.^ "^^  A marginal note from the advocate John Burnett, 
who owned one of the suiviving copies of Hume’s Commentaries, revealed 
lingering doubts about this “dangerous doctrine”.B u r n e t t  cautioned that “whims 
and fancies” were not sound proofs of insanity. Despite such criticism, Hume had 
published theoretical bases to delusional and monomaniacal insanity at law.
Scottish theory and practice may have influenced perceptions of delusional 
insanity in England. Thomas Erskine received his training in England, but he was
Scots Magazine July 1795 pp.477-9 and August 1795 pp.541-543. 
Hume Commentaries I pp.26-37.
Ibid, p.25.
Idem.
Hume Commentaries I p.25. This copy is held by the NLS.
Idem.
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the younger brother of the famous Scottish advocate “Harry” Erskine. Thomas 
Erskine may therefore have been aware of Kinloch’s case and Hume’s exposition 
and imported this knowledge to the English courtroom. Erskine was not the only 
contemporary Scot to practice English law. Scottish lawyers such as Hume were not 
cited widely within the English tradition, but knowledge of Scottish legal tracts 
amongst English lawyers should not be discounted. Scots Law may therefore have 
influenced both Thomas Erskine’s understanding of partial insanity and broader 
conceptions of mental distraction within the English tradition.
PN B XVII pp.436-439.
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Idiocy
Recently, it has been suggested that British literary conventions failed to 
distinguish between idiocy and insanity before the mid nineteenth century. 
Likewise, it has been suggested that institutional supervision did not distinguish 
between these two foiins of non compotes before 1800.*^  ^ By contrast, Britain’s 
legal conventions did differentiate the insane fi’om the idiotic, which were also 
known as the “fatuous” in Scotland. This section will outline how and why idiocy 
and insanity were perceived to differ.
Both legal traditions compared idiocy with the mental abilities of an infant. In 
simple terms, idiots were people who had reached the age of discretion, but whose 
mental faculties and facilities had not developed beyond those of infants. Similarly, 
it was assumed at law that persons who were bom “deaf, dumb and blind” were 
“looked upon by the law as in the same state with an idiot ... being supposed 
incapable of understanding [and] wanting those senses which furnish the human 
mind with ideas’’.*"*^ Authors suggested guiding principles to aid the process of 
differentiating between idiots, insane persons and those of sound mental abilities. 
Blackstone offered that idiots might be incapable of recognising their own 
parents. Mackenzie cited a test which prevailed in the courts and legal texts of
J. Andrews, “Begging the question o f  idiocy: the definition and socio-cultural meaning o f  Idiocy 
in early modern Britain: Part I”, HP. ix, (1998) pp.65-66. Dickenson “Idiocy in nineteenth centuiy 
fiction compared with medical perspectives o f  the time”, Histoiv o f  Psvchiatrv. xi (2000) p.291, 
Idem. N. Anderson and A. Langa (ed. H. Freeman), “The development o f  institutional care for 
“imbeciles and idiots” in Scotland”, HP. viii (1997) pp.245-249.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) I pp.292-293.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) I p.304.
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both Scotland and England when he suggested “if a Person can count their ten 
Fingers, they are not accounted Idiots”. Mackenzie cited the Dutch theorist 
“Zackeus” as the authority for this test, which indicates how Scots Law was 
influenced by Continental, but particularly Dutch, legal theories and practices 
during the late seventeenth century. Tests were not necessarily conclusive 
indicators of idiocy, but they did inversely reflect the sort of behaviour, knowledge,
or level of numeracy and literacy, which was regularly expected of adults within
■ a. 144 society.
Typically, British legal theorists presented idiocy as being a congenital 
condition. Blackstone echoed the pre-eminent English and Scottish jurists when 
he declared that, “An idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath no understanding from 
his nativity; and therefore is by law presumed never likely to attain any”.^"*^  ^ Idiots 
had never developed the ability to use reason or form intent, which was expected of 
sound-minded adults. This was in contrast to the insane, whose mental faculties had 
developed, but whose ability to reason was removed (sometimes temporarily) by 
their troubling mental conditions. There were some exceptions to the rule that 
idiocy was purely a congenital affliction. By the mid eighteenth century, some legal
Mackenzie Matters Criminal (1672) p.88.
Cairns “Civil Law Tradition” pp. 191-220. Cairns “Importing” pp.I38-152. Gordon “Roman Law’ 
pp. 135-143.
Houston Madness pp.76-77. Ibid, “Class, Gender” pp.54-58..
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” pp.66 and 83. Andrews “Idiocy ... part II” p. 199. Dickenson “Idiocy” 
p.292. Houston Madness pp.76-77. Neugebauer “Mental Handicap in Medieval and Early Modern 
England: Criteria, Measurement and Care” in P. Bartlett and D. Wright (eds.) Outside the Walls o f  
the Asvlum -  The Historv o f  Care in the Community. 1750-2000. (1999) p.25. P. Rushton “Idiocy, 
the family and the Community in early modern North East England”, in D. Wright and A. Digby 
(eds), From idiocv to mental deficiencv: historical perspectives on people with learning difficulties. 
(1996) p.47.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) I p.302. See also Hale Pleas (1736) p.28. For Scotland, see 
Mackenzie Pleadings (1704) p.87 and Erskine Institute (1773) I. p. 149.
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writers suggested that people could regress into an idiotic, child-like mental state 
thi'ough the effects of disease, injury or old-age. This marked a significant shift in 
British conceptions of idiocy. Erskine, for instance, described how idiots were “not 
accounted moral agents” because they had “either never had reason, or have lost the 
use o f The interpretation that idiocy could develop after birth was voiced in 
England from at least the early nineteenth centuiy onwards, too. The forensic 
commentator, Jolin Haslam, asserted in 1817 that idiocy, “whether it be ex 
nativitate, or supervene at any period of life, implies a deficiency of intellectual 
capacity”. Legal and medical theoretical understandings of idiocy altered during 
the course of the long eighteenth century. In practice, however, most provincial 
British prisoners who were found to be idiotic had been so since attaining the “age 
of discretion”.
Wliilst idiocy was not always expected to be congenital, it continued to be 
perceived as a permanent form of mental impairment by British jurists before 
1830.^^’ Idiocy was only presented as a curable affliction from the 1840s 
o nw ards .B e fo re  then, idiots were regarded to have “no hope of recoverie” 
because they had never attained the use of reason.Likewise,  recuperation was not 
anticipated where persons regressed into imbecility. In legal theory, insanity could
Andrews “Idiocy ... part II” p. 198.
Erskine Institute (1773) I p.4 (my emphasis).
Haslam, Medical Jurisprudence as it relates to Insanity according to the Law o f  England. (1817)
p.86.
For instance, 22-year-old James Cheesbrough had been in that state “for about 12 years” (ASSI 
41/12 and York Herald March 9“' 1818).
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” p.66. Dickenson “Idiocy” p.292.
Idem.
Dalton Countrev Justice (1618) p.215.
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be understood as a temporary affliction, but not so idiocy. Like the infant, the idiot 
was totally incapable of forming intent. Unlike infants, it was not expected that 
idiots would develop the ability to employ rationality which was associated with 
mature adulthood. Idiocy and infancy were thus distinguished. In terms of 
criminal responsibility, an idiot was permanently distressed, utterly incapacitated 
and incapable of criminal intent. The idiotic could neither be tried nor responsible 
for their crimes.
Scottish jurists maintained that the completely debilitated and permanently 
fatuous were exculpated of their crimes. Scots theorists also contended that less 
incapacitating degrees of imbecility could mitigate a prisoner’s sentence, according 
to the “Rule of Proportions”. Such constructions echoed Lockean conceptions, 
whereby imbecility could affect persons in varying degrees. The “weak-minded” 
had developed some reasoning capabilities and could form criminal intent, but their 
ability to control their will or utilise reason were impaired. Sufferers from a “partial 
degree” of idiocy, or “weak-mindedness”, were not fully responsible for their 
actions.
Only a complete lack of intent was presented as sound criminal defence by 
England’s jurists. The idiot was utterly incapable of forming criminal intent and 
was therefore privileged in English law. A partially impaired level of understanding 
was not accepted in theory, either in terms of insanity or weak-mindedness. True,
Houston Madness p.37. |
Rushton “Idiocy” p.49.
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the late sixteenth century English jurist Edward Coke proposed a reduced form of 
idiocy in his concept of the ""stultitia’" who was troubled by a less severe form of 
imbecility than the full-blown But Coke proposed that the less acute
benefited from a full defence, not a proportional reduction of sentence as 
happened in Scotland. Proceeding English jurists disowned Coke’s exposition. 
Blackstone stated that only a “total idiocy”, where no “glimmering of reason” was 
discernable, could acquit because the prisoner could not form intent.
Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.36 and 41.
Blackstone employs the phiase “total idiocy”: Commentaries (1765-9) I p.304 and IV p.25.
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Conclusions
British legal treatises converged upon how mad and imbecilic prisoners failed 
to appreciate the nature of their actions, lacked a will or intention to act, and were 
deficient in reason. Consequently, persons who suffered fiom such afflictions could 
not be held responsible for their crimes. The same principles meant that prisoners 
who were insane or idiotic at the time of their court hearing were mentally unfit to 
stand trial, be judged or receive punishment. Such attitudes towards insane and 
idiotic prisoners were grounded in broader philosophies concerning criminal 
responsibility, whereby culpability was understood in terms of moral guilt as well 
as the physical peipetration of a crime. Despite independent legal traditions and 
influences, the laws of England and Scotland therefore shared some broad 
principles regarding criminal accountability.
Yet some critical distinctions persisted between English and Scottish theoretical 
conceptions of criminal responsibility between 1660 and 1829. English and Scottish 
jurists presented alternative inteipretations of how partially debilitating forms of 
mental affliction affected the prisoner’s responsibility. By conforming to the “Rule 
of Proportions”, Scots Law adhered to broader, more flexible theoretical 
constructions of criminal responsibility and mental afflictions than its English 
neighbour. Scottish prisoners who suffered from mental afflictions that merely 
obscured or constrained, rather than completely obstructed, the use of their reason 
were deemed to be less than fully responsible for their crimes. Consequently,
Eigen Witnessing pp.35-58. Houston Madness pp.72-90.
70
Scottish prisoners who suffered from a partial obstruction of their reason received 
proportional amelioration of punishment if they were found guilty. The existence of 
such a strong dogma of diminished responsibility stood in stark contrast to the 
English legal tradition. English jurists insisted upon a narrower definition, whereby 
only “total” insanity or idiocy (which completely removed the prisoner’s intent) 
could be accepted as a sound criminal defence and only in exculpation of sentence. 
Unlike Scots jurists, English theorists argued that less than fully debilitating forms 
of mental affliction could not earn a partial reduction of the prisoner’s sentence.
There were some parallel developments in England and Scotland regarding 
what Hale called “partial insanity ... in respect to some subjects ... [or] some 
particular discourses”. This chapter has begun the process of tracing the 
intellectual origins of Thomas Erskine’s famous defence of James Hadfield in 1800, 
which argued that such “partial insanity” restricted severely the prisoner’s criminal 
intent and could therefore be accepted as a sound basis of acquittal. Further research 
is required, but Erskine could have drawn upon British legal precedents of practice 
and theory, beside broader philosoplrical ideas. Subsequent chapters will establish 
that “partial insanity ... in respect to subjects”, which later became associated with 
delusion and monomania, could be proposed as an acceptable defence in both 
countries from at least the late eighteenth centmy onwards.
The study of published legal commentaries provides valuable indications of 
how contemporaries understood mental incompetence, at least within the context of
159 Hale Pleas (1736) p.30.
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criminal and civil tribunals. British legal tracts shared broad conventions regarding 
persons non compos mentis. English and Scottish jurists produced similar categories 
of mental affliction, with both traditions differentiating between idiocy (fatuity) and 
insanity (furiosity). It was understood that insanity robbed a person of their ability 
to employ reason, control the will and form criminal intent. Insanity could be a 
transient, even infrequent, affliction whereby the sufferer’s ability to reason was 
removed temporarily. “Limatics” could be accountable for their crimes if it were 
proven that they had been lucid at the time of committing their transgression. By 
contrast, English and Scottish “natural” idiots had never developed such mental 
capacities and possessed, in essence, a mental state which was akin to infanthood. 
Idiocy was understood to be a perpetual and irrecoverable condition, althougii by 
the late eighteenth century it was imderstood that mentally mature persons might 
“regress” into such a state.
Some British juristic works indicated that insanity and idiocy could only be 
accepted in defence of capital felonies, although this “rule” was relaxed in practice 
by the late eighteenth century. In theory, defences of mental affliction were 
restricted to fewer types of crimes in the seventeenth than the nineteenth century, 
because fewer crimes then canied the death sentence. The next chapter will present 
quantitative analyses of provincial insanity and idiocy defences. This will establish 
whether pleas of insanity and idiocy became more common during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as juristic values altered regarding the 
acceptability of these types of defence. The supposition that defences of insanity
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were most acceptable and understandable when the prisoners had committed violent 
crimes, such as murder, is examined also. It is considered whether insanity was 
associated primarily with violent forms of behaviour in Britain during the long 
eighteenth century. Subsequent chapters also question whether juristic principles 
were employed universally in practice during insanity and idiocy defences. By the 
late eighteenth century, practical and theoretical considerations of “partial insanity” 
could clash at the Northern Assizes. Similarly, “weak-mindedness” which did not 
amount to a full degree of idiocy was accepted in mitigation of sentence in early 
nineteenth century England.
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J.
Paradigms o f  the mentally perturbed.
Underlying patterns in British insanity and idiocy defences, 1660-
1829.
This chapter establishes the pertinent quantitative patterns relating to insanity 
and idiocy defences in northern England and southern Scotland. The following 
statistical analyses are based upon fonnal legal documents and printed narratives. 
These materials cany limitations, but aggregative trends can be offered which help 
us to understand the nature of British insanity and idiocy defences. These patterns 
ar e compared with published findings for the contemporary Old Bailey and High 
Court of Justiciary. This study of criminal hearings is also related to published 
works upon the experience of the mentally afflicted at civil courts and English 
Quarter Sessions tribunals, alongside materials such as asylum admissions.
Comparisons between the Northern Assizes, Old Bailey and Scotland’s 
Justiciary court are tempered by the existence of alternative types of source 
material. Joel Eigen’s work on the Old Bailey has been based upon extensive 
printed descriptions of trials, reinforced by formal court records. Few published 
accounts of provincial hear ings exist before the 1790s; quantitative data is therefore 
based upon court minutes, gaol records and pre-trial depositions. Where possible, 
narratives have been used to supplement this material. Using these sources, the 
incidence of incidence of insanity and idiocy defences in northern England and 
southern Scotland is compared, in relation to the global rates of formal
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prosecutions. The success-rates of provincial English and Scottish defences of 
insanity and idiocy are also presented. The materials available for the Northern 
Assizes does bear comparison with Nigel Walker’s older projection of the average 
acquittal-rate during all English Assize insanity defences, which was also based 
upon formal court documents.'
A closer inspection of what may have affected the success of such defences 
supplements these broader aggregative outlines. The types of crimes which were 
committed by insane and idiotic offenders are investigated. For the Old Bailey, Joel 
Eigen has argued that insanity defences pled in response to crimes of interpersonal 
violence met with a higher acquittal rate after 1800 than defences which were 
entered for property transgressions.^ Published studies of British insanity defences 
have indicated that sufferers of insanity and idiocy were not universally violent in 
nature, but that there was an intimate association between a loss of rationality and 
violent behaviour.^ These paradigms ar e here evaluated in a provincial context.
Additionally, the important correlation between capital crimes and British 
criminal defences of lunacy or idiocy is investigated.'' Historians of crime and the 
courtroom in England have demonstrated that complex layers of formal and 
informal mitigation alleviated the bloody rigours of the criminal code. Both the 
English and Scottish criminal codes were “sanction specific”; meaning that the
' Eigen Witnessing pp.9 and 18-28. Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.67-72. 
 ^Eigen Witnessing pp.22-28.
 ^Idem, Houston Madness pp.216-221.
Walker Crime and Insanity I p.45.
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prisoners’ sentences were designated and restricted by the crime which they were 
found guilty of committing. Subsequent chapters challenge whether insanity and 
idiocy defences were simple extensions of formal mitigatory processes. Such 
debates are better appreciated by establishing the quantitative patterns concerning 
the sentences which were coupled with the prisoners’ crimes.
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Sample
This survey excludes persons who committed suicide but were mentally 
disturbed and not held responsible for their actions. This follows published 
methodologies regarding British insanity and idiocy defences.^ Self-mui'der {felo de 
se) was a felony in England.^ Inquests into English suicides were undertaken 
regularly before a coroner, rather than at the Northern Assizes. A coroner’s jury 
reached a verdict regarding the suicide’s state of mind, not the Assize’s “petty” 
(trial) jury.^ The results of the coroner’s inquest might be reported to the Assize 
meeting and recorded in the minute books, but the mental condition of the accused 
was not decided through Assize court procedures and structures.
In Scotland, suicide was teclmically a crime but in practice it was punished 
rarely as a criminal offence. Suicide cases were not recorded systematically 
amongst southern Scotland’s Justiciary court records.* The Scottish historiography 
lacks detailed study of self-murder, although the coimection between self-harm and 
mental distraction has been examined in the context of Scottish criminal and civil 
court hearings.^ Mental discomposme was affiliated with self-destruction and self- 
mutilation, but comparisons of provincial British inquests into suicide must await 
separate research.
 ^Walker Crime and Insanity I. Eigen Witnessing. Houston Madness.
 ^Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p. 189.
 ^M. MacDonald and T.R. Murphy Sleepless Souls. Suicide in Earlv-Modern England. (1990) p.223.
* Mackenzie Matters Criminal (1678) XIII, I pp. 144-147. Erskine Institute (1773) IV p.769. Houston 
p.c.
 ^Houston “Madness and Gender” pp.323-325 and “Class, Gender” pp.52-53.
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Joel Eigen unearthed 331 “insanity trials” within the trial narratives and court 
records for Middlesex and London between 1760 and 1843, including failed 
defences."' 142 northern English insanity and idiocy hearings were unearthed for 
the period between 1660 and 1829. Some prisoners made multiple appearances at 
the Assizes, especially where persistent distraction caused hearings to be 
postponed." Richard Waddy was found insane and unfit to stand trial for the 
murder of his father three times at the Yorkshire Assizes between 1726 and 1727, 
for example.'^ The 142 “insanity trials” studied therefore involved 104 individual 
prisoners.
The lack of detailed court narratives for northern English hearings before the 
nineteenth century precludes comprehensive comparison with Eigen’s findings. The 
northern English Assize court minutes record most verdicts of mental 
incompetence. However, minute books are not a reliable guide to the incidence of 
insanity and idiocy trials because they tend to obscure failed defences, where the 
prisoner’s guilt was proven.'^ Simple verdicts of “not guilty” could also mask 
successful defences of insanity, particularly before the nineteenth century.''' 
Minutes register “not guilty” verdicts against the hearings of Charles Jackson
37 prisoners were found to be non compos mentis at the Old Bailey between 1717 and 1799, 
source: www.oldbaileyonline.org.
” The Criminal Lunatics Act (1800), 39&40 Geo III c94, allowed for the indefinite incarceration o f  
prisoners who were mentally incapable o f standing trial. As a consequence, fewer prisoners had their 
mental condition assessed more than once at court after 1800.
ASSI 41/2.
Eigen Witnessing pp.7-11 
Idem.
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(1665) and John Sutcliffe (1776), for instance, whilst other sources reveal that these 
prisoners were actually acquitted on the grounds of insanity.'^
To rectify this imbalance, depositions relating to 2,600 northern English cases 
were scrutinized for instances where witnesses refeiTed to the prisoner’s state of 
mind, either at the time of committing the crime or whilst lying in gaol awaiting 
trial. This sample of cases was selected randomly and included all types of crime. 
600 cases were examined for the early period between 1660 and 1730, when 
criminal business was lighter and the depositions series are fragmented. Business 
becomes heavier and the associated records more complete after 1730. For each 
decade between 1730 and 1829, the depositions relating to two-hundred cases were 
examined for signs of insanity defences. This study of foiinal, pre-trial records was 
supplemented by an investigation of 2,000 detailed, printed, courtroom narratives 
for the period 1775-1839. This sampling of court records and narratives paid 
dividends. The minutes made no reference to any defence of mental affliction for 
thirty-seven of the 104 northern English prisoners who were unearthed by this 
study; these thirty-seven defendants account for just over one-third of the total 
English sample.
Jackson: ASSI 42/1 and ASSI 45//7/2 nos. 69-70. Sutcliffe: ASSI 41/7, ASSI 24/32/2, York 
Chronicle August 2"** 1776, York Herald July 30*'* 1776 and Trials (Lammas 1776).
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Jurisdiction Prisoners Courtroom
Appearances
Northern Assizes 104 142
Southern Justiciary 35 35
Table 3.1. Comparison o f number ofprisoners whose state o f mind was 
examined at court, and the total number o f appearances they made at
court, 1660-1829.
Jurisdiction Dates covered
Total number o f  
insanity and idiocy 
hearings
Old Bailey'^ 1760-1843 331
Northern Assizes 1660-1829 142
SCSCJ'' 1660-1829 35
High Court, Edinburgh'** 1739-1818 13
Table 3.2. Total number o f criminal trials where the prisoner's insanity or 
idiocy is known to have been entered as a defence. Comparison o f  the Old Bailey, 
the Northern Assizes, southern circuit o f Scotland's Court o f Justiciary and 
supreme High Court in Edinburgh.
Fewer fuiiosity and fatuity defences were entered at Scotland’s superior 
criminal courts than at either England’s Old Bailey or Northern Assizes. Between 
1739 and 1818, only thirteen cases are known to have occuiTed at Scotland’s High 
Comt in Edinburgh.'^ Thirty-five fatuity and furiosity defences occurred on the
Taken ftom Eigen Witnessing p.9.
Southern circuit o f  Scotland’s Court o f  Justiciary.
Modified figure based upon Houston Madness pp.72-90.
Houston Madness pp.72-90 found twelve cases during this period. Houston’s research does not 
include the case o f  Susan Tinny, in 1816. The High Court Minutes omit Tinny’s defence o f  furiosity.
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southern circuit of Scotland’s Couit of Justiciary between 1708 and 1829, involving 
thirty-five individual prisoners (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). In Scotland, cases where the 
pannel’s mental distraction postponed or “barred” trial could be remitted to the 
superior criminal court at Edinbmgh for fuitlier consideration. This contrasted to 
the cyclical re-appearance of prisoners at the Northern Assizes before the nineteenth 
century.
The southern Scottish sample was also based upon Minute Book records of 
pleas and verdicts. Legal counsel were involved more regularly in Scotland than in 
England and they were required to enter and debate any special defences, such as 
fatuity or furiosity, at the outset of the trial (known as the “relevancy”).^' This 
procedure means that failed defences of insanity are more visible amongst the 
Scottish minutes than their English coimteiparts. Every recorded plea, “relevancy” 
debate and verdict was scrutinized amongst the southern Scottish records. Until the 
1760s, Scottish Minute Books are more detailed than their English equivalents and 
include lists of witnesses and the evidence that they supplied. These condensed 
narratives indicate what proofs were offered at court and whether the witnesses 
discussed the prisoner’s mental capabilities. As with the English sample, these 
minutes were supplemented by an examination of a random selection of 
precognitions (pre-trial witness statements). Precognitions to 900 southern Scottish
but the jury recommended mercy on account o f  her insanity. See Scots Magazine 78 (March 1816) 
p.233.
Some, such as Susan Tinny, were tried subsequently at the High Court in Edinburgh. John 
Bertram’s hearing at Jedburgh in 1747 was ordered to be remitted to Edinburgh but the case was 
never re-tiied.
See pp.262-265.
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cases were inspected for occasions where at least one witness spoke about the 
prisoner’s mental state. These 900 cases account for about half of all the southern 
circuit trials that were recorded officially between 1660 and 1829. Systematic, 
detailed, printed accounts of southern Scottish hearings do not appear until the early 
nineteenth century. 450 of these narratives were investigated for signs of furiosity 
or fatuity at court. Eight of the southern Scottish prisoners studied for this thesis 
were discovered through this random sampling. The Justiciary Court minute books 
failed to record every occasion where the prisoner’s mental condition was either 
rejected, or accepted or argued in mitigation of sentence at court.
It should be expected that greater numbers of insanity and idiocy defences were 
heard at the Old Bailey than provincial England and Scotland. A substantially larger 
number of formal accusations were tried annually at the Old Bailey than in the 
provinces. Around 1,600 prosecutions were entered between 1708 and 1829 in 
southern Scotland. By comparison, at least 53,673 hearings occuned at the Old 
Bailey between 1714 and 1799, a figure that dwarfed formal prosecutions in 
contemporary northern England.^^ England’s capital and hinterlands were more 
densely populated than most provincial areas and there were concerted efforts to 
curb criminal activity in and around London.^^ By the eighteenth century, eight 
separate criminal sessions were required per annum to deal with formal 
prosecutions from London and Middlesex. This does not necessarily indicate that
See www.oldbailevonline.org for records o f  Old Bailey trials, including statistical analyses. 
^^Emsley Crime and Societv in England, 1750-1900. (2" ed. 1996) p,154. R.B. Shoemaker “Male 
honour and the decline o f  public violence in eighteenth century London” Social Historv, 2 6 ,2  
(2001), p.191.
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the “real” crime rate was lower in Scotland or northern England per capita of 
population, but rather that fewer crimes were pursued foimally at these regional 
criminal courts.^''
Faced with this regional diversity of prosecuted crime, historians have 
compared the proportion of all criminal trials which included insanity defences?^ 
For the Old Bailey, Joel Eigen has discovered that between four and eight insanity 
defences were undertaken per one-thousand criminal tr ia ls .S u c h  figures do not 
reflect the incidence of mentally disturbed persons as a proportion of London and 
Middlesex’s population as a whole, but instead refer to the criminal population. 
Eigen’s figures indicate that a very low percentage of formal prosecutions were met 
with direct evaluations of the defendant’s mental condition. Conclusions are 
tempered by the immeasurable “dark figure” of crime; transgressors who evaded 
apprehension, offences which were uni'eported, or cases where the victim chose not 
to prosecute.Likewise, the incidence of insanity and idiocy defences does not 
include occasions where the offender was perceived to suffer from a debilitating 
mental condition and this informed a victim’s discretionary choice not to 
prosecute.^*
^  S. Mercer, “Crime in Late-Seventeenth Century Yorkshire: an Exception to a National Pattern?”, 
NH, 27, (1991), pp.106-177.
^  Eigen Witnessing p.9. These results extend and supplement Walker’s conclusions, see Walker 
Crime and Insanity I p.67 (Table 2).
Eigen Witnessing p.9. This equates to between 0.4% and 0.8% o f all criminal tirais at the Old 
Bailey.
King Crime p.28 and “Punishing Assault” pp.62-63. R.B. Shoemaker, “Using Quarter Sessions 
records as evidence for the study o f  crime and criminal justice”, Archives, xx, 89-90, (1993) p. 153. 
Houston Madness pp.72-90.
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In both northern England and southern Scotland, the ratios of insanity and 
idiocy defences amongst criminal prosecutions were greater than at the Old Bailey. 
At England’s Northern Assizes, a prisoner’s mental state was evaluated in between 
eight and fourteen cases per thousand trials. Criminal defences of furiosity and 
fatuity were more prominent in southern Scotland than at either the contemporary 
Northern Assizes or the Old Bailey. Fatuity and furiosity defences accounted for 
between twenty-one and twenty-five hearings per thousand criminal cases tried on 
the southern circuit; at least three-times the proportion discovered for the Old 
Bailey/^
Scotland’s independent legal traditions provide one reason for the higher 
relative incidence of “insanity defences” in southern Scotland when compaied with 
the English courts. Scotland’s principle of “diminished responsibility” meant that 
partially debilitating mental conditions could be accepted as sound legal defences in 
mitigation of sentence.^'' By contrast, “partial degrees” of insanity or idiocy were 
not accepted as sound legal defences in the English courtroom. Of the thirty-five 
hearings uncovered for southern Scotland, fourteen of them were defences on 
grounds of “diminished responsibility”. Twenty-one defences (sixty-percent) 
argued that prisoners were either incapable of standing trial or should be fully 
exculpated of their crimes owing to their mental afflictions. This type of plea was 
most akin to English defences of insanity and idiocy. Excluding defences of 
“diminished responsibility”, fatuity and furiosity accounted for between ten and
Houston Madness provides no specific ratio for furiosity and fatuity defences per criminal 
hearings o f  all kinds entered at Edinburgh.
30 See pp.328-342.
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sixteen hearings per one-thousand cases in southern Scotland. This is only slightly 
higher than the integers for the Northern Assizes.
Jurisdiction Defences arguing 
prisoner either had no 
responsibility for crime, 
or was incapable o f  
standing trial
Proportion per 
one-thousand 
criminal trials
Northern Assizes 142 8-14
SCSCJ 21 10-16
Table 3.3. Comparison o f northern English and southern Scottish trials excluding 
defences o f ‘ diminishedresponsibility”, 1660-1829.
Compared with English processes. Justiciary Couit procedures paid greater 
attention to the prisoner’s state of mind and this generated defences of fatuity and 
furiosity. During pre-trial examinations, Scottish inteiTogators and their clerks were 
required to affirm that the prisoner uttered statements voluntarily and whilst in their 
“sound mind and sober senses”. This was not just legal formulary, for examiners 
could testify at court about the prisoner’s mental competence. John Fairbairn’s 
hearing in 1759 included evidence from both the Justice of Peace (JP) who 
questioned the prisoner upon his arrest and the clerk who recorded the pre-trial 
examination.^' Their testimony was fundamental to the evaluation of the prisoner’s 
mental abilities. Less formal emphasis was placed upon recording the offender’s 
state of mind at this stage of English criminal proceedings. English coroners, JPs
Jedburgh April 1759. JC 12/9 and 26/163.
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and their clerks might observe the prisoner’s mental condition, but they did not 
attest regularly at court to the prisoner’s mental condition.
A greater proportion of the British provincial criminal trials that were studied 
featured an insanity or idiocy defence than at the Old Bailey. This requires 
explanation. The different types of source material that are available for the Old 
Bailey and the Northern Assizes must have affected this outcome. Hypotheses apart 
from the vagaries of the historical materials can be proposed, however. Pre-trial 
procedures and the attitudes of England’s prosecuting officials may provide a 
supplementary explanation. Legal officials such as JPs (who played a key role in 
instigating and preparing prosecutions for the superior courts) could evaluate the 
prisoner’s state of mind outside of the formal, couitroom setting and deal with 
insane felons in a summary fashion. These officials might show discretion to 
mentally perturbed offenders by declining to enter a formal prosecution; there is 
also evidence that such mad and idiotic criminals were incaicerated without trial in 
gaols, poorhouses and private m adhouses.Som e mentally distracted criminals 
who were apprehended never faced formal prosecution at court.
Alternative pre-trial processes developed in London, which was more densely 
populated and crime-intensive than the northern conurbations and rural areas 
studied. London’s prosecutors and officials may have demonstrated such summaiy
R. Paley, (ed.) “Justice in Eighteenth Century Hackney: the justicing notebook o f  Hemy N on is 
and the Hackney Petty Sessions Book”, London Record Society Publications, xxviii, 28, (1991); 
cases mentioned on pp.47 and 136.
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“discretion” towards mentally afflicted persons more often than in northern 
England, although such activity is difficult to quantify. Some Northern Assize 
insanity defences were entered in response to trivial offences, such as petty theft or 
misdemeanour, which could have been tried at an inferior jurisdiction, such as the 
Quarter Sessions. These cases seem to have been referred to the Assizes because the 
prisoner’s mental condition needed to be evaluated. Prisoners such as John Windle, 
who was charged with being “a dangerous [lunatick] person” at the Yorkshire 
Assizes in March 1756, may have been entered at the Assizes because an order of 
detaimnent was required and the circuit court was regarded as the most authoritative 
jurisdiction in such m atters .T he  Assizes may also have been used because they 
were the next formal court meeting in the locality.
According to both the English and Scottish samples studied, the proportion of 
insanity and idiocy defences increased in relation to all criminal defences from the 
1790s onwards. These ratios were not as linear as Table 3.4 (below) might suggest, 
for they fluctuated by year and decade, just as at the Old Bailey. '^  ^ Again, such an 
apparent change corresponds strongly with the enhanced documentation of criminal 
hearings. However, there is evidence that insanity defences did become more 
common at the Old Bailey from the 1760s onwards. Provincial British patterns of 
incidence may have followed a similai' progression at roughly the same time.
A SS I41/4 and 42/7.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 18-28.
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Jurisdiction
Ratio of insanity and idiocy 
defences as a 
proportion of 1,000 
criminal trials
1700-1789 1790-1829
Northern Assizes 8 14
SCSCJ 21 25
Table 3.4. Ratio o f insanity and idiocy defences per 1,000 criminal trials. 
Comparison o f England's Northern Assizes and Scotland's southern circuit o f
Justiciary, 1700-1829.
This real rise in the incidence of insanity and idiocy defences reflected an 
increased awareness of mental afflictions and mentally troubled criminals within 
society. By the 1760s, crimes committed by persons who were purported to be mad 
were sensationalised and their trials well-publicised, like the hearing of earl Ferrers 
in 1760.^  ^ George III was assaulted in both 1788 and 1800 by mentally disturbed 
offenders.Such notorious (yet atypical) insanity defences may have fostered an 
enhanced association between crime and insanity, whilst also broadcasting 
perceptions about mental abnormality. Both the Scots Magazine and the Edinburgh 
Magazine earned detailed accounts of James Hadfîeld’s trial for shooting at King 
George in 1800, for instance. Subsequently, these journals published the essays “On 
Insanity” and “On the Cause and Cure of Melancholy”, whilst an aiticle entitled
Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp. 193-214. Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.62-63.
Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp.215-254. J. Brooke King George III (1972) passim. Eigen 
Witnessing no.22 and 48-54. Forbes Surgeons pp. 173-176. Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.74-78.
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“The Frantic Lover” appeared in both.^^ It has been established that printed media 
could be disseminated beyond literate, educated persons, although there was no 
universal interpretation of such information.^® Published accounts of the causes of 
mental distress, as well as the speech, appearance and behaviour of the afflicted 
person, could have informed and reflected broader awareness and perceptions of 
criminal insanity.
Scots Magazine 62 (1800) pp.359, 528 and 602. Edinburgh Magazine 15 (1800) pp.397 and 16 
(1801)p .l68 .
Barker, Newspapers. Politics and English Society 1695-1855. (2000), passim.
Eigen “Intentionality” pp.41-42. Jones Lunacy pp.44-48.1. Macalpine and R. Hunter George III 
and the Mad-Biisiness. (1969) passim. Walker Crime and Insanity pp.70-72. Houston Madness 
p .l 16.
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Types o f crime committed in relation to insanity and idiocy defences
The majority of southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity defences were pled in 
response to property crimes between 1708 and 1829 (Table 3.5). Offences such as 
arson, housebreaking and theft proliferated in southern Scotland, rather than assault 
or murder. There was also a reduction in the numbers of interpersonal 
transgressions which spawned insanity and idiocy defences after 1800. This pattern 
contrasted with that of the contemporary High Court in Edinburgh and the Northern 
Assizes (Table 3.6), where prisoners who alleged madness or imbecility were 
charged most regularly with offences of interpersonal violence.^^
This southern Scottish pattern was akin to that of the Old Bailey, where 
property offences accounted for around seventy-percent of all insanity defences 
between 1760 and 1829."^  ^ Southern Scotland’s sample-base is small, however, so 
any generalisations must be treated cautiously. Nevertheless, there was a stronger 
correlation between mental disturbance and property, rather than interpersonal, 
crimes in southern Scotland. Combined with Joel Eigen’s work upon England’s Old 
Bailey, these findings indicate that insane and idiotic criminal behaviour in Britain 
was not violent universally. Scots jurists suggested that insanity defences were most 
readily accepted in cases of inter-personal violence, but these defences were also 
accepted in crimes against property."^  ^Contemporaries perceived mentally disturbed
Houston “Courts” p.345. The same pattern existed in nineteenth centuiy Ireland, see Gibbons, 
Mulryan and O’Connor “Guilty but insane” pp.467-472.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 18-28.
‘‘^ Seepp.37-48.
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prisoners to be capable of committing offences against material goods (including 
real estate) as well as against fellow human beings.
Dates
Number 
of trials
%
Property
Crimes
%
Personal
Crimes
%
Combined 
Property 
& Personal 
Offences
%
Other
1708-1799 15 46.7 46.7 - 6.6
1800-1829 20 75 20 5
Overall 35 62.7 31.5 2.9 2.9
Table 3.5. Categories o f crime committed by Southern Scottish prisoners who 
used furiosity andfatuity defences, 1710-1829.
The pattern at the Northern Assizes contrasted with the Old Bailey and southern 
Scotland. In northern England, just as at the High Court in Edinburgh, most insanity 
and idiocy defences were pled in response to violent personal crimes rather than 
offences against property (Table 3.6). Just over sixty-one-percent of the northern 
English hearings that were studied involved crimes against the person. This was 
double the proportion found either in southern Scotland or at the Old Bailey, where 
only ai'ound thirty-percent of all insanity and idiocy defences were pled by 
prisoners who were charged with violent interpersonal transgressions.
9 1
Dates Number 
of trials
%
Property
Crimes
%
Personal
Crimes
%
Combined 
Properly 
& Personal 
Offences
%
Other
1660-1799 68 30.9 52.9 7.4 8.8
1800-1829 74 25^ 64.9 5.4 3.8
Overall 142 29.6 57.7 5.6 7.1
Table 3.6. Categories o f crime committed by Northern English prisoners 
who entered insanity and idiocy defences, 1660-1829.
A  strong relationship between violence and mentally disturbed prisoners existed 
at the Old Bailey, despite the preponderance of insanity defences for property 
crimes. Personal crimes were over-represented amongst insanity defences when 
weighed against the general trend of indictments. Joel Eigen calculated that 
personal crimes were pled “three or four times [greater than] their proportion in the 
general caseload” during Old Bailey insanity trials."^  ^ No comprehensive analysis 
has been published regarding the categories of crime which were prosecuted in 
either southern Scotland or northern England.' '^* Tentative surveys can be proposed, 
based upon the wide sample of criminal cases examined for “hidden” insanity 
defences in both England and Scotland (Table 3.7). According to this research, 
violent transgressions appeared amongst Northern Assize insanity and idiocy 
defences at two-to-three times the ratio of violent offences amongst all criminal 
indictments."^  ^By contrast, southern Scottish furiosity and fatuity defences were not 
grossly over-represented amongst crimes of inteipersonal violence. Accusations of
Eigen Witnessing p. 18.
Some aspects o f  northern English crime have recently been discussed. Jackson “New-born child 
murder”. King “Juvenile Delinquency”. Mercer “Exception to a National Pattern?”.
Excluding Grand Jury decisions o f  “No Bill” or “Ignoramus”.
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violent offences accounted for around thirty-one-percent of fatuity and furiosity 
defences and thirty-eight-percent of all criminal cases tried on the southern circuit 
between 1708 and 1829, This suggests that there was a stronger association between 
interpersonal aggression and mental distraction amongst foimal indictments at 
England’s Old Bailey and Northern Assizes than those for southern Scotland.
Jurisdiction Number 
Of Trials
%
Property
Crimes
%
Personal
Crimes
%
Combined 
Property 
& Personal 
Offences
%
Other
Northern Assizes 2600 59 27 10 4
Southern Justiciary 850 48 38 8 6
Table 3.7. Survey o f categories o f crime indicted at the Northern Assizes (1660- 
1829) and southern Justiciary Court (1708-1829), based upon random samples
o f cases.
Amongst British insanity and idiocy defences which were entered for 
interpersonal crimes, a higli proportion of the victims were either related to the 
prisoner or else belonged to the same household (including servants, apprentices 
and masters).Relatives and household members were the victims in around seven- 
tenths of northern English insanity defences which involved violent interpersonal 
aggression (Table 3.8). The figure for southern Scotland stood nearer to thiee-fifths. 
These prosecutions reflect the development of broader perceptions that such violent
Stone, “Interpersonal violence in English Society (1300-1980)”, P&P. 101, (1983), pp.27-28 
claimed that the majority o f  violent, interpersonal crimes were directed towards persons who did not 
belong to the offender’s household or kin. This argument has been questioned by James Cockburn, 
who suggested that most victims o f  inteipersonal violence were familiar with their perpetrator 
(Cockburn “Patterns in violence in English Society: Homicide in Kent 1560-1985”, P&P. 130, 
(1991)p .l05).
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behaviour was excessive and unacceptable. Recourse to physically aggressive 
conduct was condemned more widely during the eighteenth century than in the
seventeenth.47
Jurisdiction
% of victims belonging to same 
household or 
related to the prisoner
Northern Assizes 71.9
Southern circuit of Justiciaiy 6Z3
Table 3.8. Proportion o f victims o f violent interpersonal crime who were either 
belonged to the same household or were related to the prisoner. Comparison o f the 
Northern Assizes and Scotland's southern circuit o f Justiciary, 1660-1829.
Jurisdiction % of Males % of Females
Northern Assizes 47.7 81.3
Southern circuit of Justiciary 50 100
Table 3.9. Proportion o f insanity and idiocy defences which were entered for  
interpersonal violence upon household members or kin, by the prisoner's gender. 
Comparison o f the Northern Assizes and Scotland's southern circuit o f Justiciary,
E. Foyster “At the limits o f  liberty: married women and confinement in eighteenth-century 
England”, C&C. p.40. King “Punishing assault” pp.60-61. Sharpe, “The history o f  violence in 
England: some observations” P&P. 108, (1985). Shoemaker,“Quarter Session records” p.206. 
Shoemaker “Male Honour” Stone “Interpersonal Violence” p.32. Stone “The histoiy o f
violence in England: a rejoinder” P&P. 108 (1985), p.32.
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Violent criminality was not sex-specific, but the association between intra- 
household violence and insanity was especially strong amongst the English and 
Seottish females (Tables 3 .8  and 3.9). In both northern England and southern 
Scotland insanity and idiocy defences, around half of the violent, male prisoners 
had attacked household members or kin. By compaiison, such victims accounted for 
four of every five cases involving violence by females in northern England. Only 
three mentally disturbed women were prosecuted for violent crimes in southern 
Scotland; all of them had attacked relations.
The statutory crime of child-murder informed these different patterns for males 
and females, though few child-murderers entered insanity defences at court (Table 
3.10).“^® Exactly half of northern England’s female prisoners who were mentally 
disturbed had killed their infants, a figure which replicates Eigen’s findings for the 
Old Bailey."^  ^ In Scotland, two of the three violent female offenders studied were 
arraigned for child-murder. In Britain, the statutory offence of child-murder was 
principally restricted to women who concealed and killed illegitimate progeny.^® 
Women accounted for the vast majority of persons who committed “neonaticide”, 
or the murder of new-born children.^* Contemporaries included children up to the 
age of seven in their conception of “infanthood”, so studies of “infanticide” should
In their study o f  child-murder, Hoffer and Hull found that 90% o f assaults against children were t
performed by women and that these were typically domestic crimes, Murdering Mothers p.xviii and 4
98. Kilday found a similar pattern in her study o f  southern Scottish child-murder, “Maternal I
Monstem” pp. 164-165. See also Symonds Weep not for me p.83 and “reconstructing rural I
infanticide” p.65. j
Eigen “Did Gender matter?” p .418. |
For England, 21 Jac I c.24 (1624). For Scotland, 2 Chas II c21 (1690). !
Hoffer and Hull Murdering Mothers p.xiii. They employ the term “Filicide” to describe the |
murder o f  offspring who were more than a day old, p. 148.
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be extended to include physical assaults upon children and new-born babies. 
Depending upon the interpretation of “infanticide”, this crime was not as sex- 
specific as some studies seem to suggest. Males could kill infant offspring and be 
acquitted owing to mental distraction, but the murder of infants accounted for a 
lower proportion of violent crime amongst males than fem ales.T h e  murder of 
infants accounted for fourteen-percent of the violent offences committed by insane 
males in northern England, compared with eighteen-percent in southern Scotland 
(Table 3.10). Both men and women could be perceived to transgress norms 
regarding domesticity and parenthood by murdering children. In both countries, 
such activity was associated with mental instability amongst adults of both sexes.
Jurisdiction
Proportion of violent offences 
that were “child-murders” (%)
Males Females
Northern Assizes 14 50
Southern circuit of Justiciary 18 n/a^^
Table 3.10. Proportion o f violent offences committed by criminal insane and idiotic 
which were perpetrated against infants, northern England and southern Scotland
Blackstone Commentaries IV p.24. Dalton Countrev Justice set the upper limit at nine-years-old. 
Beattie Crime p .l35 . Sharpe Crime pp.l 14-115.
See, for instance the trials o f  Jonathan Swift at Yorkshire in 1785 (ASSI 41 /8 ,41 /9  and 45/34/4) 
and James Connacher at Ayr in 1823 (JC 12/35 and AD 14/23/7).
Only three women committed violent offences and entered pleas o f  fatuity or furiosity in southern 
Scotland, two o f  them were accused o f  child-murder.
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Although violent crime could be associated strongly with mental imbalance, not 
all violence was perceived to be insane or idiotic in nature. Contemporaries 
believed that they could distinguish between “bad” and “mad” deeds, violent or 
otherwise. The context of the prisoner’s criminal behaviour, rather than their crime 
per se, indicated their mental state. Violent conduct was most persuasive as an 
indictor of insanity where such behaviour was unusual in the prisoner, thereby 
suggesting an altered state of mind. John Gibson’s failed defence of madness, at 
Jedburgh in 1814, illustrates this.^  ^ Gibson believed that his wife, Janet Renwick, 
was engaged in an extra-marital affair and was trying to poison him. Gibson 
confronted his wife, they argued and in the struggle which ensued, Gibson stabbed 
his wife to death^^|i^itnesses were convinced that such behaviour represented 
Gibson’s “violent and irritable temper, rather than the alienation of mind”. 
Aggressive belligerence was typical of Gibson’s usual character and demeanour. 
The violence represented Gibson’s usual, rather than an altered, state of mind; thus 
he was deemed to have been sane and guilty of his crime.
JC 12/28 and 26/366.
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Global patterns o f success
The English “success-rates” are based upon the proportion of known insanity 
and idiocy defences where the prisoner’s mental distraction was proven, either 
earning an acquittal or postponement of trial. Joel Eigen has followed the same 
methodology.^^ English (and Scottish) prisoners could earn a full pardon or 
mitigation on the grounds of their insanity or idiocy, via post-trial applications to 
clemency. Few documents relating to English pardons exist before the 1780s and 
the resources are unsystematic before the nineteenth century.^® An examination of 
minutes, newspaper reports and papers relating to applications for pardon unearthed 
a mere five northern English prisoners who benefited from formal, post-trial 
mitigation because of mental infirmity. Fom of these prisoners were tried between 
1816 and 1829, when records are more complete. Pardons therefore account for less 
than five-percent of the northern English sample of “insanity defences”.
Papers relating to around 400 pardons (from all England’s regional courts) 
between 1782 and 1829 were examined to establish whether mental affliction was 
regular cause for clemency outside of northern England. The prisoner’s state of 
mind was considered directly in only five of these applications, or just over one- 
percent of the cases studied. This research therefore reinforces Dana Rabin’s 
conclusion that post-trial alleviation was granted rarely in England on the grounds
Eigen Witnessing pp. 18-30 
Series HO 13 and 47.
59 See pp.355-359 for a discussion o f  Elizabeth Ward’s pardon (1816).
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of the prisoner’s mental incompetence.^^ Nor was insanity the only cause for 
clemency in the few cases discovered. In 1785, for instance, a pardon was mooted 
for George Oliver because of the prisoner’s insanity and the presiding judge’s belief 
that Oliver had been convicted “on circumstantial Evidence”.^ ^
Comparisons between the “success-rates” of insanity defences in England and 
Scotland are tempered by the alternative conceptions of criminal responsibility that 
existed within these neighbouring countries. In Scotland, guilty pleas were entered 
alongside express attempts to procure mitigated sentences owing to reduced degrees 
of insanity. In 1759, for instance, John Fairbairn’s weak-mindedness and youth 
were argued to restrict his sentence, but he also pled guilty to his crime and 
petitioned to be banished.^^ It was presented successfully that Fairbairn’s mental 
state should earn him a mitigation of sentence, but no full acquittal. Scottish juries 
could also consider prisoners to be guilty but worthy of recommendations to mercy 
on account of “partial” degrees of imbecility or madness. The failure to include 
these types of verdict within the quantitative analysis would misrepresent Scottish 
perceptions of mental affliction and criminal responsibility. Trials such as John 
Fairbaim’s were “successful” because it was proven that the prisoner suffered from 
a debilitating mental condition.
Rabin “Law and Responsibility” p. 138. 
HO 13/228-230.
“  JC 12/9 and JC 26/163.
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Dates:
Northern
England:
Southern
Scotland:
Total 
insanity 
and idiocy 
defences
%
successful
Total 
insanity 
and idiocy 
defences
%
successful
1700-1759 31 77.4 9 44.4
1760-1799 28 67.9 6 6&7
1800-1829 74 64.9 20 70
Overall 1700-1829 133 68.4 35 6Z8
Table 3. 11. Global success-rates during insanity and idiocy defences at the 
northern English and southern Scottish circuit courts, 1700-1829.
Overall, insanity and idiocy defences were more successful in northern England 
than in southern Scotland. Compared with southern Scottish hearings, these types of 
criminal defence were almost twice as likely to succeed in England before the 
1760s (Table 3.11), although failed hearings can be difficult to trace. Acquittal-rates 
in provincial England and Scotland followed divergent trends throughout the long 
eighteenth century. Between 1760 and 1799, the success-rate rose in Scotland, but 
fell at both the Noilhern Assizes and Old Bailey. About fifty-percent of Old Bailey 
cases ended in the proof of madness during the 1760s, dropping to a low of thirty- 
seven percent during the 1790s, before increasing again after 1800.^^
Eigen Witnessing pp.22-24. Figure 1.2.
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The success-rates of both northern English and southern Scottish defences are 
appreciably higher than published figures for insanity defences. Nigel Walker has 
suggested that only one-third of English insanity defences were proven during the 
eighteenth century. Joel Eigen has demonstrated that, with the exception of two 
anomalous decades, the acquittal-rate during Old Bailey insanity defences stood at 
around fifty-percent between 1760 and 1843. At both provincial circuits, the 
success-rate hovered at aroimd two-thirds of all insanity and idiocy defences 
between 1760 and 1800 (Table 3.11). Undoubtedly, failed insanity defences have 
been veiled by the vagaries of the provincial criminal materials that were 
investigated. This failing has been corrected somewhat by the surveys of 
depositions and narratives. Comparisons between Eigen’s work and this research 
must be considered carefully, yet it would seem that criminal defences of insanity 
and idiocy were more successful in provincial England and Scotland than at the Old 
Bailey, at least after 1760. In contrast to Walker’s conjecture, the provincial 
prisoner’s insanity or idiocy was proven in the majority of northern English and 
southern Scottish cases. Such high proportional success-rates suggest that the 
provincial courts were not predisposed to regarding all insanity and idiocy defences 
with scepticism.
64 Walker Crime and Insanity I p.72.
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Explaining success-rates: types o f crime committed and associated sentences
Joel Eigen has provided a lucid explanation for the changing rates of acquittal in 
Old Bailey insanity defences. Eigen bifui'cated the prisoners’ transgressions into 
offences against persons and property, finding significantly different patterns of 
acquittal for “personal” and “property” crimes. Successful insanity defences for 
interpersonal, violent offences rose sharply from around forty-percent in the 1790s 
to over sixty-percent in each decade between 1800 and 1830. By contrast, the 
success-rate in property offences did not alter significantly.^^ Eigen argued that the 
increased acquittals in violent crime were connected to the Criminal Lunatics and 
Safe Custody Acts of 1800, which were drafted and implemented following James 
Hadfield’s infamous insanity defence.^^
Similar* trends were not perceptible in either northern England or southern 
Scotland. The Scottish acquittal-rate fell from sixty-seven-percent in the late-1700s 
to forty-percent between 1800 and 1829 (Table 3.12). In souther*n Scotland after 
1800, in contrast to both northern England and the Old Bailey, a higher proportion 
of insanity and idiocy defences were successful in relation to property offences 
(Table 3.13). Some Parliamentary statutes regarding criminal insanity were not 
applicable to Scotland, such as the terms included in the 1744 Vagrancy Act for the 
detention of “dangerous” persons who were mentally disturbed.^^ The Criminal
Eigen Witnessing pp.22-23.
^  Walker Crime and Insanity I pp. 74-82. Moran “Origins” pp.487-504. Eigen Witnessing p.23.
Houston “Poor Relief and the Dangerous and Criminal Insane in Scotland during the long 
eighteenth century” (unpublished paper) p. 1.
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Lunatics and Safe Custody Acts of 1800 did apply to Scotland, however. These acts 
neither sparked nor regularised a higher acquittal rate amongst fatuity and furiosity 
defences which were pled to exculpate violent interpersonal crimes on the southern 
circuit of Justiciary.
Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
1760-1799 83% 67%
1800-1829 76% 40%
Table 3.12. Proportion o f insanity defences W’hich were successful in response to 
violent crimes against the person. Northern England and southern Scotland 1760-
7(929.
Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
1760-1799 57% 67%
1800-1829 57% 73%
Table 3.13. Proportion o f insanity defences which were successful in response 
to property offences. Northern England and southern Scotland 1760-1829.
After 1800, the acquittal-rate also fell in northern England regarding insanity 
defences for violent offences. Eighty-three-percent of such cases earned acquittals 
between 1760 and 1799, whilst the success-rate fell to seventy-six-percent between 
1800 and 1829 (Table 3.12). Eighteenth century sources may have masked failed
1 0 3
defences, thereby hiding a real increase in success-rates after 1800. It seems 
unlikely, however, that the acquittal-rate at the Northern Assizes rose by twenty- 
percent as occurred at the Old Bailey between 1760 and 1843.^ ® For such a 
proportional increase to have occurred in northern England, a further fifteen cases 
(sixty-percent of the total already discovered) would need to be uncovered for the 
period between 1760 and 1799. All of these cases would need to be failed defences 
for violent crimes. It seems unfeasible that such a bulk of cases would evade 
scrutiny, especially given that court records relating to 1,400 cases and 2,000 
printed narratives were examined for the period 1760-1829 in an effort to identify 
failed insanity defences. It is more realistic to suggest that Hadfield’s trial, and the 
legislative changes which followed, did not have the same impact upon acquittals in 
northern England as at the Old Bailey.^^
^  Eigen Witnessing p.23.
It might be possible to speculate that such famous cases led to an increased awareness o f  criminal 
lunacy and the ramifications o f  such a verdict at law, although adequate proof is lacking to support 
such a thesis.
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Capital offences
The success-rate of insanity and idiocy defences for capital offences fell in both 
regions after 1800. The northern English acquittal rate in “capitals” fell by twenty- 
percent after 1799 (Table 3.14). A less dramatic decline in success-rate occurred in 
southern Scotland. An enlarged number of specific offences carried the death 
penalty over the course of the long eighteenth century within both legal traditions. 
Despite this, capital punishment was regarded increasingly with distaste and was 
reserved as an exemplary punishment for serious crimes. Aversion to hanging was 
epitomized by British juries who mitigated sentences by returning “partial verdicts”, 
whilst there were Parliamentary calls to reform judicial codes from the late 
eighteenth century.^^ If insanity or idiocy was used as a simple means of mitigating 
harsh penal codes, then an enhanced acceptance of this type of plea might be 
reflected by an increased success-rate at court. That the opposite was tme suggests 
that false pleas of mental distraction were not accepted or invented as a regular 
form of mitigation in capital cases. Courtroom participants applied the concepts of 
mental disability and distraction selectively, rather than indiscriminately.
S. Devereaux, “The Making o f  the Penitentiary Act, 1775-1779”, HJ, 42, 4, (1999) pp.408-412. 
A.J. Draper, “Cesare Beccaria’s influence on English discussions o f  punishment, 1764-1789”, 
History o f  European Ideas. 26, 3-4, (2000), passim.
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Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
1760-1799 83% 78%
1800-1829 62% 70%
Table 3.14. Proportion o f insanity and idiocy defences which were successful in 
response to capital crimes, northern England and southern Scotland 1760-1829.
By the nineteenth centmy, a significant minority of British insanity and idiocy 
defences concerned non-capital offences (Table 3.15). The increase in numbers and 
proportion of non-capital offences indicates further that insanity and idiocy 
defences were not invented merely to mitigate the death-penalty. This can partly be 
explained by changes in statutory law. Both legal traditions carried seventeenth 
century statutes which established “child-murder” as a capital offence. These 
statutes directed courts to assume that those accused of child-murder were guilty 
until proven innocent, rather than vice versaJ^ Such instructions chafed against 
broader evidentiary principles. Stimulated by concerns regarding legal evidence and 
the severity of sentence, the child-murder statutes were repealed in 1803 for 
England and 1808 for Scotland.^^ Insanity or idiocy continued to be pled in 
response to accusations of child-muider through to 1829, despite this change. This 
also indicates that connections between insanity and the crime of child-murder were 
established fiimly in provincial Britain by the early nineteenth century.
For England, 21 Jac I c.24 (1624). For Scotland, 2 Chas 11 c21 (1690).
Walker Crime and Insanity 1 p. 126. Hoffer and Hull Murdering Mothers pp.85-90. Symonds 
“Reconstructing rural infanticide” p .l.
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Dates Northern England Southern Scotland
Number 
of trials
Proportion 
of trials
Number 
of trials
Proportion 
of trials
1700-1799 12 29% 3 19%
1800-1829 21 36% 10 30%
Table 3.15. Proportion o f insanity and idiocy defences which were pled in response 
to non-capital crimes, northern England and southern Scotland 1760-1829.
The success-rates of insanity and idiocy defences for non-capital crimes 
increased after 1800 (Table 3.16). This echoed broad changes in legal theory. The 
seventeenth century English juiist, Matthew Hale, argued that insanity or idiocy 
could only be accepted as a sound criminal defence where a “capital” offence had 
been committed.Likewise, Mackenzie argued that such a plea was only fit for 
serious crimes such as murder. By the late eighteenth century, Blackstone reflected 
a more lenient attitude when he stated that mentally distracted persons were 
“incapable of committing any crime”, capital or otherwise.Furiosity and fatuity 
defences were also accepted for non-capital crimes in Scotland by the early 
nineteenth century, such as James Me Adam’s assault upon Janet Rogerson in 
1804.^  ^Mental unsoundness was received as a sound defence for a broader range of 
crimes both in practice and in theory by the late eighteenth century.
Hale Pleas 117361.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p. 195, my emphasis.
JC 12/24.
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Date Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
1700-1799 66% 33%
1800-1829 81% 60%
Table 3.16. Proportion o f insanity and idiocy defences which were successful in 
response to non-capital crimes northern England and southern Scotland 1760-
7,929.
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Conclusions
There are difficulties in tracing insanity and idiocy defences, particularly those 
which failed in northern England before the 1790s. Still, some broad conclusions 
can be drawn. In relation to all criminal trials, few insanity and idiocy defences 
were entered at the provincial courts between 1660 and 1829. The irregularity of 
these types trial demonstrates that findings of insanity and idiocy were not reached 
indiscriminately at court. Such verdicts were not used regularly as alternative means 
of discretionary mitigation in the courtroom, but were employed to designate 
prisoners who were perceived to have suffered from pathologies which were only 
too real. Contemporaries were convinced that specific types of conduct, appearance 
and speech were indicative of troubled mental states. Most criminals did not display 
these signals.
Between 1660 and 1829, fewer insanity and idiocy defences were entered at 
England and Scotland’s circuit criminal courts than at the contemporary Old Bailey, 
principally because provincial courts dealt with far less litigation. The lack of 
provincial court narratives before the 1770s hampers direct comparisons between 
the incidence of these defences at the Northern Assizes and the Old Bailey. 
Northern English records might mask failed defences of mental incompetence. Even 
without these “dormant” hearings, however, the incidence of insanity and idiocy 
defences as a proportion of all criminal hearings was higher at the Northern Assizes 
than at the Old Bailey, at least after 1760. The personnel who were central to the
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processes of prosecution may have been more receptive to these forms of plea in the 
provinces. Perhaps most intriguingly, this pattern might indicate that London’s 
mentally distracted transgressors more regularly avoided formal prosecution, either 
through pre-trial discretionary mitigation or summary incarceration. These 
hypotheses require further investigation of the pre-trial processes in Britain, in the 
specific context of mentally disturbed offenders.
The southern Scottish sample is small in relation to the English findings, but 
this research provides intriguing analysis. A greater share of southern Scottish 
criminal tribunals included an evaluation of the pannel’s mental condition when 
compared with either the Northern Assizes or the Old Bailey. Scotland’s different 
pattern can be explained by her adherence to independent legal principles, notably 
the “Rule of Proportions”. The Justiciary Court obtained to distinctive legal 
practices, such as the regular involvement of legal representatives. Scotland’s 
system of public prosecution may also have ensured that these types of offenders 
were officially assessed at court, rather than escaping formal accusation. This 
hypothesis is expanded later.
As at the Old Bailey, there was no simple, linear increase in the proportion of 
insanity defences that succeeded in provincial Britain. The source materials 
investigated preclude firm comparisons between the success-rates in provincial 
Britain and the Old Bailey. Amongst the English and Scottish circuit trials that were 
unearthed, defences of insanity and idiocy appear to have been more efficacious
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than at the contemporary Old Bailey. Nigel Walker once contended that two-thirds 
of insanity defences failed in England, but this study suggests that prisoners were 
able to prove their mental distress in most northern English cases. Similarly, the 
minority of southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity defences failed between 1707 and 
1829.
The broad patterns of success differed in southern Scotland and northern 
England, as befits legal circuits which could apply substantially different theoretical 
and practical frameworks. Joel Eigen discovered a marked increase in the success- 
rates of Old Bailey insanity defences entered for violent, personal offences after 
1800. This pattern was not replicated in either northern England or southern 
Scotland. James Hadfield’s trial in 1800 and the consequent statutory changes had 
less notable impacts upon either of the circuit courts than at the contemporary Old 
Bailey. Alternative explanations for trends in acquittal and incidence have been 
proposed. Insanity and idiocy defences were usually entered for capital crimes in 
Britain, although non-capital offences could be met also with pleas of mental 
incapacity. Defences entered for capital transgressions did not enjoy a greater 
success-rate than those used in response to non-capital crimes. Insanity and idiocy 
were not used recuiTently as alternative means of circumventing the death penalty.
The behaviour of mentally disturbed persons was not associated universally 
with violent interpersonal crime. Propeity crimes proliferated amongst southern
I l l
Scottish and Old Bailey insanity and idiocy defences/^ Despite such findings, there 
was a sti'ong relationship between aggressive, inteipersonal transgressions and 
mentally distracted prisoners in England. At both the Old Bailey and Northern 
Assizes, a higher proportion of the prosecutions brought against violent offenders 
involved insanity defences than in property felonies. Tliis was not true of southern 
Scotland, which may have been anomalous in this respect. Subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate that Scotland’s different patterns of incidence were related to the type 
of plea entered on behalf of the prisoner. Defences of fatuity and fuiiosity “in-bar- 
of-trial” (postponement of the hearing) certainly accounted for most of the southern 
Scottish property offences studied.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 18-28.
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4,
The prisoner's social characteristics
This chapter investigates how the prisoner’s social characteristics impacted 
upon these types of hearing. The social and economic station of northern English 
and southern Scottish prisoners is compared, followed by an investigation of the 
prisoner’s gender, age and marital status.
Interpretations of the social standing and gender of those who suffered from 
mental afflictions, in relation to those who validated and managed them, have 
spawned contentious debates. Scholars such as Thomas Szasz and Michel Foucault 
have suggested that the identification and authentication of mental disturbance were 
oppressive discourses rather than real pathologies.’ These theories contend that 
mental afflictions were invented and wielded by male-dominated, property-owning 
elites to maintain their authority. Social subordinates, such as impoverished persons 
and females, who refused to conform to cultural expectations of conduct, wer.e 
categorised as being mentally incompetent. Thomas Szasz has also argued that 
criminal defences of insanity were applied in instances where socially subordinate 
persons attacked their patiiarchal superiors, such as Edward Arnold’s assault upon 
Lord Onslow in 1723, or James Hadfield’s shooting at George 111 in 1800.^ To 
Szasz, the insanity defence was an elaborate means of camouflaging social fissures.
 ^ Szasz Myth and Manufacture o f  Madness. Foucault Madness and Civilisation p.23-28. For similar 
arguments, see Dorner Madmen and the Boui geoisie. For a critical analysis o f  these theories, see 
Vatz and Weinburg “Rhetorical Paradigm”, also Houston Madness and “Class, Gender and 
Madness”.
 ^For an outline o f  these cases, see Eigen Witnessing pp.22, 40 and 49-54.
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It is questioned whether verdicts of insanity and idiocy were only employed 
repressively against persons of inferior social and economic standing.
Detailed expositions of the prisoners’ social characteristics, other than their 
gender, ar e hampered by the tachygraphic manner of formal legal documents.^ The 
prisoner’s social and occupational background was not recorded in almost one-third 
of English and around one-fifth of Scottish cases. This was particularly true of 
females, who were generally identified by their marital status or else the occupation 
of their husband or father.'’ Still, it is possible to reveal some aggregative patterns 
which help in our imderstanding of long eighteenth century insanity and idiocy 
defences. This section provides a springboard for the qualitative analyses which are 
presented in subsequent chapters. The construction that is employed here to 
characterise British society underestimates the level of social mobility within each 
strata. This construct also masks the internal divisions within each stratum, based 
upon wealth, occupation and gender.^ This basic categorization is used because it 
provides clear, if generalised, analyses.
 ^For a discussion o f the “contingencies” which affect the statistical analysis o f  legal documents, see 
Houston Madness chapter 3 “Patterns o f  Madness” pp.91-17.
Houston Madness p.35.
 ^Walker “Women, Üieft” p .81.
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Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
Number % Number %
Elites^ 5 4.8 2 5.7
Middling sorts^ 13 12.5 5 14.3
'"Labourers”^ 52 50 21 60
Unknown^ 34 32.7 7 20
Table 4,1. Broad categories o f the social station o f northern English and 
southern Scottish prisoners during insanity and idiocy defences, 1660-1829.
Most English and Scottish insanity and idiocy defences concerned impoverished 
prisoners of low social station (Table 4.1). This is unsurprising, because the 
majority of British criminal defendants belonged to the lower, landless ranks of 
society. Persons of elite status were subjected infrequently to formal criminal 
prosecution and this was reflected by their low proportion amongst insanity and 
idiocy defendants. Amongst the trials studied, the patterns relating to the prisoners’ 
social stations therefore corresponded broadly to trends regarding the social
 ^Persons styled “gentleman” or “Esquire”, wealthy landowners. Justices o f  the Peace. In Scotland, 
this included landowning persons who were described as being “o f ’ their place o f  residence, such as 
William Douglas o f  Luce. The same designation could be applied in England, paiticulai'ly before the 
mid-eighteenth centuiy, as in “Charles Jackson o f  Carleton” (see below).
’ Persons styled “yeomen”, farmers (including tenants where they not described as being 
impoverished), wealthier tradesmen, merchants, craftsmen and artisans.
® Persons typically styled as belonging to “labouring”, impoverished households; also including the 
likes o f  miners, sailors, journeymen artisans, seivants and vagrants.
 ^Includes occasions where females were recorded as being “single” but no occupation (household or 
individual) was supplied.
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standing of all prosecuted criminals. Nevertheless, prisoners from all stations of 
English and Scottish society could be afflicted mentally, from Granville Medhurst 
Esquire, who was described as being a “gentleman of very large fortune”, through 
to the “vagabond”, Jean Stowrie.”’
In northern England, rates of acquittal differed according to the prisoner’s social 
standing. Amongst the northern English cases studied, one-third of persons 
described as being “labourers” (or of similarly low, landless station) failed to prove 
that they were afflicted mentally. By comparison, upwai'ds of eighty-five-percent of 
“middling” English prisoners were successful in their plea. All five northern 
English “gentlemen” proved their defences of insanity. These gentlemen had 
committed offences which carried sentence of either death or transportation, but this 
pattern did not reflect a conspiracy, whereby persons of higli standing avoided harsh 
punishments by feigning or arguing their insanity deceptively.”  Insanity defences 
involving elite persons could fail, such as earl Ferrers’ hearing at the House of 
Lords in 1760 for murder.’^  The location and public interest in Ferrers’ defence was 
atypical, but his fate illustrates that, to be a successful defence, mental incapacity 
had to be proven by observing contemporary evidential standards. Earl Ferrers’ case 
was organised poorly and he failed to provide persuasive proofs of his insanity.
Medhurst: A S S I41/10, Gentleman’s Magazine 81 pt. II (August 1811) p .l31 . Stowrie: JC 12/4.
” Three committed murder (Jackson 1666, Medhurst 1800 and Maister 1803), one was arraigned for 
riot (Fothergill 1778) and one for spreading false news (Drake 1686).
Walker Crime and Insanity I pp. 62-64. Eigen Witnessing pp. 1-2 Andrews and Scull Undertaker 
pp.193-215.
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This, combined with substantial evidence that he resorted regularly to violence, but 
did so in a rational, calculated fashion, confirmed the peer’s guilt.”
Northern
England
%
Southern
Scotland
%
Elites 100 n/a’'’
Middling sorts 84.7 73.1
Labourers 66.4 71.4
Table 4.2. Success-rate o f defences o f insanity and idiocy by category o f social 
standing, Northern Assizes and southern Justiciary Court, 1660-1829.
Britain’s criminal laws were not impartial or equitable to all litigants.” 
Prisoners of high social and economic status could be advantaged by their 
capability to employ counsel in large numbers and pay the expenses of witnesses 
who might prove their insanity, for instance. Yet successful insanity defences 
matched broadly-held perceptions of criminal responsibility and universal standards 
of legal proof. ”  The law of evidence was not merely dictated by social (or legal) 
elites.”  Criminal trials were conducted in public and the criminal code was justified 
by the adherence to broadly assumed expectations of justice and criminal 
responsibility.”  Witnesses, jurors, judges and spectators were convinced that
Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp.193-215.
Only two prisoners o f  high local standing entered defences o f fatuity or furiosity in southern 
Scotland, Thomas Kirkpatrick o f  Fenton (Perjuiy, Dumfries 1755) and John Douglas o f  Luce 
(Murder, Dumfries 1795). The defence o f  the former failed, whilst the latter was acquitted by a 
plurality o f  the jurors’ votes.
See, for instance. Hay “Class Composition” Green “Retrospective” pp. 384-395. King
Crime p.353.
Crawford “Emergence” pp. 9-11 and 93-100. Eigen Witnessing passim.
Green “Retrospective” pp.393-395.
Idem.
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prisoners who suffered from mental disabilities could be distinguished from 
defendants who were sane or who dissimulated such conditions.
Southern Scotland’s success-rates suggest that the prisoner’s social standing had 
a less significant impact upon the outcome of their fatuity or furiosity defences than 
in England. Three-fifths of middling and lower order “pannels” were successful in 
southern Scotland. Scotland’s pattern was informed by a close attention to 
evidential criteria, driven by the regular involvement of legal counsel for both 
litigating parties. The impact of regular participation of counsel is considered in a 
later chapter.”
Some historians have suggested that England’s criminal law was utilised by 
property-owning persons of distinguished rank to control the behaviour of their 
social and economic subordinates.^’’ After considerable debate, most historians now 
concur that the male “middling sorts” most regularly entered prosecutions at law, 
when compared to both the highest and lowest orders of society.^’ This study of 
British insanity and idiocy defences fortifies such recent research (Table 4.3). The 
majority of victims studied in both northern England and southern Scotland were 
“middle-ranking” persons. These persons could own real-estate and be involved in 
local administration, but they did not belong to the highest echelons of provincial
See Chapter 9.
Thompson “Whigs and Hunters pp.258-269. Hay “Propeity, Authority” pp.58-59 and “War, 
Dearth and Theft” p. 152. See also Porter Mind Forg’d Manacles p.9 and Scull “Museums o f  
Madness Revisited” for synopses o f  this historiography.
Peter King’s study o f  eighteenth-century Essex suggests that the middling sorts (such as farmers 
and tradesmen) accounted for two-thirds o f  all property prosecutions. King Crime pp.35-37.
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society. The lower orders of society could be the victims of crime and instigate 
formal prosecutions at law during the long eighteenth century. Almost one-quarter 
of English and Scottish victims were of impoverished and low standing, at least 
amongst the cases where their social identities were revealed (Table 4.3). Lower 
order persons were typically, but not uniformly, the victims of interpersonal and 
intra-household violence, particularly murder.^^ This indicates that a broad section 
of British society regarded such aggression to be unacceptable.
OCCUPATION 
/  STATUS
NORTHERN 
ENGLISH VICTIMS 
(%)
SOUTHERN SCOTTISH 
VICTIMS 
(%)
Gentlemen, Esquires, major 
landowners, etc. 9 5
Farmers 
(Tenant and small-holders) 20 44
Tradesmen, Merchants, 
wealthy Artisans etc. 18 19
“Labourers” 
(Miners, servants, etc.) 24 23
Unknown 18 0
Table 4.3. Social and economic status o f the victims ofprosecuted crime during 
insanity and idiocy defences. Northern England 1665-1829 and southern
Scotland 1711-1829.
King has suggested that a high proportion o f  all lower-order victims had suffered violent, 
interpersonal transgressions. Crime p.26 and “Punishing Assault” p.55. See also Cockbuin, “Patterns 
in violence” p. 105 and Stone “Interpersonal Violence” pp.27-28.
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It was not inevitable that criminal cases involved the prosecution of social and 
economic subordinates by their superiors. Besides cases of intra-household 
violence, victims of low standing could prosecute property transgressors who also 
belonged to the lower ranks of society.^^ At the Yorkshire Assizes in 1795, Thomas 
Musgrave alias Robert Johnstone was incapable mentally of standing trial for the 
theft of many articles, including clothing.^'’ Musgrave was prosecuted by his fellow 
“servants” who worked at Mr Smith’s mill at Hunsingore.^^ Persons of different 
occupational and social strata could perceive the law in distinctive manners 
Musgrave’s case demonstrates, however, that persons of low social and economic 
standing perceived the criminal law to be a useful, effective and legitimate means of 
redressing criminal wrongs other than violent offences.
N. Garnham The Courts. Crime and Criminal Law in Ireland 1692-1760. (1996) pp.60-61 
proposes a similar thesis for contemporaiy Irish property offenders and crime.
^  ASSI 41/10.
ASSI 45/38/3 nos. 8-14.
^  King Crime pp.353-373.
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The prisoners ' gender
Scholars have claimed that insanity was perceived to be experienced by 
females, rather than males, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries/^ These 
interpretations have also contended that the concept of “insanity” was invented and 
used oppressively by male, professional persons to label, curtail and control female 
behaviour which rebelled against customary, male-imposed norms. Such 
contentions have been challenged strongly by arguments that contemporary 
experiences and perceptions of insanity were not gendered so crudely It has also 
been suggested that contemporaries perceived that mental afflictions robbed persons 
of their ability to choose to act in the way that they did. Any “rebellion” by females 
was therefore implicit, rather than explicit in nature.”
Jurisdiction Ratio of Prisoners
Male Female
Northern Assizes 3.7 1
Southern Justiciary Court 4.8 1
Table 4.4. Gender o f prisoners during insanity and idiocy defences, expressed 
by ratio. Northern England and southern Scotland, J660-1829.
Amongst provincial British prisoners, mental afflictions were most regularly 
experienced by males rather than females (Table 4.4). This reflects the fact that
Chesler Women and Madness (1972). Showalter Female Malady (1987).
MacDonald “Women and Madness”. Busfield “The Female Malady?” and Men. Women and 
Madness Tomes “Feminist Histories o f Psychiatry”. Houston “Madness and Gender” and “Class, 
Gender and Madness”.
Houston “Madness and Gender” p.325.
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fewer females were prosecuted formally at the superior courts than males. In total, 
twenty-four of the northern English prisoners that were studied were female (just 
under one-quaiter of the English sample). In northern England, the mental 
conditions of thirty-seven males were evaluated for every ten females.^” Six of the 
thirty-five southern Scottish “pannels” were women, where the ratio stood at forty- 
eight males to ten females. This was not dissimilai* to the sex-ratio of persons whose 
mental faculties were examined at the contemporary Scottish civil courts, where 
around forty-four male subjects appeared for every ten females.^’ Informative 
analysis can be offered, despite this low sample-base of women.
Records do not reveal the social and economic standing of aromid one-third of 
the British women who entered defences of insanity or idiocy. Where data can be 
retrieved, the vast majority of female insanity and idiocy defences involved women 
from poor, labouring households or who were servants. All but two of the women 
who pled fatuity or furiosity in southern Scotland were of impoverished 
backgrounds. To take one example, Susan Tinny had been dismissed from service 
“having quarrelled with her master”, Andrew McDowal.^^ Depositions reveal that 
Tinny remained unemployed and in a dire state of poverty, having “no Clothes of 
any consequence to spare, as her clothes had been arrested for Debt”. These 
criminal court records reveal priceless accounts of the experiences and perceptions
The sex-ratio for litigants at England’s civil courts between the 15"' and 17"* Centuries stood at 
around 5 males to 1 female, Neugebauer “Mental Handicap in Medieval and Early Modem England: 
Criteria, Measm ement and Care”, in Bartlett and Wright (eds.). Outside the Walls o f  the Asvlum -  
The Histoiv o f  Care in the Community. 1750-2000. (1999), p.27.
Houston Madness p. 124.
AD 14/15/41.
122
of abnormality amongst lower-order females. On the other hand, these records 
reveal less about the experiences of higher status women.
The occupation or social standing of males could not be deduced in around one- 
fifth of all the cases studied. Where vocation and status were recorded, the majority 
of the males whose mental soundness was questioned also belonged to the 
impoverished, landless orders of society. Low-status occupations such as labourers, 
miners and journeymen predominated. In contrast to the women studied, one- 
quarter of males owned land and could be identified as belonging to either the 
wealthier “middling sorts” or the “elites” of society. Thus, provincial British cases 
included wealthy landowners such as William Douglas of Luce and Charles Jackson 
of Carleton who pled insanity.^^ Prisoners appeared such as the merchant, John 
Fairbairn, and the surgeon, James Towers, who were socially superior to the 
landless poor and subordinate to local lairds or gentry.^'’ It was not just low status 
males who were formally prosecuted at the provincial criminal courts between 1660 
and 1829.
British insanity and idiocy defences involved male subjects most frequently. 
This finding is significant because, conventionally, males were afforded greater 
legal, social and economic statuses than females. A verdict of mental incompetence 
therefore removed such antecedent distinctions from male prisoners.^^ Female 
mental incompetence was less likely to be established formally and publicly by
JC 12/22. ASSI 42/1 ffl63b. 
JC 12/9. ASSI 41/12. 
Houston Madness p. 125.
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legal processes/^ In the context of criminal hearings, it seems probable that the 
legal and social principles that subordinated women within society also sheltered 
them from prosecution and subsequent debates concerning their mental fitness. 
Women could thus avoid the social and legal corollaries which accompanied 
verdicts of insanity or idiocy, such as the stigma which was attached to mental 
infirmity or the prospect of indefinite incarceration on such grounds.
Victims and prosecuting officials could decide not to prosecute deranged 
persons. Thus, the offender’s unsound mental state could inform pre-trial 
discretionary mitigation of both males and females in Britain.^^ In 1810, William 
Masterman was apprehended for “shooting and wounding” a corporal of the Suffolk 
militia, who was billeted in Carlisle.^^ Newspapers reported that the prosecution 
against Mastennan was dropped before trial “on account of insanity”. Six years 
later, Elizabeth Ward was found guilty of poisoning her sister at the Yorkshire 
Assizes. Petitions for Ward’s pardon, grounded upon her “weak-mindedness”, were 
entered subsequently.^^ It was noted amongst these pardoning-papers that “about a 
fortnight” before Elizabeth Wai’d had poisoned her sister (unwittingly), Elizabeth 
had stolen “a box of ribbands” fiom “the shop of one Mr. Effingliam at Rothwell”. 
Elizabeth then proceeded to distribute “the greater part of these ribbands on the 
same day and within twenty yards of the shop ... to women and children gratis”.'”’
O f course, female insanity and idiocy could be announced by other means, such as by admission 
to madhouses or asylums.
See King Crime for a recent investigation o f  pre-trial discretion in England regarding (sane) 
offenders against property.
Carlisle Journal
ASSI 41/12 and 45/49. York Herald July 27"’ and September 7"’ 1816. HO 13/29 and 47/55.
HO 47/55/109-109, Viscount Lascelles to Lord Sidmouth, 3T ‘ August 1816.
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Ward’s activities signalled her imbecility. Elizabeth’s distribution of the “ribbands” 
so close to the shop indicated that she did not understand that she had committed a 
crime, whilst her dispersal of the goods for free suggested that she had no 
comprehension of their financial worth. Ward’s mental condition informed Mr. 
Effingham’s discretionary decision not to prosecute, although Effingham’s 
amicability was also influenced by Ward’s impoverished father, who agreed to pay 
for the pilfered goods. Victims may have shown such discretion less readily towards 
poor prisoners who were imable to rely upon friends and family to provide suitable 
compensation.
Jurisdiction
Male Female
No. of 
prisoners
%
successfril
No. of 
prisoners
%
successful
Northern Assizes 81 79 23 69.6
Southern Justiciary Court 29 69 6 66.7
Table 4.5. Proportion o f defences where the prisoner’s mental debility was 
proven successfully, expressed as a percentage 1660-1829.
Women were not more successful than men in proving that they suffered from 
debilitating mental conditions during criminal trials (Table 4.5). Amongst the small 
southern Scottish sample, around two-thirds of both male and female fatuity and 
furiosity defences were proven at court. In northern England, a greater proportion of
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male prisoners were acquitted than females during the long eighteenth century. If 
contemporaries did regard women to be more susceptible to mental infirmity, then 
such preconceptions were not reflected by the outcome of provincial insanity and 
idiocy defences. Eigen reached a similar conclusion in his study of gender and 
insanity defences at the Old Bailey, finding generally that acquittal-rates were 
unaffected by the prisoner’s gender.'^’
In her study of contemporary literature, Elaine Showalter suggested that there 
was an explicit relationship between females and the transient condition of 
insanity.'’^  By contrast, insanity was neither experienced nor perceived to be a 
“female malady” in Britain’s criminal courts. Amongst non compotes who were 
insane, rather than idiotic, females were outnumbered by males at both the Northern 
Assizes and in southern Scotland (Table 4.6). Nor were women more liable to be 
acquitted when pleading insanity, as the success-rates for insanity alone followed 
the general patterns at the provincial criminal courts (Table 4.5).
Jurisdiction: Male : Female
Northern Assizes 4.54 : 1
Southern Justiciary circuit 3 : 1
Table 4.6. Ratio o f prisoners pleading insanity (not idiocy) in northern England 
and southern Scotland, 1660-1829.
Eigen “Did gender matter?” pp.418-419. 
Showalter Female Malady pp.3-4.
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A minority of the British prisoners who were investigated were found to be 
idiotic, as opposed to insane. A mere ten-percent of northern Assizes non compotes 
were considered to be idiotic or imbecilic, whereas over one-third of the southern 
Scottish prisoners studied were either fatuous or “weak-minded”. A larger 
proportion of Scottish defendants were proven to suffer from idiocy because of the 
“Rule of Proportions”, which stated that a partially debilitating form of imbecility 
could be presented as a sound legal defence in mitigation of sentence.
Overall, the lower proportion of “imbecility” defences may indicate that fewer 
British criminals suffered from idiocy than insanity, but it could also reflect 
contemporary ideas that idiocy was a less threatening (if incurable) form of mental 
affliction than insanity.'’^  The behaviom- of idiots was understood to be more 
predictable than manic forms of insanity. Imbecilic persons were also perceived to 
be totally incapable of forming criminal intent or plamiing crimes, but were 
susceptible to being duped into offending by nefarious crooks. This may suggest 
that persons afflicted by idiocy may have offended less frequently than insane 
persons, or that greater discretion was shown towards idiots who committed crimes.
Peter Rushton has found that idiocy more regulai'ly afflicted males than females, 
at a ratio of three-to-one, within north-eastern English Quarter Session records.'’'’ 
The sex-ratio of idiocy defences at the Northern Assizes was more evenly balanced.
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” p.66. 
Rushton “Idiocy” p.42.
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at five males per thiee females, although more male than female prisoners suffered 
from idiocy at the Northern Assizes (Table 4.7). A greater proportion of women 
prisoners were afflicted by imbecility (Table 4.8). Of the northern English females 
whose mental faculties were examined in court, just over one-fifth of them were 
deemed to be idiotic or weak-minded, which contrasted with a mere five-percent of 
northern English males. This could reflect contemporary archetypes that women 
were more prone to being weak-minded or mentally deficient than males.'’^
Jurisdiction: Male : Female
Northern Assizes 5 :3
Southern Justiciary circuit 5 : 1
Table 4.7. Ratio o f prisoners pleading idiocy (not insanity) in northern England 
and southern Scotland, 1660-1829.
On Scotland’s southern circuit, male outnumbered female fatuity by a ratio of 
five-to-one (Table 4.7), including cases of imbecility or “weak-mindedness” which 
were pled in mitigation of punishment. The subjects of Scottish civil court “brieves” 
of fatuity were predominantly male, at a ratio of just over four men per woman 
assessed.'’^  The proportion of southern Scottish males and females who were 
considered to be imbecilic or else “weak-minded” was very similar, however, 
accounting for about one-third of the cases for both sexes (Table 4.8). So, in
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” pp.81-82.
Houston Madness pp.124-125. The sex-ratio amongst brieves o f  fatuity stood at 4.09:1,
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contrast to northern England, idiotic forms of mental deficiency were not more 
likely to be associated with women than men during southern Scottish criminal 
defences.
Jurisdiction
Male Female
No. of 
prisoners
% of
prisoners
No. of 
prisoners
% of 
prisoners
Northern Assizes 6 7.4 5 21.7
Southern Justiciary Court 11 37.9 4 66.7
Table 4.8. Proportion o f northern English and southern Scottish male and 
female prisoners whose defence rested upon idiocy (as opposed to insanity), 1660-
The admission of mentally distressed persons to private madhouses and public 
asylums could depend upon their marital status in Britain and France/^ The 
offender’s marital status could also affect whether prisoners were prosecuted or 
their mental states were evaluated foimally at court. The six Scottish women whose 
mental condition was evaluated at court were single, although three were widowed. 
Just over two-thirds of the English women studied were either “singlewomen” or 
widows. Marriage may well have shielded mentally disturbed women from formal 
prosecution, with husbands or household accepting responsibility for their
Digby Madness. Morality p .l75 . Houston Madness pp. 144-151 and “Madness and Gender” 
pp.314-317. Ripa Women and Madness p.55, although Ripa focuses upon the female experience o f  
admission.
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behaviour/^ Single females lacked such shelter, especially those who had no living 
kin, or whose relatives refused obligations to supervise them. The widow Susan 
Tinny was one such unfortunate woman. Susan’s dismissal from service was 
compounded by her father’s refusal to accept his troublesome, mentally disturbed 
daughter back into his household.'’^  Michael Tinny had ejected Susan from his 
house and refused to take responsibility for his daughter’s criminal actions. Susan 
lacked kin who were willing or able to take responsibility for her. Such mentally 
troubled persons were perhaps at most risk of being prosecuted formally for their 
crimes.
This pattern was also true of males, especially those who were youthful, 
impoverished and unmarried. Where marital status is recorded, two-fifths of 
Scottish and one-third of English male prisoners were unmarried, excluding 
widowers. Just like women, socially isolated males, who lacked kin or whose 
families refused to take responsibility for them, were particularly exposed to formal 
prosecutions. In 1786, fourteen-year-old Samuel Pirrie, “Post-boy or Rider of the 
Mail betwixt Ballantrae and Stramaer”, was prosecuted for the theft of moneys 
fi*om the mail pack e t.T h e  jury deemed that Pirrie had not developed fully his use 
of reason and had been duped into committing the crim e.Sam uel’s father and his 
step-mother were suspected of instigating the offence, but both denied any 
involvement and they refused to be obliged formally for their son’s actions. Just
Houston Madness p. 151.
‘‘^ AD 14/15/21.
^ JC  12/19 and 26/240.
Idem. Scots Magazine 48 (April 1787) p.206.
130
like women of a similarly subordinate social and economic station, the 
impoverished Samuel Pirrie was isolated and especially vulnerable to prosecution. 
Samuel was found guilty and sentenced to be hung, although the jury recommended 
mercy on account of his weak-mindedness. Accordingly, Pirrie’s sentence was 
reduced to Transportation for seven years.
Offenders who were unfamiliar to the communities where they committed their 
crimes, such as foreigners and “vagrants”, were also detached socially and hence 
prone to prosecution.^^ The lay community continued to be integral to the 
identification of mental afflictions. Purportedly mad or idiotic strangers were 
disadvantaged because local communities lacked the long term knowledge of their 
character, actions, appearance and speech which informed contemporary 
assessments of mental conditions. Jean Stowrie who “lived on the Country by 
soming, oppression and begging” for “several years”, was prosecuted in 1725 at the 
Jedburgh Assizes for child-murder.^^ The local population were suspicious of 
vagabonds and supported the prosecution against the unfamiliar Stowrie, whose 
insanity defence collapsed because she could not produce any “friends” who might 
have spoken to her mental condition. Likewise, when the Dutch smuggler James 
Rice murdered his friend and shipmate, Thomas Wastdell, at Staiths in 1775, he 
killed the only individual within the community who had a long term and intimate 
knowledge of him and his state of mind. Rice was truly a “foreigner” in Staiths.^'’ 
Only a letter from an old employer in Holland, Helleman Van Eyeckelenberg,
King Crime p.28 and p.32. Shoemaker “Quarter Sessions records” p. 153.
JC 12/4.
The term “forraigner” could be used to describe persons outwith the immediate locality.
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indicated that Rice had a history of behaving “foolishly” like “one out of his 
Senses”/^ Rice was vulnerable to prosecution and his defence of insanity failed in 
1777 because he lacked friends and family to prove his history of mental 
debilitation and suffering.
Conclusions
Mental maladies were experienced predominantly by men amongst the 
provincial criminal cases that were investigated. This adds further weight to the 
argument that insanity was not a “female malady” during the long eighteenth 
century, at least within the context of the Britain’s civil and criminal aienas.^^ The 
incidence of these types of defence follows the broader patterns of prosecution, 
whereby males predominated amongst the ranks of British prisoners between 1660 
and 1829. Nor were women more successful at proving their mental incompetence 
at court. Notions that females were more susceptible to mental distress were not 
reflected by the incidence or success-rates of British insanity and idiocy defences.
In England, few prisoners were found to be idiotic. In Scotland, the “Rule of 
Proportions” allowed for partial degrees of fatuity (“weak-mindedness”) to be 
entered as a defence in mitigation of sentence. Upwards of one-third of southern 
Scottish defences therefore rested upon the prisoner’s imbecility rather than 
madness. At the Northern Assizes, a similarly small number of males and females
ASSI 45/32/2 no. 140.
Showalter Female Malady pp.3-4.
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suffered from idiocy, but a greater proportion of female prisoners were understood 
to be thus afflicted. This reflected broader perceptions that females were more 
prone to being “weak-minded” than males. No such pattern emerges from the small 
southern Scottish sample, where around one-third of both males and females were 
found to be idiotic or imbecilic rather than insane. Future research is required in 
order to establish whether imbecility was less associated with females in Scottish 
society.
The occurrence and success-rates of insanity and idiocy defences cannot be 
explained by the prisoner’s gender alone. Single persons were most vulnerable to 
being prosecuted for tlieir crimes, even if they were considered to be mentally 
disturbed. These persons were isolated socially and economically, whilst they also 
lacked kin, family and household who were willing and able to take responsibility 
for them and their mental debilities. Such isolation left mentally disturbed persons 
most vulnerable to formal prosecution at law.
The vast majority of insanity and idiocy defences involved persons of low social 
and economic standing. Criminal prosecutions were not merely brought against 
persons hailing from the lower-orders, however. The local middling sorts and elites 
of British society could be prosecuted and found insane, which indicates that the 
criminal law was not merely wielded as a tool of social control by persons of high 
standing. On a different tack, this study also illustrates that persons from all social 
strata could suffer from mental afflictions.
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At the Northern Assizes, the prisoner’s social and economic standing could 
affect the success of their insanity or idiocy defence, although high-station persons 
were not guaranteed to be acquitted. Nor should it be assumed that elite prisoners 
argued their insanity fraudulently, but nevertheless effectively. Criminal trials were 
public events which di ew upon broadly shared concepts of justice and proof as a 
means of legitimisation. No matter what a prisoner’s social status, the defence had 
to be proven at law in order to be successful. Persons of high standing did not break 
evidential mles and employ insanity defences to avoid being fomid guilty. On the 
contrary, in each of the cases examined, strong proof of insanity was provided. 
Wealthy, high status prisoners may have been better able to produce persuasive 
evidence of their insanity or idiocy at court. Subsequent chapters will therefore 
evaluate what contemporaries considered to be convincing and credible evidence of 
mental afflictions. This jurisprudential study will be complemented by an 
investigation of how the various courtroom players interacted during the criminal 
theatre, within the context of defences of insanity and idiocy.
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5.
appeared to me, as i f  he was not capable o f  him self \  
British lay testimony, 1660-1829
Witness statements were imparted to the courtroom in most British insanity and 
idiocy defences between 1660 and 1829. Only five-percent of English and ten- 
percent of Scottish cases which were studied lacked any formal, oral, contribution 
from witnesses at court upon the day of the prisoner’s hearing. In a small proportion 
of cases, only the defendant, bench or legally trained representatives spoke during a 
criminal trial, but in most instances, the prisoner’s mental condition was 
authenticated by witnesses who presented viva voce testimony at court.
At court, witnesses were adduced to provide information pertaining to the 
crime, character and sanity of prisoners.’ This was important because British jurors 
could lack first-hand knowledge of the crime or litigants, especially by the early 
nineteenth century.^ Witnesses’ recollections informed decision-making processes 
at court. Pre-trial statements could also be significant to the initiation and course of 
insanity and idiocy defences, for this was where observers might first recount how a 
person “fell into great Distractions” or possessed “a most wild and horrible look”.^  
Provincial criminal cases want comtroorn narratives before the 1790s, so pre-trial 
declarations provide the only indication of the evidence that established the
 ^ Beattie “Scales” p.232. Crawford “Emergence” p.28. Eigen Witnessing pp. 103-107. Landsman 
“Rise” p.514. Langbein “Trial Jury” pp.30-31. J.S Cockbum “Early modern assize records as 
historical evidence” Journal o f  the Society o f  Archivists. (1975) pp.215-231.
 ^Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” pp. 1170-1171. J.M. Mitnick “From Neighbour-Witness to Judge o f  
Proofs: The Transformation o f  the English Civil Juror”, AJLH. 32, 3, (1988), p. 1202.
 ^ASSI 45/22/3 no.22. ASSI 45/43.
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prisoner’s criminal responsibility. In the few cases when no testimony was heard at 
court, pre-trial statements could also inform the assessment of the prisoner’s mental 
capacities.
Scholars have debated whether the assessment of mental conditions was 
dominated by “lay” or “medical” persons, both within and without the courtroom. 
“Anti-psycliiatrist” methodologies, most notably expressed by Thomas Szasz and 
Andrew Scull, have suggested that the “medical” and “psychiatric” professions 
were involved significantly in the identification, incarceration and supervision of 
persons who suffered from mental maladies."  ^ Szasz argued that mental affliction 
was an illusory concept which was created and promulgated by such professionals. 
Such interpretations have been challenged, not least within the context of legal 
hearings.^ The subsequent chapters consider the quantitative and qualitative impact 
of “lay” and “medical” testimony during northern English and soutliern Scottish 
criminal defences of insanity and idiocy. This thesis establishes what sort of witness 
and testimony authenticated mental afflictions.
Szasz Manufacture p. 15 and Myth passim. See also Dorner Madmen and the Bourgeoisie. A 
similar thesis is presented in Foucault Madness and Civilisation p.23-28 and Scull Museums o f  
Madness pp. 14 and 124-129. For a critical analysis o f  these theories, see Vatz and Weinburg 
“Rhetorical Paradigm”. Crammer “where Scull is wrong”. Houston Madness. “Madness and 
Gender” and “Class, Gender”.
 ^See for instance, MacDonald Mystical Bedlam and Eigen Witnessing in an English context. For 
Scotland, see M.A. Crowther and B. White Upon Soul and Conscience. The medical expert and 
crime. 150 veai’s o f  forensic medicine in Glasgow. (1988). Houston Madness and “Courts”.
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Recent historiography has stressed that lay persons remained fundamental to the 
validation of mental afflictions within Britain’s legal processes.^ Lay witnesses 
continued to identify and endorse madness and imbecility at England’s Old Bailey 
and Scotland’s High Court of Justiciary during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Lay persons could also dominate qualitatively and quantitatively the 
assessment of prisoners’ mental conditions on the noifhem English and southern 
Scottish circuits studied. The impact of lay testimony during provincial trials is 
compared with published studies. There were some important, correlative patterns 
to the appearance of lay testifiers in England and Scotland, influenced by broad 
perceptions of the value of lay testimony.
Late seventeenth and early eighteenth century court processes are examined to 
illustrate how evidential standards evolved in Britain between 1660 and 1829, 
driven by legal professionals.^ Evidential modifications affected the type of witness 
and testimony which was sought out at law, as well as the merit accorded to lay 
statements. “Expert” testimony (such as that provided by doctors) became valued in 
certain situations at court, whilst the efficacy of second-hand, “hearsay” evidence 
was eroded. These, and other, key theoretical and practical changes are considered 
during this chapter to establish what sort of lay testimony was deemed to be
 ^MacDonald Mystical Bedlam. Eigen Witnessing and “Intentionality”. Houston Madness. “Madness 
and Gender” and “Courts”.
 ^For England: Beattie “Scales” pp.232-233., Crawford “Legalizing” pp.93-96 and 114-115. Eigen 
“Intentionality” pp.34-49. Jackson “Understandings o f  imbecility” pp.31-363. Landsman “Rise” 
passim. Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” Shapin Truth pp.42-60. Shapiro “Concept Fact” pp.2-
26. Shapiro Culture o f Fact pp.8-32. Weiner “Judges V. Jurors” pp.467-506. For Scotland: Crowther 
and White Soul and Conscience passim. Crowther “Crime” pp.225-236. Houston “Professions” 
pp.441-466. Important information may be gleaned from “An Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History” Stair Society (1958).
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persuasive during insanity and idiocy defences, and why. It is explained how 
adaptations in testimonial values enhanced the courtroom impact of two specific 
types of witness: gaolers and legally trained persons.
The witness’ social characteristics affected perceptions of the value of their 
testimony. The social station of British provincial witnesses is presented, allowing 
broader historical debates regarding crime and the criminal law to be engaged. 
Older histories emphasised how the criminal law could be employed by the elites of 
society to maintain their hegemony.^ Current studies have provided a more 
sophisticated analysis, arguing that the lower and middling sorts of society could be 
heavily involved in the prosecution of crime, for instance, suggesting that such 
people perceived this type of formal, legal redress to be justified.^ Persons below 
the highest ranks of society could obtain to distinct concepts of justice and 
criminality, but they could also legitimise the criminal law. The involvement of the 
lower orders of society as witnesses meant that they could impart their 
understandings of criminal responsibility and mental afflictions, thereby infoiming 
the assessment of the prisoner’s mental condition.
A deponent’s gender might affect the likelihood of their providing formal, oral 
evidence either before trial or at court itself. The qualitative value of a lay person’s
® Hay “Propeily, authority” pp.26-48. For an oveiview o f  this historiography see Innes and Styles 
“Crime wave”.
 ^See, for instance. King Crime and “Punishing Assault”.
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testimony could also be affected by their gender.*® It is investigated whether British 
lay women played a restricted role in the identification of mental afflictions 
between 1660 and 1829.** The participation of male and female testimony during 
provincial insanity defences is compared, alongside perceptions of their testimony’s 
worth.
Houston Madness pp.45-47 and 232-3. Houston “Madness and Gender” pp.309-326. Foyster 
“Limits” pp.39-45. Eigen “Did Gender Matter?” pp.409-419.
" Chesler Women and Madness. See also Tomes “Feminist histories” pp.348-383 for a critique o f  
such an approach.
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Defining lay witnesses and quantitative analysis
For the purposes of this thesis, “lay witnesses” are identified as persons who 
provided evidence, but lacked formal medical or legal training and were not 
occupationally engaged in either of these professions.*^ Testimony from “medical” 
witnesses, including asylum keepers, is considered sepaiately. Gaolers and legally 
trained attestants could be classed legitimately as “expert” witnesses, owing to the 
type of testimony which they imparted, known as “opinion”. These types of 
deponent are here compared with lay persons, because they lacked formal medical 
training and qualifications.
Historians have compartmentalised witnesses into categories of “lay”, 
“medical” and “legal” persons for ease of reference. However, it must be 
recognised that boundaries between these categories remained fluid during the long 
eighteenth century. The boundary between “professional” and “laity” became more 
distinct during the long eighteenth century, but these evolving professions did not 
monopolise the expertise, experience and understanding of medicine and the law.*  ^
Lay persons could possess a broad familiarity (if a different interpretation) of both 
medical and legal knowledge.*"*
Between 1660 and 1829, most testimonies were produced by “lay” persons 
during English and Scottish insanity and idiocy defences. Joel Eigen found that
Houston “Professions” p.442.
Porter “Laymen, Doctors” pp.290-304. Prest “Lay Legal Knowledge” p .311. 
Idem.
140
around seventy-percent of the narratives concerning Old Bailey insanity trials 
involved lay testimony between 1760 and 1843, with only prisoners or medical 
witnesses speaking in the remainder.*^ Similarly, the majority of testimonies were 
imparted by lay persons during criminal cases at Scotland’s High Court in 
Edinburgh between 1739 and 1815.*®
In global terms, lay witnesses outnumbered medical and legal testifiers in 
provincial England and Scotland. The majority of provincial pre-trial depositions 
were produced by lay persons. Depositions are lacking for some trials, particularly 
in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.*^ In England, lay persons emitted 
just under four-fifths of the depositions that survive for insanity and idiocy defences 
between 1660 and 1830 (table 5.1). The greater involvement of lawyers within 
Scotland’s procedures ensured that greater numbers of witnesses were interviewed 
formally per case before the trials began. In southern Scotland, just over three- 
quarters of pre-trial statements were produced by lay persons.
Eigen Witnessing p.83.
Houston Madness p.p.46-48 and “Courts, Doctors” pp.341-345.
Depositions relating to nineteenth century trials at Lancaster have been water-damaged heavily. 
Some were too fragile to permit investigation. This sample therefore includes depositions for ten o f  
Lancaster’s insanity and idiocy defences between 1750 and 1829.
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Depositions / Precognitions
Total number 
of pre-trial 
statements
Number 
provided 
by lay 
persons
Proportion 
provided 
by lay 
persons
Northern England 454 360 79.7%
Southern Scotland 504 387 76.8%
Table 5.1. Number and proportion ofpre-trial witness statements produced by 
lay persons during insanity and idiocy defences, northern England and southern
Scotland, 1660-1829.
In most cases, the laity also provided the vast majority of testimonies on the day 
of the trial too. The Scottish sources provide reliable indications of the testimony 
that was imparted during Justiciary Court trials. Early eighteenth century Scottish 
minute books record the names and designations of witnesses, alongside the content 
of testimonies that were adduced at court. Details of circuit court hearings were also 
recorded in the local and national presses by the late eighteenth century. Using 
these sources combined, around three-quarters of courtroom testimonies were 
provided by lay persons during southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity defences 
(Table 5.2). This corresponds broadly with findings for the High Court at 
Edinburgh and England’s Old Bailey.
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Courtroom testimonies
Total number 
of testimonies 
discovered
Number 
provided 
by lay 
persons
Proportion 
provided 
by lay 
persons
Northern England 251 189 75.2%
Southern Scotland 248 183 73.8%
Table 5.2. Number and proportion o f courtroom testimonies produced by lay 
persons during insanity and idiocy defences, northern England and southern
Scotland, 1660-1829.
Northern English sources are more problematic, with comprehensive narr atives 
only being available from the 1790s, with the exception of two trials belonging to 
the 1770s.*  ^ 251 witness statements survive from the forty-nine northern English 
courtroom narratives that were investigated for the period 1776-1829. Lay persons 
provided 191 (just over three-quaifers) of these testimonies. Only four of these 
printed reports lacked lay testimony concerning the prisoner’s state of mind. 
Amongst trials where narratives were recorded, at least, similarly high proportions 
of testimonies were produced by lay persons in provincial England and Scotland. 
The shortage of comprehensive trial narratives for northern English hearings 
restricts quantitative comparisons with Joel Eigen’s findings for the Old Bailey, 
particularly for the period before 1800. Eigen based his analysis upon a reliable and 
consecutive run of published accounts of Old Bailey criminal hearings, something
Trials... (1775-7), hearings o f  James Rice (1776-1777) and John Sutcliffe (1776).
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which the Northern Assizes lacked until the nineteenth century.*^ Neveitheless, 
some broad comparisons may be offered. It is evident that the majority of 
courtroom testimonies were provided by lay persons in both the provinces and the 
metropolis. Mental afflictions continued to be authenticated regularly by lay 
attestants through to 1829 in both England and Scotland.
The identities of southern Scottish testifiers can be gathered reliably through 
court minutes and, from the 1780s, printed nanatives. Most testimonies were 
provided by lay persons in Scotland, but lay witnesses were absent from nearly one- 
third of the southern circuit cases studied. This contrasted with northern England, 
where lay persons were involved in around ninety-one-percent of cases where a 
detailed narrative exists, although firm comparisons are restricted by the reliance 
upon dissimilar types of source-materials and relatively low sample-base. The lack 
of lay testimony during some Scottish trials can be explained by Justiciary Court 
procedures. Following the Hunter “test-case” at the High Court in 1801, medical 
witnesses were promoted to the role of requisite advisors to the bench where the 
prisoner’s mental capacity to stand trial was evaluated during Justiciary Court 
trials.^® In practice, gaolers were also used to inform the judge’s decision to 
postpone hearings, but evidence fi'om the wider “lay” community ceased to be a 
prerequisite to the court’s decision after 1801. Lay testimony could therefore be 
excluded firom nineteenth century Scottish defences “in-bai-of-trial”.
Langbein “Historical Foundations” passim. 
Seepp.253-261.
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Witnesses could also be absent from Justiciary Court hearings where prisoners 
confessed to their crimes. In such instances, the “pannel” could profess guilt (often 
to a lesser offence than was charged) and thereby earn a mitigation of sentence.^* 
This proceduie allowed Scottish “pannels” who suffered from partially debilitating 
mental afflictions to confess and benefit from ameliorated sentences. Such “plea- 
bargaining” contrasted with English Assize procedure, where “guilty” pleas were 
dissuaded actively.^^ Scotland’s public prosecutor could rest his proof with the 
confession, meaning that the court could pass sentence without viva voce testimony 
being adduced at court. A Scottish prisoner’s insanity or imbecility could therefore 
be assessed without any testimony being imparted at court.
This procedure occurred at Jedburgh in 1752, when James Blaikie petitioned to 
be banished after pleading guilty to house-breaking and theft. The prosecuting 
Advocate-Depute agreed to the petition, stating that Blaikie was “a poor creature of 
a very low degree of Understanding and that he was Instigate[d] to the committing 
of the Crimes whereof he is accused by another person.”^^  Imbecilic prisoners were 
incapable of planning crimes rationally, but it was also understood that their weak- 
mindedness rendered them vulnerable to being induced to commit transgressions.^"* 
Blaikie’s weak-mindedness and his mitigated sentence were decided upon without 
any courtroom testimony being delivered.
A.R. Ekirch, Bound For America. The Transportation o f  British Convicts to the Colonies. 1718- 
1775. (19871. p.24.
Langbein “Plea Bargaining” p.26L  
^ JC 12/7, Jedburgh, September 1752.
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” p.66.
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The Advocate-Depute’s opinion of Blaikie’s state of mind was informed by 
pre-trial examinations of witnesses. Decisions to accept plea bargains were based 
upon formal pre-trial precognitions (depositions), which included statements from 
lay persons. Lay testifiers could therefore influence the process of plea-bargaining, 
even if they did not appear subsequently at couil. James Blaikie’s weak-mindedness 
was emphasised by Mary Sclater, the very person suspected of instigating his 
offence. Sclater described Blaikie as “a deformed wretch and a fool” in her 
precognition, providing a rare instance where a deponent associated mental and 
physical abnormality.^^ Lay witnesses could inform assessments of Scottish 
prisoners’ mental conditions, even when they were not adduced in comt.
JC 26/147.
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Developments in the law o f evidence
Lay witnesses may have been numerically dominant at court or in a pre-trial 
capacity, but this did not guarantee that their testimony was authoritative. Evidential 
values could dictate the qualitative impact of lay witnesses and their testimony. The 
rules of evidence were broadly similar and evolved along analogous paths within 
the English and Scottish legal traditions. Comparable notions of the acceptability of 
evidence and what was deemed to be persuasive testimony existed. Both codes 
relied upon the “common-law” in this respect and such principles were reinforced 
by reference to Continental theorists.^® The works of jurists and legal professionals 
which directly focused upon the “law of evidence” can guide this investigation, but 
must be placed also in the context of courtroom proceduie.
Potential witnesses could be disqualified from bearing evidence, or their 
statements disregarded. England’s legal commentator, Geoffrey Gilbert, stated that 
“Deprivation or Defect of Reason” rendered a witness incompetent.^^ The mental 
condition of British witnesses, as well as of prisoners or victims, could be 
considered in court. Thomas Young, a “Labourer in Stevenson”, was barred from 
giving evidence at Ayr in 1813 because he was “so stupid [imbecilic] that he could 
not take the oath” required of witnesses.^^ The evidence of youths could be 
defective because their mental faculties had not matured. In 1773, two ten-year-old
Gordon “Roman law in England and Scotland” pp.135-143. Crawford “Emergence” pp. 1-9. 
Shapiro “Concept Fact” pp.2-26. Shapho Culture o f  Fact pp.2-42.
Gilbert Evidence (4* ed. 1791-6) p.220.
Ayr Advertiser September 16^ 1813.
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boys, called James Shilton and Donald McKie, claimed to have seen John 
McKnaight arguing with and beating his wife, Sarah Daffady, with a walking 
stick?^ Sarah’s cadaver was later discovered, an inquest into her death was 
undertaken and McKnaight was charged with murder. The public prosecutor’s case 
rested upon the evidence of these two boys, which was uncorroborated by any 
adults. The adult community clahned that Sarah’s death was explained by her 
history of sudden and violent “fitts”, which “deprived her of all sense and motion”, 
not her husband’s physical abuse. The bench allowed the jury to decide “how much 
credit” ought to be attached to the boys’ testimony. McKnaight’s acquittal indicates 
that the jury were persuaded by the adults’ testimony, rather than uncorroborated 
statements from the boys. These Scottish examples demonstrate that the witness’ 
mental state could affect the value which was attached to their declarations, or even 
preclude them bearing testimony.
British testifiers delivered statements under oath during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The pledge operated as a basic safeguard against fabricated 
evidence being presented at court. Before 1702 and in contrast to Scotland, 
however, English defence witnesses did take such oaths.^® Seventeenth century 
defence testimony was therefore regarded in lower esteem than prosecution 
evidence.^* In England, Stephan Landsman has suggested that the efficacy of
JC 12/14 and 26/202. Scottish women did not always adopt the surname o f  their spouses during 
the long eighteenth centuiy.
Baker Introduction p.583. 
Langbein “Shaping” pp.293-95.
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statements delivered under oath eroded as “adversarial” practices developed.^^ By 
the late eighteenth century, it was recognised that sworn statements might be 
misleading and could be challenged in court/^
Sound proof, rather than absolute tmth, was sought out during British criminal 
cases. Criminal hearings could resemble character tribunals, where trial and 
sentencing was directed by the prisoner’s disposition. From the early eighteenth 
century, some English trials featured adversarial contests between conflicting 
factual statements.^^ Adversarial disputations of proof also occurred at Scotland’s 
Justiciaiy Court from the late seventeenth century onwards, although some aspects 
of these hearings also resembled Continental, Inquisitorial models of practice.^® 
Adversarial processes propagated the concept of “proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt”.^  ^This notion of proof had an important, but very different, bearing upon a 
trial when English and Scottish insanity and idiocy defences are compared. In 
Scotland, the prosecution were expected to prove that an act had been committed 
whilst the prisoner had been sane.^ ® In contrast, the onus of proof was placed upon 
the criminal defence in England, because prisoners were “presumed to be of perfect 
mind and memory”.^  ^ English criminal defences were required to prove that 
transgressors were mentally imbalanced in court, or had been so when committing 
their crimes.
Landsman “Rise” p.597. 
Beattie “Scales” p.235.
Shapin Tmth pp. 42-66. Shapiro “Concept Fact” pp.2-26. Shapiro Culture o f  Fact, pp.2-32. 
Landsman “Rise” pp.400-402.
Farmer “Criminal law” pp.33-38.
Landsman “Rectitude” p.459.
Mackenzie Matters Criminal (1678) p.58. Houston Madness pp.73-4.
Brydall Non Compos Mentis (1700) p.66.
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Different theoretical standards of proof existed in English and Scottish law. 
Persuasive evidence of guilt was required from at least two witnesses in Scotland, 
whilst a single testimony could condemn English prisoners."*® In practice, the 
prisoner’s mental state was rarely authenticated by the bare minimum of witnesses 
in either country. Multiple lay testimonies, which converged upon a communal 
identification of a person’s mental condition, persisted to carry great authority 
during legal hearings."** Jurors found such consensus of evidence hard to ignore. In 
1776, for instance, five neighbours and character-witnesses testified to John 
Sutcliffe’s altered mental state. They converged upon John Sutcliffe’s spiritual 
enthusiasm as both a cause and effect of his mental imbalance."*  ^ Sutcliffe had 
claimed to have spoken with both God and the Devil, whilst he had also described 
the murder of his wife and child as a “sacrifice to God, in return of a blessing”. 
Sutcliffe had also woken his neighbours on the Sabbath, wearing “nothing on him 
but his shirt”, proclaiming “I have found Jesus this morning”. Testifiers noted that 
this religiosity marked a change in Sutcliffe’s “behaviour and words”. The onset of 
his insanity was connected to his recent attendance of the “methodist-meeting”. 
Sutcliffe thereby conformed to stereotypical images that correlated evangelism (and 
paiticularly Methodism) with both public and mental disorder."*  ^ Such communal 
evidences were persuasive, for the jury acquitted Sutcliffe of murder on account of
Crowther and White “Medicine, Propeity” p,854. Crowther “Criminal record” p.83. Nelson Law 
o f  Evidence (1717) p. 11. At least two witnesses were needed to prove treason.
Houston Madness p.354.
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp. 14-17.
Hempton Religion pp. 150-152. Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp.73-83.See also the Report o f  the 
Trial o f  Jonathan Martin (1829); Martin’s religiosity and his association with Methodism were 
interpreted to have both informed and reflected his insanity.
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his insanity. As Robert Houston as recently evinced for Scotland, the “prop” of 
shared lay or community judgement continued to be recognized as compelling 
evidence during English insanity and idiocy trials between 1660 and 1829."*"*
Lay witnesses could bolster their direct observation and intepretation of the 
prisoner’s mental condition by recounting the estimations of their neighbours, 
family and friends. In 1726, Mathew Dale was convinced that Richard Waddy had 
been insane when he attacked his mother and killed his father “with a piece of 
wood”."*^ Dale re-affirmed his judgment (and those of other witnesses) by reporting 
that the local community had “looked upon” Richard Waddy “to be out of order in 
his senses” for over a year. The reference to the community’s judgement legitimised 
Dale’s testimony and the jury’s verdict that Waddy had been insane."*® Such 
evidence was accepted as a valid means of establishing whether the prisoner was 
responsible criminally. Allusions to community evaluations also served to reinforce 
and confirm the belief that Dale and other “sane” lay persons, including the jury, 
were able to distinguish between mentally sound and unsound behaviour.
Community assurances of a prisoner’s mental condition could be convincing, 
but it was also troublesome evidence. In theory, legal commentators suggested that 
lay persons were supposed to impart their own direct observations of a crime or the
Houston Madness p.354.
ASSÏ 41/2 and 45/18/3 nos. 31-32C 
ASSl 41/2 (Yorkshire Assizes, 1726).
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prisoner’s character and mental state in cou rt.T hese  first-hand experiences were 
presented as the “factual” evidence of a case. But when deponents related the 
comments, opinions and “facts” of another person or persons (which were outwith 
the testifier’s own observation), this was “hearsay” testimony."** The acceptability 
and value of “hearsay” evidence were questioned from at least the early eighteenth 
century in Britain."*  ^ As Geoffrey Gilbert’s Law of Evidence evinced, “The 
Attestation of the Witness must be to what he knows, and not that only which he has 
heard, for a mere hearsay is no Evidence"'?^ Lay testimony could be unpersuasive 
if the attestants did not offer their own observations of the prisoner’s speech, 
appearance and behaviour.
“Hearsay” might not form a credible proof by itself, but such evidence 
continued to be accepted inferior, corroboratory evidence.^* A Moffat stocking- 
maker, Joseph Clark, stated in 1818 that it was “understood in the neighbourhood 
that John Halliday has been in an unsettled state of mind for above twelvemonth 
past”.^  ^ Clark offered hearsay, but it was accepted and useful because it 
corroborated direct observations made by Clark, and other witnesses, that Halliday 
had been “in an unsettled state of mind for above twelvemonth past”.^  ^Hearsay was 
still admitted to verify direct evidential observations in both England and Scotland 
during the early nineteenth century.
Stephan Landsman has reflected upon how more suitable or persuasive evidence might be 
screened during the pre-trial phase and chosen for use in court. Landsman “Rise” p.593.
Landsman “Rise” pp.545-6.
Beattie “Scales” pp.232-3. Landsman “Rise” p.545. Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” pp. 1175-6.
Gilbert Evidence (4‘'' ed. 1791-6) p.889. Emphasis in the original. j
/W p .8 9 1 . !
AD 14/18/73. I
Idem. !
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The content of Joseph Clark’s testimony would not have been alien to the 
Scottish courtroom during the reign of Queen Anne. It resembled evidence provided 
at Thomas Towart’s trial in 1711, when John McKinlay revealed that the pannel 
“was considered by several of the neighbours as not very wise and distracted”.^ "* 
But different values were attached to such statements in the early eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. In seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, hearsay 
could be accepted as sufficient proof of a crime, or concerning a prisoner’s state of 
mind, especially if “first-hand” evidence was lacking or not forthcoming.®® Hearsay 
had not been eradicated from the British courtroom by 1829, but it was perceived to 
be less authoritative. Stricter “laws of evidence” dictated that direct observations of 
a person’s state of mind were required fiom lay witnesses after the turn of the 
eighteenth century. Subsequent chapters will suggest that legally trained eourtroom 
personnel (notably judges and counsel) made greater efforts to restrict the 
qualitative impact of “hearsay” testimony by the early nineteenth century.®®
Distinctions between “lay” and “expert” testimony coalesced in Britain during 
the long eighteenth century.®  ^ Increasingly, lay persons were precluded from 
offering “opinion” or “expert” testimony. “Opinion” testimony was evidence 
provided by persons who owned specialist occupational experience or formal
^ JC  13/4, Ayr, May 1711.
Landsman “Rise” pp.545-6.
See pp.268-270 and 406-411.
Eigen Witnessing pp.108-160. Ward “Observers” pp. 106-119. Houston “Courts” pp.339-354.
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schooling, which distinguished them from lay persons.®* Persons who were 
experienced or learned in identifying, caring or curing mental afflictions might be 
regarded as “expert” witnesses during insanity defences. “Expertise” was not 
restricted to medical professionals. Expert witnesses drew upon their general 
experiences and understandings regarding insanity and idiocy and applied them to 
the prisoner in court.®  ^Gilbert’s Law of Evidence recognised that the line between 
“fact” and “opinion” could be thin, because testimony was based upon the 
“imperfections of Memory” which meant that lay witnesses were “apt to entertain 
opinions”.®® This was especially true during insanity and idiocy defences, where 
witnesses were asked to interpret the prisoner’s mental state.
By the early nineteenth century, legal professionals made concerted efforts to 
ensure that lay witnesses did not impart opinion, as illustrated by the testimony of 
Alderman Smith Wilson at Appleby in 1822, during the trial of James Towers.®* 
Wilson began by recounting direct observations of the prisoner’s distracted mental 
state. Towers was afflicted by a peculiar literary delusion, informed by Jonathan 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels.®^ Towers was convinced that “Lilliputians were puffing 
dust in his eyes”, that he could see them “mnning along the bell-wire” and was
^  Eigen Witnessing pp. 110-115.
Idem.
Gilbert Law o f  Evidence (1796) p.6 and 301.
Kendal Chronicle March 9*^ ' 1822. Lancaster Gazette March 16*’’ 1822.
^  Towers suffered from “delirium ti emens”, brought on by excessive consumption o f  alcohol. John 
Monro’s 1760s case-notes noted a sufferer fr om “delirium tremens” who obtained to a similar 
delusion, also based upon Swift’s work (Andrews and Scull Customers and Pations pp.60-62). 
According to specialist studies. Towers’ affliction matched the specific, as well as broad, 
characteristics o f  “delirium tremens”.
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beset by imaginary “thieves, hobgoblings and blue devils”.®^ Towers’ failure to 
distinguish between reality and fantasy was indicative of mental impairment. 
Wilson’s testimony then lost focus as he stated “his own opinion” about Towers’ 
mental condition. Counsel and bench interrupted Wilson on three separate 
occasions, imploring the witness, “do give us the facts as they occuned, not your 
opinions”. Wilson persisted to offer his “opinion”, before the exasperated justice 
Holroyd declared, “I remarked to you before, sir, that long conversations with your 
neighbours could not be admitted in evidence, and are totally unnecessary on the 
present occasion -  do communicate what came within your own knowledge 
respecting the prisoner, not your opinions”. Interestingly, Wilson ignored these 
instructions and proffered his “opinion” (despite further interruptions from bench 
and counsel) twice more before vacating the stand. Wilson did impart his opinion to 
the coml, but the lawyers’ challenges reduced the impact of his testimony. Such 
efforts to constrain “hearsay” and “opinion” testimony from lay witnesses 
distinguished early nineteenth and early eighteenth centuiy legal practice in Britain.
Kendal Chronicle March 9“’ 1823.
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"Gaolers ” and “tolbooth-keepers ”
Professional “custodians”, such as gaolers, tolbooth-keepers and “turnkeys”, 
lacked formal medical or legal schooling and could therefore be classed as “lay” 
witnesses. Yet, from the 1750s onwards, these witnesses were encouraged to impart 
“expert opinion” during English and Scottish insanity defences. Joel Eigen’s work 
has not focused specifically upon such “custodian” witnesses, but he has indicated 
that the gaol became an important location for the observation and authentication of 
insane prisoners after 1760 at the Old Bailey.®"* Robert Houston has suggested that 
“gaolers” formed a small proportion of testifiers at the High Court of Justiciary, but 
that their testimony could be prized.®®
Amongst the narratives studied, “custodians” accounted for a tiny proportion of 
all witnesses in Britain. In both northern England and southern Scotland, custodians 
accounted for around three-percent of courtroom testifiers and appeared in one- 
sixth of the trials studied. Gaolers were more regularly involved when defences 
focused upon the prisoner’s mental fitness to stand trial. In southern Scotland, the 
first recorded defence of this type occurred in 1747 and the “Gaoler of Jedburgh 
Tolbooth” bore evidence at court.®® Between 1747 and 1829, custodians appeared in 
seventy-four percent of Scottish defences “in-bar-of-trial” (Table 5.3). By 
comparison, English gaolers and their staff were examined in seventy-percent of 
insanity defences which sought to postpone the prisoner’s hearing between 1750
Eigen Witnessing pp.129-130.
Houston “Courts” p.345.66 JC 12/5.
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and 1829. By the early nineteenth centuiy, custodians were established in both 
countries as regular witnesses where prisoner’s mental fitness to plead and stand 
trial was questioned.
% of “bar of trial” 
hearings which involved 
custodian testimony
Northern England 70
Southern Scotland 74
Table 5.3. Proportion o f trials involving custodians when the prisoner’s mental 
fitness to stand trial was examined, northern England and 
southern Scotland 1749-1829.
The nature of the custodian’s testimony explains why they were used to validate 
the defendant’s sanity at court. Prisoners could lie in gaol many months awaiting 
trial, especially in places such as Carlisle, where the Assizes only met once per 
annum before 1819. As a consequence of their professional function, gaoler 
testimony was valued because it offered long term and repetitive observations of the 
prisoner’s mental condition. Custodians provided pertinent evidence which could 
authenticate the prisoner’s mental ability to bear trial. William Forrest, the gaoler of 
Jedburgh tolbooth, recounted in 1747 how a prisoner called John Bertram had fallen 
“into a deep melancholy fitt, in which he has continued ever since”. Fonest 
provided persuasive evidence of Bertram’s insanity and the hearing was
157
postponed.®  ^ Some custodians reinforced their evidence with practical proficiency 
in observing prisoners, authenticating mental afflictions and delivering their 
evidence within a courtroom scenario. Mr Higgins, the keeper of the gaol at 
Lancaster Castle, yielded testimony concerning a prisoner’s insanity twice between 
the years 1812 and 1814, for instance. Such experience and “forensic” skill could 
distinguish gaoler from “lay” testimony.
It was recognised that gaolers could be adept at identifying prisoners who 
feigned insanity or idiocy. In March 1814, Charles Taylor was anaigned for 
highway-robbery at the Lancaster Assizes. Upon taking the stand and being asked 
to plead, Taylor produced an indirect and incoherent answer which was eventually 
construed as a confession of his guilt.®* Courtroom testimony was only provided by 
Mr Higgins, the keeper of Lancaster Castle, his son and a turnkey (gaol-officer) 
called Thomas Birch. This case therefore represents a rare occasion in which 
“custodian” testimony was elevated to the position of sole advisor to the court, in 
either England or Scotland. The Lancaster Gazette reported that the three,custodians 
“severally proved, that up to the 22nd January the prisoner did not affect insanity, 
which they now believed him to do”.®^ According to these custodians, Taylor was 
subject to bouts of insanity, but was lucid at his trial. The jury decided that Taylor 
was “counterfeiting insanity” and he was found guilty and sentenced to death. 
This dissimulation had been authenticated purely by “custodian” testimony.
JC 12/5.
Lancaster Gazette March 5*’’ and March 19*’’ 1814, 
March 14*’’ 1814.
Ibid  March 4*’’ and March 14”’ 1814.
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The testifier’s social characteristics
Besides the content of their testimony, a person’s gender and social station 
affected the way in which their pre-trial and courtroom statements were received 
and perceived. A person’s gender could dictate whether evidence was sought from 
them. During provincial English and Scottish insanity defences, males outnumbered 
females as both pre-trial and courtroom witnesses. Twenty-seven percent of all 
northern English and fifteen-percent of southern Scottish witnesses studied were 
female (Table 5.3). The low numbers of female deponents in southern Scotland was 
typical of Justiciaiy Court practice. In all types of criminal defences, around 
eighteen-percent of Scotland’s High Court testifiers were women between 1650 and 
1760.*^ * Fewer women were employed as criminal witnesses in southern Scotland 
and Edinburgh than at England’s Assizes. Female witnesses were more involved in 
Northern Assize defences of insanity and idiocy by the 1800s, wliilst the reverse 
was true of southern Scotland (Table 5.4). We might expect females to form at least 
fifty-percent of the total population, so women were clearly under-represented as 
witnesses in both countries in this respect.
Houston Madness pp. 123-127. 
Idem.
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Time period
% of deponents 
who were female
Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
Pre-1749'" 10 22
1750-1799 25 14
1800-1829 32 13
Overall 27 15
Table 5.4. Proportional ratio o f the gender o f witnesses during insanity and 
idiocy defences in northern England and southern Scotland.
The crime which the prisoner committed affected the likelihood of female 
testimony being utilised. Unlike in other crimes, female testimony could dominate 
numerically in cases of “infanticide” or “child-murder”. Female midwifes could 
carry experience and expertise in establishing whether female prisoners had given 
birth or murdered their children.^"* Female witnesses also appeared as witnesses to 
the crime or the prisoner’s character. Females outnumbered males two-to-one 
amongst the deponents for Mary Thorp’s child-murder case in 1800.^ ® Female 
neighbours and midwives provided persuasive testimony that Thorp had been sane 
and had planned to kill her illegitimate child. They substantiated that Thorp had 
indeed given birth to this dead infant, which had been healthy, but illegitimate 
issue. One keen-eyed deponent, Sarah Finder, noted that the “tape” which had 
strangled the child had been torn from one of Thorp’s “shifts” .^ ® A significantly 
greater number of northern English insanity or idiocy defences were pled by women
England 1660-1749, Scotland 1708-1749.
Increased numbers o f  female “expert” witnesses also appeared in these cases, such as women who 
were experienced mid-wives (although they did not necessarily receive any formal medical 
education or qualification).
AS SI 45/40/2 nos. 240-241. Although six o f  these women were witnesses to the birth, only Anne 
Seddon was designated as a mid-wife amongst the depositions.
A S S I45/40/2 nos. 240-241.
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in response to child murder than in Scotland, especially after 1750. Indeed, Scottish 
pleas were outnumbered by English defences in child-murder cases by a ratio of 
seven-to-one. Because of the unusually heavy involvement of women during these 
kinds of trial, the different incidence of child-murder cases amongst insanity and 
idiocy defences may explain the divergent involvement of female testifiers in 
England and Scotland, particularly after 1750.
Both the English and Scottish legal traditions preferred to rely upon evidences 
imparted by males in legal c a u se s .T h e  Scots jurist, Viscount Stair, stated that 
women were “rejected from being witnesses in causes merely civil, except they be 
necessary witnesses”. T h i s  assertion was transferred to Britain’s criminal codes; 
female deponents only became involved when their evidence was perceived to cany 
particular significance. Whilst male testimony was preferred in Britain’s 
courtrooms, it was not always privileged qualitatively above female evidence. 
Females may have been less apparent at court, but their testimony had to valuable in 
order for them to be involved at all. Male testimony could be challenged 
successfully by female evidence within Britain’s legal processes. In 1743, William 
Cowper attacked and killed his mother with a knife at Burton in the West Riding of 
Y orkshire.Jonathan Lockwood, a local “cord-winer”, had “discoursed” with 
William Cowper shortly before he attacked his mother and insisted that the accused 
had been “perfectly Senseable” at that time.^® William’s sister, Ellen, was present at
Houston “Class, Gender” p.47.
^ Stair Institutions (1681) p.999, cited in Houston Madness p.47. 
^  A S S I41/3.
ASSI 45/22/3/27.
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the time of the murder and disputed Lockwood’s statement. Ellen reported how 
William, “began to Discourse in Scripture and fell into great Distractions” before 
stabbing their mother in her throat.^^ Ellen also recounted that William “was in such 
distraction that four or five Men was forced to hold him and bind his hands and feet, 
and Still continues in a very bad Way and in Great disorder”. The Yorkshire jury 
acquitted William Cowper of murder on account of his insanity. Ellen provided 
credible indications that her brother suffered from an altered state of mind, which 
explained and excused his violent, unusual behaviour. Ellen Cowper was not a 
“disinterested” witness, but her testimony was persuasive because she had observed 
the prisoner committing the crime. Females were not baiTed universally from court, 
nor were female testimonies always perceived to be inferior qualitatively to male 
testimonies. Lay women could impart important proofs regarding a prisoner’s 
insanity and idiocy.
Scholars have suggested that the authentication of mental afflictions was 
dominated by males within long eighteenth century society. It has been posited that 
the concept of insanity could be employed, by lay and medical men, as a means of 
labelling and restraining the behavioui' of women who refused to conform to 
cultural norms.^^ These arguments can be rebuffed in the context of criminal 
defences. Contemporaries understood the behaviour of the mentally afflicted to be 
involuntary, rather than conscious rebellion against accepted conduct. It could be 
contended tliat these perceptions of normality were imposed by males upon
ASSI 45/22/3/22 
ASSI 41/3.
83 Chesler Women and Madness p. 16..
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females, but such a thesis camiot be soundly reinforced by the investigation of 
insanity and idiocy defences. The mental condition of English and Scottish females 
could be judged by persons of their own sex and social station. As Robert Houston 
has recently concluded, females who were deemed to be insane or idiotic had 
breached social mores that were accepted by both women and men.^ "^  Males did 
dominate quantitatively the validation of mental distraction during provincial 
British criminal trials. But, whilst fewer “lay” females were adduced as witnesses, 
British women played important qualitative roles in the assessment of the prisoner’s 
mental state. Females could be involved in identifying mental abnormality in males 
and regularly outnumbered male witnesses in cases where women committed child- 
murder, at least.
84 Houston “Class, Gender” pp.49 and 58-59.
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The social standing o f witnesses
A witness’ social standing could also affect the way in which their testimony 
was perceived at court. Courtroom participants could defer to the judgement of 
persons of high social standing and thereby afford significant value to their 
statements. In 1665, the gentleman Charles Jackson was prosecuted for murdering 
his servant, James Browne. It was presented that Jackson suffered from
“melancholy”, whilst Jackson stated that “if he was not in [a “melancholy frtt”], he 
was entring into itt”.®^ According to the principal contemporary jurists, these 
statements were at best equivocal proofs of Jackson’s insanity. Matthew Hale’s 
Pleas suggested that “melancholy persons” were “not wholly destitute of the use of 
their reason”.^  ^It followed that this “partial degree” of insanity did not fully remove 
the ability to form intent and was therefore not a sound legal defence in England. 
The term “melancholy” could also denote the general species of insanity in the late 
seventeenth century, however, rather than “partial insanity” founded upon 
“excessive fears and griefs”. I n  this sense, the evidence concerning Jackson’s state 
of mind could be interpreted as being sufficient to excuse his crime.
The second assertion, that Jackson “was entring into” a fit of madness was more 
troublesome. It was recognised that lunatics might enjoy lengthy spells of lucid 
rationality, but that they were responsible for their actions during these periods.
ASSI 42/1 ff.l63b.
ASSI 45/7/2 nos. 69-70.
Hale Pleas pp.30-36. See also Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.35-38 and Eigen Witnessing pp.36- 
38.
Idem.
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Jackson was on the very cusp of a mad fit, but if he was lucid and capable of 
forming intent, then he ought to have been found guilty of murdering his servant. 
Charles Jackson was acquitted of his crime owing to insanity. So why was 
equivocal testimony, by late seventeenth century standards, accepted as sound 
evidence of insanity? No courtroom narratives exist for this late seventeenth century 
trial, so this interpretation is based upon pre-trial depositions. Perhaps the testimony 
entered at court was less ambiguous. It might also be suggested that the prisoner’s 
high social and economic standing affected legal proceedings in a positive way. The 
jury may also have been convinced of the veracity and value of this testimony 
because of the witnesses’ high social status. A guarantee of truthfulness was 
associated with genteel q u a l i t y . A  congress of Justices of the Peace signed a 
petition which stated that Jackson was “non compos mentis”, whilst two of the 
Justices entered “recognizances” of one-hundred pounds each for the prisoner to 
appear.^® The jury may have deferred to the judgement of the Justices. Likewise, the 
bench may have accepted the authentication offered by persons of high rank, rather 
than challenging the legal ambiguities of their testimony. The statements of persons 
of high social standing could be respected and deemed persuasive within the 
courtroom.^*
^  Shapin Truth p.43.
^  ASSI 45/7/2.
Shapin Truth pp.42-44.
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Status of 
Deponent
% of 
Northern 
English 
Witnesses
% of
Southern
Scottish
Witnesses
Elite 6 10
Middling 37 40
Lower 43 38
Unknown 14 12
Table 5.5. Comparison o f the social status o f northern English and southern 
Scottish witnesses during insanity and idiocy defences, 1700-1829.
Testimony from the social elites could be authoritative, but such witnesses 
imparted a small proportion of all evidences during provincial British insanity and 
idiocy defences. Persons who belonged to the lower and middling ranks of society 
far outweighed the elites amongst criminal testifiers in both southern Scotland and 
northern England (Table 5.5), “Elite” status deponents, such as Justices of the 
Peace, Sheriffs-Depute, Esquires and Gentlemen, produced six-percent of the 
English and ten-percent of the Scottish witness statements which were studied 
(Table 5.5).^  ^This group of witnesses could include females of high standing, but 
just as it was rare for upper order women to be subjected to formal prosecution, so 
they seldom appeared at court as witnesses.^^ Insanity and idiocy were therefore 
most regularly identified by persons of low or middling status.
^  This includes both pre-trial and courtroom statements. 
See pp. 114-124.
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This finding relates strongly to the broader historiography of crime and the 
courtroom. It could be argued that England’s social, economic and political elites 
were able to utilise the criminal law to reaffirm and justify their elevated station 
within a society which was based upon an inequitable division of land and wealth. "^  ^
More recently, historians have emphasised the regular involvement of the middling 
and lower orders of society and how they perceived the criminal law.^  ^ The 
“middling sorts” and the “laborious poor” of provincial Britain made strong 
quantitative and qualitative contributions towards the identification of mental 
afflictions within the criminal courtroom. The criminal law proceeded with 
reference to perceptions of justice and criminal responsibility from a broad cross- 
section of society. Persons belonging to the lower and middling orders could impart 
their understandings of mental afflictions to the court, thereby affirming their 
perceptions of who was or was not mentally unsound. The reference to and 
involvement of these types of witness legitimised the criminal law beyond the ranks 
of the social elites, whilst validating broadly held conceptions regarding criminal 
responsibility. This thesis therefore suggests that the criminal law could be both 
accepted and legitimised by a broad range of social ranks in both northern England 
and southern Scotland.
The social station of witnesses could be tied intimately to the status of both 
prisoners and victims. Family and household members were adduced regularly as
^  Hay “Property, authority” pp.26, 35 and 48.
Langbein “Fatal flaws” pp.96-120. King “Decision-Makers” p.53 and Crime passim.
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witnesses during British insanity and idiocy defences, because they could provide 
long term, intimate observations of the prisoner’s sanity. Wealthy households could 
include persons of varying social status, from the master and mistress to 
housekeepers and servants. But lower-order households tended to include persons 
of broadly similar social standing, who could be called upon in cases where crimes 
were committed within the domestic setting. Also, a prisoner might share a similar 
social status to their friends and neighbours, who might be adduced as eye­
witnesses to crimes and character-witnesses too. John Gibson, an impecunious 
nailor and discharged soldier, was accused of murdering his wife at Hawick in 
1814.^  ^ Gibson’s social interactions were clearly restricted by his occupational 
status. The key deponents were drawn from Gibson’s neighbourhood and included 
the likes of impoverished journeymen and their wives.^^ In contrast, the insanity of 
the landed gentleman, Charles Jackson, was proven by Justices of the Peace, who 
were of similarly high social and economic station to the prisoner.Indeed, these 
Justices of the Peace were acquainted personally with Jackson and were his social 
and political “friends”.
This relationship between litigant and witness does not adequately explain why 
a greater proportion of elite status witnesses appeared in southern Scottish trials. 
Only around six-percent of prisoners and five-percent of victims belonged to the 
highest, landowning ranks of southern Scottish society before 1830.^  ^ Instead, the
JC 12/28. 
JC 16/366.
98 ASSI 42/1 and 45/7/2 nos. 69-70 
See pp. 112-120.
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augmented appearance of wealthy, high station testifiers on the southern circuit was 
connected to their function within the criminal system. The likes of Scottish Justices 
of Peace, Sheriffs-Substitute and Sheriffs-Depute interviewed prisoners, victims 
and witnesses in criminal cases. Routinely, these supervising officials testified to 
the prisoner’s state of mind during these interviews. Prisoners had to be of sound 
mind to produce credible legal statements, particularly when confessions were 
extracted. Officials and recording clerks evaluated whether the prisoner’s 
declaration, “might be supposed to proceed from a weariness of life, or deprivation 
of judgement”. In 1759, John Fairbairn behaved “foolishly” when interrogated by
demanding that the armed nature of his robbery be recorded on the formal 
accusation. At Fairbairn’s trial. Dr William Ormiston of Henderside, a Justice of 
Peace for Roxburghshire, was called to establish that Fairbairn had been of sound 
mind at his interrogation.^®^ hi Scotland, there was a determined, practical effort to 
ensure that a prisoner was sane at the time of providing a declaration or confession. 
High station witnesses therefore provided evidence in their capacities as supervising 
officials within the legal system. Such testimony was valued because these office­
holders bore no close relationship to the litigants. Jurors might also display social 
deference towards such persons and endow their judgements with particular 
credence.
English IPs and coroners also performed interrogations between 1660 and 1829.
Scots Magazine 16(1754), p.203. Trial o f  William Causland, Jedburgh. I
Armed transgressions exacerbated crimes and lessened chances o f  receiving a ju iy ’s I
recommendation for mercy. !
JC 12/9. I
I
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In contrast to Scotland, guilty pleas and prisoner confessions were less readily 
entertained or sought out before trial in England. Thus, high status English 
witnesses bore evidence infrequently in their official capacities as legal 
administrators. Northern English witnesses such as IPs were usually arraigned 
because of their intimate association to the prisoner or victim, not because of their 
detached nature or function within the legal process. High status Scottish witnesses 
could also be closely tied to litigants, but they appeared more often because of their 
official, legal role than in England. The Scottish practice of seeking disinterested 
testimony from “supervising” legal officials therefore explains why a greater 
proportion of southern Scottish witnesses were of high station when compared to 
northern England.
Legally experienced or trained witnesses played an enhanced role during 
Scottish hearings than their English counterparts (Table 5.6). John Waldie, a 
“Writer” (legal clerk) in Kelso, recorded William Ormiston’s interview of John 
Fairbairn in 1759.^ ®^  Waldie was also adduced to prove whether Fairbairn had been 
of “sound mind and sober senses” at the time of emitting his confession. Waldie 
was convinced that Fairbairn’s declaration was sound legally, but he also mentioned 
that the prisoner “behaved Foolishly” during the interview. Waldie reinforced 
beliefs that Fairbairn was “weak-minded” and may have been instigated to commit 
the crime. Fairbairn was found guilty “art and part” of housebreaking and theft, but 
the jury recommended him to mercy on the ground of diminished responsibility. 
Waldie was presented at court because of his role within the legal process and he 
JC 12/9.
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was able to provide valuable, “disinterested” evidence regarding Fairbairn’s mental 
state. As a seasoned legal professional, Waldie would have been familiar with legal 
formularies and the concept of criminal responsibility. The regular use of persons 
such as Waldie within the Scottish criminal system explains why “legal witnesses” 
played an augmented role, from an earlier date, in Scotland than in England.
“Legal Witnesses” 1708-1749 1750-1799 1800-1829
Southern Scotland 10 21 21
Northern England 0 6 18
Table 5.6. Proportion o f all testifiers who were "legal witnesses ” in northern 
England and southern Scotland, 1708-1829.
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Conclusions
Between 1660 and 1829, lay persons provided the majority of evidences during 
northern English and southern Scottish insanity and idiocy defences. These broad 
quantitative testimonial patterns therefore mirrored contemporary insanity defences 
in London and Edinburgh. Whilst the bulk of Scottish testifiers were lay persons, 
these lay witnesses appeared in a smaller proportion of southern Scottish than 
northern English criminal hearings. This disparity can be explained by the divergent 
practical routines which were employed within these distinctive legal codes. The 
practice of plea-bargaining was encouraged at Scotland’s Justiciary courts, but was 
dissuaded at England’s Assize courts. Usually, no testimony was heard at court 
where Scottish “pannels” entered guilty-pleas. Thus, a lesser proportion of southern 
Scottish trials included “lay” testimony. Even so, pre-trial statements from lay 
persons could inform decisions to mitigate sentences on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility.
Greater pedagogic and practical attention was paid to evidential standards in 
Britain over the course of the long eighteenth century. Changes in testimonial 
principles affected the participation of lay deponents and the value of their 
testimonies. After 1700, lay testifiers were increasingly expected to impart 
information regarding the prisoner’s speech, behaviour and appearance which they 
had observed directly. Direct observations were understood to be constructive and 
instructive forms of evidence as the concept of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
became entrenched.
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Conversely, British “lay testimony” became restricted in its scope and impact 
owing to some evidential developments. Indirect and “hearsay” testimony declined 
in value, although such testimony was not eradicated or perceived to be worthless 
by the early nineteenth century. Even in the 1820s, “hearsay” testimony could be 
accepted as secondary, coiroboratory evidence, which might clinch the jury’s 
decision regarding the prisoner’s mental state. By the early nineteenth century, 
lawyers made greater efforts to restrict lay deponents from imparting “opinion”. 
The margins between “fact” and “opinion” were perhaps never more shaded than in 
cases where the prisoner’s criminal responsibility was questioned explicitly. Lay 
witnesses continued to offer their opinions (but not “expert opinion”), sometimes in 
strict defiance of instructions from legal professionals.
The impoifant developments in testimonial principles were reflected in the 
enhanced quantitative and qualitative impact of “gaolers”, and their testimony, flt 
Britain’s circuit courts. “Gaolers” and other persons who were professionally 
associated with prisons and “tolbooths” were more prominent as witnesses after 
1750 in both nortliern England and southern Scotland. “Gaolers” were especially 
involved where the prisoner’s mental ability to stand trial needed to be assessed. 
Their custodial roles allowed these testifiers to provide direct observations of the 
prisoner’s behaviour, speech and appearance. “Custodians” typically lacked any 
formal medical or legal training, but they could be treated as “expert” witnesses 
who imparted a posteriori opinion, based upon their personal experiences of
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identifying mentally disturbed prisoners. “Gaolers” were not purely “impartial” 
witnesses, but it was recognised that they could offer less partial testimony. The 
“gaoler’s” experience, detachment and ability to offer opinion marked them apart 
from most “lay” witnesses.
This thesis has focused upon some of the key theoretical and practical 
developments which altered the nature and impact of lay testimony. But in some 
senses, perceptions of persuasive evidence did not alter significantly in Britain 
between 1660 and 1829. The interpretations of the local “lay” community or 
“neighbourhood” played an enduring role in the authentication of mental afflictions. 
Multiple lay testimonies, which converged upon a common elucidation of the 
prisoner’s mental soundness, continued to convincing proofs (beyond a reasonable 
doubt) of whether the prisoner was “mad” or “bad”. The English Assize courts 
persisted to relying upon community consensus for the assessment of a defendant’s 
mental faculties. Lay testimony was restricted in Scottish defences “in-bar-of-trial”, 
but the .Justiciary courts continued to depend on lay estimations where the 
prisoner’s mental state was questioned at or around the time of the crime itself. In 
cases where lay testimony was imparted alone during the 1820s, tlie way in which 
the prisoner’s mental condition was evaluated at law would not have been alien to 
the couitrooms of the late seventeenth century.
The witness’ gender could prescribe whether they appeared as deponents. The 
vast majority of witnesses were male in both England and Scotland, but women
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could outnumber men in some trials, most notably cases where females were 
accused of child-murder. Both traditions preferred male to female testimony, yet 
female testimony was not always perceived to carry inferior qualitative value when 
compared to male testimony. Females could challenge successfully male testimony 
at the provincial courts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Too few 
cases were studied to provide solid conclusions regarding the seventeenth century in 
this respect, but friture research could establish whether such patterns existed before 
1700. The identification of mental abnormality was not a male preserve during this 
era. Women could be involved in the authentication insanity and idiocy amongst 
both male and female prisoners. Female witnesses could convey their 
understandings of unusual and typical behavioui* to the couitroom, which converged 
with male perceptions. Female prisoners could therefore be judged by standards of 
“normality” which were imparted by testifiers of their own sex.
Deference could be shown to witnesses of high social and economic standing. 
The observations of persons such as Justices of the Peace and Sheriff-Substitutes 
could be highly respected and rather equivocal testimony regarding a prisoner’s 
mental condition could therefore be accepted as sound evidence, rather than being 
challenged. Yet “elite” persons provided a small minority of testimonies, especially 
in England. The social standing of the deponent and prisoner was related, as friends 
and neighbours were drawn to court to act as “character witnesses” as well as “eye­
witnesses” to the crime. Persons from the “middling” and “lower” sorts in society 
were involved heavily as witnesses, as well as litigants, throughout the period
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studied. Criminal trials proceeded with reference to conceptions of justice, criminal 
responsibility and mental abnormality which were imparted by attestants of 
middling and lower status. The involvement of these sorts of people reinforces 
recent research which has emphasised that Britain’s criminal laws were not merely 
tools of social control, which were wielded by society’s elites alone. Persons of 
inferior status could perceive the criminal comts to be a worthwhile and legitimate 
means of redressing anti-social behaviour.
Scottish criminal trials involved a greater proportion of “elite” witnesses than 
their English counteiparts. Scotland’s independent legal practices explain this 
phenomenon. Scotland’s Justiciary court made regular use of legally trained and 
experienced persons, who had inteiwiewed the prisoner before trial, in order to 
establish whether the “pannels” were of “sound mind and sober senses”. Persons of 
high social standing, such as Sheriffs-Depute and Sheriffs- Substitute, were adduced 
to give evidence during Scottish defences of fatuity and furiosity. Less 
distinguished legal personnel, such as writers, were employed similarly to provide 
“detached” observations of the prisoner. Legally trained and experienced persons 
did examine prisoners and record pre-trial depositions in England, but they were 
adduced at court less regularly than in Scotland. Wliilst the Scottish system referred 
to testimony from interviewers as a matter of course, no such procedure existed 
during English criminal trials.
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Lay persons continued to be provide persuasive, powerful forms of proof where 
the prisoner’s state of mind was evaluated in both countries. Neighbours and friends 
were adept at providing long and short-term observations of the prisoner’s mental 
soundness. Lay testimony was especially useful in authenticating the prisoner’s 
mental condition at the time when the crime was committed. The subsequent 
chapter will compare this qualitative analysis to that of expert, medical “opinion”. 
Only once “expert” testimony has been evaluated, can solid conclusions be drawn 
about the value which was afforded to lay evidence within the contemporary 
courtrooms of England and Scotland.
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6.
Medical witnesses and the authentication o f mental afflictions in 
northern England and southern Scotland, 1660^1829
The previous chapter argued that some important differences evolved between 
lay and “expert” testimony during the long eighteenth century. This thesis is here 
expanded by investigating the role which one prominent group of “experts”, who 
can be broadly described as being “medical witnesses”, played during provincial 
insanity and idiocy defences. John Haslam, sometime apothecary to London’s 
Bedlam and author of the first treatise on medical evidence regarding insanity, 
revealed what might be expected of medical witnesses in an early nineteenth 
century court, “The physician should not come into court to merely give his opinion 
-  he should be prepared to explain it, and be able to afford the reasons which 
influenced his decision”.^  Did Haslam’s understanding of medical testimony reflect 
common practice amongst his contemporaries, and if so, how did the activity of 
expert, medical attestants evolve between 1660 and 1829?
The relationship of medical “professionals” to mental affliction before 1830 has 
been debated by scholars.^ Thomas Szasz has suggested that mental maladies were 
not real pathologies, but were invented to control the behaviour of persons who 
failed to conform to cultural norms.^ Szasz also contended that medical
‘ Haslam Medical Jurisprudence (1817) p.4. 
 ^See pp. 13-14.
 ^ Szasz Manufacture p. 15. Myth passim.
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professionals propagated and sustained this deceptive concept of mental affliction, 
by dominating processes of identifying and incarcerating persons who were deemed 
to be abnormal mentally. This latter theory was modified by Andrew Scull, who 
argued that England’s “mad-doctors” came to govern the certification of insanity 
and idiocy after the mid eighteenth century."  ^ Recent research into British legal 
hearings has challenged such assumptions. Joel Eigen and Robert Houston have 
studied the testifiers and testimony that appeared during insanity defences at the 
Old Bailey and Scotland’s High Couit, respectively.^ They have concluded 
independently that neither the infant “psychiatric” profession, nor the broader 
medical community, dominated the courtroom identification of madness and idiocy 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Their findings coiTelate with 
the wider historiography, whereby medical professionals played restricted roles in 
Britain’s legal arenas, especially compared with their Continental counterpaits.®
This chapter engages with these broader debates, by establishing the impact of 
“generic” medical and “alienist” testimony during provincial English and Scottish 
insanity and idiocy hearings between 1660 and 1829. The proportion of all 
provincial English and Scottish witnesses who had medical training is compared, 
alongside the proportion of trials which included medical testimony. Key trends 
which underpinned the appearance of medical testifiers are identified and explained. 
Joel Eigen has found a specific relationship between crimes of inteipersonal 
violence and the appearance of medical witnesses during Old Bailey insanity
** Scull Museums o f  Madness pp. 14 and 124-129.
 ^Eigen Witnessing and “Intentionality”. Houston Madness and “Courts’
Crawford “Emergence” pp.2-20.
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defences/ It is questioned whether this thesis can be extended to northern English 
and southern Scottish criminal defences of madness and idiocy. Mental affliction or 
debilitation could be argued as a defence either to postpone a hearing or to 
exculpate a crime. It is suggested that medical persons were involved most regularly 
in defences where the prisoner’s immediate mental state threatened to suspend 
hearings. The reasons for this pattern are elucidated.
Quantitative analyses are enhanced by qualitative assessments of medical, 
“expert” evidence within Britain’s legal arenas. It is investigated how the fruition of 
stricter evidential standaids enhanced the value of medical testimony at court. By 
the late eighteenth century, the concept of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” was 
applied decisively during criminal trials. Such testimonial principles affected the 
testimony which was expected of, and delivered by, medical professionals during 
the long eighteenth century. It is examined how desires for “impartial” and sound 
proofs, propagated by legal professionals, shaped the qualitative and quantitative 
impact of medical professionals during provincial British insanity and idiocy 
defences. Besides references to laws of proof, it is discovered how medical 
testimony was employed during criminal hearings. It is questioned whether lay 
estimations of the prisoner’s mental condition was challenged or dominated by 
medical testimony. Published work has suggested that medical testimony was 
utilised most frequently to legitimise or reinforce lay evidences of a prisoner’s 
mental condition.^ This thesis demands to be tested for provincial trials. The final
 ^Eigen Witnessing pp.24-30. 
® Houston Madness pp.46-49.
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section of the chapter considers witnesses who specialised in the identification and 
management of mentally troubled persons. The reasons why such “experts” or 
“specialists” appeared at court, as well as the type of evidence which they imparted, 
are investigated.
Defining "medical ” witnesses
Within the context of British criminal hearings, “medical” witnesses were 
distinguished from “lay” attestants by their formal medical training or education.^ 
Their schooling and vocational skills meant that medical professionals could be 
classed as “expert” witnesses, who could offer “opinion” testimony. During insanity 
defences, expert “opinion” could be validated by the witness’ occupational 
experience and abstract knowledge of mental afflictions. Experts were allowed to 
opine whether the prisoner’s conduct, speech or appearance matched those 
associated with general cases of insanity or idiocy. Medical witnesses could 
therefore provide different proofs to lay testifiers, who were restricted increasingly 
to relating the “facts as they occurred” to the court.
Most medical testifiers were “general practitioners”, who did not claim any 
special expertise in identifying or treating mental afflictions. Statements from 
English and Scottish physicians, sur geons, apothecaries and “druggists”, alongside
Houston Madness pp.48-52.
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medical students and apprentices, are therefore considered here/® Medicine became 
more “professionalised” during the long eighteenth century, but the boundary 
between the “laity” and medical occupations remained fluid/^ Distinctions between 
professional medics and lay persons were blurred by the endurance of “empirics”, 
or experienced practitioners who belonged to no formal trade structure/^ The most 
substantially represented kind of “experiential” witnesses were female midwifes, 
who appeared regularly during child-murder cases. Generally, women midwifes 
received no formal medical education, but were practiced in delivering infants. 
The evolving medical professions did not monopolize medical experience and 
understanding, for lay persons could share a broad familiarity with such 
knowledge. Historians have isolated “lay” from “medical” persons, but such 
dichotomies are limited intrinsically.
Britain’s medical occupations were stratified in terms of wealth, social status, 
experience and expertise. Typically, historians have associated a tripartite, 
hierarchical structure with Britain’s medical professions, but regional medics were 
not categorised neatly into physicians, surgeons and apothecaries.^^ Provincial
By the 1820s, the term “apothecary” had been replaced by “druggist” in some northern English 
depositions.
" /Wp.290.
/Wp.304.
L. Rosner, Medical Education in the Age o f  Improvement. Edinburgh Students and 
Apprentices. 1760-1826. (1991), pp.54-55.
Porter “Laymen, Doctors” p.304.
I. Loudon “The Nature o f  Provincial medical practice in Eighteenth-Century England” MH. 29, 3, 
(2002), p.7. J. Lane, “Medical practitioners o f  Provincial England,” MH. 28, (1984), pp.353-371. 
Ibid, “A Provincial Surgeon and his obstetric practice: Thomas W Jones o f  Henly-in-Arden, 1764- 
1846”, MH. 31, p.355. Ibid, “Provincial Medical Apprentices and their Masters in Early Modern 
England”, ECL. 12, 2, (1988), p .l4 . Porter “Inti-oduction” /?fl5'5’//«.
Loudon “Provincial medical” p.7. Porter Disease. Medicine and Society in England (1993) pp.34- 
35. Rosner Medical Education dd.18-19.
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medical practice was dictated by commercial opportunity, competition and 
economic necessity/^ Medical professionals could be forced into generalised 
practice by the diverse needs of local communities, especially in isolated rural 
areas. Thus, the “Surgeon-Apothecary”, who transcended boundaries of practice 
within the medical occupations, proliferated in northern England. Owing to this 
fluidity of practice, medical designations were not adhered to rigidly. For instance, 
George Elleiton was presented as being both a “Surgeon” and “Surgeon- 
Apothecary” at court in 1800.*®
Scholarship has also considered the importance of persons who specialized in 
the authentication, supervision and treatment of mentally disturbed people. These 
“specialists” (“mad-doctors”, “alienists”, “asylum-” and “madhouse-keepers”) 
highlight the problems of imposing delineated categories of “lay” and “medical” 
upon long eighteenth century witnesses. “Specialists” sometimes lacked formal 
adjuvant training, but their occupational expertise focused upon the identification of 
mental afflictions.^® Both “specialist” and “medical” testifiers could be classed as 
“expert” witnesses, capable of imparting “opinion” testimony, because of their 
occupational training and experience.
The vast majority of British “generic” medical and “specialist” witnesses were
Loudon “Provincial medical” pp.7-8.
Holmes Augustan England p. 167. Holmes argues that the general medical practitioners can 
therefore be traced back to at least 1680, challenging the importance o f  the 1815 “Apothecaries 
Act”.
ASSI 45/40/2 and York Herald August 1800.
Houston Madness p. 119.
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male during the long eighteenth century. Men produced ninety-percent of all 
medical testimony which was imparted during provincial insanity and idiocy 
defences. Formal, medical training remained strongly a male preserve in Britain.^* 
Women usually appeared as midwifes, although Margaret Dalton, who had 
managed “Catesby Lunatic Asylum” in Northumberland for twenty-six years, 
testified as an expert during Jonathan Martin’s trial in 1829.^  ^ Females could 
operate as medical practitioners in provincial England and Scotland, but the 
overwhelming majority of apothecaries, surgeons and physicians were men. The 
male dominance of medical testimony therefore reflects broader ti'ends within the 
evolving medical professions themselves.
Testimony from female “empirics” illustrates that the line between lay “fact” 
and expert “opinion” could be thin. Female midwifes testified regularly during 
British child-murder cases.^^ Typically, these women had practical expertise in 
delivering children, but had not received foimal medical schooling.^"* British courts 
drew upon the midwife’s expertise in identifying signs of pregnancy and their 
ability to distinguish between still-birth, accidental death and the murder of infants. 
During insanity defences, midwifes were not adduced because of their experience in
Lane “Provincial surgeon” p.337. Porter Patients and Practitioners. Rosner Medical Education 
p. 10. A.L. Wyman, “The Surgeoness. The Female Practitioner o f  Surgery, 1400-1900”, MH. 28, 
(1984), pp.24 and 37-38.
London Morning Herald April 2"^  1829.
L. Abrams “From Demon to Victim: the Infanticidal Mother in Shetland, 1699-1899”, in Brown 
and Ferguson (eds.) Twisted Sisters. (2002), pp. 186-198. Beck, “O f Two Minds About the Death 
Penalty: Hippel’s Account o f  a Case o f  Infanticide”, Studies in Eighteenth Centui v Culture. 
American Societv for Eighteenth Centurv Culture. 18, (1988). Hoffer and Hull, Murdering Mothers. 
Jackson “Suspicious infant deaths” pp.64-82. Kilday “Maternal Monsters” pp. 156-184. King 
“Gender, Crime” pp.55-57. R.W. Malcolmson, “Infanticide in the Eighteenth Century”, in Cockburn 
(ed.) Crime in England. 1550-1800. (1977). Symonds, Weep Not for Me. Symonds, “Reconstructing 
Rural Infanticide”. Wessling, “Infanticide trials”.
^  Lamer Medical Education p.55.
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authenticating mental disorders and therefore ought to have related factual 
observations rather than opinions. But the division between fact and opinion was 
blurred where the prisoner’s mental state was evaluated. Witnesses were asked to 
interpret the prisoner’s conduct by comparing it with common preconceptions of 
normal and abnormal behaviour. At Ayr in 1761, for instance, a septuagenarian 
midwife called Janet Muir reported how Janet Thompson, “appeared ... to be a 
weak Silly thing”. M u i r ’s statement reinforced “lay” evidence that Thompson 
suffered from a partially debilitating form of imbecility. Muir had to base her 
interpretation of Thompson’s mental faculties upon broadly accepted indicators of 
sanity and mental imbalance. Evidence from midwifes and lay persons was not 
reinforced by occupational specialism or theoretical learning, but their testimonies 
could resemble expert “opinion” because they applied general understandings of 
mental afflictions and criminal responsibility to the specific case, or prisoner.
Female testimony was utilised reluctantly in Britain’s legal codes, but women 
could testify and provide persuasive evidence.^® Women deponents were most 
readily adduced when they offered “facts” which males could not have observed. At 
the Cumberland Assizes of March 1825, the “gaol-matron” of Carlisle prison, Anne 
Routledge, provided distinctive evidence regarding Hannah Wells’ insanity.^^ 
Routledge had obseiwed Hannah daily for two months. Tliis “gaol-matron’s” 
testimony was therefore similar to other “expert” witnesses (most notably medics 
and gaolers) who had monitored prisoners repeatedly whilst they lay in gaol.
JC 12/10.
^  See pp. 146-154.
Cumberland Racquet August 16"' 1825.
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Routledge recounted how Wells provided “indirect answers” to questions and was 
“at times insane”. Wells could not always remember whether she had taken 
breakfast, for instance. Routledge also averred that Wells “often tells me in the 
morning that she has washed herself when she has not”. This final observation 
signifies that female prisoners at Carlisle, even those who suffered from mental 
afflictions, were expected to cleanse themselves daily and that washing facilities 
were available in the prison. Male witnesses, such as gaolers, would not have 
imparted such an illustration of Wells’ mental incapacity. Social decorum dictated 
that males should not obseiwe female ablutions, where intimate regions of the 
female body were exposed. Routledge therefore communicated a fact which only 
women ought to have witnessed. Routledge’s role as “gaol-matron” allowed her 
repetitive, intimate observations of the female prisoner. It is explained why such 
testimony was perceived to carry particular value at court.
181
Quantative analysis
Robert Houston and Joel Eigen have demonstrated that medical witnesses, 
including “general practitioners” and insanity specialists, provided a minority of 
courtroom testimonies during insanity trials at Edinburgh and the Old Bailey 
These findings challenge alignments that medically trained persomiel dominated 
quantitatively the testimony which authenticated prisoners’ mental conditions?^ It 
is suggested that medical professionals and insanity experts also continued to 
provide a small proportion of depositions and courtroom testimonies in northern 
England and southern Scotland between 1660 and 1829. This reinforces arguments 
that Britain’s criminal courtrooms were not “medicalized” before 1830; lay persons 
remained central to the validation of the defendant’s mental state.
The proportion of insanity and idiocy trials which included at least one medical 
witness (either amongst depositions or narratives) provides a basic indication of 
their quantative impact. Whilst lay attestants appeared in the majority of provincial 
British insanity and idiocy defences, most cases did not include evidence from a 
medical witness.^^ Amongst the northern English trial narratives, only forty-three 
percent of them included any medical testimony (Table 6.1). In southern Scotland, 
minutes and naiTatives indicate that medical witnesses were involved in just thirty- 
seven-percent of furiosity and fatuity defences. Both lay and medical witnesses
^  Houston Madness pp.46-49 and “Courts” pp.341-345. Eigen “Opinion” pp. 169-172 and 
Witnessing pp. 108-132.
Scull Museums o f  Madness pp. 14 and 124-129.
See pp. 139-140.
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were involved in fewer trials in southern Scotland than northern England. Once 
again, this phenomenon can be explained partly by Scotland’s practice of “plea- 
bargaining”, whereby the prisoner could plead guilty and be sentenced without any 
testimony being heard at court.
Regional 
Circuit Court:
No. of 
Trials
% of trials which 
included “lay” 
witnesses
% of trials which 
included “medical” 
Witnesses
Northern England 142 83.8 43
Southern Scotland 35 6 5J 37.1
Table 6.1. Witness appearance by category, expressed as a proportion o f all 
insanity and idiocy hearings in northern England and southern Scotland, 1660-
7,929.
Medical opinion was not always sought to clarify the prisoner’s mental 
condition, even when medical witnesses did appear in court. Fully one-quarter of 
both Scottish and English medical deponents neither volunteered, nor were asked to 
convey, such opinions during provincial hearings. These medics were engaged 
initially to speak about the cause and nature of wounds and their testimony focused 
upon this task alone. This indicates that medical testimony was not perceived to be 
necessary to the authentication of troublesome mental afflictions during criminal 
trials.
In the absence of courtroom narratives, it is impossible to ascertain accurately
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whether medics were adduced at court in northern England before the late-1770s. It 
seems likely that they were, but that they appeared irregularly. According to the 
pre-trial depositions, at least, no medical witness appeared during a Northern Assize
insanity or idiocy defence before 1726.31
1700-1749 1750-1799 1800-1829
Northern England 11 31 48
Southern Scotland 20 10 55
Table 6.2. Proportion o f northern English and southern Scottish insanity and 
idiocy defences which involved depositions or testimonies from at least one medical
witness, 1700-1829
1700-1749 1750-1799 1800-1829
Witness % % % % % %
Type: Medical Lay Medical Lay Medical Lay
Northern
England:
6 94 13 87 18 82
Southern
Scotland:
8 92 6 94 17 83
Table 6.3. Involvement o f lay and medical witnesses, expressed as a percentage 
o f all deponents in northern English and southern Scottish insanity and idiocy
Richard Waddy’s case, Yorkshire 1726. A S S I45/18/3 no.32A.
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At the Old Bailey, the participation of medical witnesses during insanity 
defences rose from the mid eighteenth century onwards?^ Similar patterns were 
evident at the Northern Assizes (Table 6.3). Medical participation is unclear until 
the period 1800 to 1829, when almost fifty-percent of the northern English insanity 
and idiocy hearings involved medical evidence. Medical witnesses also increased as 
a proportion of northern England’s pre-trial deponents and courtroom testifiers from 
the 1770s onwards. Whilst medical persons formed a mere eight-percent of pre-trial 
deponents before 1750, this figure rose to thirteen-percent between 1750 and 1799. 
Medical witnesses produced close to one-fifth of all suiwiving depositions between 
1800 and 1829. The increase in narratives after the 1770s allows a tentative survey 
of medical testimonies at court, too. Amongst the forty-eight detailed reports that 
were studied for the period 1776-1829, medical witnesses also provided one-fifth of 
testimonies at court.
In southern Scotland, meanwhile, medical witnesses had a minimal impact 
upon eighteenth century fatuity and furiosity trials. Medical testifiers participated at 
the seventeenth century High Court, but no medical testimony was delivered during 
southern circuit furiosity and fatuity hearings before 1747.^  ^The prisoner’s mental 
condition was only evaluated directly during five cases in southern Scotland before 
1750. This low sample-base precludes firm quantitative conclusions. In contrast to 
insanity defences at England’s Northern Assizes and Old Bailey, medical witnesses
Eigen Witnessing d p . 108-160.
See the trial o f  Philip Standsfield, 1688, JC2/17.
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did not become more prominent during Scottish furiosity defences between 1750 
and 1799. Only one of the eleven southern circuit trials between 1750 and 1799 
included medical testimony concerning the prisoner’s state of mind, that of William 
Douglas at Dumfries in 1795.^ "^  Indeed, medical professionals did not become 
involved regularly during southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity hearings until the 
period 1800 to 1829, when medical professionals accounted for seventeen-percent 
of all testifiers. Perhaps more significantly, medical testimony was included in more 
than half of the early nineteenth centmy hearings in southern Scotland. Medical 
witnesses were involved in a greater proportion of cases than lay witnesses after 
1800. This pattern stood in stark contrast to contemporary hearings in England, 
France and paits of Germany.
There were progressive, yet divergent, tiends to the involvement of medical 
testifiers during northern English and southern Scottish insanity and idiocy 
defences. Medical testifiers were more prominent during early nineteenth century 
than late seventeenth century British criminal healings. This enlianced quantitative 
impact was related strongly to evolutions in evidentiary standaids. From at least the 
late eighteenth century, the “opinion” of expert witnesses was sought out 
increasingly because such testimony was perceived to be a constmctive means of 
establishing “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”. The unusually high participation of 
medical witnesses in Scotland after 1801 was directed by fomial changes to
JC 12/22 Dumfries, September 1795.
Crawford “Legalising” pp.89-109 and “Emergence” Eigen Witnessing pp. 108-132. Forbes 
Surgeons passim. Landsman “Rectitude” pp.463-469. J. Goldstein, Console and Classify. The 
French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century, (1997), pp. 162-169. Kaufraann “Boundary 
Disputes” pp.276-285. Wessling “Infanticide” p .l l8 .
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Justiciary Court practice, which were informed by changing evidential values.
Medical witnesses may have become more prominent at couit over the cour se of 
the long eighteenth century, but they could be absent from early nineteenth century 
hearings. The mental conditions of Richard Routledge (Cumberland, 1824) and 
James Russel (Ayr, 1826) were authenticated without reference to medical 
testimony, for instance.^^ Witliin the context of legal hearings, Michael MacDonald 
has suggested that insanity and idiocy was defined by legal and medical “experts”, 
but that lay persons verified mental afflictions in practice.^^ Between 1660 and 
1829, medically trained professionals did not regularly dictate the identification of 
mental afflictions, at least within the context of British criminal hearings. In 
England, evidence from individuals with prescribed, medical schooling and 
expertise wæ never a prerequisite to the authentication of a prisoner’s mental 
condition before 1830. In Scotland, medical testimony was required to detennine 
the prisoner’s mental fitness to stand trial after 1801, but was not necessary to 
establish the prisoner’s mental condition at the time of committing a crime.
Carlisle Journal August 28*^ ' 1824. A w  Advertiser April 13‘’* 1826. 
MacDonald Mystical Bedlam p .l 13.
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Forensic skills and the augmented appearance o f medical testifiers
The chapter upon “lay witnesses” has established contemporary distinctions 
which were drawn between medical or expert “opinion” and lay testimony during 
the long eighteenth century. This section aims to investigate what sort of impact the 
development of medical “forensic” skills, or the application of medical knowledge 
and opinion in court, had upon medical testimonies during insanity and idiocy 
defences before 1830. Perceptions of the testimonial value of medical “opinion” 
certainly altered between 1660 and 1830. Catherine Crawford has presented a 
cohesive and persuasive analysis of the interrelated evolution of jurisprudential 
theories and forensic proficiency in Britain during this era.^  ^This thesis builds upon 
Crawford’s suggestion that evidential evolutions had a significant impact upon the 
qualitative and quantitative impact of medical testimony upon insanity and idiocy 
defences, at least fi*om the mid eighteenth century onwards.^^
Two principal areas of jurisprudence and forensic science are investigated. 
Following Joel Ergen’s argument that medical witnesses most regularly appeared 
during Old Bailey insanity defences where the prisoner had committed inter­
personal violence, the growth in anatomical skills and schooling amongst medical 
professionals is evaluated."^  ^ It is examined whether provincial medical deponents 
were also involved heavily in response to violent crimes, rather than offences
Crawford “Emergence” passim. 
^^/Wp.25.
Eigen Witnessing pp.23-25.
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against property. Before engaging with these broader historiographical matters, 
medico-legal interest in criminal responsibility and mental afflictions are assessed.
Medical practitioners could lack abstract knowledge and practical experience 
regarding the treatment or authentication of mental afflictions. A clear example of 
this occuned in 1823, when the Lancashire physician. Dr St-Clai’e, felt compelled to 
qualify his uncertain diagnosis of Andrew Ryding’s mental state with the admission 
that, “The diseases of the mind are in some places become a separate department [of 
expertise]: I have not studied it a great deal”.'^ * Dr St-Clare had been adduced to 
impart his opinion of the probable cause and severity of the victim’s wounds, which 
he had observed and dressed shortly after the crime. St-Clare was comfortable in 
this anatomical function, but he was ill-prepared to answer questions about 
Ryding’s sanity and provided equivocal, unpersuasive testimony in this regard."^  ^
Yet the very fact that medical persons were asked to comment upon the prisoner’s 
mental condition in such cases is significant. All medical witnesses could offer 
opinions and hence, in a broad sense, all medical professionals held the potential to 
be “expert” witnesses during insanity and idiocy defences.
By the eighteenth centmy, medical professionals could turn to diversity of 
published practical and theoretical expositions regarding mental afflictions.'^^ By the 
eaidy nineteenth century, public lectures were delivered on the subject in Edinburgh
Lancaster Gazette August 2 TM 823. 
Idem
Eigen Witnessing p .l 10-122.
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and London?'^ Medical guidebooks and theories upon mental disturbance were 
published from the late sixteenth century onwards?^ Published works expanded 
with titles such as George Cheyne’s English Malady (London, 1733). Debates 
between two of London’s premier “alienists”, Drs William Battie and John Monro, 
were published in 1758. Momo vilified Battie’s suggestion that madness was 
""deluded imagination ”, for instance, declaring “I should rather define madness to 
be a vitiated judgmenf\^^ The disagreement between Battie and Monro indicates 
that distinctive theories regarding mental afflictions could exist concomitantly.
Written discourses also evolved concerning the forensic application of medical 
knowledge in the courtroom. British authorship upon medical jurisprudence lagged 
behind its Continental counterparts, although European texts were available in 
Britain from at least the mid eighteenth century .T he publication of Samuel Farr’s 
Elements of Medical Jurisnmdence (London, 1788) illustrates that British interest 
had been sparked by the late eighteenth century. Formal education in forensic skills 
developed in Britain (especially in Edinburgh) from the late eighteenth century, 
although such training was established in some Continental comitries before the mid 
eighteenth century.
Porter “Laymen, Doctors” pp.285-286.
Bright, A Treatise o f  Melancholic. (1586).
Battie Treatise on Madness (1758) and Monio Remarks on Dr Battle’s Treatise on Madness 
(1758). Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp.52-72 interprets the roots and (hidden) intentions o f  this 
debate.
Crawford “Emergence” p.3. Eigen Witnessing pp.l 10-122.
Crawford “Emergence” p.3. Earner Medical Education pp.46-55.
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The developing field of medical jurisprudence had an important effect upon the 
role of medical witnesses and then* testimony dur ing insanity and idiocy trials?^ 
Jurisprudential works highlighted the potential use of medical opinion during legal 
cases, but medical testimony during insanity and idiocy defences had emerged as a 
secessive branch of interest by the 1820s?® John Haslam’s Medical Jurisprudence 
as it relates to Insanity (1817) was the first text to be published by a British author 
on this topic?^ Public lectures were also delivered on the subject in London and 
Edinburgh during the early nineteenth century?^ The influence of such disquisitions 
should not be overstated, for they were sparsely attended by contemporary 
standards. But they did provide specific guidelines for medical witnesses to follow 
when imparting testimony and what might be expected of them in court. This 
development both reflected and informed the changes which were apparent within 
some medical testimonies by the 1820s.
Ward “Observers” pp. 106-119.
Crawford “Emergence” pp.2-20. See also Forbes Surgeons p.40. 
Eigen Witnessing p. 115.
Porter Disease. Medicine pp.32-45.
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The relationship between forensic skills, anatomical schooling and the 
appearance o f medical witnesses during provincial British insanity and idiocy
defences.
Joel Eigen has demonstrated that the kind of offence which a prisoner 
committed impinged upon the appearance of medical witnesses during criminal 
trials in London and Middlesex?^ Eigen separated Old Bailey hearings into those 
incited by violent, inter-personal crimes (such as murder and assault) and those 
undertaken in response to property offences (such as theft and arson). Eigen located 
a strong link between medical participation and cases of inter-personal violence, at 
least after the trial of James Hadfield in 1800 (see Figure ô.l). '^* From around the 
mid eighteenth century onwards, similar patterns were evident in northern English 
and southern Scottish insanity and idiocy defences.
40
30IS 20
iCL 10 ,
o' I ■  ■ ■1760-9 1770-9 1780-9 1790-9 1800-9 1810-9 1820-9 
Years
H i Personal Crimes 0 0  Property Crimes
Figure 6.1. Simplified results taken from Eigen, p. 25, fig. 1.3. Rates o f 
medical participation by crime type. Old Bailey 1760-1829.
Eigen Witnessing pp.23-28 and 120-122. 
Ibid  pp.24-26.
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A minority of fatuity and furiosity defences were pled in response to offences of 
inter-personal violence in southern Scotland?^ Nevertheless, medical participation 
increased over the long eighteenth century in relation to such offences. There was a 
sharper augmentation of medical involvement during personal offences at the 
southern Justiciary circuit than at the Old Bailey (Table 6.4). The involvement of 
medical witnesses in Scotland was therefore related to the prisoner’s transgression.
1700-1749 1750-1799 1800-1829
Northern England 15 28 42
Southern Scotland 0 25 75
Table 6.4. Participation o f medical witnesses during insanity defences pled in 
response to crimes o f inter-personal violence, expressed as a percentage. 
Northern England and southern Scotland compared, 1700-1829.
There was also a clear relationship between the appear ance of medical witnesses 
and crimes of inter-personal violence at the Northern Assizes. The victim had been 
wounded in four-fifths of insanity and idiocy defences where medical testimony 
was adduced.^® According to courtroom narratives unearthed for the period 1800- 
1830, medical opinion was heard in forty-two-percent of northern English insanity
55 See p.85.
The remai 
ysical atte
because o f  the type o f  plea entered by the prisoner (pp.200-207).
^  ining 1/5**' were therefore called in relation to property offences which involved no 
ph si ack upon a victim. We shall see that medical witnesses could be involved in these cases
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defences pled in response to inter-personal crimes. This finding is broadly 
comparable to Eigen’s analysis of the printed reports for the Old Bailey, where 
medics appeared in between twenty-five and forty-percent of insanity defences for 
violent crimes between 1800 and 1830. The relationship between personal offences 
and medical participation was as compelling at the Northern Assizes as at the Old 
Bailey.
g  40
1760-9 1770-9 1780-9 1790-9 1800-9 1810-9 1820-9
Dates
Figure 6.2. Northern English Insanity and idiocy defences 1760-1829. 
Proportion o f trials for personal offences which included medical testimony about
the prisoner’s state o f mind.^^
There was no simple, linear progression by decade to medical participation 
during personal crimes in northern England (Figure 6.2). The sharp fluctuations 
between 1760 and 1799 were affected by the vagaries of eighteenth century source 
materials. Whilst courtroom narratives exist for the trials of personal offences 
between 1775 and 1778, few survive for the 1780s or 1790s.^  ^None of the medical 
witnesses’ depositions directly address the issue of a prisoner’s mental condition
Depositions or trial narratives only survive for one insanity defences involving personal offences 
between 1760 and 1769, that o f  Sir Thomas Gerard o f Warrington, at Lancaster in 1767.
Trials ... (1775-1778L
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between 1780 and 1799, but it is uncertain whether these persons testified at court, 
or whether their testimony was so vacant. The eighteenth century figures in Figure 
6.2 underestimate the appearance of medical witnesses during personal offences, 
especially for the 1780s and 1790s.
Depositions and trial narratives exist in greater numbers for early nineteenth 
century provincial trials, allowing fimier comparisons with the Old Bailey. Medical 
persons were involved in a markedly greater proportion of personal offences at the 
Old Bailey after 1800, a trend which was mirrored at the Northern Assizes.^® 
Northern English medical participation levelled off at around fifty-percent of these . 
cases in the 1820s, which contrasted with the sharp decline that occuned at the Old 
Bailey between 1820 and 1829,®® Crimes of inter-personal violence continued to 
predominate amongst northern English insanity and idiocy defences through to 
1829.®^  Because of this, medical testimony was involved in a greater proportion of 
Northern Assize insanity defences after 1820.
The broadly progressive pattern in medical appearance during inter-personal 
crimes was not peculiar to insanity defences. By the late eighteenth century, 
medical testimony was utilised more regularly within English criminal processes to 
explain wounds and death, whilst “lay” testimony became less imperative to
Eigen Witnessing p.25.
Ibid  pp.24-28 esp. figs. 1.3 and 1.4. 
See p.87.
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establishing such matters?^ As evidential principles evolved, medical testimony 
became an important means of proving, beyond a reasonable level of doubt, who 
and what had caused wounding or death?^ The developing relationship between 
medical testimony concerning a prisoner’s state of mind and personal crimes was 
therefore related to broader developments in British legal procedure.
This enhanced involvement of medical opinion in trials for violent crimes was 
both a product of, and reinforced by, expansion in forensic and anatomical 
education.®'  ^ Surgery and anatomy formed popular and integral components of the 
private and public schooling of British physicians, surgeons and medical 
apprentices by the late eighteenth century.®® Private schooling in surgery was 
available in London from the 1740s, whilst Continental manuals and textbooks 
were also available from at least the mid eighteenth century.®® Formal anatomical 
training became more widespread from the late 1780s onwards in Britain.®  ^In 1788, 
inaugural public medical lectures upon anatomy were delivered in Edinburgh, the 
hub of Georgian anatomical tuition.®  ^These developments mirrored and reinforced 
the amplified role of medical opinion in cases concerning wounding or death.
Crawford “Legalizing” p. 107 and “Emergence” pp.207-296 .Forbes Surgeons p.98. Landsman 
“Rectitude” pp.451-454.
Crawford “Emergence” pp.207-296. Landsman “Rectitude” pp.445-454. Shapiro Culture o f  Fact 
pp.2-32.
Crawford “Emergence” pp.3-4.
Lamer Medical Education pp.46-67 and 141-175.
Lane “Provincial” p.338 cites texts which were advertised within the Medical Register, although 
such adverts were also printed in newspapers and subscription periodicals such as the Gentleman’s 
Magazine. Medical persons could also receive a European schooling in such technical expertise.
Andrew Marshall, an attendant surgeon at London’s Bethlem, dissected cadavers o f  deceased 
inmates between 1789 and 1794. Marshall’s anatomical studies and comments upon the roots o f  
insanity were published posthumously in 1815. Andrews and Scull Undertaker p.34.
^  Crawford “Emergence” p.20, fii.57. Crowther and White Soul and Conscience p.3. Earner Medical 
Education pp.46-59.
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Medical knowledge evolved to match desires for proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
at law.
The maturation of anatomical knowledge amongst medical persons, as well as 
the increased reliance upon medical opinion in cases of physical injury, had a 
significant subsidiary effect upon insanity and idiocy defences. Medical witnesses 
could be engaged initially to testify to the cause of the victim’s wounds, rather than 
to substantiate the prisoner’s mental condition. Fully one-fifth of northern English 
medical witnesses who were either interviewed before trial or adduced at court (or 
both) had been called initially to attend wounds or establish cause of death. By 
comparison, around one-quarter of southern Scottish medical opinions concerning 
the pannel’s fatuity or furiosity came from medical people who were engaged 
originally to supply anatomical evidence. Courtroom participants, especially the 
legally trained judges and counsellors, could take advantage of the presence of 
medical persons and ask them to authenticate the prisoner’s state of mind alongside 
the nature of the victim’s wounds.
A prisoner’s insanity might not become apparent until the hearing itself. In such 
cases, medical witnesses could then be asked to impart their opinion of the 
prisoner’s sanity, as well as the nature of the victim’s physical wounds. This was 
illustrated by the divergent content of Thomas Rigg’s pre-trial deposition and 
courtroom testimony at Carlisle in 1810. In June 1810, Jackson Reay killed his 
wife, Elizabeth, by striking her head with an “iron wedge” at their farmhouse near
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Wigton in Cumberland. Reay fled for Carlisle by foot, where he was apprehended 
and arraigned for trial.®® Thomas Rigg, a surgeon at Aspatria, was called to attend 
Elizabeth Reay’s wounds, but she died before the surgeon amved at the scene of the 
crime At the subsequent coroner’s inquest, Rigg reported how he had discovered 
“three large wounds” upon Elizabeth Reay’s head, “one of which had fractured her 
Skull very Much so as [he] could introduce a probe into her Brain”. Rigg passed 
no comment about the murderer’s state of mind in his deposition, but he provided 
key evidence of Reay’s insanity in his couitroom testimony, stating that, “He 
considered the prisoner as insane, and was applied to by the family for medical 
advice, and they did not chuse that severe remedies should be resorted to, which in 
the prisoner’s case [Rigg] thought were indispensable”.^’ Surgeon Rigg was 
aiTaigned originally to prove the cause of Elizabeth’s death, but this witness’ 
function altered radically once evidence of Jackson Reay’s insanity emerged at 
court. Thomas Rigg became both an “expert” and a character witness, providing 
persuasive evidence that Jackson Reay was afflicted by delusions which rendered 
him both violent and confused.
The association between the appear ance of medical witnesses and crimes where 
the victim was physically injured provides an explanation for the predominance of 
surgeons and surgeon-apothecaries amongst provincial British medical deponents. 
In contrast to insanity defences at the Old Bailey, where physicians accounted for
^  Cumberland Pacauet June 12*’' 1810 (report o f  the crime). Carlisle Journal September 8“’ 1810 
(report o f  the trial).
ASSI 45/45.
Cumberland Pacquet June 12**' 1810.
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around half of all medical testimony after 1760, surgeons dominated the ranks of 
provincial British medical witnesses, both amongst depositions and trial testimonies 
(Table 6.5)?^ Over the course of the long eighteenth century, physicians declined as 
a proportion of all medical witnesses in both northern England and southern 
Scotland. Physicians could possess surgical skills, but surgeons became more firmly 
associated with anatomical processes by the nineteenth century, at least within the 
context of the criminal law.^  ^ In northern England, surgeons were involved 
regularly as medical attendants at coroners’ inquests into suspicious deaths from at 
least the 1750s.^'’ Amongst medical professionals, surgeons were most regulaiiy 
adduced in order to establish the cause and nature of a victim’s wounds in both 
England and Scotland (Figures 6.3 and 6.4).^ ® Surgeons were also most frequently 
asked to impart their opinion of the prisoner’s mental state after speaking about the 
victim’s wounds.
Eigen “Intentionaiity” p.42. Stephan Landsman considered all Old Bailey criminal hearings and 
found that surgeons also predominated as witnesses (Landsman “Rectitude” p.453). There was a 
greater supply o f  physicians in the metropolis than in many provincial areas, but their testimony may 
have been sought out specifically during Old Bailey insanity defences, possibly because o f  their 
superior social and professional station or because physicians were perceived to specialise in 
“internal” afflictions. Old Bailey trials were also published from the late seventeenth century 
onwards, in contrast to provincial tiials. Physicians may have testified to advertise their skills.
Lamer Medical Education p.67.
Lane “Provincial surgeon” p.337 suggests that younger, less experienced surgeons used inquests 
to expand their anatomical skills and knowledge.
Landsman “Rectitude” pp.452-453. Houston Madness pp.46-49.
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Physicians Surgeons Apothecaries Mad Doctors 
Designation of medical witness 
■  1700-1799 ■  1800-1829
Others
Figure 6.3. Designation o f northern English medical witnesses (depositions and 
trial narratives combined), expressed as percentage o f all medical testifiers, 1700-
76
Physicians Surgeons Apothecaries Mad Doctors 
Designation of medical witness 
■  1700-1799 ■  1800-1829
Others
Figure 6.4. Designation o f southern Scottish medical witnesses (precognitions 
and trial narratives combined), expressed as percentage o f all medical testifiers,
I708-I799and I800-I829.”
“Surgeons” includes “Surgeon-Apothecaries”. “Mad Doctors” refers to persons who were 
professionally engaged in supervision, care and cure o f  the mentally disturbed. “Others” includes 
undesignated medical witnesses, male and female midwifes, medical students and apprentices. 
See previous footnote.
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The contrasting impact of surgeons at the Old Bailey and the circuit courts also 
reflects the different structure of provincial and metropolitan medical professions. 
The Medical Registers of the late-1770s suggest that four-fifths of northern English 
medical professionals were either surgeons or surgeon-apothecaries.^^ The Registers 
provide incomplete pictures of the remedial occupations, but they suggest that the 
elite strata of physicians and lower-station apothecaries formed minorities amongst 
practicing provincial medics. Undoubtedly, there would have been a greater 
demand for the medical services of physicians in the densely populated 
conurbations and hinterlands of London, Edinburgh and places such as York and 
Lancaster. Less populated rural regions supported fewer medical professionals than 
urban areas. The scarcely populated county of Westmoreland supported few 
physicians. This may explain why only one physician was recorded amongst the 
depositions and narratives pertaining to Appleby insanity defences before 1830.^ ®
Cited by Lane “Practitioners” p.3 55. This figure includes entries for Cumberland, Durham, 
Lancashire, Northumberland, Westmoreland and Yorkshire.
Trial o f  James Towers, Westmoreland, 1822.
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Medical witnesses and the ‘"species ” o f insanity defence entered
The “species” of insanity or idiocy defence which was undertaken by or entered 
for the prisoner had an important bearing upon the appearance of medical witnesses. 
There were distinct ways in which the prisoner’s mental distraction could affect 
criminal hearings.^® This section will focus upon insanity and idiocy defences 
which sought to postpone the prisoner’s trial, rather than exculpate their crime. 
Medical professionals could play significant roles in the authentication of the 
prisoner’s mental state during the weeks preceding court hearings and during 
courtroom tribimals.
In Scotland, there was a strong association between medical participation and 
defences of firriosity “in-bar-of-trial”. On the southern circuit of Justiciary, ten of 
eleven defences “in-stop-of-trial” involved medical testimony between 1707 and 
1829. By contrast, during this same era, medical witnesses only appeared in four of 
the twenty-four trials where the prisoner stood trial but their mental state at the 
crime was investigated (Table 6.5).^’ The robust relationship between defences “in- 
bar-of-trial” and medical witnesses also provides a strong explanation for the 
meteoric rise in medical participation in southern Scotland after 1800. Ten of the 
nineteen furiosity and fatuity cases between 1800 and 1829 concerned the 
prisoner’s mental fitness at court; nine of these trials included medical testimony. 
Fully four-of-five of pleas “in-stop-of-trial” involved property offences in this
See pp.37-48.
Comtroom testimony is lacking for three trials o f  this type and for one other “in bar-of-trial’
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jurisdiction. This species of defence also explains why Scottish medical opinion 
was sought out in relation to so many property, rather than personal, offences.
1700-1799 1800-1829
No. o f  
defences
No. o f  
Defences 
Including 
Medical 
Testifiers
% o f
Defences
Including
Medical
Testifiers
No. o f  
defences
No. o f  
Defences 
Including 
Medical 
Testifiers
% of
Defences
Including
Medical
Testifiers
Non compos mentis 
at trial 1 1 100 10 9 90
Non Compos mentis 
at crime 15 2 13.3 9 2 22.2
Table 6.5. Comparison o f the number and proportion o f insanity defences pled to 
postpone trial and exculpate sentence in southern Scotland, 1700-1799 and 1800-
7,929.
1700-1799 1800-1829
No. o f  
defences
No. o f  
Defences 
Including 
Medical 
Testifiers
% o f
Defences
Including
Medical
Testifiers
No. o f  
defences
No. o f  
Defences 
Including 
Medical 
Testifiers
% o f
Defences
Including
Medical
Testifiers
Non compos mentis 
at trial 33 5 15.1 29 12 41.4
Non compos mentis 
at crime
29 5 17.2 50 12 24
Table 6.6. Comparison o f the number and proportion o f insanity defences pled to 
postpone trial and exculpate sentence in northern England, 1700-1799 and 1800-
7,929
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The enhanced participation of “expert” witnesses, like medics and gaolers, 
during defences “in-bar-of-trial” at the Justiciary Couit was regularised by 
protocolic changes in 1801. The mechanics of who should assess the prisoner’s 
mental ability to stand trial were discussed during David Hunter’s High Court “test- 
case” between 1799 and 1801.^  ^ After prolonged, politicised legal debate 
(considered elsewhere in this tliesis), it was concluded that the bench ought to 
decide upon the “pannel’s” mental fitness to plead. It was resolved also that expert 
opinion, based upon observations of the “pannel” in gaol, ought to advise the 
bench’s estimations. Local Sheriffs offices arranged for experts to visit prisoners 
and report their observations in court. After 1801, therefore, testimony from medics 
was required by law to establish the prisoner’s fitness to plead, although gaoler- 
testimony was also adduced regularly in such cases through to 1829. At the 
Dumfries circuit of 1829, for example, both the jailor of Dumfries and a local 
surgeon testified to the mental fitness of Peter Higginson.^^ Lay testimony could be 
heard, but it was not a prerequisite to the affirmation of the prisoner’s mental 
capacity to stand trial.
The reliance upon “expert” witnesses heightened the quantitative and qualitative 
impact of medical witnesses during Scottish “bar-of-trial” defences. The number of 
medical deponents who appeared at court could match or even exceed that of lay 
witnesses, which was unusual in British legal practice. At the Spring circuit for 
Dumfries in 1827, for instance, only medical testifiers were called to inforni the
JC 8/1. Houston “Courts” pp.348-152 
JC 12/40.
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bench’s decision to postpone the hearings of both John Smith and Duncan 
McDonald?'’ Dr Laing or Lane, a Dumfries physician, provided the only testimony 
at Smith’s trial. Suspiciously, Smith’s mental unsoundness surfaced on the morning 
of his trial; Laing had only had a matter of hours to examine the pannel and merely 
testified that he “was by no means satisfied that [Smith] was insane”. It was 
recognised that Laing’s testimony was flawed, by both the bench and the testifier 
himself. Laing had not been given the opportunity to form an opinion through long 
tenn or repeated observation, which reinforced the efficacy of expert testimony. 
The testimonies of at least two witnesses were required to form persuasive proof in 
Scotland, a luxury not afforded in Smith’s case. In light of evidential shortcomings, 
judge Meadowbank returned Smith to custody and referred the case to the High 
Court in Edinburgh for further consideration. The judge also ordered that Smith “be 
regularly visited by Medical Men, in order that they may be prepared, if necessary, 
when the case comes to be tried at Edinburgh, to give their opinion, upon oath, as to 
the real state of the Parmel’s mind”.^ ®
At England’s Assizes, in contrast to Scotland’s Justiciary Court after 1801, the 
prisoner’s fitness to plead was assessed by jurors and “expert” testifiers were not 
established as the sole advisors to the court. On very rare occasions at the Northern 
Assizes, “expert” medical and gaoler witnesses provided the only authentication of
84 JC 12/38.
It was proven at Edinburgh that Smith was mentally unsound (JC 8/21). After his original hearing 
in April, tlu ee medical persons observed Smith whilst he was incarcerated in both Dumfries and 
Edinburgh. On further observation, Laing concurred with the opinions o f  other physicians and 
Dumfries’ gaol staff that Smith was idiotic. There are detailed medical notes attached to the 
precognitions in AD 14/27/2.
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a prisoner’s rational ability to stand trial. At Lancaster in 1812, for instance, only 
the gaoler and surgeon Baxendale gave evidence regarding the “disordered state” of 
Patrick Davis’ mind.^^ In such cases, English medical professionals (and gaolers) 
could be instructed to assess the defendant’s mental condition duiing the weeks 
preceding Assize meetings, just as in contemporary Scotland. In contrast to Scottish 
defences “in bai-of~trial”, English insanity defences seldom beheld a quantitative 
dominance of “expert” witnesses. Régulai' reference was made to lay evidences 
from employers, friends, family, household and members of the prisoner’s 
community, who provided factual information concerning the defendant’s character 
and mental history. In all species of English insanity and idiocy defences, expert 
opinion continued to reinforce the perceptions and “facts” presented by lay persons.
Compared with southern Scotland, a less emphatic relationship existed in 
northern England between the appearance of medical deponents and the assessment 
of the prisoner’s mental fitness to plead. Only one-seventh of northern English pleas 
to postpone or delay a trial on the grounds of extant insanity or idiocy included 
medical opinions between 1750 and 1799. Medical participation rose thereafter, so 
that one-third of these kinds of hearing included medical opinion between 1800 and 
1829. The correlation was not as strong as in contemporary Scotland, but medical 
witnesses became involved more regularly, after 1800, on occasions where the 
prisoner’s mental ability to stand trial was evaluated. This pattern provides an 
important, but partial, explanation for the rise in medical participation at the 
Northern Assizes after 1800.
Lancaster Gazette April 18 1812.
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This particulai* pattern of enhanced medical participation reflected the increased 
involvement of medical persons within British institutions like gaols, tolbooths and 
houses of correction by the late eighteenth centuiy. This trend was not restricted to 
the provinces. The “gaol interview” became the principle means by which a medical 
witness met the prisoner at the Old Bailey after 1760, whilst medically trained gaol 
attendants became more frequently engaged in trials at Scotland’s High Court in 
Edinbui'gh from the late eighteenth century onwards.^^ These medics did not 
necessarily reside at these establishments, but arrangements were made for certain 
medical professionals and their apprentices to inspect and attend to prisoners.^® 
Thus, Mr William Stillingfleet was described as “the surgeon attending the gaol” at 
York Castle in 1776.^  ^Because of their capacity as medical attendants, these types 
of witness were able to provide persuasive testimony concerning a prisoner’s 
mental condition as they awaited trial. Their evidence could be persuasive because 
their observations were based upon frequent visits which, in many cases, could span 
many months. In 1776, gaol surgeon Stillingfleet declared to have observed the 
prisoner James Rice up to three times a day, for at least eight months.^^
Eigen Witnessing pp. 130-131. i
Hospital attendance could be important to the career progression o f  a medical professional, and 1
this may well have been true o f  gaol and house o f  correction posts, especially amongst surgeons 1
whose vocational paths were somewhat different to physicians. See W. F. Bynum “Physicians,
Hospitals, and Career Structures in Eighteenth Centmy London” in Bynum and Porter (eds.) William 
Hunter and the Eighteenth Century Medical World (1985).
;
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (17761 pp.3-4. {i
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In both England and Scotland, testimony from institutional medical attendants 
was employed to expose prisoners who dissimulated mental distraction at c o u r t . In  
Rice’s case, Stillingfleet stated specifically that he had undertaken such a 
regimented observational routine “to observe any thing of feigned insanity” in the 
prisoner.^^ From the late eighteenth century onwards, the likes of gaol surgeons and 
matrons were deemed to be particularly valuable to the process of validating the 
prisoners’ fitness to stand trial and direct their defences. These experts were not 
asked to infer a priori opinions from puiely theoretical standpoints. Expert 
witnesses were perceived to be useful because their testimonies were based upon 
direct, personal examinations of individual defendants. These observations could be 
reinforced by experience and expertise in the field of insanity, but this was not 
requisite. Experts produced a posteriori evidence. Before 1830, in both England 
and Scotland, an “expert” witness was not expected to take the stand and 
authenticate a defendant’s madness or sanity without having met and studied the 
prisoner.
This was never more evident than during the shambolic trial of Susan Tinny, at 
Ayr, in 1815. Tinny entered the court with “her bosom bare” and flung her shoes at 
spectators whilst alternately singing, laughing and crying.^^ The pannel’s counsel, 
James Campbell, declared that such odd behaviour was conclusive evidence of 
mental distraction, but only adduced the “Jailor of Wigton” as a witness to Tinny’s 
recent state of mind. The public prosecutor, Andrew Clephane, noted that a single
Eigen Witnessing pp.129-132. Houston Madness p.56 and pp.262-265. 
^  Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.3-4.
Ayr Advertiser September 2 1 8 1 5 .  JC 12/29. AD 3/1.
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testimony formed insufficient proof at law and argued that lay witnesses could 
prove that Tinny’s madness was feigned. Clephane could produce no expert opinion 
to inform the bench’s assessment of Tinny’s mind (as required after 1801) and the 
defence’s case was flimsy. In bemused desperation, the presiding judge. Lord 
Gillies, “requested a Medical Gentleman who happened to be in Court [as a 
spectator] to give his opinion upon the Pamiel”. This medical professional was 
miprepared for his sudden change of role and “declined giving any decided opinion 
on the subject”, forcing Gillies to remit Tinny’s case to Edinburgh for further 
consideration. It was significant that Lord Gillies tuined to a medically trained 
spectator in the hope of establishing Tinny’s mental condition. This illustrates that 
medical opinion was afforded superior value during Scottish defences “in bar-of- 
trial”, at least after 1801.
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The qualitative impact o f medical testimony
Within the context of the evolving adversarial comtroom processes, the 
augmented use and appearance of medically trained witnesses suggests that greater 
value became attached to their testimony. This next section will therefore 
investigate how and why medical testifiers and their testimony could make such an 
enhanced qualitative impression in Britain by the early nineteenth century. This will 
begin with a simple comparison of the success-rates of defences which included 
medical opinion about the prisoner’s state of mind in England and Scotland.
Between 1660 and 1829 in northern England and southern Scotland, the global 
“success-rates” of insanity and idiocy defences stood at sixty-eight and sixty-two- 
percent respectively (Table 6.7). Insanity and idiocy defences stood an even greater 
chance of success if medical testimony was involved and opined that the prisoners 
did suffer from mental maladies. Around three-quarters of northern English and 
seven-tenths of southern Scottish defences involving such medical testimony were 
proven (Table 6.7). Tliis conclusion must be treated cautiously, because medical 
testimony was rarely the only evidence imparted at court. Even in Scottish defences 
“in-bar-of-trial” after 1801, gaolers advised the bench alongside medics. This 
analysis is also incomplete; most English trials lack narratives before 1800, whilst 
the Scottish sample-base is small relatively. Both depositions and published reports 
could filter out medical testimony which was deemed to be unpersuasive, 
uninteresting or to have little impact upon the final verdict. Futur e resear ch needs to 
focus upon the prosecution of insanity defences to ascertain whether victims and
.  .. 4
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prosecuting lawyers were also more successful when they employed medical 
witnesses, especially when defendants lacked such proofs. Nevertheless, the 
guarded analysis of the “success-rates” insanity defences which included medical 
testimony does provide a broad base from which to investigate the qualitative 
impact of medical witnesses at court.
Overall rate 
o f success
Success-rate o f  
defences which 
included medical 
opinion
Northern England 68% 76.9%
Southern Scotland 62% 71.4%
Table 6.7. Comparison o f the overall success-rates o f insanity defences to those 
involving medical opinion about the prisoner’s mental state. Northern England and
southern Scotland, 1660-1829.
There were statutory guarantees that medical testimony would appear during long 
eighteenth century criminal hearings in some Continental countries, such as France 
and Italy, which adopted and amended principles from the “Carolina Code”.^ "^ 
Medical testimony remained marginalised in some Continental traditions; even in 
the 1820s, insanity defences in Wiirttemburg could proceed without reference to 
medical opinion, which was not afforded superior evidential value.^^ Nevertheless,
^  Crawford “Emergence” p.25 and “Legalising” p.90. Forbes Surgeons p.40. Smith Trial by 
Medicine passim. Ward “Observers” p .l05 . Eigen Witnessing pp. 108-160. A Russian statute o f  1717 
also established the regular participation o f  medical witnesses during violent criminal offences 
which resulted in injury or death, for instance. Becker “Judicial Refoim” p.7 fia. 17.
Wessling “Infanticide” pp.l 17-138.
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medical witnesses were venerated witliin certain Continental systems and were 
arraigned specifically to advise the court on issues like the cause of death and sanity 
of the prisoner. Formal medico-legal positions were sought out by Continental 
medics.^^ Forensic work was distiibuted venally and was rewarding financially, 
whilst medics who refused to appear at court were reprimanded for failing to 
comply with statutory law. In specific Continental legal systems, therefore, medical 
witnesses were established figures whose testimony earned elevated value thanks to 
criminal procedures.
In England and Scotland, by contrast, there was no statutory guarantee that 
medical testimony would appeal* in court. The criminal traditions of England and 
Scotland, especially, borrowed evidential principles from Continental “Civilian” 
codes. But in England, forensic testimony from medically experienced witnesses 
was never a condition for a criminal trial to proceed before 1830.^  ^ The same was 
true of Scottish trials, except regarding defences of mental unsoundness “in-bai*-of- 
trial” after 1801, when expert opinion was required to advise the bench’s appraisal 
of the prisoner’s mental state. After 1801, Justiciary Court procedure “in-bar-of- 
trial” resembled strongly the practice of contemporaiy. Continental criminal 
hearings in places such as Russia.
In contrast to their Continental cousins, British medical professionals were 
reluctant to become entangled in lengthy legal processes. “Expert” witnesses were
^  Crawford “Legalising” pp.92-100. 
Shapiro Culture o f  Fact pp.28-32.
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discouraged from testifying by ineffective and irregulai* remuneration by 
comparison with France, for instance.^^ Scottish guidelines were similarly vague 
regarding the payment of witnesses for the public prosecution, although (as in 
England) wealthy litigants could lure medical deponents to court by paying their 
expenses.^^ Medical professionals could seek to avoid participating in British 
criminal trials and were not castigated officially for such inertia. When Maigaret 
Paisley killed her infant at Milnthorpe workhouse in 1828, the local surgeon, Robert 
Hancock, dispatched his apprentice to examine the corpse in his stead. 
Apprentices could be trained in anatomy, but the most experienced local doctor was 
excused from attending the coroner’s inquest into Paisley’s crime and her 
subsequent trial at the Cumberland Assizes. Thus, British medical professionals 
could avoid bearing testimony at the circuit courts.
^  Crawford “Legalizing” p.91. Medical professionals could be paid for appearing at a coroner’s 
inquest, however.
Crowther and White Soul and Conscience pp.2-3.
A S S I45/60. Carlisle Patriot March 8*^* 1828. Crawford “Legalizing” p.91 notes that surgeons in 
London and Middlesex similar means o f  avoiding bearing testimony at the Old Bailey dui ing the 
eighteenth century.
Rosner Medical Education passim.
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Changes in evidentiary standards and medical testimony in Britain.
»
With the exception of Scottish “bar-of-trial” defences after 1801, British 
medical persons were not involved in criminal healings because of statutory or 
procedural requirements. In the provinces, medical participation became heightened 
after the mid eighteenth centuiy because their testimony promised to be persuasive 
within the context of more stringent standards of proof. As greater theoretical and 
practical attention was paid to evidential principles, it was recognised that the 
opinion of expert witnesses (of whom, medical professionals formed a significant 
sub-category) could be distinguished from lay testimony. The adoption of stricter 
evidentiary principles eroded the efficacy of “hearsay” evidence and lay testifiers 
were increasingly restricted to reporting their direct observations in court. “Expert 
opinion” was also based upon a witness’ direct observations, but this evidence was 
reinforced by the testifier’s personal experience and teclmical knowledge.Thus ,  a 
medical witness’ interpretation of a prisoner’s sanity could be coloured by their 
theoretical and practical familiarity with distracted mental conditions, which was 
garnered through occupational training and experience. Medical persons were not 
the only expert witnesses who could deliver “opinion” during criminal hearings, 
however. As testimony from witnesses witli specialist skills obtained greater value 
in com*t, so experts were used in a wider variety of cases. For instance, calligraphers 
could be called to court in an effort to substantiate whether a forgery had taken 
place.
Ward “Observers” pp. 106-113.
Eigen Witnessing p . l l l .  Ward “Observers” p. 105.
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The value of testimony from “disinterested” or less partial witnesses rose as 
evidential standards changed. This resulted in the enhanced involvement of “lay” 
witnesses such as gaolers and those with legal training and experience within the 
British criminal systems. The enhanced quantitative and qualitative impact of 
medical testifiers in the provinces, after the mid eighteenth century, was also related 
to heightened desires for impartial testimony within Britain’s courtrooms.
Medical witnesses could be adduced or subpoenaed on the litigants’ behalf, but 
they could assume objective stances at court and thereby produce “impartial” 
evidence. Stephan Landsman has argued that impartiality was expected from, and 
delivered by, medical deponents at the Old Bailey and that inequitable medical 
testimony was very poorly received by judges and jurors. This was also tme of 
provincial England and Scotland, as exemplified by William Stillingfleet’s 
testimony during James Rice’s case, at York between July 1776 and July 1777.^^  ^
Stillingfleet provided unprejudiced opinion concerning Rice’s mental stability 
throughout this extended case. In July 1776, Stillingfleet’s evidence had been 
crucial in establishing Rice’s inability to stand trial due to in s a n i ty . In  July 1777, 
as the sole defence witness, Stillingfleet reiterated that Rice had been insane in 
1776 but also volunteered that, after recovering from “gaol fever” in March 1777, 
the prisoner’s “senses came to him, and have continued so ever since”.
Shapiro “Concept Fact” p.6. Landsman Rectitude esp. p.451 and p.489. Houston “Couits, 
Doctors” p.340.
Landsman Rectitude pp.451 and 489.
ASSI 42/9 and 41/7. Trials ... (1776-1777). Rice’s condition postponed his trial on three 
occasions before he was found guilty in July 1777.
Trials ... Lent Assizes (1777), p.23.
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) p.lO.
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Stillingfleet could not be expected to perjure himself by providing false information 
which favoured the defendant in 1777, but he adopted an objective stance which 
reinforced the prosecutor’s case. Northern English medical witnesses could be 
detached witnesses and provide impartial testimony from at least the late eighteenth 
century. Provincial English and Old Bailey medical deponents could therefore play 
similar, detached roles at court.
Legal professionals and jurors could expect medical testifiers to offer impartial 
evidence, but desires for objective medical testimony were also promoted by 
medical professionals, themselves, during the eighteenth century. Jan Goldstein 
has suggested that early nineteenth century French medical witnesses sought to 
present themselves as educated, “enlightened” characters. They facilitated this 
identity by promoting themselves as detached, objective deponents who could 
transport useful empirical, as well as theoretical, scientific knowledge to the 
courtroom. Goldstein’s insightful analysis can be transplanted productively to the 
British criminal courtrooms. As Catherine Crawford has proposed, the objectivity 
which was demonstrated by English surgeons and physicians at court reflected 
wider efforts to reform the practice and identity of the medical professions by 
placing them upon a fiimer, scientific foo t ing .M edica l  persons approached 
forensic issues objectively from at least the late eighteenth century. Such reforms 
may have been most evident in the 1820s, but this development was rooted in 
eighteenth century medical testimonies.
Crawford “Legalising” p.92.
' Goldstein Console and Classify pp. 164-5.
Crawford “Emergence” p.278 and “Legalising” pp. 108-9.
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Despite evidential developments, medical and lay testimonies could be 
indistinguishable in provincial Britain before 1830. Typically, medical witnesses 
had personal knowledge of the prisoner or case at hand and were not pure, 
“detached” testifiers. To take an English example, “surgeon-apothecaiy” George 
Ellerton played a vital role in proving that Granville Medliuist, gentleman, had been 
insane at the time of killing his wife, Sarah, in 1800.* Ellerton was a long standing 
client of the wealthy Medhurst household and had attended both Granville and 
Sarah in a remedial capacity. Ellerton obseiwed that, about two weeks before the 
murder, Granville Medhurst became low-spirited and melancholy, possibly owing 
to financial misfortunes.* Ellerton believed that Medhurst’s insanity was revealed 
by a sudden “change in countenance”. Ellerton claimed no expertise in identifying 
mental afflictions and he was not an objective deponent. The surgeon’s testimony 
was persuasive because of his social and professional familiarity with Medhurst, 
which allowed the testifier to compare Medhurst’s normal conduct with his atypical 
behaviour during the weeks preceding the crime. During insanity defences, lay 
testimony was based upon similar long term observations from persons who were 
related intimately to the prisoner. Tliroughout the long eighteenth centuiy, 
“medical” and “lay” persons could produce comparable testimonies.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 123-130. Crawford “Emergence” pp.28-35. 
ASSI 41/10.
 ^ York Herald August 2"^  1800.
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The content of medical and lay testimonies could also be indistinguishable. 
Both types of witness authenticated mental afflictions by evaluating the context of 
the prisoner’s speech, appearance and behaviour. George Ellerton was convinced 
that Granville Medhurst’s verbal interactions betrayed the prisoner’s disturbed 
thought processes. The surgeon recounted that Medhurst conceived falsely that his 
bread and brandy had been poisoned by both his wife and Ellerton. Medhurst’s (lay) 
servants related identical inferences of their master’s unusual conduct. Both medical 
and lay testifiers noted that Medhurst’s conduct had altered; he was low-spirited 
and lost interest in leisurely riding, a gentlemanly pursuit he had previously 
enjoyed. Both Ellerton and the servants noted the prisoner’s “wild and agitated 
look”, which contrasted to his normal calm, collected and well-presented 
appearance. Witnesses were shocked to observe that Medhurst’s hair was “half­
shaved”, for the insane were depicted conventionally with shaven heads, alongside 
disorderly elements of the lower orders of society.**  ^ Lay and medical testifiers 
concurred that Medhurst’s gentlemanly status and identity had been removed by his 
mental affliction. Ellerton was a “medical witness”, but the content and basis of his 
testimony mirrored those provided by lay servants.
During Medhurst’s trial, surgeon Ellerton reinforced, rather than directly 
challenged, “lay” perceptions of the prisoner’s mental condition. Despite the 
evidential modifications, it was rare that medical witnesses challenged directly the 
ability of lay persons to identify mental abnormality in Britain’s courts before 1830. 
Cases which lacked lay, community consensus and relied upon medical testimony 
Houston “Face” pp.52-53.
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alone were prone to spectacular collapse, as illustrated by John Gibson’s failed 
defence of furiosity at Jedburgh in 1814.***^  Gibson confessed to killing his wife, 
Janet Renwick, at their abode in Hawick, but claimed to have done so whilst 
mentally distracted.**^ The public prosecutor employed seven lay and two medical 
witnesses to prove that Gibson had been sane and had behaved in his usual (violent) 
manner prior to the crime. This was a powerful case. It was bedded upon the 
community of Hawick’s belief that Gibson had been bad, not mad, and was 
buttressed by the “expert” opinions of two respectable medical professionals. These 
medical witnesses both reflected and reinforced the consensus held by the local 
community; that Gibson’s violent behaviour was not reflective of an altered mental 
state because he acted regularly and willingly in such an unacceptably aggressive 
manner towards the victim.
A solitary witness, surgeon John Wilson, was called to prove that Gibson 
suffered from insanity. Wilson had obseiwed Gibson in gaol at the behest of the 
Sheriff-Substitute of Roxburgh and produced a detailed written report that Gibson 
was melancholic, “upon one subject exclusively, with the consequences that may be 
supposed to arrive out of it”.**^  Wilson added that Gibson suffered from “confusion 
in the head”, revealed by unsubstantiated beliefs that his wife had poisoned his food 
and committed adultery (with a handsome, captive French officer from the 
Napoleonic wars, no less). Days after submitting this report, the surgeon changed 
his mind and entered a forthright admission that Gibson fabricated his madness
JC 12/28.
JC 26/366.
*** Idem.
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“with a purpose to deceive, and to alleviate the crime”. Following further 
investigation, Wilson suggested that there was now “too much evidence” to suggest 
that Gibson was “a violent and irritable” man. Wilson acknowledged that Gibson 
was sane and that his initial evaluation therefore carried “no weight and falls to the 
ground”.
John Wilson’s expert testimony was equivocal and therefore unpersuasive. 
Wilson’s opinion was also disregarded because, originally, it had contradicted the 
consensus of other medical and lay witnesses, who deemed that the pannel was 
sane. Gibson’s woefully inadequate defence therefore disintegrated; he was found 
guilty and gained subsequent notoriety by becoming the only criminal to be hung at 
Hawick.**  ^ Gibson’s case clearly underlines Tony Ward’s recent argument and 
extends it to Scotland: tliat the most convincing medical opinions of insanity and 
idiocy did not challenge lay assumptions about mental defects, but were firmly 
based upon a “cultural consensus” of opinion regarding the prisoner’s mental 
state.
At the Old Bailey, Joel Eigen has suggested that medical witnesses began to 
claim the courtroom authentication of mental distress as their own “cognitive 
territory” after 1820.*^* From the 1790s, expert witnesses reinforced their opinion of
A.F. Young Encyclopaedia o f  Scottish Executions. 1750-1963. (1998) pp.30 and 176. 
Ward “Observers” p . l l7 .
Eigen Witnessing pp.l 13-120.
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the prisoner’s mental condition with metoposcopic and physiognomic references.
At Susan Tinny’s trial in 1815 a spectating “medical gentleman” was asked to 
proffer his opinion of the prisoner’s mental state. He declined to provide a “decided 
opinion” because he lacked prior observation of the prisoner, but “did not think 
from her Eye that she was deranged”. L a y  persons could also deem that a 
person’s character and mental state was reflected by their facial expressions, 
including the eyes, but medical witnesses imparted such observations more 
regularly.* "^* Physiognomy and metoposcopy were most compelling when offered 
alongside other observations of a prisoner’s insanity or idiocy. Thus, at Lancaster in 
1823, Andrew Ryding’s facial “features” were described as being “particularly 
expressive” of insanity. But this remaik was qualified by well-established traits of 
madness, such as his “peculiarly animated ... at times violent” gestures and the fact 
that he ate apples “voraciously”.*^ ^
By the late-1820s, a handful of provincial British medical testimonies disproved 
lay consensuses and thereby challenged assumptions that mental afflictions could 
be identified correctly by lay persons. In 1828, a flax-dresser and sailor called John 
Smith stole a “Black Gig Mare” from an inn at Ringford, in the parish of Tongland 
in south-western Scotland. Smith was apprehended by members of the local 
community, who were convinced that Smith was of sound mind, “smelt much of
J. Cule “The Enigma o f  Facial Expression: Medical Interest in Metoposcopy”, JHMAS. 48,
(1993), p.308. Houston “Face” pp.49-50. Andrews and Scull Customers and Rations p.77.
JC 12/29.
Houston “Face” pp.57-66.
Cumberland Racquet August 25*‘‘ 1823.
JC 12/38. AD 14/27/2. Smith admitted to being drunk at the time and it was noted by some |
witnesses that he was intoxicated upon arrest, but did not suffer from a permanently incapacitating j
mental affliction. I
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drink” and “pretended to act the Idiot”. It was also recounted that a man called John 
Lees (who was “rather tipsy at the time”) visited Smith in custody and told him “to 
pretend to be an idiot and he would get off’. Witnesses from the community of 
Ringford were convinced that Smith dissimulated mental incompetence, knew right 
from wrong and was responsible for his crime.
By order of the Sheriff-Substitute of Dmnfriesshire, Smith’s mental state was 
scrutinized by three medical professionals and the gaol-keeper as he lay in 
Dumfries tolbooth, awaiting trial. After several observational visits, these 
“experts” concurred that Smith was fatuous. This consensus of “opinion” was 
endorsed by the gaoler’s wife, who observed secretly as Smith spread his own 
“excrement on a piece of bread, which he immediately put into his mouth and eat”. 
Expert opinion prevailed at court; Smith was found to be idiotic and incapable of 
standing trial. Smith’s case illustrates that, by the 1820s, “expert” witnesses could 
proffer a consensus of “opinion” which confronted directly “lay” or community 
evaluations of a prisoner’s mental capacities. This may have stemmed from 
perceptions, held by at least some medical and legal professionals by the early 
nineteenth century, that mental affliction needed to be authenticated by “experts”. 
By the 1820s, greater attention was paid to the possibility that “lay” persons might 
diagnose incorrectly prisoners, although juries continued to regard such community 
consensus as an important means of verifying the prisoner’s state of mind.
These were physician William Maxwell, physician John Laing and surgeon James Spalding, all 
residing in Dumfries. All these medical witnesses were therefore removed fr om the community in 
Ringford, which may have facilitated the clash between expert and lay consensus in Smith’s case. 
Eigen Witnessing pp. 110-122.
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Such abrasions between medical and lay testimony were raie in provincial 
England and Scotland before 1830. Medical proofs were employed most regularly 
to legitimise lay testimony and community analysis of the prisoner’s mental 
condition. In 1726, the observations of Montague Giles, an Apothecary from 
Hemsley in Yorkshire, were used to reinforce the local community’s perception that 
Richard Waddy had been insane when he murdered his father.*^ ** Giles buttressed 
and replicated lay testimony by submitting simply that Richard had “been 
disordered in his senses this year or two by past”. Likewise, during John Burton’s 
hearing at Jedburgh in 1747, the physician William Douglas did no more than 
recount lay informants by stating that he had “been credibly informed that the 
prisoner has sometimes before been seized with fitts of melancholy”. These 
affirmations persuaded Douglas, two other medical witnesses and the court that 
Burton was mentally unfit for trial. Community or lay identification remained 
strong and regular means of authenticating the prisoner’s mental state in long 
eighteenth century Britain.
Even in the 1820s, British medical witnesses continued to be most confident and 
hence most persuasive when reinforcing lay testimony. Dr St-Clare, a Preston 
physician, was the sole medical testifier who appeared at Andrew Ryding’s hearing 
which took place at Lancaster in 1823.*^* The prosecution adduced St-Clare to 
provide the final, clinching, evidence that Ryding had inflicted severe wounds upon
Houston Madness pp.46-53.
ASSI 41/2 and 45/18/3 nos. 31-32C. 
Lancaster Gazette August 21®‘ 1823.
223
Mr Horrocks, who had been assaulted with a blunt cleaver after leaving a Preston 
church. It was established that Ryding had planned the assault and then fled the 
scene of the crime, “facts” which were strongly suggestive of Ryding’s sanity. 
When examined, St Clare merely produced the evasive statement that, “[T]he 
diseases of the mind are in some places become a separate department: I have not 
studied it a great deal”.
As the prosecution rested, Andrew Ryding embarked upon a rambling defence 
monologue which was suggestive of mental confusion. Ryding’s parents also 
provided positive indications that their son had suffered from mental distractions for 
many years and had behaved bizarrely before committing the crime. As the trial 
drew to a close. Dr. St-Clare was recalled to the stand and asked to clarify whether 
Ryding was insane. For a man who had claimed initially to have no expertise in the 
field of insanity, St-Clare now provided a detailed exposition,
“A person may be deranged as to some points, and be very acute as to others, in his 
opinion. On the Monday after the committal of the deed, [Ryding] seemed to labour 
under great mental excitement. There seemed to be a complete apathy, as to any 
moral feeling, which appeared to me to be real and not pretended. Cases of delusion 
and delirium are distinct cases; they border on each other; there may be a 
considerable degree of delusion when there is no delirium. I thought his manner, on 
the 22nd July, when he was in the Dispensary, was rather stiange. On the Friday, he 
appeared to be a little better”.
132
Lancaster Gazette August 16“' 1823.
See pp.422-424.
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St-Clare’s opinion was better informed second time around, but he also drew 
confidence from the preceding proofs of Ryding’s mental instability. St-Clare’s 
divergent testimonies indicate that, in both cases, the lone physician was wary of 
providing an opinion which was not grounded in lay “fact”. British medical 
witnesses continued to fortify and legitimise lay testimony in the 1820s, at least 
within the context of insanity and idiocy defences.
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Mad-doctors, expertise and the authentication o f mental distraction
Having examined the quantitative and qualitative roles of the broad category of 
“medical” witnesses duiing insanity and idiocy defences, attentions must now be 
turned towaids the courtroom impact of “mad-doctors”. Nascent “alienist” 
occupations had emerged in Britain by the nineteenth century, but they were not 
coherent “psychiatric” professions, as some scholars have implied.* "^* Recent 
research has suggested that such “specialists” could have an important, if 
quantitatively restricted, impact upon some English insanity defences duiing the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It has been suggested that Earl 
Ferrers’ hearing at the House of Lords, in 1760, was the first English criminal trial 
to involve testimony from a professional whose expertise was grounded in the 
identification and care of insane persons. This evidence was imparted by the 
famous “mad doctor” and physician, John Monro, whose family formed a dynastic 
association with London’s Bethlem asylum during the eighteenth cen tu ry .A f te r  
the 1760s, persons who were professionally confederated to London’s madhouses 
and asylums were “well presented” amongst Old Bailey witnesses during insanity 
defences. This section investigates the appearance and impact of “alienists” at 
England’s Northern Assizes and Scotland’s southern circuit of Justiciary after 1660.
For England’s Northern Assize circuit, no “mad-doctors” were recorded
Szasz Manufacture p. 15. Scull Museums o f  Madness p. 14 and 125-129. 
Eigen Witnessing p p l20-121. Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp. 193-215.
137 Eigen Witnessing p. 127.
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amongst depositions or printed reports until 1803, when John Willis (1751-1835)*^^ 
and Alexander Hunter (1729-1809)*^^ testified during Philip Maister’s hearing at 
York Castle.*"*** Before 1800, “alienist” participation during Assize trials may be 
obscured by the sources examined. “Specialist” witnesses might not be asked to 
provide pre-trial declarations, only to appear subsequently at court as expert 
witnesses. Neither Willis nor Hunter was interviewed by the coroner or the JPs who 
collated the pre-trial declarations for Philip Maister’s case, for instance. After 1800, 
northern English testimonies were recorded more faithfully amongst printed 
accounts. Of Northern Assize insanity defences between 1800 and 1829, twelve- 
percent of medical witnesses claimed expertise in identifying mental maladies 
(Table 6.8). Even in the early nineteenth century, “specialist” medical witnesses 
formed a small minority of depositions and testimonies. The observations of 
persons experienced in the identification of mental afflictions were not prerequisite 
to findings of insanity and idiocy at the Northern Assizes before 1830.
In southern Scotland, meanwhile, no recognised “alienists” or “mad-doctors” 
appeared before 1830. After 1800, eight-percent of southern Scotland’s medical 
witnesses did reinforce their testimonies by claiming experience in authenticating 
mental afflictions, however. Persons with professional experience in treating and
John Willis belonged to a famous “alienist” family based in Lincolnshire. John and his father, 
Francis, tieated King George III successfully for his malady during 1788. John Willis was employed 
treated the King again during 1801. Parry-Jones Trade in Lunacy p.76.
Scots-born and Edinburgh-educated Alexander Hunter sought a professional career in Yorkshire 
shortly after completing his MD. He was involved in the foundation o f  York Lunatic Asylum  
between 1772 and its opening in 1777. He was confederated to York Lunatic Asylum as its 
physician from 1777 through to 1809. PN B  XXVIII pp.283-284.
Rede York Castle pp.209-210. The lack o f  courtroom nan atives may hide the impact o f such 
“experts” between 1760 and 1800. Willis and Hunter, for instance, made no pre-trial depositions, but 
were arraigned for the case itself. Their testimony is considered below, pp.598-600.
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authenticating mental disturbance therefore provided small proportions of the 
testimonies and depositions produced for southern Scottish and northern English 
insanity and idiocy defences. Such “experts” were involved beyond their 
proportional representation within society as a whole, but they remained marginal, 
rather than firmly established, figures during early nineteenth century provincial 
criminal tribunals. This simple quantitative analysis challenges assumptions that 
“alienist” experts generated the concept of mental disorder and then dominated the 
authentication of such afflictions, at least in the context of British criminal trials. 
Michael MacDonald has argued that mental distraction could be defined by experts, 
but its discovery was dominated by lay persons within England’s legal processes.*"** 
This was certainly true of the northern English and southern Scottish superior 
criminal courts through to 1829.
% of all Medical 
Witnesses 1800-1829
Northern
England
Southern
Scotland
“Insanity Experts” 12 8
Other Medical Witnesses 88 92
Table 6.8. Proportion o f medical witnesses who had, or claimed to have, 
experience in identifying mental afflictions between 1800 and 1829, northern 
England and southern Scotland compared.
MacDonald Mystical Bedlam p. 113.
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According to available evidence, “insanity experts” made a belated and less 
dramatic impact upon provincial British insanity defences than at the Old Bailey.*"*^  
The lesser participation of “alienists” in the provinces, when compared with 
London, can be explained partially by the regional concentration of asylums and 
madhouses during this era. By the 1760s, two public asylums and a number of 
private (licensed) madhouses were established within London and its environs.*"*  ^
By contrast, public asylums were not erected within some regions of northern 
England and southern Scotland before 1830. Both Cumberland and Westmoreland 
lacked licensed private “madhouses” or public asylums before 1830, although 
mentally disturbed persons from these regions were admitted to Newcastle Lunatic 
Asylum from at least 1824, once pauper lunatics were accepted there.'"*'* Unlicensed 
private “madhouses” may have operated in these areas, but these tended to be small 
establishments which were reserved for a wealthy clientele. There was no guarantee 
that impoverished or criminal lunatics would be accepted by private proprietors.*"*^
The lack of “alienist” witnesses who appeared in some provincial jurisdictions 
might be explained by their inability to travel to the seat of court. John Halliday, for 
instance, had been admitted to and released from Glasgow Asylum before he
Eigen Witnessing pp. 120-121.
Parry-Jones Trade in Lunacy pp.34-35. Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp. 143-171.
Pany-Jones Trade in Lunacy pp.34-35 (Table 3) and 61-62. Hannah W ells’ two trials 
(Cumberland, 1825 and 1827) had been restrained at Whitehayen’s House o f  Correction before 
being transfeired to Newcastle Lunatic Asylum by her kin. Carlisle Patriot 13* August 1825. 
Cumberland Pacquet 16* August 1825.In 1846, Cumberland and Westmoreland magistrates 
formally arranged for pauper lunatics to be confined at Dunston Lodge, near Gateshead in north­
eastern England, rather than within their own counties.
Parry-Jones Trade in Lunacy pp.74-95.
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threatened his family and attempted to burn down his rented fai'mhouse in Rivox.*"*^
No professional affiliated to Glasgow Asylum gave evidence at Halliday’s trial in 
Dumfries, during 1818. Perhaps the time and expense of travel from Glasgow 
precluded their appearance, but this explanation is less persuasive for places like 
York and its hinterlands. By the turn of the nineteenth century, York and parts of 
Yorkshire were provisioned by a public asylum, the Quaker “Retreat” and 
numerous private madhouses.*"*  ^ It must therefore be questioned why the likes of 
Alexander Hunter, the first physician to York Asylum (opened in 1777), was not 
recorded as participating at the local Assize courts before 1803. The relative lack of 
eighteenth century narratives may provide one answer for northern England. This 
does not hold true of all Scottish trials, however, where testimonies were recorded 
faithfully in Minute Books. Dynamics other than the source materials ought to be 
considered.
“Alienists” may have wished to avoid becoming embroiled in time-consuming 
and costly legal processes. Insanity experts, just like generic “medical witnesses”, 
were not guaranteed to be remunerated for their courtroom appearances.*"*  ^ It is 
therefore unsurprising that the participation of “mad-doctors”, alongside other
professional associates to asylums and madhouses, was related strongly to the social
!and economic status of the prisoner, or their kin. The superior wealth and station of jj
Philip Samuel Maister Esquire ensured that both Drs Alexander Hmiter and John |
JC 12/31-32.
J.A.R. Bickford and M.E. Bickford “Private Lunatic Asylums o f  the East Riding”, East Riding 
Local History Society, (1976). Digby, “Changes in the Asylum” and Madness. Morality and 
Medicine.
Crawford “Emergence” pp. 151-156.
230
Willis testified at his Yorkshire hearing for m u r d e r B e f o r e  the crime, Maister’s 
household had borne the costs of their melancholic master travelling to London to 
consult and remain under the supervision of John Willis for two w eeks /H un te r  
and Willis were present at Maister’s hearing because the defendant’s household was 
able to pay their e x p e n s e s / T h e  criminal process may have restricted the 
remuneration of witnesses, but a wealthy prisoner was more able to financially 
compensate deponents for their expenditure (as well as the loss of time and income) 
incurred by attending a geographically distant criminal trial.
Just like Willis and Hunter at Maister’s trial, “specialist” deponents were 
employed typically at court because they had managed and treated the prisoner in a 
professional capacity some time before the crime had been committed. Some 
“experts” had no pre-crime association with the prisoner, such as Drs. Williams and 
Wade who provided persuasive evidence that Jonathan Martin was insane in
1829.*^  ^But even Williams and Wade had formulated their opinions after observing 
Martin as he lay in gaol, awaiting trial. Just like medical witnesses in general, it was 
rare that “specialists” presented opinions which were based upon deductive 
reasoning from general principles alone. These experts presented a posteriori 
testimony, which was derived from their personal observations of the prisoner, 
rather than pure a priori evidence. In 1829, Margaret Dalton opined that the arsonist
Medland and Weobly Remarkable and Interesting Criminal Trials (1803) pp. 158-160. Rede York 
Castle pp.209-210.
Idem.
The Willis dynasty was rooted in Lincolnshire, but John had commitments in London and may 
have travelled from the capital on this occasion.
Eigen Witnessing pp.21-22 presents a similar pattern for the “specialists” who appeared at the 
Old Bailey after 1760.
London Morning Herald April 2"^  1829.
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Jonathan Martin was “a really insane person”/ D a l t o n  had managed Martin as 
keeper of “Catesby Lunatic Asylum” during the early 1820s, and she based her 
opinion upon the express knowledge of Martin’s behaviour, speech and appearance 
whilst he had been under her supervision. Like other witnesses, Dalton was 
convinced that Martin’s extreme religiosity and purposeless fasting were indicative 
of a disturbed mental state. Margaret Dalton was not introduced as a detached, 
impartial expert who might inform the court of the general principles regarding 
mental afflictions. Instead, Dalton was selected as a witness because of her 
knowledge of Jonathan Martin and his specific mental condition, validated by her 
occupational expertise. Professional “specialist” opinion was not grounded in 
abstract reasoning alone, but was founded upon personal observations of, and 
interactions with, the prisoners who stood at the bai*.
In England, evidences from both lay persons and non-specialist medical 
professionals were adduced routinely alongside proofs from “insanity experts”. At 
Philip Maister’s hearing in 1803, for instance, the mad-doctors John Willis and 
Alexander Hunter were complimented by two general practitioners and three lay 
witnesses. Willis and Hunter were not employed to introduce or conclude the proof 
of Maister’s insanity; they appeared after the lay witnesses had taken to the stand 
and were sandwiched between the generic practitioners, surgeon Fielding and 
physician Alderson. Evidences from “insanity experts” were not necessarily 
recognised as being sufficient proofs of the prisoner’s mental state by themselves. 
To be persuasive at court, the opinions of “mad-doctors” had to reflect or reinforce 
Idem.
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the interpretations offered by lay persons, as well as the broader medical 
community. Testimony from a “specialist” was not therefore accorded 
automatically a higher qualitative value than the evidences which were presented by 
other types of witness. This was also true of southern Scotland; even in defences to 
“bar” trials after 1801, gaolers and generic medics advised the bench, not “alienists” 
or mad-house keepers.
There was no prescribed obligation that “expert” testimony should be involved 
in the authentication of insanity and idiocy in England before 1830. This was also 
tme of Scotland, excepting pleas “in-bar-of-trial” after 1801. The opinions of “mad- 
doctors” were not mechanically accepted or accorded superior value at court. As 
Joel Eigen has demonstrated for the Old Bailey, these witnesses could be subjected 
to stringent cross-examination and faced public humiliation if they did not provide 
persuasive, objective testimony.Although “specialists” such as John Mom'o were 
high status individuals who developed socially exclusive clienteles, their characters 
and occupation were also subjected to a variety of publicised r idicule.Perhaps 
the pertinent question is why “alienists” and “insanity specialists” should appear at 
court at all, rather than why so few were engaged in the provinces. It has already 
been suggested that the prisoner’s wealth and social station might influence the 
appearance of “mad-doctors” at court, but there are some other plausible 
explanations which must be considered, too.
Eigen Witnessing p. 137.
Andrews and Scull Undertaker pp.3-13, 43-52, 143-179.
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Alienists could demonstrate their occupational skills and curative regimes by 
appearing in high-profile, publicised court cases. Newspapers transcribed criminal 
cases in detail by the nineteenth century, especially in cases that excited public 
interest, such as Jonathan Martin’s tribunal for his audacious arson attack upon 
York Minster in 1829.*^  ^ Accounts of Martin’s life, crime and trial appeared in 
“national” newspapers like the London Morning Chronicle and the local presses. 
Five “specialists” testified at this hearing and their opinions received particular 
exposure. Three were affiliated to asylums and madhouses which were situated in 
north-eastern England, testimony to the expansion of that region’s “trade in 
lunacy”. The other two were physicians from York, who were experienced in 
ministering to the mentally afflicted. Reputations could also be shattered through 
ill-considered or ill-received testimony. In 1829, madhouse-keeper Richard 
Nicholson was forced to defend his opinion that Jonathan Martin had “never” been 
insane, even when under Nicholson’s supervision.Nicholson was also obliged 
explain why he had released Martin back into society in 1818, only for Martin to be 
certified as insane and admitted into a different madhouse months later. Nicholson’s 
professional proficiency and expert opinion were confronted directly by other 
“expert” and lay deponents, who persuaded the jury that Martin had been afflicted 
by a mental affliction which rendered him a menace to society from 1816 onwards. 
For Nicholson, the publicity of bearing testimony was a double-edged sword.
Martin originally appeared at the Assizes for the City o f  York, but the case was transferred to 
York Castle and the Yorkshire Assizes for fear that he would not receive a fair trial. London 
Morning Herald April 2"'^  1829. Report o f  the trial o f  Jonathan Martin (1829).
Idem.
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Alienists were in competition for trade and this was reflected in the accusations 
and confrontations which imbued their opinion-testimonies. The open discord 
between “specialists” contrasted to generic medics, who rarely contradicted or 
challenged one-another in the provincial courts. Philip Maister’s hearing, at 
Yorkshire in 1803, was notable because of the alternative opinions proffered by 
alienists and general medical practitioners regarding insanity and criminal 
responsibility. The disagreements which arose during this case demonstrate that 
there was no monolithic conception of mental distraction, even amongst experts in 
the field.
Philip Maister’s melancholy had been treated independently by the alienists, Drs 
Willis and Hunter. These two specialists testified at Maister’s hearing and 
concurred with generic medical and lay testimony that the prisoner suffered from a 
lowness of spirits, otherwise termed “melancholy” or (a species of) “partial 
insanity”. B u t  Willis and Hunter disagreed as to the effects of Maister’s 
condition. Willis stated, from his experience, that Maister’s insanity rendered him 
“liable to sudden fits of phienzy, in which fits he might commit any act of violence 
on himself or others”. Hunter concurred that suicidal tendencies were common 
amongst melancholics, but opined that he “had never known anyone, in a similai*
Willis appeared to provide alternative diagnoses o f  Maister’s mental condition, suggesting 
that the prisoner suffered from “sudden fits o f  phi*enzy” as well as being permanently insane upon 
one discourse or “frain o f  thinking”. Further research is required to assess whether W illis’ conceived 
that Maister suffered from both forms o f  “partial” insanity (accordmg to Hale’s conception, at least). 
O f course, Willis may also have been reluctant to provide definitive testimony, especially as Hunter 
was due to follow him into the witness’ box.
Medland and Weobly Criminal Trials (1803) pp.158-160. Rede York Castle pp.209-210.
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situation, commit violence on others”/^^ If accepted. Hunter’s opinion could have 
undermined Maister’s defence, which rested upon the prisoner having been 
“melancholic” at the time of murdering his children and hence could not be held 
responsible for his actions. The disagreement between Hunter and Willis 
represented a rare instance where “expert” witnesses disputed the typical 
characteristics of insanity in either northern England or southern Scotland before
1830. Indeed, these witnesses presented alternative a priori and a posteriori 
grounds for their opinions.
The jury conceived that Maister was melancholic and that this removed his 
criminal responsibility. Hunter’s opinion that melancholics did not “commit 
violence on others” was challenged implicitly by this verdict. The jury followed 
Willis’ belief that Maister’s affliction could explain his attack upon his children. 
Willis’ opinion was reinforced by the final testimony in Maister’s case, provided by 
the Hull physician Dr. Alderson, which recounted instances where melancholics 
had killed their children. Alderson’s statement was also fortified by the case- 
history at the Yorkshire Assizes. The melancholics, John Swift (1785) and 
Granville Medhurst (1800), had been acquitted owing to insanity, thanks to proof 
that they had been devoid of criminal intent at the time of killing family 
m em b ers .W i l l i s  and Hunter had embarked upon a public confrontation of 
professional experience, expertise and opinion. To the embarrassment of the Scots-
Idem.161 
Mem.
Swift; A S S I41/8, 41/9 and 45/34/4/196. Medhurst: ASSl 41/10 and 45/40/2/160-161, also York 
Herald August 2"*^  1800.
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born Hunter, his conception of the typical affects of melancholy had been rejected 
at couit. Hunter’s only appearance as an “expert witness” in his adopted home-town 
of York ended in abject failure. Willis, a commercial and professional rival, had 
successfully advertised superior knowledge and forensic competence in Hunter’s 
own back-yard.
Conclusions
Medical witnesses and their “expert” testimony did not dictate the identification 
of insanity and idiocy within England’s criminal courtrooms between 1660 and 
1829. Procedural changes, driven by legal rather than medical professionals, 
afforded expert opinion authoritative status at Scotland’s Court of Justiciary during 
defences “in-bar-of-trial” after 1801. Experts remained irregular contributors to the 
authentication of the prisoner’s mental state at the time of the crime. “Specialists” 
who owned occupational experience in the treatment of mentally disturbed persons 
were marginalised figures within both traditions before 1830. “Anti-psychiatric” 
theories cannot be applied within the context of British long eighteenth century 
hearings. In all English and most Scottish criminal cases, the identification and 
incarceration of mentally disturbed prisoners could proceed without reference to 
“alienist” or generic “medical” testimony.
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Medical testimony was most regularly employed to supplement and legitimise 
lay evidences regarding the prisoner’s mental condition. Within the context of 
evolving standards of proof, litigants could use medical testimony to their 
advantage as clinching forms of proof. Statements from medical persons were 
therefore utilised similarly at the Northern Assizes, the Old Bailey and, with the 
exception of defences “in-bar-of-trial” after 1801, at Scotland’s Court of Justiciary. 
To be most persuasive, medical opinion had to be grounded in a consensus of lay 
estimations concerning the prisoner’s mental state and criminal responsibility.*^"  ^
Few medical opinions contested directly the lay or communal consensus in court. 
Some medics did disprove lay perceptions of the prisoner’s mental state during the 
1820s and thereby challenged implicitly the lay person’s ability to diagnose 
correctly mental maladies. These cases represented an emergent acknowledgement 
that experts were required to identify and authenticate mental distress in the court of 
law. This was a far cry, indeed, from typical seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century trials which lacked reference to medical testimony.
The quantitative and qualitative impact of medical testimony altered between 
the mid eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Britain. On both circuits 
studied, medical professionals provided an increasing proportion of depositions as 
the long eighteenth centuiy progressed. It seems likely that medical witnesses were 
also involved in an enhanced proportion of British criminal hearings by the early 
nineteenth century, particularly in response to crimes of inter-personal violence. 
The greater involvement of medical witnesses during provincial trials reflected
164 Ward “Observers” p .l 17.
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broader changes in testimonial values and attitudes towards expertise in both 
countries. Nevertheless, there was no simple, progressive acceptance of the 
superiority of medical testimony at court, especially where the authentication of 
mental maladies was concerned. Even during the 1820s, medical opinion which 
clashed with the “lay consensus” continued to be discredited.
Developments in medical training and knowledge affected the evidence which 
was both expected of, and delivered by, medical professionals at court. Medical 
testifiers could be expected to offer persuasive evidence regarding the prisoner’s 
mental state owing to expansions in medical forensic skills and knowledge of 
mental afflictions.*^^ From the mid eighteenth century onwards, medical witnesses 
were better prepared to meet the evolving standards of proof at law, including the 
submission of opinion testimony regarding the prisoner’s state of mind. 
Refinements in anatomical schooling enhanced the participation of medical 
professionals during criminal hearings, as medics were increasingly engaged to 
comment upon wounds. Similar to the Old Bailey, the majority of insanity defences 
which included medical testimony also involved crimes of interpersonal violence.**^ ® 
In these cases, medics could be arraigned to speak about wounds and be asked 
subsequently their opinion of the prisoner’s mental soundness.
The desire for medical testimony reflected broader changes in evidential 
standards in Britain. By the late eighteenth century, it was acknowledged that
Crawford “Emergence” passim. 
Eigen Witnessing pp.23-28.
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medical witnesses could provide a form of legal evidence (expert opinion) which 
was useful to the establishment of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”. This was 
related to broader efforts to restrict lay “hearsay” testimony, although such reform 
was by no means complete by 1830. The value of medical opinion was enhanced by 
emerging perceptions that these “experts” could provide “detached” objective 
observations. As in France, the desire for objectivity formed a strong basis of 
identity for medical persons within Britain’s legal realms and distinguished the 
evidence which they offered.
During insanity defences, objective medical opinion was founded upon repeated 
and direct observations of the afflicted person, especially where the prisoner’s 
mental ability to stand trial was assessed. Indeed, “expert” testimony (from gaolers, 
as well as medical attendants) was most regularly used to inform decisions about 
the prisoner’s mental fitness to stand trial and to expose dissimulators. In such 
cases, medical witnesses could be employed to observe the prisoner in the weeks 
leading up to the trial. These “expert” observers typically had no prior knowledge 
of the prisoner, so they could also be understood to be “impartial” or “detached” 
witnesses. As at the Old Bailey, the gaol marked an increasingly important setting 
in which the “expert” witness observed and interacted with the prisoner.**^ ® After 
1801 in Scotland, experts advised the bench whether the “pannel” should be tried or 
not. There was no contemporaneous procedural change in England, but after 1800,
Goldstein Console and Classify pp. 162-166. 
Eigen Witnessing pp. 129-130.
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medical witnesses also became more regularly adduced to inform the Northern 
Assize jury’s appraisal of the prisoner’s mental state in court.
The qualitative value which was attached to medical testimony was enhanced 
over the course of the long eighteenth century, but the type and scope of the 
evidence offered by medical professionals remained similar in some respects. 
Medical witnesses continued to be called to court because they had intimate, 
personal knowledge of the prisoners as well as their states of mind. Thus, surgeon- 
apothecary Ellerton’s testimony during Granville Medhuist’s trial in 1800 was that 
of a character witness who was also medically trained, rather than expert, impartial 
opinion. Like Elleiton, many medical witnesses continued to be acquainted with the 
prisoner in a private or professional capacity through to 1830.*^  ^Despite evidential 
evolutions, medical and lay testimony could remain indistinguishable in both 
England and Scotland.*^ **
Eigen Witnessing pp. 122-130.
Ib id pp.82-160. Houston Madness pp.91-265 and 331-336.
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7.
Judicial influence during English and Scottish defences o f  insanity
and idiocy, 1660-1829
“A Judge ought to have nothing to do, 
but sit like an Oracle and propound the law
The function of the criminal court judge was debated dining the long eighteenth 
century. Judges who sought to dominate courtrooms and dictate the outcome of 
trials were criticised flercly in some quarters. Advocates James Boswell and Henry 
Cockburn, for instance, argued that the Scottish bench ought to act as a "pedagogue 
or instructor” of legal matters to jurors, but should not infringe upon the 
sovereignty of the jury’s verdict.^ This chapter explicates the theoretical and 
practical remit of Britain’s judiciaries during criminal trials. It compares how 
judges operated during defences of insanity and idiocy in northern England and 
southern Scotland, alongside how their remit altered between 1660 and 1829.
Interpretations of the judiciary’s function during long eighteenth century 
criminal trials has generated historiographic controversy. In the context of 
England’s Assize and Old Bailey courtrooms, academics such as James Cockburn, 
Douglas Hay and Thomas Green have portiayed an ascendant, assertive bench that
' Anon. (Hemy Cockburn), Observations on the mode o f  Choosing Juries in Scotland. (Edinburgh, 
1822), p.3.
 ^Anon. (James Boswell), A  Letter to a Jurv-man. In which the powers, privileges and duties o f  
Juries are examined and explained. (Edinburgh, 1785) p. 10. For an English example see J. Hawles, 
The Englishman’s Right: A Dialogue between a Barrister at Law and a Juryman Plainly Setting 
Forth the Antiquity, the excellent designed use and the office, and the lust privileges, o f  Juries. By 
the Law o f  England. (1681-1796, 8 editions).
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subjugated criminal tribunals/ They contend that judges could manipulate trials 
and force verdicts upon submissive jurors. Scholarship which has emphasised 
judicial dominance has been criticised heavily, however. John Langbein has argued 
that trial juries could reach verdicts autonomously and played an important 
mitigating role at court, thereby tempering the judge’s influence."* Peter King and 
Martin Weiner have demonstrated that victims, prosecuting officials and jurors 
wielded discretionary measures which inhibited the bench’s preeminence over legal 
processes.^ Insanity and idiocy defences were entered sporadically, but these 
hearings disclose how judges acted and allow a broader consideration of courtroom 
interactions.
Published studies of English and Scottish insanity defences have followed these 
expansive historiographical trends and produced distinctive interpretations of the 
benches’ remit and impact. Joel Eigen proposed that English judges governed the 
evaluation of the prisoner’s mental condition at the Old Bailey between 1760 and 
1843.^ Eigen presented a courtroom dynamic similar to that provided by Cockburn, 
Hay and Green. Martin Weiner has suggested that the judiciary was not always 
ascendant during nineteenth century insanity defences, however. By comparison, 
Robert Houston argued that Scotland’s judiciary was less assertive at the High
 ^J.S. Cockburn, “Twelve Silly Men? The Trial Jury at Assizes, 1560-1670”, in J.S, Cockburn and 
T.A. Green (eds.). Twelve Good Men and True. The Criminal Trial Jurv in England, 1200-1800, 
(1988) pp. 176-181. Hay “Property, Authority” pp. 19-63. T.A. Green Verdict According to 
Conscience. (1985), pp. 152 and 369. Green subsequently re-assessed his interpretations, allowing 
greater dynamism to the trial jury, see “Retrospective” pp.375-6.
Langbein “Fatal Flaws” pp. 105-6. Langbein “Trial jm y” pp.35-37.
 ^King “Decision-Makers” pp.26-27. King Crime pp.43, 227-235 and 243-256. Weiner “Judges V. 
Jurors” pp.472-474.
 ^Eigen “Intentionality” pp.34-39. Eigen Witnessing pp. 14, 33-34,40-48 and 52-55.
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Court in Edinburgh than its English counterpart. Houston suggested that Scottish 
judges could lead jurors towards conclusions, but that that the bench did not dictate 
the outcome of fatuity and fuiiosity defences. England’s historiography should not 
be relocated imprudently to Scotland, but Houston’s analysis of comlroom 
processes reflected the astute critiques offered by King and Langbein. This chapter 
evaluates these broad debates within a provincial context, questioning whether 
verdicts of insanity or idiocy were tmly dictated by the activity of the circuit bench 
in England and Scotland.
The activity of British and Eui'opean judges are also compared. The judiciary 
were the principal decision-makers within archetypical, Continental, “Inquisitorial” 
legal traditions, which lacked trial by jury.^ “Inquisitorial” benches considered 
evidences and led cross-examinations at court, before passing judgement upon 
prisoners. As Hemy Cockburn opined, European judges could dominate legal 
processes “at every step, from the suspicion against the criminal, down to the 
infliction of sentence”.^  Historians have questioned whether all European traditions 
were so “Inquisitorial”. Nevertheless, British perceptions that the “Civilian” bench 
acted arbitrarily were important, even if Continental judges did not perform 
dictatorially.^ Contemporary arguments about the role of British judges must be 
understood in the context of the perceived contrasts to European benches. Scottish 
lawyers recognised that their law was imbued with Continental influences, more so
 ^Crawford “Emergence” ppl61-2. Farmer “Criminal Law” pp.33-39. Houston “Court” pp.343-344. 
® Cockburn Observations (1822) p.3.
 ^Crawford “Emergence” ppl61-2. Farmer “Criminal Law” pp.33-39. Lôpez-Lôzaro “No Deceit 
Safe” pp.465 and 471.
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than England’s Common Law/** It is suggested how European “Inquisitorial” 
concepts of judgeship impressed upon the function and outlook of Scotland’s Lords 
of Justiciary.
The courtroom contributions of Britain’s judiciaries were defined by legal 
frameworks, which evolved between 1660 and 1829. Stephan Landsman has 
detected the roots of “adversarial” legal practice in the eighteenth century 
England.** Landsman suggested that, from around 1730 onwards, judges assumed 
less inquisitive roles as litigants (and counsel) began to bear greater responsibility 
for the production and demonstration of proofs at court. Judges did not become 
“passive umpires”, however.*^ Evidentiary principles received enhanced attention 
from seventeenth century in England. Consequently, judges became involved more 
frequently as the adjudicators and clarifiers of legal ambiguities.*^ Legal 
quandaries, such as theories of criminal responsibility and standards of evidence, 
were raised regularly during insanity and idiocy defences. It is examined whether 
English and Scottish judges were particularly vociferous during insanity and idiocy 
defences because they were expected to expound and elucidate the law. This may 
explain why Eigen found that judges were ganulous during Old Bailey insanity 
defences.
Cairns “Civil Law Tradition” pp. 191-209. Cairns “Importing our Lawyers” pp. 138-152. Gordon 
“Influence o f  Roman Law” pp.135-143.
Landsman “Rise” pp.500-502.
'^ /W pp.513-519.
Beattie “Scales” p.222. Landsman “Rise” pp.513-9.
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The basis o f  judicial authority
Procedural guidelines underpinned judicial authority at court, allowing them to 
comment upon legal points and scrutinize testimony. Britain’s judges also passed 
sentence or released prisoners according to the jury’s verdict. In long eighteenth 
century British courtrooms, influence and power-relationships were regulated by 
social rank and wealth, as well as professional knowledge and standing. The social 
and professional relationships between judges and other courtroom participants had 
an important bearing upon courtroom dynamics and reinforced the bench’s 
authority.
British judges were of high social standing.*"* Younger sons of aristocratic 
families were prominent amongst Britain’s judiciaries until the 1750s, although the 
numbers of aristocratic-born judges waned thereafter, particularly in Scotland.*^ 
Britain’s legal bars and benches became more inclusive socially as the costs of the 
legal education became less prohibitive.**  ^Even so, promotion to the bench effected 
both social elevation and economic reward upon successful candidates. Britain’s 
judiciaries belonged to the wealthy, property-owning minority of British citizens. 
Judges could be socially revered whilst riding the circuit, with “hanging towns” 
holding festivities in honour of the travelling bench. Judges were superordinate to 
most prisoners, witnesses and jurors (with the English “Grand” and Scottish
Hay “Property, Authority” pp.58-61. Langbein “Fatal Flaws” pp.108-9.
Cairns “Alfenus Varus” pp.208-209. Duman “English Bar” p.93. Duman Judicial Bench pp.34-36. 
/bMpp.206-208.
246
“Special” jurors being the most common exception). The judiciaries’ authority 
represented an extension of deferential social relationships.*^ The judge’s elevated 
social standing reinforced the prerogative of the bench’s advice, mlings and 
decisions at court.
The judiciary’s authority was also grounded in their legal expertise and 
experience. Judges were situated at the apexes of the Scottish and English legal 
hierarchies and promotion to the bench marked the pinnacle of an accomplished 
legal career.*^ Elevation to the bench could be deteimined by professional and 
“party” politics.*^ By the mid eighteenth century, it was usual that Britain’s 
judiciaries had enjoyed lengthy spells as legal counsellors.^** During the eighteenth 
century, most English judges had practiced law for between twenty and thirty years 
before elevation to the bench.^* Of the Scottish judges who dealt with furiosity 
defences upon the southern circuit, most had “passed advocate” between twelve 
and thirty years before being elevated to the judiciary.^^ Judicial authority was 
therefore reinforced by technical, legal expertise.
Scotland’s High Court bench comprised sixteen Ordinary Lords of Session from 
the inception of the Court of Justiciary in 1672. At any given time, seven of these
Hay “Property, Authority” pp.58-61. 
Duman Judicial Bench p .l4 .
Duman “English Bar” p.95. Prest “English Bar” p.71. Murdoch “Advocates” p. 148. Phillipson 
“Scottish Whigs” p.25. Phillipson explains how Tory candidates were preferred consistently to 
Whigs in Scotland between 1785 and 1811.
^  Duman “English Bar” p.98.
Idem.
Lords Meadowbank and Pitmilly took twelve years to reach the bench, whilst Lords Cullen and 
MacQueen took around thirty years. DNB III pp.278-9 and PN B XII pp.718-9.
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judges were entitled to try criminal cases at the supreme courts in their capacity as 
Lords of Justiciary/^ By comparison, England’s judicial establishment consisted of 
seventeen judges from the early eighteenth century/"* At “Assize time”, twelve of 
England’s judges held temporary commissions of “gaol delivery” (the authority to 
clear prisoners from gaol) and “oyer and terminer” (the authority to try criminal 
cases) at the provincial courts/^ In both England and Scotland, it was regular 
practice that two judges were assigned in tandem to deal with each circuit’s legal 
business. Senior judges could avoid riding the circuits studied, but leading justices 
were to be found in both northern England and southern Scotland by the late 
eighteenth century
At English Assize meetings, it was common for one circuit judge to deal with 
criminal hearings whilst the other attended to “Msi Prius"" (civil court) trials. In 
some instances, provincial English criminal trials may have been chaired jointly by 
two judges, particularly if Prius" business had been completed. Thus, at the 
Northumberland Assizes of 1736, Justices Lee and Fortescue cooperated during the 
insanity defence of Anne Vardy.^^ The vague style of northern England’s Minute 
Books preclude quantitative conclusions in this respect. Minutes recorded which 
judges were present at the Assizes, but did not always indicate which one presided 
over criminal affairs. Printed reports suggest that it was usual for a single member
Murdoch, “Advocates”, p. 148 
Duman, Judicial Bench, p. 17.
25 Ibid  p.23.
^  Cockburn “Northern Assize Chcuit” p. 122. 
ASSI 41/3.
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of the judiciary to preside over criminal hearings. By the 1770s at the latest, it was 
rare that both circuit judges presided over northern English insanity and idiocy 
defences.
In contrast to northern England, a ^^quorunC of three to six judges officiated over 
criminal trials at Scotland’s supreme High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh.^^ The 
mental condition of Susan Tinny was considered by a “gworwm” of three Lords of 
Justiciary in March 1816.^  ^ Procedure on the Justiciary circuits differed from the 
High Court regarding the numbers of presiding benchers. The two Scottish circuit 
judges could cooperate during provincial Justiciary Couit hearings, but a single 
judge officiated in fom-fifths of southern Scottish fuiiosity and fatuity defences. 
Scottish circuit judges were most likely to operate concurrently during cases that 
contained challenging legal issues, such as conceptions of criminal responsibility. 
Scotland’s circuit judges could officiate jointly to confer upon the legal issues 
raised by the prisoner’s mental affliction.
Where solitary judges presided over British provincial cases, they did not 
necessarily act alone. There was scope for informal collaboration between the 
circuit judiciary outside of the courtroom. Circuit judges could discuss legal issues 
whilst they travelled and lodged together. After Yorkshire’s summer Assizes had 
concluded in 1816, Justice Bayley conferred with Baron Wood before granting a
Mackenzie used the term “quorum” to describe the four judges (three during the “Vacance”) who 
sat together dm ing criminal ti ials at the High Court from the 1680s; Mackenzie, Institutions o f  the 
Law o f  Scotland. (Edinburgh, 1684), p.25.
*JC8/11.
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respite to prisoner Elizabeth Ward, on the grounds of her mental infirmity/** 
English cases that were delayed owing to the prisoner’s insanity could re-appear at 
subsequent Assizes before a different judge. Cornelius Linney was found insane 
and unfit to stand trial before four separate judges between 1748 and his discharge 
in 1752.^* Assize cases could also be removed to the Court of King’s Bench in 
London for fuither review, as happened when Sir Thomas Gerard of Warrington 
pled insanity at Lancaster in 1161?^
In southern Scotland, postponed cases could be remitted to the High Court in 
Edinburgh, especially when the prisoner’s mental fitness to plead was not 
established satisfactorily. When insufficient proof of Susan Tinny’s mental 
distraction was provided at Ayr in 1815, Lord Gillies remitted the case to the High 
Court.^^ At Edinburgh in 1816, Gillies again presided over Tinny’s deferred case, 
but this time he was joined by Lords Boyle and Succoth. "^* The judgements and 
decisions of a solitaiy judge could be infoimed by their fellow benchers. The 
estimations of more than one judge could be involved in the assessment of a 
prisoner’s mental condition.
HO 47/55/86.
ASSI 41/4, ASSI 42/3, Yorkshire, July 1748 to 1752. 
PL 28/3. Rabin “Committing Crimes” pp. 110-111.
JC 12/29, September 1815.34 JC 8/7, March 1816.
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The postponement o f trials owing to the prisoner's mental incapacity
Most frequently, insanity and idiocy defences argued that prisoners had been 
mentally incompetent at the time of committing their crimes (Table 7.1). In all 
defences of this type, the assessment of the prisoner’s criminal responsibility was 
undertaken by a jury panel in both England and Scotland. Also, Britain’s criminal 
laws held that persons could not be tried whilst they laboured under insanity or 
idiocy.^^ Whilst the legal philosophies of England and Scotland were analogous in 
this respect, the practical means of assessing whether a prisoner was fit to stand 
trial could be distinctive. English and Scottish judges could obtain to dissimilar 
functions where the prisoner’s capability to stand trial was gauged. This type of 
hearing will be considered separately from defences which claimed that prisoners 
were mentally incompetent when committing crimes.
Region
Prisoner’s mental incompetence 
argued to:
Postpone trial Exculpate crime
Northern England 40.1 % 59.9%
Southern Scotland 3T494 68.6%
Table 7.1. Proportion o f insanity and idiocy defences argued to postpone trials 
compared to those argued to exculpate crimes, northern England and southern
Scotland, 1660-1829.
35 See pp.37-48.
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Between 1708 and 1829, fifty-seven criminal hearings (involving thirty 
prisoners) were postponed owing to the defendant’s madness or idiocy at England’s 
Northern Assizes. In each of these cases, the jury decided whether the prisoner was 
fit mentally to stand trial. Eleven defences of either furiosity or fatuity “in-bar-of- 
trial” were entered at Scotland’s southern circuit between 1708 and 1829 (Table 
7.1). In stark contrast to English Assize practice, all of these defences were 
considered by a judge, without reference to a jury panel. Instead, Scotland’s circuit 
bench decided whether to postpone the hearing, based upon the evidence and legal 
argumentation that were entered at court. Such tribunals were therefore akin to 
Scottish (civil court) “Commissary” and “Court of Session” procedure, where no 
jury panel was utilised.^^ In almost one-quarter of all species of furiosity and fatuity 
defences, southern Scottish “pannels” had their mental conditions judged without 
consultation of an “assize”. The English and Scottish circuit courts obtained to 
different procedures to evaluate the prisoner’s mental ability to bear trial.
The predominant role played by Scotland’s bench during hearings “in-bar-of- 
trial” was reminiscent of formulaic “Inquisitorial” Continental models of legal 
procedure.^^ Contemporary Prussian and Russian judiciaries managed the 
examination, judgement and sentencing of criminals without reference to a jury 
panel.^^ The lack of a criminal jury during these Justiciary Court hearings signifies 
that Scottish procedure could resemble Continental, rather than English “Common
Houston Madness p,42. 
Farmer “Criminal Law” p.3 3.
38 Idem. Becker “Judicial Reform” pp. 1-8.
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Law” practices. This reflects the broader influences of Continental “Civilian” and 
“Roman” Law traditions upon Scots Law in general.^^ How and why Scottish and 
English judges acted divergently are examined next. Justiciary and Assize com*t 
procedure is compared, alongside the theoretical frameworks which governed the 
practical remit of Britain’s judiciaries. Particular attention is paid to contemporary 
perceptions, both abstract and applied, concerning the difference between points of 
“fact” and “law”. Whilst the latter could be firmly situated within the judiciary’s 
realm, the issue of who should decide upon matters of “fact” and “law” was a 
contentious topic.
Gordon “Roman Law” pp.135-143.
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The remit o f the British judiciaries in questions o f "Fact” and *‘Law”
An imperative courtroom function of English and Scottish judiciaries was to 
comment and arbitrate upon legal principles when they arose. During British 
insanity and idiocy defences of all types, presiding judges were expected to explain 
the criteria for proving mental distraction, as dictated by legal writings and case- 
precedents. The bench provided the legal guidelines which informed and 
underpimied the jury’s considerations. The jury’s prime function was to deliver 
judgment upon the factual evidence which was presented at court. It was recognised 
that the spheres of “fact” and “law” were not always distinguishable,"*** Issues of 
criminal responsibility sat at an uncomfortable point where “fact” and “law” 
overlapped. Jurors contemplated implicitly points of law during insanity and idiocy 
defences, because they considered whether factual evidence met legal and 
evidentiary criteria. Insanity and idiocy defences therefore aroused broader debates 
concerning the respective courtroom functions of judge and jury.
At the northern English Assizes, only the petty jmy could reach a foimal 
decision regarding the prisoner’s mental condition. Petty, not Grand, jurors 
assessed the prisoner’s state of mind. The Grand Jury was not able to delay, abort 
or reject a criminal hearing on the basis of a prisoner’s insanity or idiocy. Nor did 
English judges postpone trials after considering both facts and law, as the Scottish
See, for instance, Hawles, The Englishman’s Right. (1680) p.9. Anon. (William Smellie), An 
Address to the People o f  Scotland. &c.. on the natur e and privileges o f  Juries. By a Juryman. 
(Edinburgh, 1784), p. 13.
254
bench could do. In contrast to some Scottish and European, “Inquisitorial” 
hearings, England’s petit jury therefore decided whether the “plea of msanity was 
affectation” or not in every case."**
The absence of Scottish juries from the assessment of the prisoner’s fitness to 
plead can be explained by Justiciaiy Couit procedure. No “Grand Jury” was 
involved in the Scottish criminal process, except after 1707 when English legal 
form was adopted in “high treason” cases."*^  Instead, Justiciary Court hearings 
commenced with a discussion of the “relevancy”, or points of law which were 
applicable to each case. Counsel and judiciary debated legal issues during this 
phase of proceedings, such as whether indictments had been entered correctly. 
Where furiosity or fatuity was presented as a defence, lawyers contested the 
evidential criteria which were required to prove mental disability and, according to 
Scots Law, to what “degree” the person was afflicted."*  ^ Because the “relevancy” 
focused upon the law, judges were expected to engage with and inform these 
discussions. The bench could rule on points of law at this stage. Importantly, these 
cogitations about the “relevancy” took place before the “assize” was empanelled 
formally. This reflected perceptions that jui’ors ought not to consider legal points, 
except where issues of “law” and “fact” were inseparable."*"* Once the “relevancy”
York Herald. 9th August 1823. Chiistopher B ew ’s trial, Yorkshire, July 1823.
7 Anne c.21. Willock “Origins” p. 147. None o f  the southern circuit furiosity or fatuity cases 
involved treason.
See pp.55-63.
Willock “Origins” pp. 191-192.
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debates were complete, the jury was then empanelled to consider the factual 
evidence and might contemplate the legal issues wliich were raised.
So, in contrast to the English system, decisions regarding legal criteria could be 
taken by Scotland’s judiciary without the assize being formally empanelled to try 
the case. This explains why Scottish judges could resolve to “bar” criminal hearings 
owing to the prisoner’s mental distraction or incompetence. On the southern circuit, 
a prisoner’s mental fitness to plead was considered to be a point of law which could 
be raised and resolved during the “relevancy”. At this opening stage of trials, the 
criminal assize was not yet empanelled and presiding judges decided upon the law, 
including whether the prisoner’s trial ought to be postponed. This was dissimilar to 
English Assize procedure, where legal issues were debated in the presence of trial 
jurors.
Defences “in-bai-of-trial” followed a uniform pattern of practice in southern 
Scotland, but the Court of Justiciaiy did not adhere to a regimented procedural form 
in such hearings before 1801. Outside of the southern circuit, jurors could assess 
the prisoner’s mental fitness to plead duiing the eighteenth century. James Taylor’s 
mental ability to bear trial was evaluated by an Inverness “assize” in 1766, for 
instance."*  ^ It was not until the conclusion of the David Hunter “test-case”, at 
Edinburgh in 1801, that Justiciary Court proceduie was standardised for these types
JC 10/13.
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of defence.^^ The arguments and decisions presented in Hunter’s case therefore 
deserve clarification."^^
David Hunter was first arraigned at the High Court in December 1799, for 
murder, when his insanity rendered him incapable of standing trial.^^ The trial and 
Hunter’s fate were not concluded until March 1801. Hunter’s hearing was 
protracted by heated discussions, involving opposing advocates and the presiding 
“quorum” of judges, regarding the proper procedure for defences “in-bar-of-trial”. 
The hearing was arraigned repeatedly whilst advocates prepared arguments and 
judges considered relevant precedents. The debates at Hunter’s trial were driven by 
genuine and broadly shared aspirations to set a viable, practical precedent. But 
prosecution and defence advocates argued for different forms of procedure to be 
adopted (or regularised) in such instances."*  ^ At the heart of these incompatible 
contentions lay the issue of whether the prisoner’s mental fitness to plead ought to 
be assessed by “assize” or bench. Hunter’s case marked the culmination of legal 
debates concerning the apposite role of judge and jury, which had been deliberated 
in Britain over the previous two-hundred years.
Discussions about the judiciary’s courtroom remit were charged by political 
debates in Britain, especially during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
JC 8/1. See also Houston “Courts” pp.345-350. 
Idem.
JC 8/1.
Debate also centred upon the perceived utility o f  “expert” witnesses in the couitroom verification 
o f mental distraction and incompetence, an aspect which w ill be discussed in Chapter 10.
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centuries. During Hunter’s case, the clash of opinions regarding the bench’s role 
was infused and informed by broad political ideologies and allegiances. The 
government-appointed lawyers, Solicitor-General Robert Blair^ ® and Lord 
Advocate Robert Dundas of Amiston,^^ led the public prosecution against Hunter. 
These characters held the pre-eminent posts within the contemporary Scottish legal 
professions and they owed their promotions to Tory patronage. During the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, leading Tories endorsed the need for a 
strong, experienced bench within the courtroom, which held extensive powers to 
influence proceedings and take key decisions.^^ The conservative proclivities of 
Blair and Dundas were illustrated by their argument that the judiciary, informed by 
“expert” witnesses, ought to be sole adjudicators of the prisoner’s mental fitness to 
pead, during the “relevancy”. Blair and Dundas argued that the prisoner’s mental 
ability to stand trial was a point of “law” and therefore fell into the judges’ realm.
“Tory” convictions that the courtroom needed to be closely managed, if not 
dominated, by the bench were intensified by the European political climate of the 
1780s and 1790s. The violent excesses of the French Revolutionaries were 
perceived to represent the dangers of popular, “mob” rule.^  ^ Impressions of the 
Revolution served to polarise British politics. Some erstwhile “Whigs” were so 
disgusted and disappointed by the chaos in France that they altered their political
Robert Blair o f Avontoun P N B  II p.27.
Robert Dundas o f  Arniston was the nephew o f  tiie Tory grandee Heniy Dundas; Phillipson, 
“Scottish Whigs”, p. 19.
Houston “Courts” p.347.
A. Padoa-Schioppa, “Introduction”, in A. Padoa-Schioppa (ed.) The Trial Jury in England. France 
and Germany 1700-1900. (1987), pp.7-9.
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stance and sided with the Tory-dominated government. The criminal jury was 
arguably the most socially inclusive aspect of formal trial procedure. 
Uncompromising Tories associated an unrestricted, “popular” jury with the 
potential for social anarchy. Such fears were reinforced hy the adoption of trial by 
jury within Revolutionary France during the ITÇOs.^ '^  During the Hunter “test- 
case”, these perceptions instructed the public prosecutors’ arguments that judges, 
not juries, ought to assess the criminal’s state of mind at court.
The notoriously politicised Scottish sedition trials of the 1790s added fuither 
controversial piquancy to the prosecutors’ line of reasoning during Hunter’s case. 
In these sedition hearings, pannels were prosecuted for “radical dissent” against die 
Crown and Tory-dominated administration.^^ Whiggish critics suggested that the 
presiding bench was overbearing and partisan during these trials, by favouring the 
prosecution and rendering the (Whig) defence counsellors ineffective. Promotion to 
the bench could be determined by political allegiance and judges who had gained 
from Tory patronage, such as Lord Braxfield, were criticised for favoming the 
Tory-led prosecutions. Advocates Blair and Dundas had prosecuted sedition cases 
in their capacities as legal representatives of Scotland’s Tory reg im e .T o  return to 
Hunter’s case, the prosecution’s desire for a dominant judge justified their own 
involvement in the infamous sedition tribunals, alongside the actions of judges such
Idem. 
JC 7/21
56 See pp.3 89-393.
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as Lord Braxfield, They sought to vindicate a criminal system where the key 
decisions lay with the bench.
The Whiggish advocate, John Peter Grant, directed David Hunter’s defence. 
Grant had declared his opposition to Dundas’ Tory-dominated government in 
Scotland by defending prisoners during the sedition trials. Grant’s political and 
legal philosophies fuelled his argument that the “assize” should decide whether the 
prisoner was mentally unfit to plead.^^ Grant proposed that the assessment of a 
prisoner’s mental condition fell into the realm of “fact” and therefore ought to be 
determined by the jury, not the judge. Like Grant, many contemporary Wliigs 
believed strongly in the ethical superiority and justness of trial by jury.^^ From such 
a perspective. Revolutionary France’s adoption of a jury-system in the early 1790s 
marked a significant progression, especially as it replaced an “Inquisitorial” 
organism which was perceived to be corrupt, inequitable and dominated by the 
ju d ic iary .G ran t believed that the jury’s autonomy should not be challenged 
duiing criminal trials. The sedition hearings of the 1790s therefore formed a painful 
example of how judicial dominance led to an oppressive legal system. Grant later 
criticized publicly the uncensored autonomy of Scotland’s civil court judges.^®
Houston “Courts” pp. 345-350 also considers Grant’s political background and role in Hunter’s 
case.
For a radical Scottish Whig’s assertion o f  the jury’s powers, see Anon. (Smellie) Address (1784) 
passim.
Padoa Schioppa “Introduction” pp.7-9.
Grant, Some observations on the constitution and forms o f proceeding o f  the Court o f  Session in 
Scotland: with remarks upon the Bill now depending in the House o f Lords for its reform. (1807). 
Houston “Courts” pp. 345-350.
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Hunter’s defence team prepared a list of the nine har-of-trial “Decisions” made 
in the Justiciary Court between 1737 and 1799 to illustrate that eighteenth century 
practice had been haphazard. Grant moulded carefully the information in this list to 
support his contention that the jury should decide upon Hunter’s ability to stand 
trial. Prudently, Grant dismissed decisions made by the bench alone as being 
erroneous and presented a suitable precedent, at Edinburgh in 1770, where the 
“assize” had decided to postpone the hearing of William Hanis. Grant’s efforts 
indicate that, by the nineteenth century, legal precedent was perceived to be binding 
in Scotland.^^
On inspection, Grant’s list of “Decisions” did not include the case of John 
Burton which was postponed at Jedburgh in 1747 and remitted to the High Court in 
Edinburgh.^^ Burton’s case may simply have been overlooked, or ignored because 
the prisoner and his accomplices were never re-tried at Edinburgh and therefore set 
no conclusive precedent. John Peter Grant may have omitted Burton’s case 
purposeMly, however. Minus the Burton case, his list included more decisions to 
“bar” trial which were made with reference to a jury than w ithou t.T he inclusion 
of Burton’s southern circuit case would have damaged Grant’s desire to promote 
assessment by jury rather than judge.
For a discussion o f  this in an English context see Weiner, “Judges V. Jurors: Courtroom Tension 
in Murder Trials and the Law o f  Criminal Responsibility in 19th Century England”, LHR. 17, 3, 
(1999), p.472.
JC 12/5.
^  Grant’s list included four cases where the judge decided the issue alone and five where the 
question was remitted to an assize.
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Despite Grant’s arguments, the High Court judges ruled that the prosecution’s 
view prevailed. From 1801, in contrast to English Assize practice, Scotland’s 
judiciary were certified as the sole judges of insanity and idiocy “in-bar-of-trial”.^ "^ 
This was a bitter political blow to Whigs, who were challenging desperately the 
Tory supremacy at the tuin of the nineteenth centuiy.^^ Hunter’s “test-case” 
demonstrates how political alliances, leanings and sympathies directed the 
evolution of the Scottish legal system.
This practice was adhered to on Scotland’s southern circuit at least, where all decisions “in bar o f  
trial” were taken by the Judge alone between 1801 and 1829.
65 Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” pp. 16-30.
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Questions o f law, the “relevancy” and furiosity or fatuity in exculpation o f
punishment in Scotland
Besides deciding supplications “in-bar-of-trial”, other forms of furiosity or 
fatuity defence could be settled during the “relevancy” in Scotland. During the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Scottish bench could assess proofs 
which argued that prisoners had been mentally incompetent when committing their 
crimes. Until at least 1725, judges could consider written precognitions and reject 
defences outright before the assize was empanelled. The bench thereby removed 
the consideration of the prisoner’s mental state from the jurors’ deliberations.
Elizabeth Lockhart appeared at Dumfries, in October 1711, charged with the 
capital offence of “beating and curseing” her mother. During the “relevancy”, 
Lockhart’s counsel contended that she had been insane at the time of committing 
the transgression.^^ In response, the public prosecutor maintained that there was 
insufficient evidence of Lockhart’s madness in the precognitions. The presiding 
judge. Lord Grange, considered both of these arguments and read the precognitions 
before repelling “the Defence of madness as proponed” for Lockhart.G range 
found the charges relevant to “infer an arbitrary punishment”, however, which 
meant that Lockhart could not be hung for her crime. The trial went before the 
assize, which found the indictment proven and Lockhart was banished “to any of 
her Majesty’s American Plantations never again to return to Scotland”.^  ^ Lord
JC 12/2 
Idem.
68 
69
James Erksine, Lord Grange (1679-1754). 
JC 12/2
263
Grange had assessed the Scottish law of the insanity and had evaluated implicitly 
the factual evidence of Lockhart’s madness. There was no recorded criticism that 
Grange had overstepped his mark. Lockhart’s purported insanity was not 
considered by the “assyzers”, who were directed by the judge’s decision upon the 
relevancy of the prisoner’s defence.
Two years later, at Ayr in 1713, Thomas Towait’s furiosity defence for murder 
was accepted by the circuit bench during the relevancy.^^ The presiding judge on 
this occasion was Lord Pancaitland, who sustained the “Defence that the pannel 
was Furious at the time of Committing the Crime” and allowed the assize to 
evaluate the proofs. The bench’s resolution was again founded upon arguments 
presented by counsel and the written precognitions of the case, which included two 
independent accounts of To wart’s mental distraction. Towart’s defence thereby met 
the minimum standard of proof required in Scotland.^^ In 1711, Lockhart’s defence 
counsel had failed to provide such proof. To wart and Lockhart’s hearings indicate 
that the bench did consider both fact and law during the relevancy, at least in the 
course of furiosity defences. Importantly, Scottish judges only rejected defences of 
fatuity or furiosity which lacked evidential prerequisites.
On the southern circuit, judges had ceased to “repell” defences of furiosity and 
fatuity during the “relevancy” by the late-1740s. From at least 1749 through to 
1829, the bench allowed the assize to consider all defences, even cases which
JC 13/4. Towart was accused o f  murder.
Towart’s defence failed and he was sentenced to be hung. JC 13/7 and 17/4.
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lacked sufficient proofs of the prisoner’s mental incapacity. By the late-1740s, the 
Scottish judiciary was willing to allow the jury to decide whether defences could be 
proven, rather than determining such issues themselves. This challenges broad 
interpretations that, during the eighteenth century, there was an enhanced tendency 
for Scottish judges to dominate the key decision-making phases of criminal trials.^^ 
Plainly, Scotland’s judiciary relinquished the ability to reject furiosity defences 
during the “relevancy”.
The judge’s remit during the relevancy phase of fatuity and furiosity defences 
changed between 1725 and the late-1740s. Why such practical modification 
occurred is less transparent. A particular judge’s personal preference, or the 
individual’s legal philosophy regarding the roles of judge and jury, might explain 
this change injudicial function. Developments after 1725 may have reflected wider 
efforts to clarify the relationship between bench and assize. It was argued that the 
jury ought to assess the facts of a case and the judiciary’s remit was restricted to 
clear issues of law. This reforming drive was focused by broader changes to legal 
practice, wrought by the “Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act” of 1747.^^
The altered role of judges during the “relevancy” at the Justiciary Court mai ked 
an evolution away from Continental practices towards an “adversarial” courtroom, 
as described in an English context by Stephan Landsman.^"  ^ Scotland’s judiciary
Chorus “Judge’s role” pp.33-39. Houston “Courts” p.340. 
20 Geo II c43.
Landsman “Rise” pp.500-502.
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ceased to be active “testers” of whether prisoners had been of sound mind when 
they committed crimes. By the late-1740s, the southern circuit bench ceased to 
consider “facts” and whether they met the necessary evidential standards. Instead, 
from at least 1749, the assize always resolved whether prisoners were responsible 
for their actions. The centrality of trial and verdict by jury represented another 
essential “adversarial” routine. The early eighteenth century judiciary had taken it 
upon themselves to clarify the “grey area” between “fact” and “law” when issues of 
criminal responsibility arose. Judges still advised upon such agendas after 1725, but 
the jury was permitted to consider these issues for themselves, even where difficult 
points of law surfaced.
266
Judicial activity during the presentation o f proofs to the jury
Prisoners who were insane or idiotic at the time of committing their offences 
were acquitted because they lacked criminal intent. In both England and Scotland, 
juries assessed the prisoner’s criminal responsibility when mental incompetence 
was argued in exculpation of crime. Jurors evaluated the evidence and arguments 
presented at court before supplying their verdict. This section focuses upon how the 
opinions and actions of British judges impinged upon the jury’s decision-making 
processes in the provinces. Notions that judges reigned supreme within England’s 
Assize courtrooms have been challenged by recent scholarship.^^ English judges 
did not adjudicate passively during criminal hearings, h ow ever.T h is  section 
focuses upon the vocal input of Britain’s benches during healings, although judges 
did not have to be vocal to indicate where their sympathies lay. The Scottish 
lawyer, James Boswell, was convinced that a judge’s “looks and shrugs” could be 
persuasive.
During northern English insanity defences, judges could guide the jury’s verdict 
by outlining legal criteria and provoking evidence which addressed the principles of 
criminal responsibility. Such oral influences upon proceedings were confined by 
evolving “adversarial” courtroom practices after 1660. As litigating parties became 
more responsible for the production of proofs and greater recourse was taken to
See, for instance. Landsman “Rise” pp.513 and 591-603. Langbein, “Fatal Flaws”, p .l09 . 
Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” pp. 1170-1172.
^  This point has been made in the context o f  regular trials too: see Landsman “Rise” p .513. 
Boswell Letter to Lord Braxfield (1780) pp.14-15.
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representative legal counsel, the role of the English judge altered significantly/^ As 
evidential rules developed and were employed more frequently at court, the judge 
was required to settle such matters. Scottish judges could also be self-informing, 
but were less vocal than their English counteiparts during the examination of 
witnesses. As Robert Houston has recently suggested, Scottish judges led rather 
than dominated trials after the relevancy stage had ended and before any summary 
was heard.^^ Scottish trials had incorporated adversaiial contests between legal 
counsel from at least the late seventeenth century. The English and Scottish 
benches therefore operated in subtly different ways during the examination of 
witnesses and production of evidences at court.
In both England and Scotland, the judiciary ensured that evidentiary rules were 
adhered to conectly.^^ Before the nineteenth century, the British legal traditions 
lacked statutory and juristic guides to standards of proof when compared with 
contemporary Continental codes.^^ But evidentiary criteria were not ignored in 
Britain, either in teims of practice or theory. From at least the seventeenth century, 
British legal traditions imported Continental authorities and principles of proof, 
whilst British juiists expounded upon the law of evidence within their legal 
treatises.M aija Jansson has identified recently a manuscript which was penned by 
Matthew Hale, circa 1688, which declared that it was the judge’s responsibility to
^  Landsman “Rise” pp.501 and 524-532.
Houston “Courts” pp.339-340.
Landsman “Rectitude” p.408. Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” pp. 1172 and 1177-1202. Houston 
“Courts” pp.339-340.
Crawford “Legalising Medicine” p. 101.
^  Crawford “Emergence” pp. 1-20. Shapiro “Concept Fact” pp.2-26. Cairns “Importing our lawyers’ 
p.l46.
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ensure that verdicts were informed by suitable standards of proof Handbooks 
dedicated to the subject of legal proof were published in Britain from the early 
eighteenth century onwards. William Nelson’s Law of Evidence (1717) provided 
categorical guidelines for the admissibility of witnesses and the standards of proof 
during English criminal trials, for example.*"  ^Nelson’s work was supplemented and 
eventually superseded in 1751 by Sir Geoffrey Gilbert’s manual, also known as the 
Law of Evidence. These texts both reflected and informed broader desires 
amongst both English and Scottish lawyers to rationalise and categorise the rules 
regarding evidence.
Jansson “Matthew Hale” p.207.
^  Nelson, The Law o f Evidence: wherein all the cases that have vet been printed ... are collected and 
methodicallv digested under their proper heads, (1717).
Anon., (Sir Geoffrey Gilbert), The Law o f  Evidence. Bv a Late Learned Judge, (1751), 4 vols.
The appetite for such works was suggested by the production o f  other titles during the eighteenth 
century relating to the law o f  evidence, perhaps most notably Henry Bathurst’s anonymously written 
The Theoiv o f Evidence. (1761). A fourth edition o f Gilbert’s tteatise appeared between 1791 and 
1796 under the title o f  The Law o f Evidence, bv Lord Chief Baron Gilbert. Considerably enlarged 
bv Capel Lofft. Barrister at Law.
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English judges at the Northern Assizes.
Greater practical attention was paid to the evolving laws of evidence within 
England’s Assize courtrooms as the long eighteenth century progressed/^ In the 
context of Northern Assize insanity defences. Minute Books and newspapers report 
that judges adjudicated upon evidential matters from at least the mid 1770s. To take 
one example, the proofs presented at court were fundamental to the petty jury’s 
decision to find James Rice insane and unable to stand trial in July 1776.^  ^ The 
prosecution sought to establish that Rice had been sane at the time of murdering 
Thomas Westell and adduced witnesses to prove this. A skilled defence counsellor 
argued that the evidence presented by the prosecution was irrelevant, because the 
bench had instructed the jury to discover whether or not Rice was insane at his trial, 
not at the crime itself. The presiding judge. Justice Gould, arbitrated that the 
prosecutor’s evidence was indeed immaterial. In his concluding address, Gould 
clarified the legal debate, declaring that the jurors were "... not now trying the 
prisoner for the murder, but the only question for the consideration of the jury [is] 
whether Rice is now insane or not ... if  you think he really is [insane] at present, 
according to the laws of this country, he camaot be tried”. The jury concuired with 
Gould’s elucidation of the defence counsellor’s argument and decided that Rice 
was suffering from mental distraction. Rice’s trial was postponed until the next 
Assizes.^^
^  Beattie “Scales” p.222. Landsman “Rise” pp.513 and 564-572. Landsman “Rectitude” p.456-462. 
Langbein “Law o f Evidence” pp.l 171-1202.
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776), pp.6-7.
Idem.
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Similar evidential developments occurred at the Old Bailey and the Northern 
Assizes between 1660 and 1829. England’s judiciary endeavoured increasingly to 
restrict lay witnesses from imparting “hearsay” and “opinion” testim ony.During 
James Towers’ trial at the Westmoreland Assizes in 1822, the presiding judge, Sir 
George Sowerby Holroyd, censured repeatedly Smith Wilson’s testimony before 
losing patience with the witness and declaring, “I remarked to you before, sir, that 
long conversations with your neighbours could not be admitted in evidence, and are 
totally unnecessary on the present occasion - do communicate what came within 
your own knowledge respecting the prisoner, not your opinions”.^  ^By the 1820s, 
lay persons such as Smith Wilson were expected to report their direct observations 
of persons or events to the courtroom; only “expert” witnesses were regularly 
permitted to impart “opinion-testimony” at law.^  ^ Holroyd’s denunciation of 
Wilson’s statement echoed a section of Gilbert’s Law of Evidence, which classed 
hearsay as “Secondary Testimony”. Gilbert’s work stated that, “the Attestation of 
the [lay] Witness must be what he knows, and not to that only which he has heard, 
for a mere hearsay is no Evidence'"'P The lack of courtroom narratives hampers 
comparisons with the period before the 1770s, but it would be rash to conclude that 
the English judiciary suddenly began to clarify evidence in the late eighteenth 
century. After all, seventeenth century jurists affirmed that England’s judiciary
Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” p. 1172. Eigen Witnessing p. 15.
Kendal Chronicle. March 9th 1822. Smith Wilson appeared as a witness during the trial o f  James 
Towers.
See Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Gilbert (ed. Lofft) Law o f  Evidence (1791-6) II p.889 (emphases in the original).
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ought to clarify any legal ambiguities which arose during hearings/^ It would 
therefore seem likely that English judges acted in such a manner thi'oughout the 
long eighteenth century. Witli the advent of counsel and changes in standards of 
proof, perhaps judges were more involved in the elucidation of evidential criteria 
from the late eighteenth century onwards.
English Assize judges could question witnesses during insanity defences 
between 1660 and 1829.^ "^  John Sutcliffe’s trial in 1776 was affected notably by the 
judge. Sir William Henry Asshurst. Only Asshui'st cross-examined the six 
witnesses who were adduced in this case.^  ^ Asshurst probed for information 
concerning Sutcliffe’s insanity by asking direct questions such as, “What opinion 
did you form of his state of mind?” to Reverend Joseph Atkinson.^^ Towards the 
middle of the trial, Isabel Teeming described how Sutcliffe had made peculiar 
noises, appeared in an unusual state of undiess and had made bizarre gesticulations. 
Asshurst considered these facts to be indicative of insanity and prompted Teeming 
to answer the succinct question, “Do you not think this kind of behaviour very 
extraordinary?”. Teeming responded with, “I thought he was not in his senses as he 
should have been”. Teeming considered Sutcliffe’s appearance and behaviour to be 
indicative of mental distress. Thioughout Sutcliffe’s trial, judge Asshurst’s 
questions both induced and reinforced testimony pertaining to the prisoner’s 
insanity. As late as 1829, at the Westmoreland Assizes, baron Hullock also led the
Jansson “Matthew Hale on Judges and Judging”, JLH. 9, I, (1988), pp.201-209. 
Landsman “Rise” p.505.
^  A S S I41/7. Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.14-17.
^  Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) p. 15.
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questioning of the principal witnesses to William Luss’ state of mind/^ England’s 
bench sought proactively to compel succinct proofs of the prisoner’s mental 
condition from deponents.
Despite such probing, the English judiciary were restricted by the testimony 
induced at court. During Northern Assizes insanity defences, judges did not attempt 
to subvert the jury into producing a verdict against the main thrust of evidence.^^ 
Still, the bench could induce persuasive testimony at court. The jury’s deliberations 
could be influenced by the judge’s explicit questioning of witnesses. Through to 
1829, English judges continued to operate as proactive “testers” during insanity and 
idiocy defences. English judges therefore acted similarly to Continental, 
“Inquisitorial” judges who could lead the production of proofs.^^ The courtroom 
activities of English and Continental judges were not as different as was once 
thought.
The increasing involvement of legal counsel at the Northern Assizes illustrated 
that “adversarial” legal processes had emerged in England by the late eighteenth 
century. The different levels of participation allowed to legal counsel within the 
English and Scottish criminal systems created distinctive roles for the respective 
judiciaries. Scottish advocates appeared regularly for both prosecutor and prisoner
Carlisle Patriot March 7th 1829. 
^  Langbein "Fatal Flaws” p. 109.
^  Farmer “Criminal Law” p.33.
See Gorla and Moccia “Revisiting” for a reassessment o f  the differences between English and 
Continental legal codes and practices.
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from at least the late seventeenth century at the Justiciary C o u r t / I n  contrast, 
prosecution lawyers were only involved in English trials from the early eighteenth 
century and even by the 1820s defence counsel was present in a minority of cases 
tried at the Northern A ssizes/C ounsel for the prisoner appeared at the discretion 
of the English bench before 1836, although judges rarely refused to allow defence 
counsel to deal with points of law (such as insanity) as they arose at court/ 
Theoretically, English Assize judges could limit the participation of defence 
counsel during insanity defences.
The English judge’s role altered where trials were imbalanced by only one 
litigant employing legally trained counsel. In such cases, the bench’s actions could 
ensure that the trial ensued equitably and that counsel did not dominate 
proceedings. The judiciary could therefore act in the interest of prosecutors and 
defendants who lacked counsel. As a result, English judges could be perceived to 
act as “Counsel for the prisoner”, as advocate James Boswell once noted. In 
northern English insanity and idiocy defences, the circuit bench was certainly 
active on behalf of prisoners who lacked counsel and faced prosecution by 
barristers. Baron Hullock’s interventions aided Hannah Wells’ defence for burglary
See JC 12/1 to JC 12/3 for this development. Prisoners may have been more regularly 
represented by legal counsel before the 1720s, but the Minute Books (as in England) may have 
failed to mention them,
D. Lemmings Professors o f  the Law. Barristers and the English legal culture in the eighteenth 
centuiv. (2000) p.278. Landsman “Rise” pp.505-506.
Post “Defence Counsel” p.29. Walker Crime and Insanity I p.56.
Beattie “Scales” p.253.
Boswell Letter to Lord Braxfield ( 1780) p. 14.
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at the Cumberland Assizes in 1827/^^ In this case, a servant called Elizabeth 
Stamford had discovered Wells early one morning in the cellar of a house in 
Moresby. It was purported that Wells had been “quite tipsy” and a “bottle of wine 
and some mead” were missing from the cellar’s s to c k s .M is s  Rebecca Woodvile 
lodged a formal accusation of burglary against the prisoner and a barrister, Mr 
Aglionby, was employed to prosecute at court. The prisoner employed no legal 
representative at court and had been afflicted by insanity until a few weeks prior to 
the Assizes.
Aglionby contended successfully that Wells was fit to stand trial, but thereafter 
the prosecution stumbled into legal difficulties. Baron Hullock had to clarify for the 
jury that a theft technically could occur, even when the property stolen was not 
removed from the owner’s prem ises.Subsequently, however, Hullock grilled 
prosecution witnesses and poured scorn over the case against Wells. Proof was 
required that Wells had perpetrated her offence at night to fulfil a statutory charge 
of burglary. Hullock questioned witnesses and established that that Wells had been 
discovered “in broad daylight”, prompting the disdainful remark, “Come now, 
that’s your burglary disposed o f’ from the bench. Elizabeth Stamford then 
described how coffee, ginger wine and mead were “missed” from the cellar. But 
Hullock once again intervened and identified eruditely that the coffee did not 
belong to Miss Woodvile and that there was “no ginger on the indictment”. Such
Wells had been arraigned originally in 1825 for the same offence, but she was adjudged to be 
insane and her trial was postponed until March 1827.
Carlisle Patriot. March 13"^  1827.
Idem.108
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errors damaged the prosecution’s case because Wells could only be tried for 
offences which were entered formally (and correctly) upon the indictment.
During Wells’ hearing, Baron Hullock acted like contemporary English defence 
counsellors. The judge protected the prisoner by ensuring that the proper legal form 
was followed, engaging with the legal niceties of the case and challenging the 
relevance of the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution against Wells collapsed 
under constant pressure from the judge, the jury acquitted her and she was 
dismissed, but not before exclaiming thankfully, “God Almighty always protects 
the innocent!”. The English judge could act as a counter-balance to overtly 
aggressive or unscrupulous indictments, especially those which were conducted by 
lawyers against prisoners who lacked legal counsel.^
Judges could also become embroiled in English trials when counsel appeared for 
both sides. There was perhaps no clearer indication that the English judiciary did 
not automatically “act as Counsel for the prisoner” in every situation.^'* Judicial 
intercession could harm a prisoner’s insanity defence. At James Rice’s final trial in 
July 1776, witnesses were cross-examined by the judge and legal counsellors for 
both the prosecution and the prisoner,’ Questions from the bench elicited 
affirmative testimony that Rice had been “in his sound senses” and had feigned 
insanity upon arrest, evidence that seiwed to hang the prisoner.
Carlisle Patriot March 13th 1827.
Beattie “Scales” p.253.
B n s w e ll  T etter to Lord Braxfield (1780) p. 14.
112 Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.3-6. ASSI 42/9. Knipe Criminal chronology p.90.
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Judicial intervention was not only motivated by the appearance of legal counsel. 
Judges guided vague lay witness testimony towards uncluttered legal definitions of 
insanity. At Elizabeth Ward’s trial for poisoning in 1816, for example, Baron 
Bayley did not cross-examine methodically all witnesses on the prisoner’s 
behalf.”  ^ Yet when Ward’s sister, Charlotte, mentioned that Elizabeth “was not 
altogether steady, or right, in her mind”, Bayley inteiposed and asked whether the 
witness believed that Elizabeth knew the difference between “right and wrong”. 
Ward’s sister replied that she thought Elizabeth fully capable of detennining such a 
distinction. In this case, the bench was not acting to the exclusive benefit of the 
prisoner, but was seeking to prompt testimony which addressed directly a common 
legal criterion regarding insanity: the ability to distinguish between good and evil, 
which jurists related to criminal intent. Following Bayley’s intervention, Charlotte 
Ward’s testimony shifted from an indistinct to a succinct statement about 
Elizabeth’s state of mind. Whilst interjecting such questions, the English judiciary 
was not necessarily predisposed as counsel for or against the prisoner. Instead, they 
acted as legal pedagogues and sought to induce clear evidence concerning the 
prisoner’s criminal responsibility.
Rede York Castle in the nineteenth centui-y (1831) pp.393-401.
* York Herald July 27th 1816.
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The role o f Scotland's Lords ofJusticiary once the “assize ” was empanelled.
From at least the late seventeenth century, Scottish judges also interceded to 
clarify evidence at the Justiciary Court. Proof could be debated as a matter of law 
in Scotland, so the bench could deal with such matters during the “relevancy” stage 
of trials. In contrast to English Assize practice, evidential debates at the Justiciary 
Court could therefore take place before witnesses even took to the stand. At 
Dumfries in 1774, for instance. Lords Barskimming and Coalston presided jointly 
over the trial of John McKnaight and allowed two ten-year old boys to give 
evidence.”  ^During the “relevancy”, defence counsel cited the jurist Mackenzie in 
support of their objection to the witnesses, on the grounds of the boys’ immature 
“weakness of understanding”. The judges accepted the Advocate-Depute’s reply 
that, “Many objections mentioned by Sir George McKenzie as relevant against 
evidence, are exploded in modern practice, and the very passage referred to shows 
objections were then seriously attended to, which no man of business could set his 
face to now of days without being laughed at”.” ’ This legal debate illustrates how 
Scotland’s laws of evidence altered between the late seventeenth century and the 
late eighteenth century. In McKnaight’s trial, the bench deemed that the jury could 
decide the qualitative weight of the boys’ testimonies. In contrast to England, this 
judicial decision was taken during the relevancy phase of the trial, before the 
witnesses actually took to the stand.
JC 2 series.
JC 12/14, Dumfries, May 1774.
JC 12/24. The Advocate Depute was Robert Sinclair. John Crosbie, for the defence, had cited 
“McKenzies Criminals B.2 Tit.26 SS5” in objection to the boy-witnesses.
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Perhaps it was no accident that the Lords Barskimming and Coalston favoured 
the Advocate-Depute’s claims during McKnaight’s trial. James Boswell believed 
that the regular appearance of defence counsel in Scotland meant that the judiciary 
favoured public prosecutors, at least where capital offences were concerned.”  ^
Boswell criticised a system where, “ ... because much more is thought to be 
allowable in those who are saving a man’s life than in those who are taking it away 
... the [Scottish] judges have supposed some of their weight was necessary for the 
other side of the bar, to keep the balance as it should be”.”  ^Boswell’s censure must 
be considered carefully. He was an embittered lawyer, starved of the political and 
legal patronage which he so craved. Boswell’s allegations of collusion between 
Scottish judge and prosecutor may reflect his resentment at not being promoted to 
such elevated positions himself, rather than a reliable critique of legal practice.’^ ’’ 
Contemporary manuscript and published sources indicate that judges were not 
biased consistently towards the prosecutor.
Like English judges, Scotland’s Lords of Justiciary could influence legal 
proceedings by cross-examining witnesses and interjecting comments upon legal 
matters. Both Lord Hermand and Lord Meadowbank presided over James 
Connacher’s hearing at Ayr in 1823.’ ’^ Connacher was eventually deemed to have
T .e.tter to Lord Braxfield. (1780) p p .l3 -l4 .
120 SeeW insatt and Pottle (eds.) Boswell for the Defence pp.364-369 for details o f  Boswell’s 
background. ,
121 JC 12/35 and 26/441. Avr Advertiser April 17 1823.
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been insane whilst murdering his infant son, but the second witness to appear, the 
writer John Jurie, provided equivocal evidence about the prisoner’s mental abilities. 
Under examination from counsel, Jurie suggested initially that Comiacher was 
“rather imbecile, and did not seem to know on the whole fairly and properly what 
he was doing”, but then added that the prisoner did “know right from wrong”. The 
“Court” examined Jurie before he left the witness stand and induced the pregnant 
statement that Connacher was “silly but not a natural fool”. The bench clarified 
Jurie’s testimony, producing evidence that Connacher’s mental incapacity was 
partially debilitating and was therefore worthy of a mitigation of sentence, rather 
than full exculpation, according to Scotland’s “Rule of Proportions”. Scotland’s 
criminal bench clarified evidential and legal matters during defences of fatuity and 
furiosity. This resembled closely the activity of contemporary English judges.
The Scottish circuit bench could direct legal hearings through the inteijection of 
questions and comments, besides non-verbal indications of their opinions. Whilst 
witnesses were cross-examined extensively by English judges in some trials, 
Scotland’s judiciary was less forceful in this respect. Robert Houston has suggested 
that the Scottish judiciary led, rather than dictated, High Court cases at Edinburgh 
and the same was true of southern Justiciary c o u r t s .T h e  Scottish bench preferred 
to allow legal counsel to examine witnesses and raise the legal points during 
furiosity and fatuity defences.Whereas the English bench might be the only legal
Houston Madness pp.50-51and pp.79-80. Houston “Courts” pp.340-341.
T.H. Ford “Brougham as Barrister; Courtroom Dilemmas o f a Notorious Radical”, JHL. 3, 
(1984), p. 109.
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expert to be involved vocally in an Assize trial, adversary counsel participated 
regularly in Scottish Justiciary Court hearings. In most cases, the Scottish judiciaiy 
was not required to protect the interests of litigants who lacked counsel. Advocates 
scrutinized evidences and presented legal arguments on behalf of their clients, 
although Scottish judges continued to engage with and adjudicate such matters.
In contrast to England’s circuit judiciary, Scottish judges prefened to seek out 
counsel to represent the prisoner in court rather than undertake the examination of 
witnesses themselves and on the pannel’s behalf. Thus, when the Scottish prisoner 
James Blaikie lacked counsel at his trial in 1752, judge Minto immediately 
recommended that “Mr James Montgomery” act as “Advocate for Councill”.^ '^^  
Lord Minto also postponed the “dyet” until later in the day to allow Mr. 
Montgomery time to organise an improvised defence. Minto avoided engaging 
himself at court on behalf of the prisoner. This “detached” stance was an important 
aspect of judicial activity within the Justiciary couitroom, marking a long term 
development away from an active self-interest in the outcome of trials.
JC 12/7.
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The judiciary’s concluding summary
British judges could interject whilst witnesses were examined, thereby informing 
the jury’s inteipretation of testimonies. Additionally, British judges could deliver 
conclusive oral summaries of cases. This judicial summary, which took place 
immediately before the jury considered its decision, has been interpreted as a key 
element of the English judge’s ability to influence a v e rd ic t.T h e se  synopses 
recapitulated legal issues such as criminal responsibility, as well as salient 
testimonies. Judges could indicate whether they were convinced of the prisoner’s 
insanity or idiocy. These synopses reveal how evidential standards had changed 
during the long eighteenth century. Judges provided cleai' indications of the legal 
“criteria” which were deemed necessary to prove madness. The very words which 
the judge used in his instructions to the jury indicate the extent to which formal, 
medical vocabulaiy was used in Britain’s courtrooms to describe and explain 
mental derangement. In Scotland, opposing advocates were allowed to summarise 
their cases, followed by the bench’s précis. The judge’s summation took on an 
important complexion in England, however, as legal counsel were not always 
allowed to review their case to the juiy.
British judges could voice their personal estimations of the prisoner’s mental 
state and criminal responsibility during their summaries. Baron Graham was 
convinced by Granville Medhurst’s insanity defence at the Yorkshire Assizes in
Eigen Witnessing p.33.
Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” p. 1188
2 8 2
1800.^^  ^ The hearing was halted prematurely by the judge after the fourth witness 
had testified to Medhurst’s mental distress, hi conclusion, Graham summarised the 
law of insanity and recounted the “leading facts” of the case to the juiy, which 
indicated that Medhuist had been insane at the time of killing his wife.^^  ^ The 
judicial summary fortified proofs of Medhurst’s madness and signalled that legal 
criteria of insanity were satisfied. The York Herald reported that, following the 
judge’s intervention and summaiy, “the Juiy hesitated not a minute, but returned a 
Verdict of Not Guilty in consequence of insanity”.G ra h a m  conveyed clearly his 
opinions, but he did not force a verdict against the main thrust of evidence. Nor did 
Graham’s conclusion contradict widely-held perceptions of the prisoner’s criminal 
responsibility, including the jury’s collective estimations. Graham’s views were 
informed and constrained by the evidence supplied at court. British judges guided 
and legitimised verdicts during insanity and idiocy defences, rather than imposing 
conceptions of criminal responsibility upon the courti oom.
Surviving British summaries suggest that judges were not automatically 
indisposed or sceptical towards pleas of insanity .E nglish  judges were critical of 
insanity defences which lacked sufficient proofs, however. Richard Routledge 
caused pandemonium at the Carlisle Assizes in 1824 by acting incoherently at
Eigen Witnessing p.34.
A S S I41/10.
York Herald. August 2”*^ 1800.
Idem. During the same year, the celebrated Hadfield trial took place at the Old Bailey, where 
Kenyon, the presiding judge, similarly brought the case to a halt and insh ucted the jury to find the 
prisoner not guilty owing to his delusional insanity.
Eigen Witnessing p.55.
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c o u r t . A s  the “Jury turned to deliberate ... the prisoner evinced much anxiety to 
bring up liis other witnesses, and conducted himself in this business not at all like a 
mad man”.^ ^^  Justice Bayley remarked promptly to the jury, “I think if you look 
into the dock, gentlemen, you will see enough to determine the question”,B a y le y  
echoed broad perceptions that persons who were puiportedly insane at their trial, 
such as Routledge, were understood to be incapable of organising their cases in 
rational, systematic manners. The jury concurred with such estimations, finding that 
Routledge had feigned insanity and was guilty of sheepstealing.
When judges summarised insanity defences, they outlined the legal criteria 
which were required to prove that prisoners lacked criminal intent. Detailed legal 
instructions were recorded raiely for southern Scotland, but an analysis of English 
summaries provides a unique perspective upon the shifting understandings of 
criminal responsibility and mental afflictions. From the 1760s, English judges 
referred rarely to the juristic convention that only “a total idiocy, or absolute 
insanity, excuses from guilt, and of course from punishment, of any criminal action 
committed under ... deprivation of senses”/ N i g e l  Walker claimed that 
“absolute” madness had ciystallised into a rigid test of insanity amongst English 
jurists and legal commentators by the 1700.^^  ^Northern Assize judges did not apply 
such strict definitions in their summaries from the 1770s onwards.
Carlisle Journal August 28th 1824.
Idem.
Idem.
Eigen Witnessing p.47.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.25. Eigen Witnessing p.56. 
Walker Crime and Insanity I p.38.
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William Loss’s trial at Appleby in 1829 provided the clearest indication that 
both judge and jury were prepared to find a prisoner insane even where absolute 
proof of complete mental incapacitation was lacking. In his concluding address, 
Baron Hullock recounted a local surgeon’s statement that he did not “know whether 
[Luss] be insane, or otherwise”. Significantly, Hullock advised that such uncertain 
testimony “would warrant a verdict of insanity, because you ought to be sure before 
you return any other”. H u l l o c k ’s guidance contradicted England’s jmistic 
tradition which assumed that prisoners were sane until proven otherwise. Hullock 
suggested that the juiy ought to assume that Luss was insane, rather than sane. This 
provides an example of how judges could both initiate and legitimise discretionary 
mitigation within the couitroom. Again, the jmy’s verdict of insanity was 
underpinned by the evidence provided at court and concurred with the judicial 
review.
British commentators understood that insanity could be a tiansient condition. 
Blackstone, for instance, drew upon Hale’s work and insisted that “if a lunatic hath 
lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals, 
as if he has no deficiency”. This juristic supposition was not followed 
regimentally within early nineteenth centuiy judicial summaries. During 1822, at 
James Towers’ hearing for the muider of his wife, judge Holroyd summarised, “It
Carlisle Patriot March 7th 1829. . , , ^
139 See, for instance, Brydall Non Compos Mentis (1700) p.66: “Every person is presumed to be o f  
perfect mind and memory, unless the contrary is proved”.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.25.
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is ... important in point of law, to consider whether a man, who has been insane, 
may not have lucid intervals, and yet during those lucid intervals, the phrenzy may 
be lurking in his mind” .^ '^ * Holroyd suggested that even if Towers appeared to 
enjoy a lucid spell when he shot his wife, the prisoner’s insanity was actually in 
place peimanently. Witnesses, jury and judge concurred that James Towers 
suffered from delusional insanity, which indicates that such a concept was accepted 
as a sound legal defences during the 1820s. '^*  ^Medical and lay witnesses recounted 
how Towers was beset by imaginary “tliieves, hobgoblings and blue devils”. 
Towers misapplied reason consistently and therefore could not be responsible for 
killing his wife because he was incapable of forming intent. Holroyd’s exposition 
of delusion challenged juristic notions that insanity could be transient and that 
sufferers from such afflictions could act rationally and be guilty of crimes during 
“lucid spells”. By doing so, the judge did not foist his opinions upon an acquiescent 
courtroom, for witnesses and jurors concurred that Towers was delusional and 
lacked intent. The next chapter demonstrates that the judge’s summary could 
actually reinforce and legitimise broader understandings of criminality, justice and 
mental afflictions which were held by jurors, as well as the local communities to 
which they belonged. Broader perceptions of insanity could also be distinct from 
juristic principles.
Kendal Chronicte March 9th 1822.
Idem.
Idem. Lancaster Gazette March 16*'* 1822. 
Chapter 7 esp. pp.286-287 and 313-318.
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A person’s ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and hence form 
intent, remained central to British theories of criminal responsibility/Concluding 
judicial addresses referred readily to these juristic conventions, asserting that “if a 
person had any knowledge of the difference between right and wrong, he must be 
accountable for his actions”/"^  ^ Those who “could not distinguish right from 
wrong” were considered incapable of “forming a just judgment of [their] own 
actions, or those of others” and were therefore “not answerable” for their 
conduct /Judge  Asshurst drew upon centuries of jurisprudence when, in 1776, he 
declared that “In order to constitute a crime, a will must go a long with the act; a 
man out of his senses, cannot be said to have a will”/"^  ^ Just as at the Old Bailey, 
Northern Assize judges drew upon a strong tradition of legal comment during the 
insanity defences, especially concerning the nature of criminal responsibility/"^^
It is significant that most English judges employed legal, rather than medical, 
terminology and criteria regarding insanity during their summaries. Only during the 
1820s were medical terms included in a Northern Assize judge’s concluding 
remarks, although concrete conclusions in this respect are precluded by the 
historical material extant. Abridged or condensed reports incorporated the judge’s 
reference to the legal criteria for insanity, but usually lacked medical terms. This 
indicates that medical vocabulary and understandings regarding insanity and idiocy
Eigen Witnessing p.40,
Lancaster Gazette September 12th 1812. Trial o f  Thomas Kirnan and Henry and Joseph 
McGleade.
Kendal Chronicle March 9th 1822,
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) p. 17. This was a resumé o f  Ashurst’s summaiy.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 182-189.
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were not regularly included by judges in their summaries. It may also suggest that 
legal definitions were perceived to be more important and perhaps more 
understandable to the intended audience of the published trial narratives.
Judges sought to clarify testimony which imparted unfamiliar concepts to lay 
juries. Jurors were confronted rarely by complex medical theories of mental 
distraction within Britain’s provincial courts. In 1822, surgeon Thomas Harrison 
testified that James Towers’ delusions were symptomatic of “delirium tremens”, a 
form of insanity induced by alcoholic add ic t ion .Judge  Holroyd refened to 
Harrison’s testimony in his summaiy to the jury, “if you think that [Towers] was 
labouring under delirium tremens^ which has been described to you; if you suppose 
that he could not distinguish right from wrong, and that when he fired the pistols, 
he was unconscious of what he was doing, - then he is entitled to the benefit of the 
law, that is to your acquittal, on the ground of insanity”. Holroyd referred to 
“delirium tremens” because Harrison’s testimony was persuasive of Towers’ 
insanity, but the judge qualified this explanation with a legal definition of insanity 
which was used and understood widely in society: tlie ability to “distinguish right
fi'om wi'ong”. It was expected that jurors should understand the legal conception of |
!Harrison’s testimony, if not the medical context. Legal, rather than medical, |
definitions were paramount to the identification of insanity within Britain’s j
provincial courtrooms before 1830.^^  ^ This suggests that broader understandings
Kendal Chronicle March 9th 1822. j
Ü T rrza-i-^ X T l f i ' f m / a c i r v  IEigen W itnessing pp.52.
288
and vocabularies were influenced strongly by legal conceptions of insanity and 
idiocy
Conclusions
English Assize and Scottish Justiciary Court judges could operate differently 
during criminal trials. The bench was less vociferous in Scotland than in England, 
at least once the “assize” had been empanelled. Scottish judges could pose 
questions and inform themselves within the courtroom environment, but the regular 
involvement of counsel meant that the Justiciary Court bench was involved less in 
the cross-examination of witnesses. The Scottish “assize” was allowed a greater 
role in decision-making after the early eighteenth century. By the late-1740s, 
Scotland’s circuit judiciary had ceased to reject defences of fuiiosity or fatuity in 
exculpation or mitigation of a crime during the “relevancy”. Instead, judges 
sanctioned lawyers to debate and jurors to decide whether “pannels” were fully 
responsible for their transgressions. The establishment of the assize as the key 
decision-maker in such criminal hearings contrasted sharply with eighteenth 
century trends at Scotland’s civil courts, where the judge was instituted as the 
principal courtroom evaluator.
Conversely, Scotland’s criminal judges were established as the formal assessors 
of a prisoner’s ability to stand trial by 1830. This contrasted with English Assize 
procedure, where the juiy gauged the prisoner’s mental fitness to plead. Justiciary
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Court practice was irregulai' during the eighteenth century, but judges were 
confirmed as the “decision-takers” during defences “in-bar-of-triai” upon the 
conclusion of Hunter’s test-case in 1801. It was decided that the bench could 
postpone a trial because this was a question of “relevancy” (the law) and thus fell 
under the judge’s remit. Debates about Justiciary procedure, aired at Hunter’s trial, 
were infused by professional and “party” politics. In broader terms, this practical 
development illustrates that there was no simple development towards 
“Adversarial” procedures in Scotland. Nor did Scottish procedure evolve inevitably 
to mimic English practice during the long eighteenth century. Where the bench 
assessed the prisoner’s state of mind (with special reference to expert witnesses), 
the Lords of Justiciary were invested with an activity which was akin to Continental 
“Inquisitorial” models of practice.
English and Scottish circuit judges acted in some analogous ways, despite the 
persistence of different legal traditions and procedures. Britain’s circuit benches 
could be proactive and infoimative during insanity and idiocy defences. In some 
instances, British judges continued to act as the “testers” of criminal hearings, 
leading cross-examinations and summarising cases. Judges could also limit the 
impact of legal counsel. English judges sought to counter-balance cases which were 
presented by counsel, especially when only one of the litigants employed 
representatives. Such judicial activity indicates that “adversarial” court practices 
had not evolved fully in either code before 1830.^^  ^ The practical remit of British
Chorus “Judge’s role” pp.33-39.
Landsman “Rise” pp.500-502 and pp.513-4.
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and European judges could be similar, although jurors assessed the prisoner’s 
mental state in all English and most Scottish hearings/
Eigen has concluded that judges coerced jury assessments of criminal 
responsibility at the Old Bai ley /Nor thern  Assize insanity and idiocy defences 
were not directed so forcefully by the bench. Scotland’s Lords of Justiciary also 
guided, rather than dictated, defences of fatuity and furiosity at the High Court and 
on the southern c i rcu i t .Br i t i sh  judges did not impose alien understandings of 
criminal responsibility upon trial jurors. The bench did not dictate verdicts, but 
legitimised the jury’s decision by ensuring that legal principles were understood and 
adhered to. Judges guided jurors towards conclusions which corresponded to the 
proofs supplied at court; the bench was therefore constrained by the testimony 
imparted. Judges could induce sound proofs through cross-examination, but such 
endeavours were constricted by the bench’s fonnal, practical remit. Typically, 
Britain’s judiciary sought to clarify testimonies by probing for evidence which 
addressed directly the legal criteria for insanity and idiocy. This was an extension of 
the judge’s role as the paraclete of legal principles. As stricter evidential standards 
evolved in Britain, so the bench solicited persuasive proofs from witnesses which 
could inform the jurors’ deliberations. Judges sought to eradicate equivocal 
testimony and establish the prisoner’s mental condition “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”. This activity could guide jurors, but did not dictate the final verdict.
Gorla and Moccia “Revisiting” p. 146. Gordon “Roman Law” pp. 142-143.
Eigen “Intentionality” pp.34-49. Eigen Witnessing pp. 14, 33-34,40-48 and 52-55.
Houston Madness pp.50-51 and 79-80. Houston “Professions” p.2. Houston “Courts” pp.340-341.
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With the exception of Scottish pleas “in-bar-of-trial”, provincial British insanity 
and idiocy hearings reflect broader liistorical interpretations of legal processes, 
whereby criminal cases were not directed inexorably by the presiding bench. This 
analysis of judicial influence must be contextualised by an examination of the 
interactions between the principal actors during criminal c a s e s / T h e  next chapter 
investigates how the jury acted proactively and reached its conclusions independent 
from the judge’s instructions. Verdicts could represent a concurrence of jury and 
judge estimations, rather than the imposition of judicial opinions upon a malleable 
jury panel. During insanity and idiocy defences, judges did not order juries to find 
verdicts which contravened broadly held perceptions of justice, criminal 
responsibility and mental afflictions.
King “Decision-makers” pp.26-27. King Crime esp. pp.43,227, 231-35 and 243-256. Langbein 
“Fatal Flaws” pp. 108-109. Langbein “Trial jury” pp.35-37.
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British criminal trial juries and the evaluation ofprisoners^ 
mental conditions, 1660-1829
'‘Alas, good men! they mean no harm: 
they do but follow the directions o f the Court” *
Sir John Hawles rhetorical statement correlates Joel Eigen’s argument that the 
judicial bench directed the petty jury’s verdict and hence the evaluation of the 
prisoner’s mental condition, as least during Old Bailey criminal hearings/ This 
chapter extends the alternative thesis that judges did not force juries to their 
conclusions in northern England and southern Scotland. The jury could be proactive 
during the examination of prisoners and, in some cases, reach conclusions 
independent from the promptings of legal professionals or the proofs provided at 
court.
Robert Houston has resolved that Scottish High Couit verdicts of fatuity and 
furiosity reflected concurrence between bench and “assize”, rather than a 
domineering judiciary.^ This provides an important contrast to the English 
historiography, but the relationship between judge and jury could be less 
harmonious during southern Scottish hearings. In both countries, bench and jurors 
could produce divergent assessments of the prisoner’s mental capacities and 
criminal responsibility. Martin Weiner’s suggestion that English judges and juries
' Hawles Englishman’s Right (1680, 8* edition 1793), p .l9 . 
 ^Eigen Witnessing pp.33-34.
 ^ Houston Madness pp.50-52.
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could contest concepts of criminal responsibility during the nineteenth century can 
be extended to provincial English and Scottish trials of the late eighteenth century, 
at least/
Contemporary commentators and historians alike have debated the courtroom 
function of Britain’s criminal trial juries. These discussions have focused upon 
whether jurors could or should take decisions unfettered by the promptings of legal 
professionals, most notably the bench. Insanity and idiocy defences raised and 
accentuated this politicised legal issue. To understand how the jury operated, 
contemporary legal debates and the broader historiography of courtroom 
interactions must be engaged.
The social standing and outlook of England’s criminal jurors has propagated 
vehement debate amongst historians.^ Older contentions that petty jurors could be 
characterised as being the local “elites” of society has been criticised.*  ^ More 
recently, historians have agreed that trial jurors were of “middling status” and did 
not necessarily identify with or belong to the local and national elites. It is 
suggested that this analysis can be extended to northern English jury panels too. 
Less research has been published regarding the Scottish “assize”, but it should not 
be assumed that Scotland’s jury was indistinguishable from its English counteipart.^
Weiner “Judges V  Jurors” pp.468-470.
 ^Most famously, see Hay “Property, Authority”, Langbein’s criticism in “Fatal Flaws” and Hay’s 
reposte in “Class Composition”.
 ^For an overview o f  these debates see Innes and Styles “crime-wave” pp.382-409 and Green 
“Retrospective” pp.384-399.
 ^M. Crowther and B. White, “Medicine, Property and the Law in Britain 1800-1914”, HJ^  31,
4 (1988) p.854. Willock, '‘'Origins''’ passim.
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Published work concerning Scottish “assizes” is thin by comparison with English 
research. This thesis is therefore a springboard for future comparative research into 
Britain’s criminal juries. English and Scottish guidelines for jury sei'vice are 
compared, alongside a broad analysis of the social standing and occupational 
designations of jurors who were involved in fatuity and furiosity hearings. This 
comparison suggests that most Scottish jui'ors were also of “middling” status, but 
that persons of higher and lower status than English petty jurors were empanelled 
regularly upon southern Scottish “assizes”.
Sophisticated historical analyses indicate that the jurors’ role in the decision­
making processes of the criminal law cannot be explained by their social 
characteristics alone.^ It is questioned whether “middle-ranking” jurors always 
deferred to socially superior or legally experienced courtroom participants, 
particularly by the late eighteenth century. Thomas Green urged historians to 
consider what he termed the “constraints” that infoimed or directed the jury’s 
deliberations. It is therefore assessed how British verdicts of insanity could be 
stimulated by the jurors’ independent perceptions of justice, criminal responsibility 
and mental disturbance.
The salient role of British criminal juries was to return verdicts which were 
based increasingly, although not exclusively, upon the proofs delivered at court. 
Scotland’s sovereign legal traditions, particularly the “Rule of Proportions”, meant
® Green “Retrospective” pp.386-387. Hay “Class composition” pp.352-355. King “Decision- 
Makers” p.26 and Crime pp.257-294.
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that a wider array of verdicts were available to her “assyzers”. English and Scottish 
jurists maintained divergent theoretical approaches to partial “degrees” (or less than 
fully debilitating forms) of insanity and idiocy/ In practice, Scottish jurors could 
find prisoners to be afflicted by partially debilitating mental conditions, which 
deserved a proportional reduction, but not exculpation, of sentence. English theory, 
by contrast, held that “partial” degrees of insanity or idiocy earned no formal 
mitigation of sentence. By the late eighteenth century, however, the partially 
afflicted were acquitted fully of their crimes in England. It is explained how 
criminals who suffered from less debilitating mental conditions could benefit from 
mitigation which was prescribed by law (mandatory) and which circumvented legal 
principles (discretionary).
Recent research has demonstrated how petty jurors mitigated England’s harshest 
criminal sanctions thiough their verdicts. It is clarified how findings of insanity 
and idiocy could be extensions of either mandatory or discretionary alleviation 
within Britain’s criminal processes. Joel Eigen has located a close relationship 
between “partial verdicts” or “pious perjury” which mitigated sentences and 
English insanity defences. “Partial verdicts” and insanity defences could be 
informed by similar theoretical and practical legal imperatives in northern England, 
but it is contended that they represented different types of mitigative practice. 
Historians of crime and the courtroom have illustrated how die jury’s conclusions
 ^See Chapter 3.
Eigen Witnessing pp.55-57.
" See, for instance, Beattie “London’s Juries”, Green “Retrospective”, Hay “Class Composition”, 
King “Illiterate Plebeians” and King Crime.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 15-16 and 28.
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influenced post-trial clemency in England and Scotland, through recommendations 
to mercy. Nigel Walker has evaluated English and Scottish applications to royal 
clemency in the context of mental afflictions.*^ Recent investigations of British 
insanity and idiocy defences have not focused upon this further dimension of formal 
mitigation, however.*"* This chapter redresses this imbalance by comparing how 
mental disturbance might lead to post-trial mercy in these two countries.
Historical interest has focused upon the jury’s verdict, but jurors could also 
contribute towards the establisliment of proofs by questioning witnesses. Historians 
such as John Langbein and Stephan Landsman have proposed that juiors evolved 
into passive recipients and evaluators of evidence as “adversarial” criminal 
practices developed over the long eighteenth century.*^ During provincial English 
and Scottish insanity and idiocy defences, however, juries could be self-informing 
bodies. It is argued that such proactivity exemplifies how jurors could produce 
verdicts independent from coercion and according to their own understanding of 
evidential principles and legal dogmas.
pp. 196-204.
Eigen Witnessing. Houston Madness.
Landsman “Rise” p.501. Langbein “Trial Juiy” pp.34-38.
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English and Scottish criminal trial juries
Jurors assessed the prisoner’s mental state in all English and the majority of 
Scottish criminal hearings. The criminal trial jury at the English Assizes was known 
as the “petit” or “petty” jury and consisted regularly of twelve men by the 1660s.*  ^
The petty juiy assessed the mental state of prisoners after considering the facts and 
opinions supplied by witnesses. The function of England’s “grand jury” is also 
considered here and compared with Scottish practice. In contrast to English 
practice, fifteen jurors were empanelled upon Scottish Justiciary Court “assizes” 
(juries) by the early eighteenth centuiy.*^ On the southern circuit, the prisoner’s 
mental fitness to plead was evaluated by the bench rather than the “assize”, but 
jurors always assessed evidence regarding the prisoner’s mental state at the crime. 
Juries were empanelled in twenty of the thirty-five southern Scottish furiosity and 
fatuity defences between 1707 and 1829.
The format of criminal trial by jury distinguished Britain from contemporary 
Continental procedures. Criminal hearings in Prussia, Russia, Spain and 
Württemburg proceeded without reference to a jury panel before the mid nineteenth 
centuiy.*^ These were “Inquisitorial” judicial systems, where the judiciary 
investigated evidences alongside passing verdicts and sentences.*^ The 
“Inquisitorial” bench also assessed the mental condition of prisoners, informed by
Baker “Criminal Courts” p.22. Cockbum “North Riding Justices” p.490.
Willock “Origins” p. 152.
Becker “Judicial Reform” pp4-13. Farmer “Criminal Law” pp.34-39. Lopez-Lozaro, “No Deceit 
Safe” p.465. Criminal trials in Ancien Regime France lacked jury panels, although Revolutionary 
France adopted the English concept o f  a petit jury, Padoa-Schioppa “Introduction” pp.7-9.
See pp.242-244.
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“expert” and “lay” evidences. British trials where prisoners’ mental capacities were 
evaluated by panels of lay jurors were distinctive within this wider European 
context.
English and Scottish superior criminal court juiies shared some common 
characteristics. Jury service began at twenty-one in both England and Scotland, 
which was regarded as the age of majority for m ales .The  ceiling for jury service 
differed however, being sixty-years-of-age in Scotland and seventy in England.^* 
British jurors selected older members of their panel to act as the “foreman” or 
“chancellor” of the jury.^^ The “foreman” chaired deliberations amongst jurors and 
announced the jury’s verdict to the courtroom. Jurors may have defeiTed to such 
individuals owing to their age, jury experience, high social and economic station as 
well as local administrative standing.^^ The internal dynamic of the jury’s decision­
making process can be veiled from the historian’s gaze, but the “foreman” was an 
important figure at court, delivering verdicts and asking questions of witnesses.
British criminal jmies were also male bodies universally, for females were 
prohibited from jury service. During insanity or idiocy defences for child-murder, a 
“jury of matrons” examined the body of female prisoners, but such inquests took
^  Langbein “Trial Jury”p.24. Bell Dictionary (1826) II pp. 134-143. Anon. Readings on the Statute 
Law (1723-1725) IVp.79.
^  King Crime pp.244-246. K.S. Murphy, “Judge, Jury, Magistrate and Soldier: Rethinking Law and 
Authority in Late-Eighteenth-Century Ireland”, AJLH. xlvi, 3, (2000), pp.236-7.
Future research is needed to clarify whether “kinship” played an important role, especially in areas 
where such social relationships were still strong in the early eighteenth century.
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place privately before the trial/"* At court, “Matrons” were restricted to factual 
assessments of whether the prisoner displayed signs of pregnancy or child-birth. 
“Matrons” provided evidence regarding the prisoner’s sanity or guilt, but they did 
not decide the criminal verdict. It could be suggested that the jurors viewed 
criminality and their courtroom role from the perspective of property-owning males. 
This prognosis is simplistic, however. As Douglas Hay and Thomas Green have 
suggested for England, the jurors’ behaviour cannot be explained by their social 
station and gender alone.^^
Scottish and English jmors shared common occupational characteristics. From 
at least the early eighteenth century, professional medical persons were exempted 
by statute from sei*ving upon Britain’s criminal juries.^^ Medical practitioners 
testified at court, but they never assessed the mental condition of northern English 
and southern Scottish prisoners as jurors. By comparison, medical men appeared 
rarely as Scottish civil court and High Court criminal jurors between 1660 and 
1829.^  ^ One juror was a “chirurgeon” (surgeon) during Philip Standsfield’s trial, at 
Edinburgh in 1688, for the murder of his father.^^ Jurors could receive medical 
training without pursuing a career in that vocation, but provincial jury panels lacked 
the presence of formal, medical professionals. “Experts” could inform the jury’s
J.C. Oldham, “On Pleading the Belly: A History o f  the Jury o f  Matrons”, CJH. 6 (1985), pp. 1-64. 
^  Green “Retrospective” pp.386-387. Hay “Class composition” pp.352-355.
^  Crawford “Emergence” p .l61 . Landsman “Rise” p.501. Willock “Origins” p .167-168.
3% o f Edinburgh civil jurors were medical men: Houston Madness p.49 and “Courts” p.341.
JC 2/17.
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verdict, but as Michael MacDonald has suggested, mental conditions were assessed 
by panels of lay persons at court/^
Qualifications for and social structure o f British Juries
Jury paiticipation was restricted by statutoiy guidelines regarding property and 
wealth in both England and Scotland/** These real estate and income prerequisites 
were designed to guard against corruption, ensure that British jurors were 
economically self-sufficient and therefore capable of autonomous assessment/* 
These statutory prerequisites excluded the majority of Britain’s populace from jury 
service. Independent guidelines for jury sei*vice existed in England and Scotland, 
although some of these rules were analogous. Southern Scottish juiy panels retained 
alternative social structures and internal dynamics than their English equivalents. 
Owing to less restrictive jury-qualifications at the Justiciary Court, persons of 
higher and lower station than England’s petty jurors were empanelled regularly as 
“assizers” in southern Scotland.
During the long eighteenth century, the statutory guidelines were amended for 
juiy service at England’s “County Assizes”, such as Cumberland and 
Westmoreland. From 1692, the statutoiy threshold rose from the ownership of land
M. MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam -  Madness. Anxiety and Healing in Seventeenth Century 
England, (1981) p. 113.
Langbein “Trial Jmy” pp.24-27. King Crime p.244. Willock “Origins” pp. 179-182. Houston 
“Crime, Courts” p.341. For a perspectiye on Irish prerequisites, see Murphy “Judge, Jury” p235. 
Houston “Crime, Courts” p.341.
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valued at least £2 per annum to £10 and over/^ This new guideline was not adopted 
immediately or universally, however. The anonymous Readings on the Statute Law 
(1723-1725) adhered to the older forty-shillings (£2) property requirement.^^ The 
author may have been mistaken, but this reference may indicate that jury 
qualifications in England were applied flexibly, rather than rigidly, before the late 
1720s. If so, a broader proportion of property-owning men were eligible for jmy 
service at the Assizes than has previously been assumed during the early eighteenth 
century. By the mid eighteenth century, however, the £10 prerequisite was adopted 
regularly.^"*
Regional and jurisdictional variations in jury stipulations persisted in England 
throughout the long eighteenth century. Old Bailey petty jurors were householders 
in Middlesex and London who owned £100 worth of real estate or personal 
possessions.^^ London’s jurors could be wealthier and of higher standing than their 
provincial counterpaits.^*  ^The Old Bailey’s prerequisite set its petty jurors on a par 
with one-third of Essex’s grand jurors during the late eighteenth century, for 
instance .I t  might be argued that Old Bailey’s criminal jurors were closer in social 
perspective to courtroom participants of high status, such as judges, than most 
Northern Assize petty jurors.
4 & 5 W&M c24. Hay “Class Composition” p .312. King “Illiterate” pp.258-265. King Crime 
p.244. Langbein “Trial Jury” p.24. The prerequisite was raised in 1664 to £20 (16 & 17 Chas II c3), 
but Oldham and Hay concur that practice reverted to the £2 guideline by 1667 (Hay “Class 
Composition” p .312, Oldham “Special Jury” pp. 145-146)
Anon.. Readings on the Statute Law. (1723-1725), IV, pp.80-81.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.342. Langbein “Trial Ju y” p.24. King Crime p.244.
Hay “Class Composition” p .312. Hay cites the statute 3 Geo II c25 s i 9, which changed the Old 
Bailey requisites fi*om 100 marks to £100. Anon., Readings on the Statute Law (1723-25), IV, p.81.
Beattie “London’s Juries” p.233.
King “Illiterate” p. 274.
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Qualifications could vary upon the Northern Assizes, too. Jury service at 
“County” Assizes, such as Northumberland and Yorkshire, was based upon land 
ownership. By contrast, the “Town Corporation” Assizes for Newcastle and York 
could select jmors who owned moveable goods worth £40 or more, rather than real 
estate.^^ These statutory guidelines for moveable property were considerably lower 
than London’s £100 precondition. The English petty jmy was not an homogeneous 
social entity dming the long eighteenth centmy. Juries varied by epoch and region. 
Perhaps such variations have amplified the historical debates regarding the wealth 
and social structure of English petty juries.
After 1692, the prerequisites for jury service at Scotland’s Court of Justiciary 
were lower than England’s. The statute which raised jury qualifications to £10 was 
not applicable in Scots Law. In 1797, advocate David Hume cited a 1746 statute 
which maintained Scottish requirements at the, “possession of lands or tenements of 
the yeai'ly value of 40s [shillings sterling] or valued in the tax-rolls as 30s ... 
whether the possession be as owner or liferenter”.^  ^Women could not be jmors, but 
men whose wives were “infest” of £5 per year could also be empanelled in 
Scotland."*** The Scottish prerequisites were amended by statute in 1825, but 
remained lower than in England."** After 1692, a broader section of society was 
qualified for and represented upon Scottish “assizes” than English petty jmies. If
Jacob, Statute Law Common-Placed (1719) p. 138. Anon, Readings on the Statute Law (1723- 
1725)IV p.81.
Hume Commentaries (1797) II p.453. Statute 19 Geo II c.9. Hume’s figures referred to sterling 
rather than Scots currency, which was worth roughly one-twelfth o f  sterling.
Hume Commentaries (1797) II p.453.
6 Geo IV C.22. Bell Law Dictionary 11826) II pp. 134-143.
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the petty jury was regarded as one of the most inclusive, “popular” institutions in 
England, then Scotland’s assize was surely more so/^
In contrast to England’s “County” Assizes, the ownership of property was not 
paramount in Scottish jmy qualifications. Throughout the long eighteenth centmy, 
wealthy individuals who did not own significant real estate were named as jurors. 
As Hume stated, “liferenters” (persons who held long term property leases, usually 
of ninety-nine years) qualified for “assize” service."*^  From the mid-1820s, 
individuals who owned £200 sterling of “moveable property” also qualified."*"* 
English tenants who held long term leases on land valued at least £20 could act as 
jurors, but it was impractical to trace such leaseholders and they were ignored on 
official jmy lists."*^  In England, wealthy tenant farmers who lacked the necessary 
landed assets were excluded firom jmies."*  ^ In contrast, Scottish tenants of suitable 
income acted regularly as “assyzers” (Table 8.1).
After considerable debate, historians now concm that at least two-thirds of 
England’s population was prohibited from jmy service."*^  The theoretical premises 
for jmy seiwice were followed regularly in practice. “Makeweight” jurors (or
Hay “Class Composition” p.349.
Hume Commentaries (1797) II p.453.
Bell Law Dictionary (1826) II pp.134-143.
Hay “Class Composition” pp. 312 and 321. Life-rent (usually set at 99 yeais) and 500 year leases 
were accepted by statute 3 Geo II c25 s i 8 (1730).
Green “Retrospective” p.297 and King “Illiterate Plebeians” p.268 both argue that wealthy tenant 
farmers were excluded from jury service, whilst less wealthy individuals who owned £10 worth o f  
property were included.
Green “Retrospective” p.379. Hay “Class Composition” p.327. King “Illiterate” p.277. Langbein’s 
dissection o f  Hay’s work (“Fatal Flaws” pp.96-118) ought to be treated cautiously. According to 
Langbein, Hay failed to distinguish between uppermost ruling “classes” and “middling ranking” 
petty jurors. Hay’s original thesis may have been confused, but he later clarified that such a 
distinction existed. See Hay “Class Composition” pp.351-152, fii. 134.
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“talesmen”) who did not meet statutory stipulations appeared infrequently during 
British criminal trials/** As at the Old Bailey, “talesmen” were not employed during 
northern English and southern Scottish insanity defences/^ During southern 
Scottish fatuity and furiosity defences, all three-hundred jurors were named upon 
the relevant “Great Assize”, or general list of persons eligible for jury service. 
Impoverished persons did not assess the mental condition of prisoners at either of 
the British circuit courts which were examined. Trial juries were of superior status 
to the majority of English and Scottish criminals whose mental competence was 
questioned.
Number o f  
jurors
% o f  ail 
jurors
Juries
where
m^resented
% o f  juries 
where 
represented
Residenters^ 89 29.7 17 85
Landowners 86 28.7 17 85
Tenant Farmers 27 9 12 60
Merchants 26 8.6 12 60
Tenants 24 8 5 25
Writers ' 18 6 12 60
T radesmen 18 6 11 55
Portioners 9 3 5 25
Other"^ 3 1 3 15
Tata! 300 100 20 n/a
Table 8.1. Composition o f southern Scottish assizes, by designation, during 
furiosity and fatuity defences, 1711-1829.
Green “Retrospective” p.379. Hay “Class Composition” p.327. King “Illiterate” p.277. Such 
persons might be empanelled by judges in the absence o f  sufficient, qualified jurors for instance. 
Hay points out that some “talesmen” were, in fact, qualified persons who had not been selected for 
service at that particular Assizes, see “Class Composition” p.327. Willock, “Origins” p. 149 and 
Green, “Retrospective” p.379 both referred such makeweights as “talesmen”, but Blackstone used 
this term to describe the individuals who were chosen and sworn in as the petit jury for trials, see 
Blackstone Commentaries ( 1769) 111 p.365.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 12-13.
Designated by name and then the idiom “in” or “indweller”.
Legal clerks.
Including designations o f  “Baillie” and “factor” to earls.
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Historians now concur broadly about the social composition of English, 
eighteenth century ju r ie s .John  Langbein has criticised Douglas Hay’s early work 
for suggesting that England’s petty jurors were drawn from, and shared common 
interests with, society’s elites. '^* Hay has defended the subtlety of his thesis and 
clarified that petty jurors were distinguished from the uppermost strata of local 
society.^^ In his later work, at least. Hay ai'gued that the petty jury was dominated 
by “middle-ranking” tradesmen, artisans and farmers, rather than the local 
“gentry”.^  ^ Social and legal historians now agree that the petty juiies were most 
regularly staffed by “the middling sorts” of property-owners, who were of inferior 
political, social and economic status to the “gentry” and “aristocracy”.^  ^
Yorkshire’s petty juries usually consisted of farmers and artisans who therefore 
belonged to this “middling rank”. With recent research upon various regions in 
mind, and in the absence of detailed studies for jurisdictions such as Cumberland 
and Westmoreland, it seems reasonable to suggest that this was true generally of the 
Northern Assizes. This middling tier of landowners was not socially, economically 
or occupationally homogenous, but they were excluded from the highest strata of 
society.
For an overview, see Green “Retrospective” pp.384-395 and King Crime pp.3-17.
Langbein “Fatal Flaws” pp.96-118.
Hay “Class Composition” pp.351-152 fh .l34 . Hay might still be taken to task over his 
employment o f  the term “class” to describe these social stiata. Class consciousness certainly evolved 
during the eighteenth century, but whether broad, horizontal “class” awareness and movements were 
established has been a subject o f  considerable debate.
Hay “Class Composition” p.330.
King “Illiterate Plebeians” suggests that the “gentry” foimed around 2% o f Essex petty jurors, but 
were dispropoitionately represented amongst foremen. Comparable research for nortiiern England 
should be possible, but deserves an independent thesis. See also Cannon “British Nobility” p.55.
King “Decision-Makers” pp.55-56.
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Scottish Justiciary Court juries were dominated similarly by a broad spectrum of 
“middle-ranking” males such as tradesmen, craftsmen, merchants and land-owning 
farmers (Table 8.1). Trade and craftsmen were empanelled also upon criminal 
“assizes” at Edinburgh during fatuity and furiosity defences.^^ So the juries which 
assessed prisoners’ mental conditions in southern Scotland, Edinburgh and northern 
England contained similar social elements. In contrast to English Assize practice, 
tenants and tenant-farmers were empanelled regularly on Scottish “assizes”. These 
categories of juror accoimted for around fifteen-percent of “assyzers” during 
southern Scottish fatuity and fui'iosity defences between 1711 and 1829 (Table 8.1). 
The inclusion of tenants and less stringent property qualifications meant that 
Scotland’s “assizes” could include persons of lower social standing than England’s 
petty juries.
Persons belonging to the highest strata of England’s local and national social, 
economic and political elites sat rarely upon criminal juries. The English and 
Scottish peerages avoided jury service, although their interests could be represented 
by tenants, clients and legal “factors”. England’s “gentry”, who were of elevated 
social station but ranked below the aristocracy, were also absent from English petty 
ju r ies . Ins tead ,  local land magnates such as “Esquires”, “Baronets” and 
“Viscounts” were installed upon the “Grand Jury”.^  ^ Grand Juries scrutinized cases 
before they were put to the petty jury and could reject prosecutions that were
Houston Madness pp.50-52.
J. Cannon, “The British Nobility”, in H.M. Scott (ed.) The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries. Volume One: Western Europe. (1995), p.55.
Viscount was an honorary title, usually given to younger sons o f  peers. I would like to thank 
Hamish Scott for valuable advice regarding Britain’s “nobility” and “gentry”.
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malicious or ill-founded. Lancaster’s Grand Juiy rejected around eleven-percent of 
two-thousand formal accusations between 1730 and 1815, for instance.^^ This 
important process is obscuied from the historian’s gaze, but it seems likely that 
Grand Juries did reject prosecutions on the grounds of the prisoner’s mental 
incompetence during the long-eighteenth century. It is impossible to quantify such 
activity. Nevertheless, the highest ranks of northern England’s elites (who were of 
broadly similar- status to the judge) acted as “Grand” rather than “Petty” jurors. This 
means that these types of person were not involved in the evaluation of the 
prisoner’s mental condition in the capacity of trial jurors. “Special juries”, 
consisting exclusively of high-station persons could be employed in England, but 
no such jui-y was called during insanity and idiocy defences.
Conversely, soutliern Scottish “assizes” did include local landowning elites on a 
regular basis (Table 8.1). Court of Justiciary hearings lacked Grand Juries in all 
cases except treason after 1707, but persons designated “Esquire” or “Baronet” 
appeared as trial jurors and therefore evaluated prisoners’ mental conditions 
Thus, Sir Thomas Gibson Carmichael, Baronet, was named as “chancellor” of the 
Jedburgh assize that recommended Andrew Watherstone to mercy on account of his 
weak-mindedness in 1809.^  ^The Scottish statutoiy reforms of 1825 regularised the 
participation of such socially elevated persons, who were styled “special jurors”.^ ^
PL 28/1-12 contains records o f  “no bills” alongside formal prosecutions.
^  Hay “Class Composition” p,330.
'^’ Willock “Origins” p. 147.
JC 12/26. O f the trials studied, “special” jurors (and their eighteenth centuiy equivalents) appeared 
on seventeen juries between 1711 and 1829; a special juror was named as chancellor on fifteen o f  
these juries.
Bell Dictionarv (1826) II pp. 134-143.
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During southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity defences, the mode and median 
number of such jm-ors stood at four per assize. “Common” jurors may have deferred 
to such high-ranking individuals. The internal social dynamics of southern Scottish 
criminal juries were more complex than their northern English equivalents.
The consistent presence of major landowners upon southern Scottish juries 
contrasted with contemporary High Court practice, at least regarding furiosity and 
fatuity defences. Between 1730 and 1815 the mental states of thirteen prisoners 
were assessed by jury at Edinburgh, but only one of these “assizes” included major 
landowners. It might be expected that landowners would be represented 
extensively on provincial rather than Edinburgh juries, because the circuit 
jurisdiction covered a large rural area.^^ The social standing of the prisoner affected 
the social composition Justiciary Court juries, at least from the 1790s onwards. The 
only Edinburgh “assize” to include major landholders was empanelled to try 
Archibald Gordon Kinloch, Baronet. “Special” jurors numerically dominated 
assizes twice in southern Scotland, in 1795 and 1818.^  ^ On both occasions, the 
prisoner was of elevated social and economic standing locally. In these tliree 
Scottish cases, jury composition was manipulated to ensure that high status 
prisoners were tried by panels of their social peers.
The majority of British jurors were property-owners, but most of these persons 
did not belong to the uppermost political, social and economic strata of society.
Houston Madness p.49. 
Houston “Courts” p.343.
John Douglas o f  Luce, JC 12/22. John Halliday, JC 12/31-32.
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Jurors did not necessarily share broad outlooks concerning crime and criminality 
with persons of superior social status, such as the judiciary or England’s Grand 
Jury. The interests of judge and trial jury could diverge or converge, depending 
upon the character of offender and offence.^® Jurors did not always act deferentially 
to socially superior courtroom participants. Malcolm Gaskill has detected a 
cohesive, assertive identity amongst English petty jurors, from at least the 1720s, as 
the mediators between poverty and wealth at law.^  ^ British jurors did not merely 
identify or concur with those of a similar or greater social status, for they had ties of 
responsibility to those beneath them.^^ Jurors recognised the need to comply with 
the expectations of the lower orders of society, regarding the law, justice and 
mercy, in order to legitimise and propagate England’s criminal code.^^ These jurors 
could be involved in the daily administration of local law and o rd e r .T h e  local 
priority of settling disputes in relatively peaceful and mutually satisfactory manners 
could clash with the bench’s purpose of riding out from London or Edinburgh to 
dispense “Royal Justice”.^  ^ Criminal trial jurors could therefore cany independent 
obligations and principles into court.
King “Decision-Makers” p. 54. 
Gaskill “Providence” p.353 
Green “Retrospective” p.390. 
/W p p.389-390 .
/W p .3 8 4 . King “Illiterate” p.276. 
Hay “Class Composition” p.352.
76 Weiner “Judges V Jurors” p.472.
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Experienced jurors and familiarity with the law
Legal “Counsellors, Attornies, Clerks and other Ministers of the King’s Courts” 
were exempted statutorily from jury service in England/^ Northern English petty 
juiies were therefore devoid of legal professionals, although some jurors may have 
received legal training, Scottish advocates, Writers to the Signet and court officers 
were similarly barred from “assize” duty, but writers (legal clerks of inferior 
professional status) could be empanelled as jurors/^ Writers did not appear upon 
Edinburgh “assizes” during fatuity and furiosity defences, but they were sworn 
upon southern Scottish juries (Table 8.1)7^ Writers were empanelled irregularly 
during insanity and idiocy defences before the 1780s, but at least one writer was 
named upon every “assize” between 1785 and 1829. When they participated, 
writers usually named as the assize “clerk” and recorded the verdict. These writers 
had a practical familiarity with the law and could act as pleaders at the inferior 
Scottish couiis. They were competent at framing verdicts in legal forms and terms, 
whilst they may have been able to explain legal concepts to their fellow-jurors. 
Unlike England’s petty jury, therefore, Scotland’s “assize” could include legal 
professionals. As with the regular involvement of legally trained counsel, the 
involvement of “writers” as clerks to the assize illustrates how legal frameworks 
were pervaded by legal professionals to a greater extent in Scotland than in
Anon. Readings on the Statute Law (1723-1725) IV p.92.
Willock “Origins” pp. 168-169. R.A. Houston, “Writers to the Signet: Estimates o f  Adult Mortality 
in Scotland from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century”, SHM. 8, 1, (1995), p.39.
^  Houston Madness pp.50-52.
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England,Even in the nineteenth century, English judges and administrative staff 
might be the only individuals with legal training or experience at court.
Jurors with criminal jury experience could be familiar with legal processes and 
principles. Eligible persons might act as jurors at other forms of legal hearing, such 
as civil, Quarter Sessions and Sheriffs court tribunals. Until all these jurisdictions 
are examined in detail, it is impossible to state accurately how “experienced” 
provincial jurors were. A restricted overview of Yorkshire’s petty jurors between 
1758 and 1772 provides a springboard for further research (Table 8.2). Persons 
were limited, by statute, to appearing once every seven years as jurors for the 
Yorkshire Assizes. In insanity trials, around ninety-one-percent of Yorkshire’s 
jui'ors lacked prior experience at the A ssizes.N one of the “veteran” minority of 
Yorkshire’s juiors appeared in more than one insanity or idiocy defence. Essex 
jurors were similarly “unseasoned” as Assize jurors before the 1780s, but such 
trends contrast with London’s juiies where upwards of one-third of jurors carried 
ex perience.In  sharp contrast to contemporaiy Yorkshire, almost a quarter of 
southern Scotland’s “assyzers” who evaluated prisoners’ mental conditions had 
previous jury experience. Most of these jurors only appeared during one fatuity or
Crowther “Crime” p.82.
O f the 650 Yorkshire petty jurors used between 1758 and 1772, 60 o f  them (9.2%) had appeared 
onjuiy panels between 1750 and 1772.
Beattie “London’s Juries” p.234. Essex jui ors rarely appeared on criminal Assize juries more than 
once before 1784; after 1784, a system o f  tri-annual rotation was employed. King “Illiterate” p.284.
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furiosity defence, however.^^ British circuit jurors had little practical experience of 
evaluating mental conditions at court.
% o f jurors with 
prior criminal jury 
experience at the 
superior courts:
Southern Scotland "^* 28
Yorkshire^^ 9
Table 8.2. Proportion ofjurors who had previous experience ofjury service at 
the superior courts, Yorkshire 1750-1780 and southern Scotland 1711-1829.
Legal knowledge was not restricted to legal professionals.^^ Theories of 
criminal responsibility were understood broadly by a wide cross-section of Britain’s 
population, including inexperienced ju rors.R ecen t research has demonstrated how 
separate English mining communities conceived strong associations with their 
interpretations of law and justice from at least the sixteenth century.^^ Scottish 
society also possessed a pervasive legal culture. Legal principles could inform and 
reinforce occupational, community and individual identities. By the late eighteenth
^ Exceptions occurred at Ayr in April 1823, where six trials separated the mental evaluation o f  
James Connacher and Robert Currie. Seven jurors considered the mental condition o f  both the 
prisoners. See JC 12/35.
Including “assizes” for Ayr, Dumfries and Jedburgh.
Including all criminal petty juries 1750-1780. Only tenjm ors (1.5%) appeared at three or more 
Assizes. This may have been affected by the statute, 7&8 W&M 3 c32 ss6 (1696), which restricted 
eligible jurors to being called upon once every four years in Yorkshire.
Sharpe “People and the Law”. Prest “Lay Legal Knowledge” pp.312-313.
^  Prest “Lay Legal Knowledge” pp.312-315.
Fox “Free Miners and theii' Law” p.250. A. Wood Politics o f Social Conflict. The Peak Countrv, 
1520-1750. (1999), pp.135-148.
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century, greater familiarity with legal practices and principles was engendered by 
detailed published reports of crimes and trials (including insanity defences). Legal 
erudition was not restricted to literate, educated persons either, for such principles 
could be disseminated o r a l ly . I t  is likely that most lay persons could distinguish 
between “lunatics” and “idiots”, whilst the next section demonstrates that jurors 
could grapple with the finer complexities of “partial insanity”.^ ® Legal professionals 
could better manipulate theoretical principles, but British “lay” jurors could bring 
legal understandings and knowledge to court with them.^  ^ Rather than having legal 
criteria dictated to them, jurors could concur with directions from legal 
professionals, or rely upon their own experiences of the law and social-cultural 
perceptions of mental distress to inform their verdicts.
^  Prest “Lay Legal Knowledge” p .313. 
^  Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” pp.65-67. 
Green “Retrospective” p.389.
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The jury ’5  courtroom role
The composition and function of the English criminal jury had evolved from its 
mediaeval roots by 1660.^  ^ Petty juiies ceased to be panels of self-informing 
“neighbour-witnesses”, who were chosen because they had prior knowledge of the 
crime, prisoner or prosecutor.^^ A similar development occurred in Scotland.^"  ^
However, as Nelson’s Law of Evidence (1717) observed, jurors continued to be 
informed by “their own Personal Knowledge” of crimes and litigants, at least 
through to the early eighteenth century.^^ “Personal Knowledge” allowed jurors to 
validate and supplement the proofs provided at couit, but should not have been the 
sole basis of their verdicts.^^ In contrast to mediaeval practice, long eighteenth 
century British criminal jurors were expected to evaluate the evidences provided at 
couit, rather than pass verdicts based purely upon their personal observations.
The evolution of the jury’s composition and function was driven by the 
establishment of “adversarial” legal p r in c ip le s .“Truth” and “justice” could be 
determined by the resolution of opposing proofs and the need for an objective jury 
panel was emphasised in this legal environment.^^ Such perceptions and practices 
had hardened by the nineteenth century. During Abraham Bairstow’s insanity
^  Landsman “Rise” p.504. Gaskill “Providence” p.352. Mitnick “Neighbour witness” p.202. 
Langbein “Law o f  Evidence” p. 1170-1171. Beattie “London’s Juries” pp.214-215. Crawford 
“Legalising” p.93.
Mitnick “Neighbour witness” p.202. Gaskill “Providence” p.352. Langbein “Law o f  Evidence’ 
pp.l 170-1171. Landsman “Rise” p.504.
Smith “Selected Justiciary Cases” p.xlv.
Nelson Law o f Evidence (1717) p.2.
^  Idem.
Landsman “Rise” pp.502-504.
^^Idem.. Shapiro “Fact” p.4. Beattie “London’s Jurors” pp.214-5. Gaskill “Providence” p.352.
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defence in 1824, a recalcitrant juror insisted to be removed from the petty jury 
because he was “acquainted” with die prisoner.^^ The presiding judge noted that 
there was “no law” prescribing such action, but granted the juror’s wish 
nevertheless. By the 1820s, in contrast to Nelson’s early eighteenth century 
commentary, a juror’s “Personal Knowledge” was perceived to be detrimental to 
legal proceedings. Juries were expected to be independent of criminal and crime, 
even if this was not specified by law. The evolution of the jury’s structure and 
function therefore reflects how perceptions of justice in the legal courts had altered 
amongst lay persons and legal professionals.
Despite such changes, jurors continued to carry “Personal Knowledge” of 
offences or litigants into couit. Private knowledge was informed by publicly 
distributed second-hand information, such as word-of-mouth or newspaper reports. 
On May 31®^ 1798, the York Herald reported that James Russell had been 
incarcerated in gaol after confessing to murdering his infant son at Hull. The report 
stated boldly that, “As it is impossible to conceive there could exist any motive for 
the horrid deed, it may be supposed to have been perpetrated in a paroxism of 
insanity”. Russell was not tried until July 1798, when a jury acquitted him on 
account of i nsan i t y . Th e  newspaper both infoimed and reflected cultural beliefs 
of the close association between insanity and the crime of infanticide. This could 
have predisposed jurors to Russell’s defence of madness. Printed media informed
York Chronicle August 4'*' 1826. This juror may have used a valid excuse to avoid a duty he 
perceived to be time-consuming or unpleasant.
York Herald. May 3 T‘ 1798.
Yorkshire, July 1798. A S S I41/9 and A S S I41/10.
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broader knowledge and perceptions of insanity and criminal responsibility, too. 
Although late eighteenth century juries were not dominated by “neighbour- 
witnesses”, verdicts were not always based purely upon the evidence presented at 
court.
Historians have also suggested that juries ceased to act “inquisitively”, but were 
instead informed passively of the evidence in court. This was not always true of 
provincial British insanity and idiocy defences, however. Jurors continued to 
question witnesses through to the 1820s, although not as regularly as judges or 
counsel. During insanity defences at both Lancaster and Ayr in 1823, jurors 
clarified equivocal testimony by questioning testifers.'^^ These cases suggest that 
vestiges of the jury’s mediaeval, inquisitive function evolved and persisted into the 
early nineteenth century.
The Lancaster jury questioned the prosecution witness, Mr. Heald, thereby 
establishing that the prisoner, Andrew Ryding, had “run away” after striking Mr 
Horrocks repeatedly with “a blunt cleaver”. Ryding’s flight could have been 
construed as a signal that he understood the consequences of his actions (that he 
would be apprehended, tried and punished), which indicated that he was sane and 
responsible for his crime because he could distinguish “right from wrong”. This
102 Crawford “Legalising” p.93. Gaskill “Providence” p.352. Landsman “Rise” p.500. Langbein 
“Trial Jury” p.34.
Lancaster Gazette August 21®‘ 1823 (Andrew Ryding). Ayr Advertiser April 17“' 1823 (James 
Connacher). Both prisoners were insane at the time o f  committing their offences, although evidences 
to the contrary were also entered. Newspapers did not always record dhectly the questions posed by 
judges, counsel, jurors or prisoners, yet the content o f  the witnesses’ replies indicate the substance o f  
these queries.
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signifies that jurors could understand and engage with the legal criteria for insanity, 
with all its theoretical and practical complexities. Petty jurors could be dynamic 
examiners and were clearly not restricted to a passive, silent role during nineteenth 
century insanity defences. By posing questions, jurors could inform their own 
verdict and contribute to the proofs which authenticated the prisoner’s state of 
mind.
The inteijection of “D.H. Blair, a Juryman” at James Connacher’s hearing for 
murder in Ayr during 1823, suggests that Scottish jurors comprehended fully 
theories of diminished responsibility.*®'  ^David Hunter Blair of Brownhill, Baronet, 
acted as chancellor and spokesperson for the criminal “assize” on this occasion.*®  ^
Comiacher had “choked” his infant child to death, although it was proven that his 
actions stemmed from deluded fears that he could not bear the “expence of rearing 
it’» 106 Attentions focused upon the testimony of Elizabeth Clerk or Tough, a mid­
wife who had examined the child’s body. Clerk was also a key character witness, 
having “known the prisoner for 36 years’’.*®^ According to Clerk, Connacher 
understood that “putting the child to death was a crime” (which indicated that he 
was sane), but that he failed to recognise the consequences of his actions (which 
was a typical criterion for madness).*®  ^Clerk’s testimony may seem equivocal, but 
her conceptions actually corresponded with David Hume’s treatment of 
“delusional” insanity in his Commentaries, which was into its second edition by
Ayr Advertiser April 17* 1823.
JC 12/35 and AD 14/23/7.
AD 14/23/7. Witnesses testified that Connacher was wealthy and able to bear such expenses. 
Ayr Advertiser April 17* 1823.
Idem.
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1823.*®® In cases of murder, Hume argued that prisoners could comprehend the 
general principle that criminal actions were morally and legally wrong, but fail to 
recognise that they were committing a crime by killing someone, because their 
reason was perverted.**® Clerk’s testimony was accepted as evidence of delusional 
insanity, rather than a confused and contradictory set of evaluations. Clerk’s 
evidence suggests that changing legal conceptions of insanity, including “delusion”, 
were embraced by the laity.
“Chancellor” Blair sidestepped any conundrum presented by Clerk’s testimony 
and instead asked how Connacher’s mental condition was perceived in his local 
community. Clerk replied that Comiacher “was looked on in the neighbourhood to 
which he belonged as not ngM”.*** Blair prompted Clerk to clarify her testimony 
regarding Connacher’s mental condition by referring to second-hand, community 
evaluations. “Hearsay” could be reduced to a corroboratory testimonial form in the 
nineteenth century, but Blair’s question suggests that jurors continued to rely upon 
second-hand, neighbourhood judgments to inform their appraisal of the prisoner’s 
mental state.**  ^ Like England’s petty jury, the Scottish “assize” was not always 
passive at court.
110
Hume Commentaries (1819 ,2  ed.). 
Hume Commentaries (1797) I pp.23-25.
‘ ‘ ‘ Ayr Advertiser April 17* 1823. 
’ Houston Madness p.354.
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Verdicts
Having considered the jury’s role during the examination of proofs, we shall 
now contemplate how jurors reached verdicts and what “constraints” influenced 
their decision. Published work has suggested that England’s judiciary could 
influence strongly the petty jury’s verdict during insanity and idiocy defences.**  ^
Douglas Hay reported a case, at the Chelmsford Assizes in 1754, where a judge 
forced the jury to alter its assessment of a prisoner’s mental state, so that the 
defendant was found guilty, rather than insane.**'  ^ Particularly forceful and 
vociferous judges, such as Justices Ryder and Mansfield, were known to “persuade” 
juries at court.
By contrast, the Scottish sources studied indicate that the bench never forced 
southern circuit jurors to alter their assessment of the prisoner’s mental condition. 
Likewise, amongst the trial narratives that are available from 1776 onwards, 
northern English judges never forced the petty jury to reconsider its findings during 
insanity and idiocy defences. The Minute and Goal Delivery books do not reveal 
whether such activity occurred before tlie 1770s at the Northern Assizes. British 
circuit judges could order jurors to rephrase its verdict to meet the correct legal 
style or formula, but this did not alter the substance of the jurors’ conclusions. In 
1825, for instance. Justice Holroyd asked that the juiors found John Gibson “not
Eigen Witnessing pp. 15-34.
Hay “Property, Authority” p.29.
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guilty” rather than “guilty but not by felony” owing to his mental confusion.**  ^
Holroyd did not question the jurors’ supposition that Gibson was mentally troubled 
and hence lacked intent,
British judges could disagree with the jury, but they were restricted formally 
from coercing verdicts from the late seventeenth century onwards. Corporeal and 
financial punishments were not employed against either English or Scottish juries 
during trials studied, although such activity might be obscured by the materials 
studied.**® The “Bushel case” of 1670 produced a ruling that forbade English judges 
from employing physical chastisement, such as imprisonment, to compel a jury’s 
decision.**^ English juries could be kept in a room, without food, water or light, 
until they agreed unanimously, yet neither English nor Scottish juries could be fined 
for bringing in a verdict against “the direction of the court”.**^  The Scotsman 
William Smellie was an extreme advocate of the criminal jury’s rights, but he 
surmised that juries could only be penalised financially for producing verdicts 
which were influenced illegally by persons (such as the judge) outside of the 
empanelled jury. * * ®
York Herald March 26* 1825. :
' Green “Criminal Trial Juiy” p.49. Green Verdict p.369. Beattie “London’s Juries” p.45. Like |
judicial torture, punishment o f  jurors may be “hidden” from the historian’s gaze, see Langbein i
Torture and the Law o f Proof. Europe and England in the Ancien Regime. (1977), passim . !
Green “Criminal Trial Jury” p.49. Green Verdict p.369. Beattie “London’s Juries” p.45, {
“ “ (Smellie), Address, (1784), p.8. 1
Idem.
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The “sanctioning " o f mentally disturbed prisoners in Britain
England and Scotland’s criminal codes were “sanction-specific”, meaning that 
punishment was specified by the offence committed. The jury’s verdict therefore 
directed and constricted sentences imposed upon prisoners by judges.*^® Insane and 
idiotic prisoners were not sentenced for their crimes, but they could be sanctioned 
because their condition rendered them prone to troublesome, unruly conduct. It was 
understood that mental disturbance removed the culprit’s responsibility for a crime, 
but these persons represented a dangerous and disorderly threat to society which 
demanded to be controlled. The Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800 was the first British 
statute to deal specifically with the sanctioning of mentally perturbed prisoners, 
ordering that they those lacking sureties should be detained “at His Majesty’s 
pleasure”. It is investigated how this statutory change impinged upon insane and 
idiotic criminals in provincial England and Scotland.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Britain’s courts imposed 
temporary sanctions upon defendants who were unable to stand trial because of 
their mental incompetence. In England, typically, such prisoners were returned to 
gaol to await a further appraisal of their mental state at the subsequent circuit 
meeting. Bail was produced and granted rarely during this period, so it is 
unsurprising that none of these insane prisoners were released on condition that 
they returned to the Assizes be tried. To take an example, Cornelius Linney was 
deemed to have been insane and therefore unable to be tried for theft at eight
120 Langbein “Trial Jury” p.36. Chitnis Scottish Enlightenment p.32.
322
separate Yorkshire Assizes between July 1748 and March 1752, when he recovered 
his senses, stood trial and was acquitted.*^* Scottish prisoners whose trials were 
postponed were also returned to the tolbooth, but their case might be remitted to the 
High Court at Edinburgh rather than being re-tried at the circuit court. Thus, in 
1747, John Bertram’s alternation between “melancholy fitts” and “Frenzie” led to 
his case being abandoned at Jedburgh and remitted to Edinburgh. The Criminal 
Lunatics Act reinforced such activity in both countries. After 1800, English 
prisoners who were insane at court were incarcerated until they recovered their 
senses, rather than undergoing an evaluation of their mental state at each subsequent 
Assize meeting. At Carlisle in 1825, it was decided that Hannali Wells’ insanity 
rendered her unable to stand trial for burglary. Wells remained in Carlisle gaol until 
1827, when it was deemed that she was capable of being tried; at court, the 
accusation against Wells failed and she was discharged.
British criminal courts could also order that prisoners who were insane at the 
time of their crimes be incarcerated indefinitely in gaol, or until fuither order of the 
court (which could amount to the same thing during this era). As the English judge, 
John Bayley, stated in 1816, internment of such prisoners rendered it “difficult for 
the same individual again to make a similar [criminal] Attempt”.*^ '* Where kin or 
friends were either absent or unwilling or unable to take responsibility for mentally 
disturbed criminals, the prisoners could remain in gaol for many years, sometimes
ASSI 41/4.121
JC 12/5.
Carlisle Patriot August 13* 1825. Cumberland Pacquet August 16* 1825 and March 13* 1827.
HO 47/55/94.
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until their death. Ellen Bayston was found insane and unable to receive punishment 
at the Yorkshire Assizes of 1785. Ellen had killed her husband by mixing “white 
mercury” into “the milk he eat with his breakfast”; there were aspersions that Ellen 
had been unfaithful and, seemingly, she was devoid of kin or fiiends to take 
responsibility for her.*^ ® Ellen languished in York Castle until her death over twenty 
years later. A sad demise amidst unsanitary gaol conditions was a fate was shared 
by other insane prisoners. In 1750, a “Lunatick” named Robert Wareing was 
interned at Lancaster Castle until he recovered his senses, having been arraigned at 
the Lancaster Assizes for the murder of a fellow-imnate of Brindle Poor House “by 
striking her with a piece of wood”. In 1756, it was recorded that Wareing had died 
“a Natural Death” in gaol, having been “Long afflicted with a Visitation of Sickness 
and other Bodily Disorders”.*^®
The Criminal Lunatics Act regularised this indefinite incarceration of insane 
and idiotic prisoners in English and Scottish gaols. Such sanctioning therefore 
occuired regularly in both countries thioughout the long eighteenth century. From 
at least the 1770s, the practice of detaining insane criminals in gaols was lambasted 
publicly by commentators such as John Howard and Thomas Neild.*^  ^ The latter 
argued in 1812 tliat “Beings of this most pitiable description” disturbed sane 
detainees and required “medical aid ... [and] suitable treatment” in specialist
ASSI 44/35/2 nos. 13-15 
PL 28/2 ff.85-87.
J. Howard, The State o f  the Prisons. (London 1788). T. Neild, The State o f  the Prisons. (London 
1812). See also W.J. Forsythe (ed.) The State o f  the Prisons in Britain. 1775-1805. 8 vols. (2000).
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remedial institutions.*^^ Also in 1812, Dr James Paterson published a report upon 
Ayi- prison that criticised the detainment of “lunatics” in gaol, reasoning that “they 
are never regularly attended by medical people, and are therefore deprived of their 
chance of recovery from proper treatment”.*^® Paterson hoped that, in future, Ayr’s 
mentally distracted inmates would be accepted at the recently constructed Glasgow 
Asylum. Despite such reforming ideals, Britain’s superior courts had no regular 
powers to remit mentally disturbed criminals to the supervision of institutions 
outside of the gaol, such as asylums, madhouses or hospitals. The gaol remained the 
most regular locus for the supervision of Britain’s insane criminals before 1830. 
Criminal lunatics and idiots might be released upon petition (normally with 
sureties) and entered into asylums or madhouses by kin or friends. In July 1729 at 
the Yorkshire Assizes, a medical man called John Salvo agreed to act as custodian 
for an insane murderer named Joshua Marshall. It is unknown whether Salvo acted 
through professional motives or whether he was a friend or relation of the prisoner. 
Significantly, this case did not establish a pattern of medical care, through criminal 
procedures, for mentally afflicted criminals.
Between the 1750s and the 1790s, Northern Assize courts also ordered that 
insane prisoners should be supervised by the parish authorities of their last place of 
legal settlement. In August 1779, for example, a Northumberland Assize deemed 
that George Davison had been insane at the time of stabbing Reverend Ralph 
Brocklebank. The court commanded that Davison be delivered “to the Overseers of
Neild Prisons (1812) p.329.
J. Paterson, Report on the Prison o f  Air and Situation o f  the Prisoners. 14* April 1812.
(Edinburgh? 1812), p.5.
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the Poor of the Parish of Hexham ... to be taken Care of and Provided for by the 
said Overseers”.*^® Such sanction was based upon England’s legislative Poor Laws, 
particularly the Vagrancy Acts of 1714 and 1744, which allowed for the detainment 
and management of “dangerous lunatics” by parish Overseers for the Poor.*^* In at 
least some areas. Overseers and JPs placed these insane criminals in local Houses of 
Correction or Workhouses .Tha t  such activity was only recorded in northern 
England after 1755 may suggests that this particular legislation was not enforced 
immediately at a local level. This practice had waned by the 1790s and the Criminal 
Lunatics Act standardised the alternative sanction of indefinite incarceration in the 
county or town gaol from 1800 onwards.
These formal methods of detaining and constraining insane criminals would 
seem to reinforce Michel Foucault’s argument that mentally perturbed persons were 
segregated and incarcerated alongside other social “deviants” by the late 
seventeenth century. Foucault argued that this process of isolation was driven 
through formal administrative and governmental mechanisms, such as sanctions 
passed by the criminal courts. Yet Britain’s circuit court apparatuses could also 
release prisoners, rather than institutionalise them. In both countries, insane and 
imbecilic prisoners could be discharged if kin or friends agreed to bear 
responsibility for them and produced suitable financial sureties to reinforce such a 
pledge. In 1665, for instance, the gentleman Charles Jackson was acquitted of
130 ASSI 41/7.
Bartlett Poor Law o f Lunacy pp.34-37.
Idem. See also A. Digby, Pauper Houses. (1978). 
Foucault Madness and Civilisation pp.45-46.
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minder owing to insanity and released after friends produced sureties of two- 
hundred pounds in t o t a l . E v e n  after 1800, British criminal lunatics were not 
processed blindly and committed to “His Majesty’s Pleasure” if sureties were 
realised. In 1808, the Mathew Bailie travelled down from Tranent, near* Edinburgh, 
to Jedburgh and entered a petition to keep his mentally deranged daughter, Agnes, 
“in such confinement that she may not commit outragions or farther Crimes in time 
coming”. Bailie provided “three hundred merks Scots” as suiety that he would 
superintend A g n e s . G u a i a n t o r s  could decide to supervise their charges 
domestically, but could also utilise the services of madhouses or asylums. The 
Crown became responsible for mentally troubled prisoners and placed them in gaol 
where alternatives failed. Gaol was resorted to most regularly when prisoners 
lacked kin, were from impoverished families or were geographically and socially 
disconnected from relatives and friends. These prisoners were most likely to lack 
guarantors who were willing and able to accommodate the social and financial 
obligations of supemsing mentally distracted offenders.
In southern Scotland, fatuous or furious “pannels” were never released without 
surety or a certificate proving that they had recovered senses. In northern England, 
however, insane and idiotic prisoners could be acquitted and “discharged by 
proclamation” in cases where it was proven that their mental affliction robbed them 
of their intent to commit crimes. At the Yorkshire Assizes of July 1776, John 
Sutcliffe was acquitted and discharged of murdering his wife and “favourite
134
135
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child”. There was no doubt that Sutcliffe had killed the victims. He had confessed 
and witnesses explained how Sutcliffe had professed to extreme and misguided 
religious beliefs, possibly fostered by his attendance at local Methodist meetings. 
Sutcliffe had killed his spouse and son both as a “sacrifice to God, in return of a 
blessing” and also to ensure the salvation of their souls. No formal sanctions were 
recorded for John Sutcliffe, despite his violence (including an attempted suicide 
whilst in gaol), suggestions that he was unfit mentally to stand trial and a verdict of 
insanity.
It may be that Sutcliffe’s case represents the failure to record the provision of 
sureties amongst formal court records, such as the minute and gaol-delivery books. 
Yet the York Chronicle listed Sutcliffe as having been “discharged by 
proclamation”, with no reference to petition, sureties or sanction. Sutcliffe’s case 
therefore seems to illustrate that some mentally disturbed prisoners were freed 
(without sureties) as if they had committed no offence at all, which was true from a 
technical, legal perspective. This suggests that England’s directives to detain 
dangerous lunatics, as suggested in the Vagrancy Acts, were not followed rigidly 
during the eighteenth century. Even after 1800, some insane criminals who 
committed lesser offences were released unconditionally, rather than being interned 
in gaol as the strict letter of the law demanded. At Yorkshire in 1825, for example, 
John Gibson was acquitted on account of his weak-mindedness for the shooting and 
wounding a linen weaver called Matthew Simpson. Gibson was released with just
ASSI 41/7. Trials (Lammas 1776) pp.14-17. York Courant July 30* 1776. York Chronicle 
August 2”“ 1776.
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the judge’s admonishment, “Mind you never interfere with firearms again, or 
perhaps you life may be in danger”, ringing in his ears. Foucault’s overarching 
theory of the incarceration of the mad and idiotic is challenged by the existence of 
these mentally distracted criminals, who were acquitted and discharged back into 
society by the criminal courts. The process of detaining mentally disturbed 
criminals was not applied indiscriminately in Britain before the 1830s.
Scottish verdicts o f furiosity and fatuity
Scotland’s Justiciary Court employed an odd number of jurors because, in 
contrast to England, “majority” or “plurality” verdicts were essential elements of 
Scotland’s criminal p r o c e s s . T h e  assize which was empanelled for William 
Douglas’ trial in 1795, for example, was able to return a decision on his culpability 
“By a great Majority of voices”.*^ * Disunited, “plurality” verdicts signified that the 
prosecution was not proven straightforwardly. Scottish jurors were therefore 
afforded a greater variety of verdicts than their English counterparts.
Willock “Origins” pp.218-219.
JC 12/22, Dumfries, September 1795.
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From at least the 1650s, Justiciaiy Court verdicts addressed directly the 
information recorded upon formal criminal indictments.*^® Indictments were 
complex and standardised by the early eighteenth century and were divided into 
thiee distinct segments. Firstly, the “major premise” was entered, naming the crime 
that the prisoner was accused of committing, alongside the punishment which the 
transgression carried at law.*^ ® The second part, the “minor premise”, asserted that 
the prisoner named was guilty and included the principal evidence to prove this. 
The concluding section maintained that, if the accused was convicted of the 
offence, he or she must receive punishment accordingly.
Scotland’s “assize” could return general verdicts of “guilty” and “not guilty” in 
response to the indictment. “Not guilty” verdicts indicated that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the foiTnal accusation, whilst “guilty” verdicts 
designated that all of the indictment’s premises were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. At Ayr in 1823, an “assize” found James Connacher “guilty of the Homicide 
libelled but he was at tlie time of committing the said crime, and previously, of 
unsound mind and incapable of judging his actions”.*'** In this case, the charge that 
Connacher had killed his child was proven, but so was his defence of madness, 
which exculpated him of his crime. The verdict upon Connacher resembled the
Smith “Criminal Procedui'e” pp.442-443. Stair Memorial Encyclopedia 17 pp. 188-189.
The maximum punishment might be reduced by the public prosecutor to “ane aibitrary 
punishment” at the outset o f  the trial, which effectively removed the possibility o f  the prisoner 
receiving the most severe penalties, most notably the death sentence. Idem.
JC 12/35.
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irregular “guilty but insane” conclusions entered in England. This style of verdict 
was also unusual in southern Scotland, for it was only entered in Connacher’s case.
Scottish “assizes” were also permitted to return verdicts of “proven” or “not 
proven”, which were distinct from English practice. Contemporary commentators 
and legal historians have disputed what such “proven” verdicts meant, particularly 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when legal and political 
debates raged concerning the remit of judge and jury.*'^  ^ “Proven” and “guilty” 
verdicts were not always alternative expressions of the same conclusion. The words 
“lybil frilly proven” could carry the same meaning and sentence as a “guilty” 
verdict. But “Proven” verdicts could also specify that, whilst there was 
persuasive evidence that the prisoner had transgressed, there was insufficient 
evidence to prove tliat the prisoner was guilty of all the crimes which were recorded 
upon the formal indictment. Thus, at Dumfries in April 1785, three coimts of cow- 
theft were “proven” against the servant Janet Connel, but the “lybil” claiming that 
she was “habite and repute” a thief remained u n p r o v e n . T h e  jury deemed a 
“guilty” verdict improper in such cases, because the indictment had not been 
verified entirely.
See p.343-344.
Willock “Origins” pp.218-223. Smith “Criminal Procedure” pp.442.
See JC 12/20, Jedburgh, April 1789: Tweedie, Agnew and McKay were indicted for the theft, 
including stealing books from Kelso library. The Minutes record that the “lybel” was “fully proven’ 
against all o f  them. The former two were sentenced to transportation, the latter to execution.
JC 12/19.
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Juries entered “proven” verdicts during southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity 
defences. At Dumfries in 1818, the “assize” for William Halliday pronounced that, 
“... it [was] proven that the Pannel did at the time libelled attempt to set fire to the 
House mentioned in the Indictment. But find it proven that at that time he was 
insane and deprived of his reason”. I n  Halliday’s case, the jury were convinced 
both that the paimel had committed the offence of which he stood accused and that 
the special defence of furiosity had been verified. This meant that Halliday was not 
accountable for his actions and that the indictment’s “minor premise” (that Halliday 
was responsible for his crime) could not be substantiated. In Scottish furiosity 
defences, jurors avoided “not guilty” verdicts because this style of conclusion 
indicated that prisoners had not committed the offences charged. “Proven” verdicts 
allowed greater flexibility and addressed indictments directly. They established that 
the prisoner had committed an offence and was hence a disorderly threat to society, 
but also indicated that the prisoner was mentally disturbed and hence was not 
responsible by law. Strictly speaking, mentally afflicted prisoners were not “guilty” 
of committing offences because they lacked “dole” (criminal intent).
Some late eighteenth century observers interpreted “proven” verdicts 
differently. In 1785, for instance, the anonymously written A Letter to a Jurv-Man 
proposed that “proven” verdicts were “limited to the bare consideration of the 
facts”. This conception of “proven” verdicts suggested that “assyzers” could be 
unsure whether the evidence matched sufficiently the legal criteria which directed
Dumfries, September 1818, JC 12/31 and JC12/32. 
(Boswell), A Lc 
m m  XVII p.401.
etter to a Jurv-Man. (1785), p. 10. This was a reply to Smellie’s Address (1784).
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whether a panneTs furiosity had been proven, for instance. This proposal was 
connected to broader, British, legal and political debates concerning the courtroom 
roles of judge and jury.*"^  ^ These polemics focused upon whether panels of 
predominantly “lay” jurors ought to contemplate matters of law or legal theory in 
their deliberations, besides considering the factual proofs at court.
The jurors who delivered “proven” verdicts in furiosity and fatuity defences 
must have considered both fact and law. British legal commentators recognised that 
the divide between “fact” and “law” was blurred in practice. “Assizes” could not 
assess evidence regarding a prisoner’s mental condition without considering the 
legal criteria for criminal responsibility. Fuithermore, southern Scottish Minute 
Books recorded when “proven” verdicts were restricted to the “facts libelled” alone. 
These factual, “proven” verdicts only appeared during politically sensitive trials on 
the southern circuit, such as John Andrews’ hearing for sedition at Ayr in 1800.*"^  ^
Whilst southern Scottish furiosity and fatuity defences could also feature politically 
charged debate, jurors never entered verdicts which considered only the “facts 
libelled” during such trials.
The broader legal and political debates regarding the jury’s courtroom remit 
lend particular significance to the verdict produced during Robert Coalston’s trial.
For a published, English dimension to such debates, see Hawles Englislnnan’s Right (1680, 
reprinted and edited 1731, 1752, 1763, 1764, 1770,1774 and 1793). Towers Observations on the 
Rights and Dutv o f  Juries in Trials for Libel (London, 1784). Thomas Erskine (ed. Blanchard) The 
Rights o f  Juries vindicated (London, 1784).
JC 12/22 Ayr, September 1800; in this case, the “facts libelled” against Andrews were “not 
proven”.
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at Jedburgh in 1785.^^  ^ Defence counsel David Hume argued successfully that 
Coalston was prone to “sudden and temporary madness”, which utterly robbed him 
of his senses, as a consequence of being struck by lightening some years 
previous/U nilaterally, the “assize” found, “it proved that [Coalston] killed the 
youngest child of the said William Penman, named Mary, as also grossly assaulted 
and attacked the said William Penman’s wife and maltreated and abused his eldest 
child in the way and manner mentioned in the indictment”/ I t  was also 
incontrovertibly “proven” that Coalston “was insane, furious and deprived of his 
reason” when he committed these offences. The jurors added the curious rejoinder 
that they, “therefore find him not guilty of the murder ... nor the other Crimes 
charged against him”. This addition was unusual because other “proven” verdicts, 
such as the Halliday decision of 1818, never included direct reference to the 
prisoner’s guilt. Coalston’s trial coincided with an upsurge in the published debate 
upon the function of Scotland’s criminal jury.*^  ^ These broader, politicised 
discussions affected the style of verdict delivered Coalston’s case. By adding that 
Coalston was “not guilty”, the Jedburgh jurors addressed unequivocally the legal 
principles of criminal responsibility, whereby the “furious” were “not accounted 
moral agents” and were “incapable ... of committing crimes, since malicious
JC 12/18 (Jedburgh, April 1785). JC 26/366.
Hume expounds upon Coalston’s case within his Commentaries (1797) I pp.31-32.
The verdict slip was worded identically, see JC 26/366.
In Edinburgh, the anonymously written Address (1784) and Letter to a Jurv-man (1785) fanned 
the flames o f  this politicised issue. Similar pamphlets concerning the English “special” verdicts were 
also circulated and sold within Scotland. In 1784, Thomas Erskine (who later defended James 
Hadfield) challenged an English Assize judge’s faulty and illegal charge at the Court o f  King’s 
Bench. William Blanchard’s shorthand notes o f  this celebrated trial were expanded and published 
later that year under the title, The Rights o f  Juries, whilst Joseph Towers’s Observations was also 
published in 1784. The following year, an anonymous “Gentleman o f  the Inner Temple” published a 
controversial reposte to those advocating the jm y’s power in An Examination into the Rights and 
Duties o f  Jurors. (1785).
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intention” was lacking in their ac t i ons / Th i s  was a clear declaration that the jury 
could consider both fact and law in their deliberations.
Political discussions about the jury’s role also debated the meaning of “proven” 
verdicts. The additional statement that Coalston was “not guilty” may have been 
prompted by those comments in the Letter (1785) that “proven” verdicts were 
“limited to the bare consideration of the facts”. C o a l s t o n ’s “assize” added the 
“not guilty” clause so that their verdict was not mistaken as a “factual” verdict, 
which left the consideration of the law to the judge. This decision did not induce or 
reflect a conflict between bench and jury in Coalston’s case. The presiding bench, 
Lords Henderland and Braxfield, did not ask the jury to reconsider their verdict, or 
ask that the style be changed to meet regular practice. Bench and “assize” agreed 
tacitly that juiors could consider both fact and law during furiosity defences. The 
unusual reference to Coalston being “not guilty” clarified the jury’s findings in light 
of contemporary doubts about the meaning of “proven” verdicts and the jury’s 
courtroom remit.
Erskine Institute ( 1773) I p.4 and IV, p.753. Incidentally, Erskine o f  Camock’s work also 
suggested that jurors could judge law alongside fact, something which Smellie quoted in his Address 
(1784), pp.12-13. It is probably not a coincidence that the second posthumous edition o f  Erskine’s 
work was published m Edinburgh during 1785.
(Boswell) Letter to a Jurv-man p. 10.
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'Diminished responsibility ”, Scottish verdicts and recommendations for mercy
In contrast English theory, Scottish jurists held steadfastly to the principle of 
diminished responsibility. Justiciary Court “assizes” could find that “pannels” 
suffered from mental afflictions which were less than fully debilitating. The “Rule 
of Proportions” meant that such verdicts reduced the prisoners’ sentences, because 
it was recognised that the offenders were less than fully responsible for their 
actions. Scottish verdicts could include a formal evaluation of the degree to which 
the prisoner’s mental distraction affected their criminal responsibility.
Such mandatory jury mitigation was evident within verdicts that found prisoners 
to be “Guilty Art and Part” (guilty of being accessory or accomplice) of crimes. As 
William Smellie observed in 1784, Scottish jurors could use this style of verdict in 
the belief that it reduced the prisoner’s responsibility and thereby ameliorated their 
s en te nces . In  1759, a Jedburgh assize declaimed unanimously that Jolm Fairbairn 
was “Guilty Art and Part” of housebreaking and theft. The jurors were convinced 
that the prisoner was implicated in the crimes charged, but the “Art and Part” 
verdict indicated doubts that he acted alone. The juiy also recommended Fairbairn 
to mercy on account of his “weak-mindedness” (an incompletely capacitating form 
of fatuity), which intimated that he was incapable of planning crimes. Counsel 
described Fairbairn as “a young foolish Boy who was at times deprived of his 
Judgement” and was vulnerable to nefarious manipulation. It was suspected
156
157
(Smellie) Address pp.21-22. 
JC 12/9.
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sfrongly that Fairbairn had been instigated to steal, by either his mother or George 
Ker, a Kelso barber, who had stashed the stolen g o o d s / B y  producing an “Art and 
Pait” verdict and combining it witli a recommendation to mercy, the assize sought 
to diminish the prisoner’s culpability by multiple means.
As Fairbairn’s case specifies, Scotland’s “Rule of Proportions” meant that 
“assizes” could recommend prisoners for mercy on the basis of less than completely 
debilitating mental conditions. “Assyzers” could therefore find “pannels” guilty of 
the crimes libelled, but urge that the prisoners receive ameliorated sentences 
owning to their “partial degree” of insanity or idiocy. At Ayr in 1786, Samuel 
Pirrie, the “Post Boy or Rider of the Mail betwixt Ballantrae and Stranraer”, was 
guilty of the theft and resett of bills of exchange from a mailbag. The assize 
added a recommendation of mercy on account of Pirrie’s “apparent weakness of 
understanding” owing to his “tender age, being under a little or above fourteen 
years”. Pirrie’s case illustrates vividly that the criteria for fatuity were connected to 
the common understanding of a fourteen-year-old youth in Scotland. In contrast to 
English criminal theory, partially encumbering forms of insanity and idiocy were 
sound bases for a post-trial reduction of sentence by Scots Law.
Of the thirty-five southern Scottish verdicts studied between 1708 and 1829, 
seven (one-fifth of cases studied) included recommendations of mercy on account
Idem.
159 Ayr, April 1786. JC 12/19. See also JC 26/240 for details o f  the crime and the pre-trial witness 
statements.
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of diminished responsibility (Table 8.3)/^® This contrasted sharply to northern 
English practice, where juries entered rarely such requests for clemency on account 
of the prisoner’s mental disability. All of the southern Scottish recommendations 
for mercy involved “capital” property offences and only John Brown, in 1828, had 
also committed a violent, interpersonal transgression. Three of these 
recommendations indicated that the prisoner suffered from a form of madness 
which diminished their accountability. In 1749, an Ayr jury proposed that Anne 
Millar was guilty of theft, but recommended the prisoner to mercy owing to her 
“ingenuous confession”, which reflected Millar’s “disordered ... Judgement”. 
The remaining four appeals to clemency proposed that the prisoners were woilhy of 
mitigation owing to “weak-mindedness”, as in Pirrie’s case discussed above. 
Scottish jurors conceived that both furiosity and fatuity could partially impede the 
prisoner’s understanding. These recommendations also indicate that Scottish jurors 
recognised the differences between insanity and idiocy. Scottish verdicts could 
therefore involve specific and sophisticated assessments of tlie prisoner’s mental 
state.
At Ayi" in 1826, James Russel’s counsel argued that he ought to receive a reduced sentence on 
grounds o f  diminished responsibility, but this was rejected at court. JC 12/37 and Ayr Advertiser 
April 13"' 1826.
JC 12/39.
JC 12/6.
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” pp.65-67 makes a similar general note about English society.
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Total verdicts % of verdicts
Recommendation
For
Mercy
7 20
Fully Exculpated 
Or
Guilty of Crime
28 80
Table 8.3. Number and percentage o f verdicts which included a 
recommendation for mercy on account o f a prisoner’s “diminished responsibility’
in southern Scotland, 1708-1829.
Scotland’s assizes could initiate formal processes of post-trial mitigation 
tlirough these recommendations for mercy. Commendations for clemency followed 
two distinct paths at the Justiciary Court. The Scots lawyer David Hume argued 
that, “As to the inferior degrees of derangement, or natural weakness of intellect, 
which do not amount to madness, and for which there can be no rule in law; the 
relief of these must be sought either in the discretion of the prosecutor ... or in the 
course of application to the King for mercy”. Hume explained that, in capital 
sentences, the public prosecutor could propose that the maximum sentence be 
reduced to an “arbitrary” punishment, decided upon by the j u d g e . T h e  public 
prosecutor could also instigate mitigation and seek to establish that prisoners were 
less than fully responsible for their crimes.
Wliere the Advocate-Depute did not deem such mitigation worthy from the 
outset of the trial, prisoners could still earn a moderated sanction via royal
Hume Commentaries (1797) I p.36.
See JC 12/4, trial o f  Jean Stowrie, Jedburgh May 1725. After much discussion during the 
relevancy, the Advocate-Depute reduced the maximum sentence to “an arbitrary punishment”, which 
meant that Stowrie did not face the death penalty for the death o f  her child.
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clemency. At Jedburgh in 1809, the Advocate-Depute proved successfully that 
Andrew Watherston was guilty of sheeptheft, but the assize recommended liim 
unanimously for royal mercy on account of his “weak and silly state of mind”.*^  ^
Watherston’s execution was delayed pending the application for clemency. On June 
7^*^ 1810, the prisoner received a full “Remission” (pardon) on condition that 
sureties were provided for his future behaviour until 1817.*^  ^ Broad conclusions 
based upon seven cases which span nearly eighty years must be treated cautiously, 
but there does seem to have been a pattern to such recommendations to royal 
clemency. In cases of diminished responsibility, at least, royal mercy was used to 
commute sentences of death alone, rather than lesser punisliments such as 
banishment.
The Secretary of State for Home Affairs became increasingly involved in the 
process of dispensing royal clemency in Scotland after 1782, but the King (and 
counsellors other than the Home Secretary) continued to play an important role in 
such matters into the early nineteenth century. Nigel Walker has argued that 
decisions upon Scottish remissions were only passed officially to the Home 
Secretary in 1837.*^  ^ The notes and endorsements from the presiding bench could 
direct the outcome of such post-trial alleviations of sentence. Scottish “assizes” 
might recommend royal mercy, but the chances of success were reduced if the 
judicially did not concur with the jurors’ sentiments.
JC 12/26. Scots Magazine. 17, September 1809, p.714. 
C3/23/61.
Crowther “Crime” p.233.
Walker Crime and Insanity I p.204. 
'^"/W pp.200-201.
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In some cases, Scottish jurors returned verdicts which entreated the bench to 
extend mercy at the circuit court, without formal application to the Crown. Despite 
Hume’s argument against such practice, judges continued to extend mercy at court 
through to the 1820s.^^  ^ At Ayr in 1823, Robert Currie was guilty of housebreaking 
and theft, but the jury also recommended him “to the Mercy of the Court” owing to 
his “silly disposition and weak intellect”. Judges Meadowbank and Hermand did 
not refer this case to royal mercy, but instead passed a reduced sentence of 
“Transportation for seven years”. By comparison, John Clark was also guilty of 
housebreaking and theft at the same circuit meeting. No recommendation to mercy 
accompanied the verdict and Clark was sentenced to Transportation for fourteen 
years. The bench therefore reduced Cunie’s sentence by seven years owing to his 
diminished responsibility. The bench only seems to have acted in such a 
discretionary manner in non-capital felonies, or capital cases where the prosecutor 
removed the possibility of a death sentence by restricting the maximum penalty to 
“an arbitrary punishment”, which was decided upon by the bench.Ci rcui t  judges 
only held the power to commute sentences other than death.
Disagreements between Scotland’s bench and assize were evident where 
prisoners had been recommended to courtroom, judicial mercy. An instructive case
Hume Commentaries (1797) I p.36,
Ayr, April 1823. JC 12/35. Currie was arraigned for housebreaking and theft. In the other two 
cases where the judge dispensed mitigation at the circuit court itself, the assize recommended the 
prisoners to the mercy o f  “your Lordship” (the judge) and “the judges” respectively. Anne Millar, 
Ayr, May 1749 (JC 12/6) and William Dun, Dumfries April 1782 (JC 12/17).
These resfrictions were regularly entered during the relevancy and essentially removed the death 
penalty from capital offences, typically replacing the hangman’s noose with a sentence o f  
transportation for seven or fourteen years.
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occurred at Dumfries in April 1782, involving a servant called William Dun/^"  ^Dun 
was guilty of two out of three charges of housebreaking and theft, but the assize 
acted unusually by introducing the issue of the prisoner’s mental condition into 
proceedings. The assize produced a letter to the judge stating that they had “some 
apprehension” that Dun’s “intellects may not be entirely sound”. This 
recommendation was truly a “verdict according to conscience” because no evidence 
concerning Dun’s mental condition was heard at court. The “assize” thought that 
Dun’s lesser degree of insanity made him worthy of receiving the judge’s 
(restricted) mercy.
The presiding judge. Lord Braxfield, was unimpressed by either the proof of 
Dun’s insanity or the jury’s unusual i n t e rve n t ion . He  ignored the jury’s 
recommendation and sentenced Dun to be “whipt thro’ the streets of Dumfries by 
the hands of the Common Executioner” in addition to being “Banished for Life”.’^  ^
Braxfield believed that Dun was not worthy of mitigation by the “Rule of 
Proportions”. In 1784, Rodger McLean was also found guilty of housebreaking and 
theft at Dumfries; on this occasion the prisoner was “Banished for Life”, but was 
not punished corporally. Dun’s eventual punishment was increased rather than 
reduced by Braxfield. Dun’s additional whipping might be explained by Braxfield’s
JC 12/17.174
Idem. JC 26/226.
176 Willock “Origins” p.214 suggests that the juries which proposed such mitigations o f  sentence 
were overstepping them formal remit.
JC 12/17.
Dumfries, September 1784. JC 12/18. The presiding judge was Lord Glenlee (Thomas Miller).
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reputation as a harsh and uncompassionate enforcer of the law/^^ But perhaps 
Braxfield believed that Dun had feigned his insanity at court and thus duped the 
“assize”. The added corporal punishment may therefore have been designed as a 
public deterrent against prisoners who dissimulated insanity at court. Scottish 
judges were not bound to follow a jury’s recommendation that they mitigate 
sentences at court on grounds of “partial” mental incompetence. The bench could 
disagree with the jury’s assessment of the prisoner’s state of mind in such instances.
Cockburn Memorials (1856, 1946 edition), pp.81-82. Osborne, Braxfield the hanging judge? The 
Life and Times o f  Lord Justice-Clerk Robert McQueen o f  Braxfield. (1997) questions the poor 
historical reputation o f  Braxfield.
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English verdicts c.1660 to 1829
English petty juries were compelled to produce unanimous decisions by the late 
seventeenth century, as “majority” verdicts had fallen into d i s u s e / F r o m  at least 
the 1660s in northern England, prisoners who committed crimes whilst disturbed in 
mind were acquitted of their offences and received “not guilty” verdicts. English 
verdicts did not always indicate expressly where prisoners were exculpated owing 
to insanity or idiocy. In 1665, John Burrowes was found cuV' (shorthand legal 
Latin for “not guilty”) of murdering his neighbour, John Jones, in Rotherham. It 
was Burrowes’ insanity, rather than his innocence, that earned such a verdict, for 
Burro wes confessed that he “did cutt or harke” Jones’ thioat with a “Watchbill or 
broome hooke”. Burrowes’ madness was proven by testimony from his community 
and was epitomised by his sincere belief that he had “slaine a Monster”. Simple 
“not guilty” verdicts could mask successful insanity defences in England.
In contrast to regular practice, verdicts such as “Guilty but Insane” or “did it but 
not by felony” were recorded in four particular Northern Assizes cases between 
1759 and 1786.^ "^^  By returning “guilty but insane” verdicts, it is unclear whether 
the jurors ignored legal guidance from legal professionals. The recently-promoted 
judge, Francis Buller, may have guided thiee of the atypical verdicts in northern
Cockburn “English Assizes” p.35.
A S S I42/1 ffl56b.
ASSI 45/7/2.
Eigen Witnessing p.21.
James Shackleton, Yorkshire, March 1759 (ASSI 41/4 and 42/7). George Davison, 
Northumberland 1779 (ASSI 41/7). John Swift, Yorkshire, July 1783 (ASSI 41/9). Thomas Waters, 
Lancashire, August 1786 (PL 28/3 ffl50b).
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England between 1779 and 1786, if indeed he did preside over these t r i a l s / I n  
1783, for instance, a Yorkshire jury ruled that John Swift was “Guilty of killing 
Mary Swift [liis daughter] when ... in a State of Insanity”. T h e  unusual verdict 
did not alter the sanctioning of Swift. Pursuant to the 1744 statute, it was ordered 
that Swift be “locked up in some secure place in the parish or place of his last legal 
settlement”, just like contemporary prisoners who were found to have been “Not 
Guilty” but insane. “Guilty but insane” verdicts should not be dismissed as 
clerical inaccuracies. Jurors may have chosen to specify that prisoners had 
committed an offence, but that they were insane and therefore not responsible for 
their actions. In 1783, the verdict indicated that Swift’s insanity had been proven, 
alongside persuasive proof that he had killed his daughter. The “guilt” in the 
verdict referred to the commission of the act, rather than the prisoner’s 
responsibility for it. These atypical verdicts may have represented desires to 
distinguish insanity defences from cases where prisoners had committed no offence. 
At the very least, these verdicts demonstrate that there was no codified pattern for 
insanity verdicts in England during the late eighteenth century.
Francis Buller (1746-1800). Buller was promoted to the bench at the exceptionally young age o f  
32 (in 1778), owing to close professional, political and kinship links with Lord Chancellor Bathurst 
and Lord Mansfield, C hief Justice o f  the King’s Bench. Foss Biographical Dictionary pp. 137-138. 
The minutes do not state expressly which circuit judge presided over criminal business, although 
Buller may have managed these cases because he was the junior paitner on the bench.
ASSI 41/9. The York Chronicle reported a more complicated pronouncement where Swift was 
“Not Guilty o f  Murder, but guilty o f  killing his daughter in a State o f Insanity”.
17 Geo II c5. Bartlett Poor law o f  Lunacy pp.35-36.
ASSI 45/34/4 no. 196.
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Nigel Walker has argued that English verdicts regarding mentally troubled 
prisoners were not codified until the “Criminal Lunatics Act” of 1800/^^ This act 
regulai'ised the most common verdict style of the eighteenth century, by insisting 
that mentally disturbed prisoners should be found “not guilty”. No northern English 
verdicts stated that a prisoner was both guilty of an offence and insane after 1800. 
At John Gibson’s hearing at Yorkshire in 1825, the jury concluded initially that the 
prisoner was guilty of firing a loaded gun, “but not with any malicious intention”, 
owing to his mental confusion, but Justice Holroyd did not allow this verdict to 
stand. Defendants could not be both guilty and lacking in criminal intent, so the 
verdict was altered to read “not guilty”.
Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.77-80. Bartlett Poor law o f Lunacy p.60. 39 and 40 Geo III c94.
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English Partial Verdicts
English criminal procedures were permeated by mitigation, from the reporting 
and apprehension of criminals through to the application of royal clemency after 
sentence had been p a s s e d / I n  England’s “sanction-specific” legal environment, 
the offender’s sentence was directed by the verdict. Jurors could employ 
discretionary mitigation and restrict the prisoner’s sentence by returning “partial 
verdicts”. Tliis was where jurors found prisoners guilty, but of lesser offences 
than had been entered upon the prosecution indictment. In such instances, prisoners 
were held responsible for criminal transgressions which carried less severe 
penalties. Such activity was labelled “pious perjury” by Blackstone, because jurors 
sometimes returned such verdicts against the evidence presented at court. Because 
“pious perjury” circumvented strict legal dogmas, it contrasted with Scottish 
verdicts of “diminished responsibility” that addressed key tenets of Scots Law.
By 1800, around two-hundred independent offences carried the death sentence 
in England, whilst sanctions such as transportation, which might entail seven or 
fourteen years of indentured labour, could also be regarded as being severe. 
“Partial verdicts” therefore allowed strict sentences to be circumvented and 
nullified. Moral and legal justifications for such mitigation were informed by
See Beattie “London’s Juries”, Green “Retrospective”, Hay “Class Composition”, King Crime. 
Eigen Witnessing p. 15. Green “Criminal Trial Juiy” p.51. King Crime p.233. Langbein 
“Shaping” p.53 and “Trial Jury” p.36. Oldham “Truth-Telling” p. 105 calls such activity “jury 
nullification”.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 15-17.
Idem. Green “Criminal Trial Jury” p.72.
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contemporary perceptions regarding the purpose behind the sanctioning of 
criminals. Blackstone and Bentham’s writings upon criminal penalties, for instance, 
were heavily influenced by Cesar Beccaria’s argument that punishments ought to 
relate to the severity of the offence. Within such a theoretical climate, the 
harshest penalties were reserved as exemplary deterrents against crimes which were 
perceived to be most heinous, such as murder or highway robbery. “Partial 
verdicts” enabled sentences to be applied proportionally, to match broad 
perceptions concerning the magnitude of the offence, as well as the character of the 
offender.
“Partial verdicts” could be returned in cases of inter-personal violence, but most 
“partial verdicts” were retained in response to property offences which carried 
capital punishment .Richard Snailham’s hearing at Lancaster, during 1755, 
illustrates such practice. Snailham, whose mental state was never questioned, was 
accused of stealing spoons, a salt shaker and two silver tankards, with a combined 
worth of nine pounds and thirty sh i l l i ngs .The prisoner was therefore prosecuted 
for “grand larceny”, an offence which was regulated by statute as the theft of 
chattels worth more than thirty shillings sterling and earned the death sentence. 
Despite proofs that Snailham did steal the items, the petty jury found him guilty of
Draper “Beccaria’s influence” pp. 178-194.
Eigen Witnessing pp.28-30. Green Verdict p.373. King Crime p.234.
King found that 10% o f property offences tried in Essex resulted in a partial verdict. King 
“Illiterate” p.254-5. King Crime p.233. See also Green “English Criminal Trial Juiy” p.72. Langbein 
“Shaping” p.53 adds the rejoinder that the theft o f  livestock and highway robbery rarely met with a 
partial verdict. R.A.E. Wells, “Sheep Rustling in Yorkshire”, NH. xx, (1984), pp.128-144 suggests 
that mitigation might be shown in times o f  severe economic hardship.
PL 28/2.
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“petty larceny”, or the theft of goods worth less than thirty shillings/^^ This was 
Snailham’s first (recorded) transgression, so guilt in “petty larceny” entitled him to 
formal mitigation thiough the “Benefit of Clergy” and his punishment was 
reduced to branding upon the hand/^^ The jury undervalued the property which 
Snailham had stolen, which reduced his offence and sentence. Snailham therefore 
avoided a grisly meeting with the hangman’s noose. King has argued that such 
“pious perjury” declined after the late eighteenth century in property cases, partly 
because distinctions between “grand” and “petty” larceny became blurred.^^  ^
Northern English jurors continued to retimi “partial verdicts” through to 1830, 
however. These verdicts reflected beliefs that some offenders did not deserve 
execution, which in turn represented a different conception of law, justice and 
criminality than the strict “bloody” rigours of England’s legal code. Partial verdicts 
were therefore discretionary forms of mitigation, rather than mandated by law.
A prisoner’s character and demeanour continued to inform the jury’s decision 
to produce discretionary “partial verdicts”. “Pious peijury” was stimulated most 
regularly in cases which involved young, impoverished persons and first-time 
offenders. Property offenders received partial verdicts during times of 
widespread economic hardship, where material prices were high or food was
PL 28/2.
199 Baker Introduction pp.586-589. From 1718, first time offenders were branded and discharged, 
although transportation might still be meted out to repeat offenders or for serious crimes. By the late 
1770s, fines and whippings had replaced branding. “Benefit o f  Clergy” was abolished in 1827. For 
broader discussions, see Eigen Witnessing p. 15. King Crime p.233. Langbein “Shaping” p.53 and 
“Trial Jury” pp.34-39.
Snailham was not released because he faced further charges in Derbyshire. PL 28/2.
King Crime p.233.
^"^ÆWpp.233-244.
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scarce/®^ Destitute, youthful mothers with numerous children were also favoured, 
particularly in circumstances where theft was deemed to be motivated by a desire to 
survive or provide for the family. “Pious perjury” was inspired by beliefs that 
human behaviour could be constrained by social determinants.^®'  ^ In other words, 
“partial verdicts” recognised that a prisoner’s culpability could be diminished by 
extenuating circumstances such as youth or poverty, which constricted human 
choice of action.
Joel Eigen has taken these arguments a step further by connecting motivations 
for “pious perjury” with criteria for criminal responsibility.^®  ^ Eigen suggests that 
“partial verdicts” could signal perceptions that the prisoner’s ability to reason 
correctly, and hence form intent, was impeded by social determinants such as youth 
and poverty.^ ®® He therefore proposes that insanity “emerged as a further -  not 
necessarily a novel -  “constraint” for the jury to consider” at the Old Bailey.^®  ^
Contemporary legal commentators certainly recognised that youthful felons might 
not have developed the capacity to reason like a normally learned adult and hence 
lack criminal intent.^ ®^  Youthful immaturity of reason and conduct could therefore 
be connected to idiocy, or the failure to mature mentally.^ ®® Peter King has 
demonstrated that, in the context of courtroom practice, this period of “youth” could
J.M. Beattie “The Pattern o f  Crime in England, 1660-1800”, P&P. 62, (1974), pp.47-54. King 
“Decision-makers” pp.35-50. King Crime pp.32-34.
Eigen Witnessing pp.15-17. Green Verdict pp.378-383. King Crime p.234.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 15-30.
^  Ib id pp.28-30. See also Green Verdict pp.378-379.
Eigen Witnessing p. 18.
Walker Crime and Insanity I pp.26-29. Eigen Witnessing pp. 16-17. Loss o f  reason was associated 
also with senility.
Andrews “Idiocy ... part I” p.85.
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extend to a person’s mid-twenties/^® Mitigating verdicts, towards “youthful” 
offenders, could therefore have been inspired by perceptions that the reasoning 
faculties of these persons were less than fully developed.
According to English jurists, such restricted forms of mental affliction were 
worthy of neither full exculpation, nor reduction of sentence. England’s criminal 
law did not obtain formally to the concept of “diminished responsibility” adopted in 
Scotland.^*  ^ Eigen suggests that “partial verdicts” filled this theoretical void in 
England. By finding prisoners guilty of less serious offences which carried less 
severe penalties, “partial verdicts” declared that prisoners were less than fully 
responsible for their criminal a c t i o n s . ^ “Partial verdicts” circumvented strict 
theoretical guidelines concerning culpability. Similarly, jurors could disregard the 
rigorous requirement that acquittals, owing to insanity, could only be procured 
where the mental affliction completely removed the prisoner’s reason, criminal 
intent and responsibility. This was true of the Old Bailey, where prisoners were 
acquitted despite their madness falling “noticeably short of the law’s constant 
criterion of total insanity”.^ ^^  Such verdicts suggest that courtroom participants 
could interpret insanity and criminal responsibility differently to English jurists.
Despite alternative interpretations, strict criteria of criminal responsibility could 
underpin verdicts of insanity and idiocy during the long eighteenth century. Legal
King “Juvenile” p. 121.
Walker Crime and Insanity I pp. 138-142. 
Eigen Witnessing pp. 15-30.
J W p .57 .
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professionals could employ juristic guidelines and insanity defences could fail to 
meet the necessary legal criteria, sometimes with terminal consequences for the 
prisoner. Jurors could also he presented with such persuasive evidence that they had 
to return verdicts of insanity or idiocy. By contemporary standards, a verdict other 
than insanity upon John Sutcliffe in 1776 would have been perverse, for example. 
John Sutcliffe’s suicidal tendencies, incapability to dress or converse correctly, 
combined with his inability to recognise that he had committed a crime, were 
obvious indications that he was “crak’d in the brain”. It was recounted how 
Sutcliffe had “seemed to be very joyful ... and laughed heartily” after killing his 
“favourite son” and wife. In the context of Sutcliffe’s altered behaviour, which 
included attending local Methodist meetings, such a peculiar emotional response to 
the deaths indicated a man who was perturbed mentally, rather than a callous 
delinquent. Verdicts of insanity mitigated the “Bloody Code”, by finding the 
prisoner “not guilty” of their crimes, but this was a foimal mode of alleviation, 
related directly to legal dogmas of criminal responsibility. Unlike “partial verdicts”, 
jurors wielded mandatory, rather than discretionary, mitigation by acquitting 
prisoners like Sutcliffe, who clearly met the necessary legal criteria for insanity.
Some Northern Assize insanity verdicts could be described as being 
discretionary, however. In May 1783, John Swift confessed to his neighbours in the 
parish of Lewthorne, Yorkshire, that he had killed his infant child, Mary.^ '^  ^ Swift 
claimed that he had not intended to kill his daughter, but “imagined he had been
214 ASSI 45/34/4 no. 196.
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mbbing the back of a Penknife across the Infants Throat”/^^ At the subsequent 
coroner’s inquest, four character witnesses concurred that the offender had been “in 
a low, dejected way” for almost two years. Mr. Joseph Ingham, a tammy-maker 
from Pashley-Green, declared that Swift “always appeared in a low spirited, 
melancholy way and for a week past he had observed [him] to be more dejected 
than ever before”. The case was entered at the Yorkshire Assizes in August, where 
the petty jury concluded that Swift had murdered his daughter whilst he was 
insane.^The prisoner was acquitted of the crime and was ordered to be “kept 
closely confined in the Place of his last legal settlement”.^
Swift’s verdict contradicted the strict evidential guidelines for insanity which 
were presented by English legalists. Contemporary editions of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries echoed its juristic predecessors: “The law very rationally judges, that 
every melancholy or hypochondriac fit does not deprive a man of the capacity of 
discerning right fi*om wrong, which is necessary ... to form a legal excuse” In the 
seventeenth century, the term “melancholy” could be applied generally to describe 
the loss of sanity. Yet by the late eighteenth century, the idiom “melancholy” could 
expressly denote a particular form of mental affliction, whereby persons such as
Ibid  deposition o f  Anne Hawksworth.
This was one o f  the usual English “guilty but insane” verdicts. Interestingly, Swift was 
considered sane enough to stand trial. He may have recovered his senses between May and August, 
although Swift had attempted to take his own life some time after he was apprehended by his 
neighbours.
The verdict and sanction are recorded in the York Courant. August 12"’ 1783.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV pp. 189-190. The Commentaries was into its eighth edition 
by 1783, although this section remained unchanged. See also Hale Pleas p.30.
353
John Swift were subject to a “depression of spirits”/*® Swift had not endured an 
isolated “fit”, but had suffered from melancholy for at least two years. Nevertheless, 
if legal theorists such as Hale and Blackstone were interpreted strictly, then Swift 
suffered from a permanent form of insanity which merely reduced his ability to 
reason. To borrow Hale’s interpretation, melancholy was a “partial degree” of 
insanity which did not remove fully a person’s ability to reason and therefore did 
not constitute a sound legal d e f e n c e . W h a t  was at issue at court was whether 
Swift’s species of mental affliction totally deprived him of his senses.
The witnesses and jurors in Swift’s case interpreted “melancholy” differently 
from Hale and Blackstone. They understood “melancholy” as an incapacitating 
condition which absolved Swift of his crime. In one sense, the verdict of insanity 
upon Swift was discretionary, because evidence of “melancholy” was deemed to 
have matched the stricter theoretical directives whereby only “a total idiocy, or 
absolute insanity, excuses from guilt”.^ *^ But the jurors did not commit “pious 
perjury” because their interpretation of Swift’s mental condition was based upon the 
weight of evidence which was presented at court, which deemed that Swift’s 
melancholy completely removed his capacity to form intent. The jury’s conclusions 
matched the community’s inteipretation of insanity, law and hence justice. These
In 1665, the “melancholy fitts” which excused Charles Jackson o f  murder did not necessarily 
indicate that the offender was sad or depressed, but that he was subject to manic, aggressive fits. 
ASSI 45/7/2.
Hale Pleas p.30. Hale suggested that insanity could be “partial” in terms o f  degree, subject matter 
and permanence. See pp.56-63.
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.25.
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sentiments were accepted, at least, by the bench which did not rebuke the verdict/^^ 
In this particular case, the testimony and verdict represented a different 
understanding of “melancholic” insanity and criminal responsibility to that provided 
by contemporary juristic works. Swift’s verdict represented a “customary” 
interpretation of the criminal responsibility of “melancholic” persons.^^^ This 
illustrates that principles of criminal responsibility were applied more flexibly m 
practice than the leading English jurists contended.
Swift’s verdict was unlike the “partial verdicts” which were returned for sane 
prisoners in important respects. The interconnected legal issues of intent and 
criminal responsibility were more prominent during insanity and idiocy defences.^ '^* 
Findings of insanity and idiocy therefore addressed directly the law, whereby the 
mentally impeded were not held accountable for their crimes. “Partial verdicts” 
suggested that prisoners were less than fully responsible for criminal offences, but 
maintained that they were culpable to a lesser degree and “guilty”. In contrast, 
verdicts of insanity or idiocy recognised that prisoners were not at all responsible 
for their c r i m e s . Sw i f t ’s melancholy earned him not a reduction in sentence, but 
acquitted him because his affliction was deemed to be completely debilitating. This 
contrasted with Scottish verdicts of “diminished responsibility” that merely reduced 
sentences.
^  Sadly no ti'ial transcript survives, but the Minutes do not record any request by the bench for the 
jury to reconsider its verdict.
Amongst Yorkshii e trials, verdicts o f  insanity were also brought against the “melancholic” 
prisoners Granville Medhmst (Lammas 1800) and Philip Maister (Lent 1803).
Eigen Witnessing p.29.
^  Idem. Green Verdict p.379.
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English recommendations for post-trial mitigation
Mental affliction was not a régulai* cause for post-trial clemency in England, at 
least after 1780, when the historical material is most abundant?^^ Where prisoners 
were acquitted on the grounds of mental incapacity, there was no punisliment and 
therefore no need for post-trial alleviation. Some supplications for mercy were 
based upon the prisoner’s mental incapacity, however, such as the petitions relating 
to Elizabeth Ward who was convicted at Yorkshire in July 1816.^^  ^Seventeen-year- 
old Wai'd was found guilty of poisoning her sibling, Charlotte, who survived the 
ordeal.^^  ^ The jury produced no recommendation for mercy and Elizabeth was 
sentenced to hang, although judge Bayley allowed a respite pending submission to 
“Royal Mercy”. A f t e r  a month of heated debate, the Prince Regent granted a 
remission and Ward’s punishment was reduced to Transportation “to the Coast of 
New South Wales” for life.^^  ^Royal clemency could be itself mitigated, for Ward’s 
sentence was reduced subsequently to confinement at Milbank penitentiary for 
seven years.^^* The supplications for Ward’s mercy provide an informative case- 
study of the pardoning process in the context of mental disturbance.
The jury did not mitigate Ward’s sentence, either madatorily or discretionally. 
In 1816, the ultimate decision to grant royal clemency lay with Lord Sidmouth, the
Series: HO 13 and 47. 
HO 13/29 and 47/55.
In 1816, the York Herald carried reports o f  the case on August 3^ ,^ 10*^ ' and 27* as well as a 
review o f  the petitioning process on September 7*. The York Herald’s editor, William Hargrove, 
signed one o f  the petitions to the Prince Regent. See HO 47/55 (no folio number).
York Herald August 27*. HO 47/55/86.
HO 13/29 ff.42-43.
Green “Retrospective” p.387.
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Home Secretary, on the Crown’s behalf, but his judgement was informed by public 
and private correspondences. Two-hundred-and-forty persons from Ward’s local 
community marked a petition imploring royal mercy on account of Elizabeth’s 
youth and mental weakness.^^^ The petition contained justifications for mercy other 
than Ward’s imbecility, such as her poverty and that her young cousin had hung 
himself in distress because of the case.^^ It was also suggested that JP Benjamin 
Dealtry had only managed to coerce the victim, Charlotte, to prosecute by giving 
false assurances that her sister would “probably be spared” by tlie jury.^ "^^  The 
community supplication was reinforced by a separate petition of ninety-eight 
Yorkshire dignitaries, led by the Mayor of York, the Recorder of Doncaster and a 
Justice of the Peace, which focused upon Ward’s “alienation and derangement of 
mind”.^ ^^  These appeals were not successful initially.^^^ Ward’s mitigation was 
secured via private correspondences to Sidmouth from the presiding judge, John 
Bayley, and Viscount Lascelles, a local MP and JP.^^  ^ Lascelles and Bayley were 
convinced that Ward was perturbed mentally and deserved clemency, but that 
insufficient evidence of her condition had been presented at court to allow the jury 
to recommend her to mercy
John Bayley’s role in proceedings illustrates that the presiding judge’s case- 
notes and opinions could direct the post-trial mitigation of prisoners. Home
HO 47/55 (no folio number).
233 HO 47/55/92.
Idem.
Idem. Further letters were sent to Sidmouth and the Prince Regent, signed by the pseudonyms 
“Citizen o f  London” and “Friend o f  Humanity”.
York Herald September 7* 1816.
HO 47/55/86-110.
Idem.
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Secretary Sidmouth accepted Bayley’s opinion that Ward was imbecilic and worthy 
of mer cyCont empor ary  commentators perceived that a judicial respite was 
effectively a reprieve, which would lead to either a post-trial pardon or amelioration 
of sentence. In 1816, the legally trained Recorder of Doncaster reckoned that for, 
“eighteen years past certainly, and perhaps for a century, no criminal has been 
executed here [at York], after a respite from the Judge”.^ "^  ^ This happened certainly 
in War d’s case. The presiding judge’s influence over such clemency was greater on 
the circuit than at the Old Bailey, where the “Hanging Cabinet” considered 
applications to mercy and the bench’s recommendations could be ignored.^ "^  ^
Indeed, the circuit bench’s powers were cemented by a statutory change in 1823, 
which allowed judges to decide which prisoners deserwed clemency in all criminal 
cases except murder. "^^  ^Thus, at Yorkshire in 1826, George Bailey was found guilty 
of sheeptheft, but the judge reprieved him at the end of the Assizes on account of 
i d i o c y . B y  the 1820s, England’s circuit judge was firmly established as a 
principle source of post-verdict mitigation, even in cases which involved the 
consideration of a prisoner’s mental condition. The bench could mitigate the jury’s 
verdict, as occurred in Ward’s case. Jurors played important mitigating roles during 
the long eighteenth century, but the bench’s contribution should not be ignored.
HO 47/55/94. Bayley argued that “no Mercy can be expected but upon very extraordinary 
grounds; there must still be such a Punishment as will operate in some Degree by Way o f  Example” 
whilst ensui ing that Ward could not commit a similar offence again.
Walker Crime and Insanitv I p.201.
HO 47/55/122-123.
Walker Crime and Insanitv 1 p.201.
4 Geo IV c48.
^  York Herald March 25* 1826.
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In his correspondence to Sidmouth, Bayley provided two justifications for 
Ward’s mitigation. The first concerned perceptions that Ward’s trial had proceeded 
unfairly or inadequately. It was acknowledged that the family’s extreme poverty 
had restricted Ward from employing counsel to either organize or direct her 
defence, although she had “expected such assistance”.^ "^  ^ The crown prosecution 
was conducted by a barrister, which compounded Ward’s lack of counsel. "^^  ^ This 
illustrates growing expectations that poor, mentally impaired prisoners should be 
provided with comisel in England, especially if prosecuted by a barrister.^"^  ^Bayley 
also argued that Ward’s trial took place six days after her arrest, which left 
insufficient time to prepare a defence or locate the necessary witnesses to prove her 
mental state.^ "^  ^ Strong evidence of Ward’s mental weakness existed, but it was 
never presented to the petty jury. It was recounted that Ward’s father carried 
testimony which furnished “more Satisfaction upon the subject of Mental Weakness 
than any Thing I have before seen”. Bayley thought it “probable” that the jurors 
would have recommended Elizabeth to mercy if her father had testified, but he 
failed to do so due to his “poverty, ignorance and distress”.^ "^  ^ This rendered the 
guilty verdict untenable. During the long eighteenth century, such procedural 
criticisms were accepted regularly as cause for post-trial clemency, but no re-trials 
were undertaken.^^^
HO 47/55/108-109.
HO 47/55/86 and 104-105. York Herald August 3"" 1816.
See pp.391-392.
Ward committed the act on the 27* July and was tried on the 2“*^ August. 
HO 47/55/86 and 108-110.
Beattie “Scales” p .231.
359
Bayley’s second justification was a contentious interpretation of England’s law 
of criminal responsibility. English jurists maintained that “partial degrees” of 
insanity or idiocy (such as Elizabeth Ward’s “weak-mindedness”) clouded but did 
not remove the prisoner’s intent. Persons thus afflicted were deemed to be fully 
responsible for their crimes and were punished accordingly. Bayley questioned the 
“inflexible Rule” that “Weakness of Intellect ... [could not] ... produce a 
Mitigation of Sentence”.^^ ' The judge proposed that Elizabeth Ward’s sentence 
should be ameliorated to Transportation because of her cumbersome affliction, as 
occurred in contemporary Scotland (although Bayley did not refer to Scots Law).^^  ^
Bayley’s interpretations of Ward’s mental affliction and restiicted culpability 
echoed the opinions of other corespondents and petitioners. Ward’s verdict failed 
to meet broad expectations of the law and justice, which held that persons of weak 
understanding were not accountable fully for their crimes. Ward’s paidon indicates 
that the conventional, strict English juristic guidelines for “total” insanity or idiocy 
could be ignored in practice, at least during the early nineteenth century. This rule 
was perceived to be too rigid by some lay persons and legal professionals, who 
adopted an intellection of criminal responsibility which was akin to Scotland’s 
“Rule of Proportions”.
HO 47/55/92. 
HO 47/55/94.
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Conclusions
As befitted separate legal traditions, there were critical differences between the 
structure and composition of English and Scottish criminal jury panels, as well as 
the verdicts they returned. The uneven number of jurors was fundamental to 
Scotland’s system where majority verdicts were regularly returned and accepted, in 
contrast to the English Assizes. Different preconditions for jury service existed in 
these autonomous traditions. In terms of the social standing of jmors. Southern 
Scottish “assizes” were more inclusive than their English counterpar*ts. Tenants 
were more consistently involved as jurors in Scotland, as were the elites of local 
society. So the jury panels which assessed prisoners’ mental conditions in England 
and Scotland regularly possessed different internal social dynamics.
English and Scottish criminal juries shared some common characteristics. The 
vast majority of Britain’s male population, alongside all women, were excluded 
from sitting upon criminal trial juries. The majority of both southern Scottish and 
northern English jurors hailed fr om the middling ranks of property owners. Jurors 
did not merely represent the interests of the social and political elites. Provincial 
British jury panels were also dominated by laypersons between 1660 and 1829. 
Licensed legal professionals were exempted from serving as petty jurors in 
England. By comparison, Scottish “assizes” could include legal professionals in the 
guise of “writers”, but such lawyers formed a tiny minority of southern Scottish 
jurors and were even less prevalent in Edinburgh. Professional medics and 
“alienists” increasingly informed the jury’s verdict over the course of the long
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eighteenth centuiy, but these occupations did not evaluate the prisoner’s state of 
mind as criminal jurors in provincial Britain. Laymen continued to decide whether 
persons were insane or idiotic within a criminal context.
English and Scottish juries functioned similarly during insanity and idiocy 
defences. Throughout 1660 to 1829, northern English and southern Scottish jurors 
assessed whether prisoners had been mentally troubled at the time of committing an 
offence. Northern Assize “petty juries” also contemplated whether prisoners were 
mentally fit and able to stand trial. By contrast, southern Scottish defences “in-bar- 
of-trial” were evaluated by the bench, not the “assize”. Wliere British jurors 
determined the prisoner’s mental condition, they grappled with the theoretical 
concept of criminal responsibility. By so doing, provincial British jurors could 
evidently consider matters of “law” as well as “fact” during insanity and idiocy 
defences.
By the late eighteenth century, it was evident that bench and jury could disagree 
and obtain to different interpretations of a prisoner’s mental faculties. In most 
British insanity and idiocy defences, however, judge and jury concuiTed regaining 
the authentication of mental distraction and how a person’s will and intent was 
restricted. In the context of Old Bailey insanity defences, Joel Eigen h ^  argued that 
such concordance represented the impact of a dominant bench, which imposed its 
perceptions upon the jury.^^  ^ The judiciary could guide jurors during provincial 
British insanity and idiocy hearings, but jurors could also reach verdicts
Eigen W itnessing p .33-34.
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independent from judicial direction. Interactions between bench and jury were more 
complex in northern England and southern Scotland than the framework that Joel 
Eigen has proposed for the Old Bailey, Criminal juries did not inexorably show 
deference to courtroom participants of superior social status or legal experience, 
such as judges. Jurors could carry their own interpretations of criminal 
responsibility and mental distraction. Verdicts concerning the mental state of 
prisoners could accommodate local community understandings of justice and 
criminal responsibility, alongside neighbourhood interpretations of a prisoner’s 
mental capacities and ability to form intent. Jmors could operate according to 
different imperative, interests and legal interpretations to legal professionals.
The jury’s verdict represented an important cog in the courtroom machinations 
of discretionary mitigation. Within England’s sanction-specific legal environment, 
petty jurors could moderate the harsh penal code through “partial verdicts”. 
Southern Scottish verdicts seem to have operated in a similar fashion, although 
further research is needed to clarify this thesis. Within both traditions, however, 
verdicts of insanity and idiocy were not simple extensions of such discretionary 
mitigation by jurors. Insanity and idiocy verdicts mitigated the “Bloody Codes”, but 
such activity was mandatory, because jurors addressed principles of criminal 
responsibility (and hence the letter of the law) by finding prisoners incapable 
mentally.
254 Weiner “Judges V Jurors” p.472.
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The persistence of distinctive legal traditions meant that different forms of 
verdict were available to English and Scottish jui*ors. In contrast to English 
Common Law, Scots Law obtained to the dogma of “diminished responsibility”, or 
the “Rule of Proportions”. This principle recognised that species of fatuity and 
furiosity which were partially debilitating should earn a proportional restriction of 
sentence. Tliis meant that a wider array of conclusions was available to Justiciary 
Court “assizes” than their English equivalents. In contrast to English petty jurors, 
Scottish “assyzers” could discover forms of fatuity and furiosity which only 
reduced the prisoner’s responsibility and sentence.
The principal English jurists did not observe a “Rule of Proportions” and 
insisted tliat only fully debilitating forms of insanity or idiocy be met with complete 
acquittals. At both the Old Bailey and Northern Assizes, however, prisoners could 
be acquitted despite failing to meet these stringent guidelines for criminal 
accountability. These acquittals on the grounds of what Hale teimed “partial 
degrees” of insanity, such as melancholy, were different to “pious peijury”. The 
verdict that John Swift was insane, for instance, did not violate but followed the 
proofs which were entered at court. Swift’s verdict was justified by and reinforced 
community opinion regarding the prisoner’s mental state and criminal 
responsibility. These verdicts endorsed alternative understandings of criminal 
accountability and mental distress to those imparted by England’s jurists. Juristic 
constructs were not accepted monolithically during the long eighteenth century; in
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some cases juristic principles were challenged successfully by lay persons and legal 
professionals.
Scottish “assizes” could recommend that incompletely incapacitating forms of 
fatuity and furiosity were sound bases for post-trial mitigation owing to the “Rule of 
Proportions”. Post-trial clemency was rarely awarded on the grounds of insanity or 
idiocy alone in England, because no concept of “diminished responsibility” existed. 
Further research is once again required beyond the Northern Assizes, but it seems 
that such post-trial mercy was only considered in English cases where the judge 
deemed that either the jury had been misled or delivered a harsh verdict, or else 
persuasive evidence of insanity of idiocy emerged after the trial was completed.
The courtroom impact of English and Scottish juries was not restricted to the 
verdict. Juries had ceased to be panels of “neighbour-witnesses” by the 1820s, but 
they continued to act dynamically and inform themselves during the examination of 
witnesses. Even in the 1820s, jmies were not passive recipients and assessors of 
information which was provided at court. The jury’s function and composition had 
evolved from its mediaeval, inquisitive roots, but vestiges of this role remained 
through to the early nineteenth century. The questions posed by jurors provide 
priceless indications of what the jurors perceived to be persuasive testimony. 
Despite the legal profession’s efforts to restrict “hearsay” testimony, British jurors 
continued to regard community judgment and identification of mental afflictions to 
be convincing forms of proof through to the 1820s.
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9.
Pleading by legally trained counsel in Britain
Recent scholarship has investigated the impact of legally trained representatives 
upon British criminal trials between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries/ 
However, most research into long eighteenth centuiy British insanity and idiocy 
defences has ignored the practical element of legal counsel, or else has assumed 
rather than demonstrated their importance/ This chapter strengthens the 
historiography of British insanity and idiocy hearings by establishing the agency of 
courtroom pleaders at the provincial courts.
English and Scottish legal practices remained detached throughout the long 
eighteenth century. The Parliamentary Union of 1707 enshrined the independence 
of Scottish law, assuring that separate legal professions endured in Scotland. 
“Romano-Civilian” legal traditions were more apparent amidst Scots Law than 
English Common Law. It is established how the quantitative participation of
‘ For England, see: Baker Introduction. J. Bailey, “Voices in the Court: lawyers’ or litigants?”, HR. 
74, 186, (2001), Beattie “Scales”. C.W. Brooks, Lawyers. Litigation and English Society since 1450. 
(1998), Duman Judicial Bench. Duman “English Bar”. Ford “Brougham as Barrister”. King Crime 
(2000), Landsman “Rise”. Langbein “Shaping”. Langbein “Law o f  Evidence”. D. Lemmings, 
Gentlemen and Barristers. The Inns o f  Court and the English Bar 1680-1730. (1990). D. Lemmings 
Professors. Post “Defence Counsel”. For Scotland: Cairns “Importing”. Caims, “Advocates’ Hats”. 
Cairns, “Alfenus Varus”. Crowther “Crime”. N.T. Phillipson “The Scottish Whigs and the Reform o f  
the Court o f  Session 1785-1830”, Stair Society. 37, (1990) Murdoch “Advocates”. See also “An 
Introduction to Scottish Legal History” Stair Society (1958).
 ^R. Smith, Trial by Medicine -  Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials. (1981) pp.67-70 
does deal with the impact o f  English barristers after 1836, when the right to defence counsel was 
extended formally to all felons. Otherwise, this subject remains untouched. See: Jones, Lunacy. 
Walker Crime and Insanitv I. Walker and McCabe, Crime and Insanitv II. Andrews, “In her Vapours 
... [or] indeed in her Madness? Mrs Cierke’s case: an early eighteenth century psychiatric 
controversy”, History o f  Psychiatry, i, (1990), Eigen “Intentionality”. “Delusion in the 
Courtroom: The Role o f  Partial Insanity in Early Forensic Testimony”, Medical History. 35, (1991). 
Ib id  “Opinion”. Ib id  Witnessing. Moran “Origin”. Rabin “Law and Responsibility”. Houston 
Madness. Ib id  “Professions”. Ib id  “Courts”.
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counsel contrasted in northern England and southern Scotland because of different 
procedures and legal influences/ The involvement of lawyers upon the provincial 
circuits will also be compared to published research concerning Scotland’s High 
Court and the Old Bailey. The reasons why particular pleaders were involved in 
specific circuit trials deserves attention. A lawyer’s paiticipation might be driven by 
political and professional rivalry, alongside perceptions of how counsel ought to 
function at law. Ideological contentions between lawyers could be supplanted onto 
trials and it is examined how these conflicts affected the outcome of some insanity 
and idiocy defences.
England’s legal codes restricted the involvement of legal representatives, 
particularly defence counsel, during the long eighteenth century. Therefore, it is 
considered why counsellors were allowed to represent litigants dining some 
Northern Assize insanity defences. It must be assessed how discretionary decisions 
to allow counsel were informed by perceptions of the prisoner’s mental condition 
and crime. Litigants made greater use of legal representatives by the early 
nineteenth centuiy. James Beattie has suggested that this change can be explained 
partially by a burgeoning corpus of qualified barristers who sought to earn a living 
through criminal business."* This thesis is tested in a provincial context. It will also 
be examined how a broader section of English society were disposed to employ 
barristers and were able to afford their services. A litigant’s social contacts and 
wealth could determine their ability to retain counsel in both countries.
 ^Gordon “Roman Law” pp. 135-143. 
Beattie “Scales” p.228.
367
The courtroom impact that counsel had upon provincial British insanity and 
idiocy defences is juxtaposed with published findings for Scotland’s High Court 
and England’s Old Bailey. The courtroom function and behaviour of English and 
Scottish counsel are compared, such as their ability to cross-examine and 
summarise cases. Such activity could shape the contributions of other courtroom 
participants, most notably the judge, jury, witnesses and prisoners, besides opposing 
counsel. It is explored how counsel shaped the development of Britain’s legal 
processes and stmctures after 1660. Stephan Landsman has argued that the 
increased appearance of legal representatives in England reflected the emergence of 
“adversarial” courtroom procedures.^ Landsman’s analysis is evaluated to establish 
whether these legal developments had an important impact upon English insanity 
and idiocy defences. A key aspect of “adversarial” practice was the evolution of 
stricter evidential standards.^ It is argued that from around 1770 onwards, legal 
representatives initiated the appearance of medical experts during Northern Assize 
insanity defences. Joel Eigen has found a similar pattern at the Old Bailey, but Jfrom 
1760 onwards.^ Regarding the authentication of mental anomalies, lawyers 
encouraged perceptions that lay testimony could be fallible, whilst expert opinion 
could be highly persuasive.
 ^Landsman “Rise” p.501. 
® Idem.
 ^Eigen Witnessing n.133.
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Pleaders at the Justiciary and Assize courts
Britain’s legal professions were stratified by occupational function, education 
and social status/ Pleading at Britain’s superior courts was reserved for the “bar”; 
elite cadres of lawyers whose elevated professional status was eclipsed only by the 
judiciary. On the southern circuit of Scotland’s Court of Justiciary, pleading was 
only undertaken by “advocates” (from the French “avocats”, meaning graduates in 
legal studies).^ These lawyers belonged to the socially and professionally superior 
“Faculty of Advocates” which was based in Edinburgh.*** They were the equivalent 
of England’s barristers, who attended London’s Inns of Court before being called to 
the bar and whose privilege it was to plead at England’s Assize courts.** Britain’s 
“inferior” legal strata were excluded fi'om pleading at the superior circuit courts. 
English solicitors and attorneys, alongside Scottish “Writers to the Signet” 
(“W.S.”), could prepare cases and plead at inferior courts. At the foot of the legal 
profession, English clerks and Scottish “writers” prepared cases and recorded legal 
documents.*^ The extent to which British litigants consulted these kinds of laivyer, 
outside of the formal setting of the criminal courtroom, is difficult to assess. This
Duman “English Bar” p.90-91. Caims “Affenus Varus” pp.204-232, Murdoch “Advocates” 
pp. 149-150. Phillipson pp.8-9. !
 ^Cairns “Advocates’ Hats” pp.50-51. :
Murdoch “Advocates” p. 150. Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” p.8. ;
” See Duman “English Bar” and Lemmings’ Gentlemen and Barristers and Professors for detailed |
synopses o f  the training and evolution o f  the English bar during this era. Some barristers were !
awarded a prestigious appointment as “serjeant-at-law”, which could presage promotion to the i
bench. i
12 “Writers” could be involved as pleaders at the inferior courts; Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” pp. 10- j
11. Murdoch “Advocates” p. 151. Houston “Writers to the Signet” p.40. At Ayr in 1761, a “writer” |
was appointed by the bench to lead Janet Thompson’s defence. See p.374 below. I
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chapter focuses upon Britain’s “bars” at court, but the function of other kinds of 
lawyer in relation to the criminal courts is a fresh topic demanding research.
The scholastic qualifications of advocates and barristers reinforced their 
superior professional (and social) statuses. Typically, the lower strata of Britain’s 
legal professions trained through practical apprenticeship. Britain’s “bars” could 
also gain practical legal experience, but most had also obtained formal academic 
education.*^ English barristers could be schooled at the Inns of Court, but these 
evolved to become professional “clubs” rather than places of formal learning during 
the eighteenth century.*"* After 1750, most English barristers received their legal 
instruction at English universities, although they might visit European 
establishments whilst on “Grand Tour” and thereby gamer knowledge of 
Continental legal theory and practice. By comparison, it was usual that Scottish 
advocates studied “Civilian” law at Continental universities, particularly in the 
Netherlands, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.*^ By the 
1750s, a greater proportion of Scotland’s advocates attended courses on Scots Law 
which were taught at the universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh.**  ^ From 1750,
Murdoch “Advocates” p. 150. Phillipson “Scottish Wliigs” p.8. England’s Inns o f  Court evolved  
from being places o f  formal legal education to professional “clubs” during the eighteenth century, 
see Duman “English bar” pp. 15-16.
Duman “English bar” pp. 15-16.
Caims “Importing” p. 139 and pp. 143-145. At least forty-percent o f  lawyers who passed advocate 
between 1661 and 1750 had studied in Holland. Caims cites political and religious reasons for this 
relationship between Scottish advocates and schooling in the Netherlands. The Dutch universities 
were also amongst the pre-eminent educational establishments in Europe, at least between 1675 and 
1725.
Lustig and Pottle (eds.) Applause o f  the Imw p. 1.Murdoch, “Advocates” p. 150. The first Faculty o f  
Law in Scotland was established as part o f  Edinburgh University in 1722, D.B. Horn, A  Short 
Historv o f  the Universitv o f  Edinburgh (1556-1889). (1967). p.46.
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advocates were expected to pass an examination upon Scots Law.*  ^ The practical 
impact of such changes and the decline in Continental “Romano-civilian” schooling 
amongst advocates is considered over the course of this chapter.
The Faculty of Advocates and Inns of Court remained socially elevated 
institutions. The social characteristics of Britain’s bars did alter between 1660 and 
1829. By the late eighteenth century, fewer advocates and barristers belonged to j
noble families than during the early eighteenth century.*^ A rising proportion of 
British pleaders were bom into “middling”, professional families.*^ To take a i
Scottish example, Robert Cullen passed Advocate in 1764 and was raised to the !
bench in 1796.^ ** Cullen’s father had been a renowned physician rather than of noble t
birth. Nevertheless, acceptance onto the bar represented social advancement for |
persons who hailed from a middling status in society. So, despite changes in social I
structure, Britain’s “bars” continued to be dominated by persons who belonged to i
the local, land-owning, social, economic and political elites.^* Britain’s bars were of |
high social and professional standing, although they did not necessarily share the I
same ideological outlook as the bench during trials.^^ Legal counsel could challenge I
Murdoch “Advocates” p. 150. Walker Scottish Jurists p.206. Caims “Importing our Lawyers” 
p. 143. Caims “Alfenus Varus” pp.209-210 reveals that advocates could choose to be examined on 
Scots law from the seventeenth century onwards, but that this route was stigmatised and fell into 
disuse until the reform o f  admissions in 1750.
Murdoch “Advocates” p. 152. Caims “Affenus Varus” pp.204-206. Duman Judicial Bench pp.51- 
52. Brooks Lawvers. Litigation p. 187.
Idem.
Robert Cullen, (1742-1810). DNB V pp.278-279.
Duman “English Bar” p. 102. Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” p.9. Caims “Affenus Varus” pp. 227- 
232.
^  See, for instance the sections on the “Rule o f  Law” within Thompson Whigs and Hunters pp.258- 
269, Hay “Propeity, Authority” pp.58-59 and Hay “War, Dearth and Theft” p. 152.
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judicial influence. Lawyers could also initiate conciliatory, discretionary processes 
within the context of criminal cases.
Trends in pleader participation in southern Scotland and northern England
This section establishes the divergent quantitative patterns of legal 
representation during provincial British insanity and idiocy defences. It is 
considered how different legal influences, theories and procedures affected English 
and Scottish criminal tribunals. English sources allow a less comprehensive analysis 
than for Scotland, but it is possible to present some broad patterns regarding the 
emergence and contribution of pleaders at court.
Southern Scotland
Both defendant and prosecutor were represented regularly by legally trained 
pleaders duiing Justiciary Court criminal trials.^^ Between 1708 and 1829, at least 
one advocate was present in every southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity defence. 
Eighty-five advocates were involved in the thirty-five southern Scottish trials 
examined. Both the median and modal number of advocates at these trials was two. 
Scottish fatuity and furiosity trials recurrently featured a confrontation as legal 
representatives in court.
^ Smith “Criminal Procedure” p.438.
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Criminal cases could be pursued privately at the Justiciary Court, but a system 
of public prosecution dominated Scottish procedure/"* Regular prosecution in the 
“public interest” was redolent of contemporary, European “Romano-Civilian” 
traditions and distinguished Scottish from English practice/^ Scotland’s 
“Advocates-Depute” prosecuted circuit prisoners (Table 9.1). Advocates-Depute 
were formally appointed delegates of Scotland’s principal legal official, the Lord 
Advocate.^^ Scotland’s Procurator-Fiscal and the Solicitor-General entered 
prosecutions in the public’s interest, but most Justiciary Court indictments were 
initiated through the Lord Advocate.^^ All but three of the prosecutions studied 
were activated through the Lord Advocate’s office, the remainder being organised 
by the Procurator-Fiscal. Even where the latter prepared prosecutions, Advocates- 
Depute delivered the case at court.
Nimiber of 
prosecution lawyers 
at trial:
Number of cases: Proportion of cases (%):
Prosecution Defence Prosecution Defence
One 33 22 91 64
Two 2 13 6 38
Three 1 1 3 3
Table 9.1. Comparison o f the numbers o f defence and prosecution counsel who 
appeared per case, southern Scottish fatuity andfuriosity defences, 1708-1829.
As in some contemporary Continental countries, such as Switzerland, defence 
counsel featured regularly during Scottish criminal hearings.^^ Scottish pannels 
were entitled to counsel by a statute of 1424, although this ruling was not employed
Crowther “Crime” p.225.
Cairns “Legal Theory” p.225. Lopez-Lozaro “No Deceit Safe” pp.451-477. 
Smith “Criminal Procedure” pp.432-437.
ZW p.432.
^  Barras “Folies criminelles au XVIIIe siècle” Gesnerus 47 (3-4) (1990) p.294.
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universally/^ Of the thirty-five southern circuit fatuity and furiosity defences that 
occurred between 1708 and 1829, all but two were conducted by lawyers/** Every 
prisoner was legally represented after 1749/* Scotland’s judiciary could assign 
pleaders to prisoners who were devoid of counsel and wished to be represented/^ 
These appointments were not greatly remunerative, but lawyers did not refuse 
them/^ As we shall see, some advocates viewed tliese assignments as philanthropic 
and ideological objectives/"*
Formal accusations at Edinburgh’s High Court could be pursued by two or more 
lawyers, but Advocates-Depute typically acted alone on circuit (Table 9.1). 
Criminal defences were also most regularly presented by a single advocate. But, in 
contrast to prosecutions, around two-fifths of defences involved two or more 
advocates. The public prosecutor was outnumbered by adversary pleaders in 
fourteen (forty-percent) of the furiosity and fatuity defences studied. A defence’s 
success was not guar anteed by the involvement of more than one advocate, but 
additional lawyers could enhance the pre-trial preparation and courtroom 
presentation of cases.
^  Smith “Criminal Procedure” p.438.
So only five-and-a-half-percent o f  Scottish southern circuit fatuity and fur iosity trials lacked 
defence counsel. By comparison, all the prisoners studied at the High Court were legally represented 
between 1704 and 1820.
The last southern circuit furiosity trial where no counsel was employed by the defence was at Ayr 
in May 1749 (trial o f  Anne Millar, JC 12/6).
The prisoner could waive the right to be represented.
Ford “Brougham” pp. 109-110.
See below p.389-393.
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The statute of 1424 was invoked twice during southern circuit furiosity trials, in 
1752 and 1761, to provide destitute pannels with counsel. Janet Thompson entered 
court Ayr’s court in May 1761 without a legal representative, for instance.^^ The 
Advocate-Depute, Robert McQueen, implored the presiding judge to provide 
counsel for Thompson so that her trial for child-murder might proceed justly.^^ No 
advocate could be found, so a wiiter called Alexander Forsyth was appointed to 
“speak for [Thompson] in comt”.^  ^ Only four cases were arranged for trial at this 
Ayr meeting and such scarce prospective business may have dissuaded advocates 
from attending. Pleading was monopolised by advocates, but Scottish practice 
adapted to ensure that the prisoner received counsel from a legal professional. 
Interestingly, Forsyth does not seem to have examined any witnesses and was not 
allowed to provide a summary of Thompson’s case. Instead, “as the pannel was 
destitute of Councill, Lord Minto summ’d up the evidence on both sides” after the 
Advocate-Depute had produced his concluding remarks.^^ The advocates’ 
entitlement to raise questions and summarise cases at the Justiciary Court was 
protected. Forsyth’s courtroom activities were prohibited, probably because of his 
inferior professional status.
JC 12/10. The other hearing involved the pannel James Blackie or Blaikie, at Jedburgh in 
September 1752 (JC 12/7).
Robert McQueen (1722-1799) was elevated to bench in 1776 and assumed the title o f  Lord 
Braxfield. DNB vol. XII pp.718-9.
JC 12/10, This vignette evidently suggests that lawyers were not always available in southern 
Scotland and that they did not attend all o f  the courts upon a circuit.
JC 12/10.
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Northern England
English legislation restricted the participation of barristers at the Assize courts 
before 1830, especially in comparison with the regular involvement of advocates at 
Scotland’s Justiciary Courts. The statutory right to defence counsel was extended to 
all England’s felons in 1836, Before then, defence barristers were only allowed to 
appear in criminal cases of treason and misdemeanour, at least according to statute. 
England’s legal system was based upon the design that prisoners knew the veracity 
of accusations and were therefore best equipped to defend themselves.^^ In an era 
when a prisoner’s character could be imperative to the outcome of a trial, it was 
important that the accused was both seen and heard to speak at couit. England’s 
judge could also ensure that trials proceeded in a “legal and strictly regular” 
manner, thus negating the need for defence counsel in this respect."*** There were 
fewer constrictions regarding the legal representation of victims, although England 
lacked a ubiquitous public prosecution service. Privately initiated suits 
predominated at the English Assizes."** In practice, courtroom counsel was only 
employed by the accusers (or prosecution associations) who could afford the 
expense, or in some specific circumstances which are outlined below.
The historical materials do not lend themselves to accurate quantitative 
impressions of the participation of barristers at the Northern Assizes between 1660 
and 1829. The minutes record that barristers were active during northern English
Blackstone Commentaries IV p.348. Blackstone cited Coke in this instance. I
Idem. \
Gaskill “Providence” p.344. j
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insanity defences from at least the 1750s, hut these documents register the presence 
of counsel in a mere seven of the 142 hearings studied. Tellingly, the Minutes make 
no mention of barristers during the early nineteenth century, a period when legal 
representation increased dramatically at the Old Bailey and when barristers 
travelled England’s circuits in greater numbers.
Printed narratives suggest that legal representatives were more heavily involved 
in northern English insanity and idiocy defences than the minutes reveal, at least 
from the 1770s onwards. These narratives did not record methodically the presence 
and activity of barristers, however. Newspaper reports were most likely to refer to 
lawyers when they had a dramatic impact upon specific criminal hearings. 
Particularly vehement contests between adversary barristers were also recorded 
regularly, perhaps because such courtroom pursuits were rare in England before the 
1830s and therefore of interest to the newspapers’ audience.
Consecutive published accounts only become available for a restricted set of 
trials belonging to the end of the period studied. Between 1800 and 1829, 
comprehensive published reports were found for forty-seven northern English 
insanity and idiocy hearings, whilst a further twenty reports and couit minutes 
recorded the names of courtroom participants, including barristers. At least one 
barrister was present in twenty-three of these hearings (just under one-third of this 
sample). The failings of the Minute Books aie all too evident, for they only record 
the presence of lawyers in four of these twenty-three tribunals. It is impossible to
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relate precisely the involvement of barristers on England’s northern circuit. 
However, it is clear from minutes and printed narratives that legal representatives 
were involved in some Northern Assize insanity and idiocy defences from the 
1750s onwards.
Research into late eighteenth century Northern Assizes is enhanced by a hitherto 
dormant set of printed criminal reports, commonly titled The Trials at Large of the 
Felons in the Castle of York. (1775-1778)."*  ^Tantalisingly, the Trials indicate that 
more barristers were involved in prosecuting and defending prisoners during the 
mid-1770s than Minutes and newspapers suggest. The Minutes record only that Mr. 
Lee appeared as counsel for “Dutch Michael” Rice in March 1776. By contrast, the 
Trials document that “Mr. Withers” represented Rice in July 1776 and that “Mr 
Chambrie” prosecuted the prisoner in the July of both 1776 and 1777."*^  The 
apparent absence of barristers at eighteenth century Northern Assize trials is 
therefore exacerbated by Minutes and printed reports which fail consistently to 
record their presence.
The presence of banisters cannot be quantified soundly by the available 
sources, but a base guideline to their appearance can be offered. The earliest 
recorded instance of counsel participation during a Northern Assize insanity 
defence occurred in March 1756. A Yorkshire jury discovered that John Windle, 
who was accused of committing “several misdemeanours”, was “void of Reason
T rials... (1 7 7 5 to 1778).
Trials ... Lammas Assize:
Chambrie” was a phonetic spelling o f  (Alan) Chambré, the eminent Northern A ssize lawyer.
izes (1776) pp.3-7 and Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1777) pp.9-11.
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and subject to Fitts of Frenzy and Lunacy”. A barrister named Mr Stanhope 
motioned successfiilly to secure the detainment of Windle on the grounds of mental 
distraction."*"* At least one barrister was involved in a minimum of twenty-six of the 
106 northern English insanity and idiocy hearings that were investigated between 
1756 and 1829. Twenty-one of these cases took place between 1800 and 1829. It 
should be noted that the majority of Old Bailey healings before 1830 lacked legal 
counsel and the same was probably true of northern England.
The apparent increase in legal representation during insanity defences after 1800 
points undeniably to the improved accuracy and consistency of printed narratives. 
However, there is evidence that this enhanced reporting coincided with a real 
escalation in the numbers of litigants who employed barristers. England’s bar 
expanded from the 1780s, after a period of stagnation and decline from the 1640s. 
This rapid enlargement of England’s bar contrasted with the more sedate expansion 
of Scotland’s Faculty of Advocates."*  ^ The numbers of barristers who rode 
England’s Northern Assize circuit also increased from the 1780s. The Law List 
does not offer a complete register of practicing barristers, but it indicates that only 
six barristers rode England’s northern circuit in 1782; this represented a tiny 
proportion of the barristers who plied their trade at the contemporary Old Bailey."*^  
Remarkably, the Northern Assize bar increased from nineteen individuals in 1785,
44 A S S I41/4 and 42/7.
Duman “English Bar” p.88. Duman adds that o f  these 379 individuals, a minimum o f  121 and a 
maximum o f 295 actually practiced law in 1785. There were 880 registered barristers in England by 
1810. Duman Judicial Bench p.8. The numbers o f  practicing Advocates grew from 200 1714 to 
about 300 in 1810, Murdoch “Advocates” p. 150.
^  Lemmings Professors p.55 provides the example o f  the barrister John Scott who attended the 
Northern Assizes between 1776 and 1782 but was excluded from the Law List.
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to sixty-eight by 1798 and 113 by 1830/^ Even when the vagaries of the Law List 
are accounted for, the 1780s marked the beginnings of a sharp change. England’s 
bar swelled during the last decades of the eighteenth century, forcing barristers onto 
the northern circuit in search of legal briefs."** There was business to be found, for 
civil and criminal litigation expanded within the industrialising areas of northern 
England after the mid eighteenth century."*  ^ A recognisable, dedicated “criminal 
bar” also emerged in England after the 1780s, including lawyers such as James 
Parke, who regulaiJy accepted Northern Assize criminal briefs during his career.^ ** 
This augmented “supply” of barristers also provides one explanation for the rising 
demand for their courtroom services.^* It seems likely that northern England’s 
criminal bar expanded after 1780 and these lawyers became more involved in 
insanity and idiocy defences at roughly the same time.
Considering the formal and practical restrictions upon defence and, to a lesser 
extent, prosecution counsel, the pertinent question is why did barristers appear 
during Northern Assize insanity and idiocy defences at all? The evolution of stricter 
evidentiary standaids encouraged the emergence of a confrontational style of court 
hearing in England. Consequently, “partisan” advocacy which employed aggressive 
cross-examination was criticised less robustly by the bench from the late eighteenth 
century o n w ard s .T h e  bench’s discretionary decision to allow counsel more
Lemmings Professors p.55. Duman “English Bar” p,96.
Duman Judicial Bench p.8.
Duman, “English Bar” p,97.
Sir James Alan Park(e), (1763-1838), DNB. vol XV., pp.216-217. Parke was involved in Granville
Medhurst’s insanity defence at Yorkshire in 1800. 
Beattie “Scales” pp.229-230.
Landsman “Rise” p.446 and p.449.
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regularly at court was informed by broader criticisms of England’s criminal code, 
particularly for its lack of interest in the prisoner’s rights/^ These critiques emerged 
in the late eighteenth century, intensified during the 1820s and were recognised 
formally by England’s statutory extension of the entitlement to defence counsel in 
1836.^  ^The 1836 statute did not initialise the participation of defence barristers in 
England, but regularised their involvement.
Fewer objections from the bench must have encouraged counsel to offer their 
services and litigants to employ them. The courtroom involvement of pleaders 
could be directed by the wealth of prosecutors and defendants, or their household, 
kin and friends. Norma Landau has illustrated just how expensive and time- 
consuming an English law-suit might be during the eighteenth century, especially if 
lawyers’ fees were included.^^ In both England and Scotland, persons of high social 
and economic station could also afford to employ counsel in greater numbers. The 
wealthy Scottish landowner, William Douglas, was able to arrange for three 
advocates to present his defence of furiosity at Dumfries in 1795.^  ^ This was the 
only occasion that more than two advocates represented a defendant during 
southern Scottish fatuity and furiosity defences. In July 1800, a defence of insanity 
was entered successfully for a wealthy Yorkshire gentleman called Granville 
William Wheler Medhurst, who had killed his wife Sarah in an unprovoked
/W p p .249-252 .53
'^’ Beattie “Scales” pp.250-253. i
N. Landau, “Indictment for Fun and Profit. A Prosecutor’s Reward at Eighteenth Century Quarter ;
Sessions”, Law and History Review. 17, (1999), p. 534. i
^  JC 12/22. I
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attack.^^ The affluent Medhurst household was able to afford the services of four 
barristers and a solicitor, some of whom may have been Granville’s social clients. 
By contrast, if Old Bailey and Northern Assize litigants did employ counsel, 
typically they used just one barrister.^^ Most English litigants could not afford to 
retain a single lawyer, let alone five of them.
Kin, family and “friends” of the litigant could anange for lawyers to both 
research and present British criminal cases. In 1829, for instance, Jonathan Martin’s 
insanity defence was orchestrated by his brothers, who arranged for the respected 
pleaders Henry Brougham and seijeant Jones to appear at c o u rt.T h e  prisoner was 
unaware of the plea and was “highly exasperated when he heard of the defence his 
brothers were going to set up for him”.^  ^ Martin had set fire to York Minster in a 
religiously motivated attack; he was convinced that his actions were ordained by 
God and therefore justifiable, exclaiming in court that “God would not chuse a 
madman to do His work”.^  ^ Martin’s sibling, also called John, was a fashionable 
and well-heeled artist during the 1820s. He sold a celebrated painting (called 
“Balshazzar’s Feast”) for £200 and owned a large house in a stylish quaiter of 
London.^^ John Martin certainly had the financial means to manage the courtroom 
defence of his brother, and apparently did so against the wishes of the prisoner.
A S S I41/10, York Herald. August 2"** 1800.
^  Langbein, “Shaping”, p.27.
Trial o f  Jonathan Martin (1829).
London Morning Herald April 1829.
Trial o f  Jonathan Martin (1829).
PN B  X ll, pp. 1167-9. John Martin was official painter to Princess Charlotte and Prince Leopold.
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England may have lacked a comprehensive system of public prosecution, but 
some types of victim began to receive legal aid over the course of the eighteenth 
century. “Prosecution associations” were formed in England witli the common 
purpose of ensuring that apprehended suspects were accused formally. These 
associations could use common funds to employ lawyers, but this subsidy was not 
open to all victims. By the late eighteenth century, specific offences were subject to 
“public” accusation in England. “Pleas of the Crown” (arson, murder, rape, robbery 
and treason) could be prosecuted by lawyers who were employed by the 
government on the Crown’s behalf.B arristers who had been promoted to the 
position of King’s or Queen’s “Counsel” could lead the prosecution of these capital 
transgressions against the common peace. Lawyers were utilised so that these 
heinous offences were prosecuted effectively and that exemplary punishment was 
inflicted upon guilty felons. Insanity and idiocy defences followed this broader 
trend. Of the hearings where prosecution barristers were recorded as being present, 
just over ninety-percent of them related to a “plea of the Crown” and seventy- 
percent were muider cases. In these trials, the interests of both the public and the 
victims (or family of the deceased) were represented by laAvyers.
Some Northern Assize insanity hearings featured defence counsellors from at 
least the 1770s, despite the severe statutory constraints against their involvement 
before 1836.^  ^Defence barristers appeared at the Old Bailey from the 1730s and in
“  Lemmings Professors p.212. Sedition was also subject to “public” prosecution.
^  Gaskill “Providence” p.3.
Beattie “Scales” p.205. Landsman “Rise” p.539. Langbein “Trial Jury” pp.307-314. Post “Defence 
Counsel” p.23. Defendants were allowed counsel in cases o f  Treason so that prisoners might avoid
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greater numbers after 1750.^  ^ There were significant patterns to the types of case 
where representation was allowed (at the discretion of judge and prosecutor) in 
England, The consecutive hearings regarding James alias “Dutch” Michael Rice, at 
the Yorkshire Assizes between 1776 and 1777, illustrate the archetypical reasons 
why defence counsel might appear and be accepted during English criminal trials.^^
The Dutchman Rice (or “Rijks”) had stabbed fatally his friend, Thomas 
Wastdell, in an unprovoked attack and in plain view of witnesses. Deponents 
recounted that Rice acted bizarrely after gouging Wastdell in the back; he stabbed 
himself (the knife “sticking on a rib”), beat his head with a stone, “threw off his 
Hatt and ran into the sea”.^  ^Rice was apprehended and charged with murder. The 
prisoner appealed four times at the Yorkshire Assizes and was deemed unfit to 
stand trial in all but the last instance, when he was found guilty and sentenced to 
hang. Rice was represented by lawyers during both of his trials in 1776: in March 
by “Honest Jack” Lee and in July by a Mr. Withers.^^
Lawyers argued successfully that James Rice was mentally incapable of 
standing trial at both of the prisoner’s hearings in 1776. British legal theorists held 
that sufferers of mental distraction or incompetence could not be tried whilst their
malicious prosecutions and to counter prosecuting lawyers. Misdemeanours were petty offences and 
bore some strong similarities to civil comt cases. Indeed, the involvement o f  pleaders in 
misdemeanours may w ell be related to civil court practice, where both litigating parties had the right 
to counsel. Gamham has demonstrated that counsel continued to be restricted to these sorts o f  crime 
in eighteenth century Ireland, Crime p. 114.
Beattie “Scales” p.225.
T rials... (1776-1777). ASSI 41/7, ASSI 42/9, ASSI 24/32/2 nos. 135-140.
ASSI 24/32/2 nos. 135-140.
^  ASSI 41/7 and 42/9. Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776)
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afflictions lasted. Defence counsel most regularly appeared (and hence were most 
frequently accepted) during insanity and idiocy defences when a prisoner’s mental 
capability of standing trial or organising their case was in doubt. In around two- 
thirds of twenty-five hearings where prisoners were represented by lawyers, the 
defence focused upon the prisoner’s mental inability to stand trial, rather than their 
mental condition at the time of the crime (Table 9.2). Expert and lay witnesses 
concurred that Rice had recovered his senses by July 1777, which may explain why 
the prisoner was without counsel at his final, critical hearing. This suggests that a 
pre-trial evaluation of Rice’s mental capabilities was undertaken to assess whether 
he ought to be granted legal counsel.
Focus of defence:
%
of trials involving 
defence counsel
Insane at Crime 32
Insane at Court 68
Table 9.2. Type o f  insanity or idiocy defence argued when the prisoner was 
represented by a barrister, Northern Assizes 1776-1829.
By the 1810s, newspapers noticed instances where prisoners were insane at 
court and lacked legal representation.^® It was thought odd that such prisoners 
should be asked to defend themselves at court without legal counsel, especially if 
they were incapable of conversing rationally. Arguably, such prisoners were in most 
need of legal representation, because mental afflictions were understood to rob 
persons of their reason, rendering the distressed individual unable to conduct their
See, for instance, the report o f  Elizabeth Ward’s trial in the York Herald. 27^' July 1816.
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defence or understand the nature of legal proceedings. Such sentiments existed from 
at least the 1770s in northern England’s courtrooms. This legitimisation of legal 
representation for insane and idiotic prisoners may have propagated a broader 
acceptance of defence counsel during eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
English criminal hearings.
Defences of insanity and idiocy broached fundamental legal principles. The 
centrality of these legal issues legitimised the involvement of defence counsel at 
court. As Blackstone commented, concerning transgressions other than 
misdemeanour or treason, prisoners in England were only permitted to employ 
courtroom counsel where “some point of law ... [arose] ... to be debated”.^  ^ Simply 
put, barristers were most likely to be used and accepted where legal points were 
contested, such as criminal responsibility. In the cases studied, it was appropriate 
that prisoners be represented because their mental discomposure propagated 
discussions of criminal accountability. Thus, barristers were more likely to appear 
cases where a prisoner’s sanity was debated than in straightforward criminal 
hearings where the prisoner’s sagacity remained unchallenged. In this respect, 
eighteenth century insanity and idiocy defences helped to establish both the 
presence and role of defence coimsel within England’s criminal courtrooms.
As greater attention was paid to evidential rules over the course of the long 
eighteenth century, so the pleader’s ability to understand and manipulate these 
points of law became paramount. In July 1776, defence counsel Withers reinforced
Blackstone Commentaries (1769) IV p.349.
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his argument with persuasive proof (from the gaoler and gaol-surgeon) that Rice 
had been afflicted consistently with insanity for the previous eight months/^ 
Withers therefore allayed fears that Rice feigned mental discomposure to avoid 
punishment. Even where prisoners’ appearance, speech and deportment at court 
evinced mental distraction, long term observations were sought out in an effort to 
prove, “beyond a reasonable doubt”, that the prisoner did not dissimulate mental 
affliction. The augmented courtroom presence of counsel was both a cause and 
effect of the evolving standards of proof within England’s criminal processes.
English judges took the ultimate decision to allow counsel to plead and were 
most willing to assent to defence barristers where the prosecution was also 
represented. Barrister Alan Chambre organised and presented the prosecution 
against Rice in July 1776. The bench allowed Withers as defence counsel to 
“balance” the trial and ensure that the prisoner was not undone by legal jargon. It 
will be illustrated later how Withers nullified Chambré’s case by expounding upon 
the law and attacking the expediency of the prosecutor’s evidence, something which 
the (insane) prisoner was unlikely to achieve by himself. As Stephan Landsman has 
suggested, judges were most likely to accept forceful, antagonistic defences by 
counsel when prosecuting lawyers were present and hence liable to use similar 
tactics themselves.
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.3-4. 
Landsman “Rise” p.503.
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Rice’s hearing in July 1776 would substantiate Penelope Corfield’s suggestion 
that lawyers were employed recurrently to negate one-another during English 
trials/'^ Corfield claims that if  a prosecutor was legally represented, for example, 
then the accused made a greater effort to procuie counsel. This tautological 
argument is not reinforced by the small sample of northern English insanity cases 
that included legal representatives. Opposing barristers appeared in only eight of the 
twenty-three cases where counsel was recorded. Confrontations between lawyers 
occurred in one-third of all trials where pleaders were in attendance and such 
conflicts rose after 1820. Pleaders could be utilised to neutralise the impact of one- 
another before 1830, but in the majority of northern English cases studied, only one 
of the litigants employed counsel.
Offence:
% of all trials 
involving defence 
counsel:
Non-Capital 7
Capital 93
Murder 86
Table 9.3. Defence counsel participation, by crime type. 
Northern Assizes, 1776-1829.
Judges were most prepared to show discretion and allow the prisoner to be 
assisted by counsel where prisoners faced capital conviction.^^ As Blackstone 
implored, “what face of reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a
Corfield Power and the Professions in Britain 1700-1850 p.70. 
Landsman “Rise” p.539. Beattie “Scales” p.223.
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man, which yet is allowed ... in prosecution of every petty trespass?”.^ ® In northern 
English insanity defences, over ninety-percent of prisoners who were legally 
represented had committed capital offences (Table 9.3). The overwhelming 
majority of these capital offenders had committed murder, just like “Dutch 
Michael” Rice. This was significant, because convicted murderers faced a strong 
likelihood of being hung.^^ From 1512, murder ceased to be subject to the “benefit 
of clergy” in England and murderers were rarely shown post-trial clemency when 
compared with other crimes.^^ Rice was eventually found guilty of murder in July 
1777 and was hung at York’s “old gallows, without Mickelgate Bar”.^ ® Clemency 
could only be expected in muider cases where it was argued that a verdict was 
based upon insufficient or defective evidence; such legal matters were firmly within 
the remit of counsel’s role before, during and after a trial had taken place. No such 
contentions were presented successfully on Rice’s behalf. Courtroom debate was 
vital to determining the eventual punishment which was applied to capital 
offenders. Defence counsel was allowed in murder cases to provide prisoners with 
the greatest chance of exoneration, or at least of proving that they did not intend to 
kill the victim.
Blackstone Commentaries IV p.348. Blackstone here criticised a system that allowed defence 
counsel in cases o f  “misdemeanour” (which carried relatively light sentences), but that could refuse 
them in cases where the prisoner faced sentence o f  death.
Beattie Crime p.433. This, in part, explains the proliferation o f  partial verdicts o f  “manslaughter” 
in cases where it seemed likely that the prisoner did commit murder, but the evidence was too slight 
to prove such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
4 Hen VIII c2. M. Gaskill Crime and mentalities in earlv modern England (2000) p.207 (fh 14 
contains a list o f  statutes pertaining to murder). J.M. Beattie Crime and the Courts in England. 1660- 
1800. (1986) pp.433-436 suggests that under a quarter o f  murderers were reprieved at the Surrey 
Assizes between 1660 and 1800. Clemency was usually granted on the grounds o f  insufficient or 
defective evidence.
Knipe Criminal Chronologv. p.90.
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Why did counsel participate in specific circuit court trials?
There were important patterns to the appearance and acceptance of counsel 
during English trials. The reasons why barristers and advocates appeared during 
circuit comt insanity and idiocy defences must also be examined. Upon being called 
to the bar, British la'wyers usually chose to attend a specific jurisdictional circuit.^® 
Few advocates or banisters restricted themselves to provincial work; most lawyers 
established themselves in the lucrative legal hubs of Edinburgh and London. 
Ninety-five-percent of the barristers who appeared at tlie Northern Assizes in 1815 
also practiced in London.^^ Familial roots could inform a pleader’s choice of 
circuit.^^ Circuit courts were important social occasions. The northern English 
barrister, Nicholas Ridley, preferred to attend the balls and events connected to the 
Morpeth Races (which followed the Newcastle and Northumberland Assizes) rather 
than continue on the northern circuit beyond Carlisle.^^ Thus, an anonymous poet 
wrote of the Northumberland Assizes of 1751, “The LADIES handsome, brilliant, 
gay. To dance, took half the BAR away”.^ '^  The revelry and ceremony which 
accompanied the Assizes established and re-affirmed a lawyer’s personal, political 
and professional relationships in the provinces.
Duman Judicial Bench p.24. Lemmings Professors p.52, “Ciicuiteering” bairisters usually 
continued to attend a single circuit throughout then careers.
Duman “English Bar” p.97.
^  Ib id p.96. Lemmings Professors p .51.
^  Lemmings Professors p.55.
Anon. A  northern circuit described. (1751) p.24.
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Integrated professional and political ties informed a pleader’s choice of circuit 
and criminal case. In 1796, Alan Chambré was promoted to the position of 
“Recorder of Lancaster” thanks to Tory patronage, which allowed him to prosecute 
cases at the Palatinate of Lancaster.Likewise, Scotland’s Advocates-Depute were 
selected upon notoriously politicised grounds.^® British lawyers who adhered to 
Whiggish political and legal attitudes embraced the principle that prisoners ought to 
receive legal counsel. “Honest Jack” Lee’s decision to represent James Rice, at 
Yorkshire in March 1776, was informed by such an ou tlook .T he impoverished, 
tramontane and mentally distracted Rice was an especially deserving subject of 
Lee’s philanthi'opy, because the prisoner was incapable of organising his defence or 
comprehending England’s legal processes. The acceptance of Lee’s presence as 
defence counsel and his success in postponing Rice’s trial were important 
ideological victories for English Whigs. Lee countered a “public” prosecution that 
was prosecuted on behalf of a Tory administration by a Tory appointee, Alan 
Chambré. Lee’s important (if temporary) impact upon the prisoner’s fate also 
vindicated beliefs in the necessity of defence counsel, as championed by a 
succession of Whig lawyers.
British pleaders and litigants might not meet until the court tribunal itself Legal 
agents (such as solicitors and WS) could organise cases and present briefs to
P N B  IV p.30,
^  Murdoch “Advocates” pp. 154-157. Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” pp. 16-22. Smith “Criminal 
Procedure” pp.432-436.
P N B  XI p.802. John Lee, (1733-1793).
ASSI 41/7 and 42/9
Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” pp.10-13. Ford “Brougham” pp. 109-110.
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superior court pleaders. These agents could select courtroom representatives for 
litigants and broad political dynamics could inform this selection process. By the 
1790s, Scotland was gripped by a strong Tory political hegemony.^® Tory dominion 
resounded through the legal professions, where promotion was preferred 
consistently to lawyers with Tory sympathies. Legal agents chose persistently to 
hand legal briefs to advocates with Tory, rather than Whig, sympathies. The 
selection of criminal pleaders could be infused by national and professional politics.
British legal professionals could imbue insanity defences with broader political 
and legal divisions. The furiosity defence of William Douglas, at Dumfries in '1795, 
reflected the politicised courtroom conflicts of late eighteenth century Scotland. 
Lord Braxfreld, a Tory-appointed judge with a harsh reputation, sat on the bench.^  ^
Braxfield had presided over sedition trials at the Justiciary Courts during the late- 
1780s and early-1790s. Tory-appointed lawyers had prosecuted these crimes of 
political agitation against the Tory-dominated regime in Scotland. Braxfield and his 
fellow-benchers had been criticised for favouring the Tory prosecutions and 
dismissing summarily the arguments of (Whiggish) defence advocates.^^ Douglas’ 
defence was led by “Harry Erskine”, a renowned pleader and toast of the Scottish
^  Phillipson “Scottish W higs” passim.
Robert Macqueen, Lord Braxfield (1722-1799). William Craig, Lord Craig (1745-1813) also 
presided.
^  Phillipson “Scottish Whigs” pp. 16-24. Cockbmn Memorials (p.83) noted the “indelible inequity” 
o f  the sedition trials. Cockbum, a Whig, was not a contemporary o f  Braxfield and would only have 
been sixteen years old when the first sedition trials took place, so his comments ought to be treated 
with caution. During the 1790s, those who had received Toiy partronage in Britain, such as the 
leader o f  the English bench, earl Mansfield, commended publicly Braxfield’s role in the trials. To 
Whigs, Braxfield’s role became instructive o f  the dangers posed by an overpowering judiciary.
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Whigs,^^ Erskine had appeared as defence counsel during sedition hearings and 
witnessed Braxfield’s forceful activities first-hand. At Dumfries in 1795, Erskine 
argued persuasively that Douglas’ complete loss of memory was indicative of a 
temporary aberration of reason and the “assize” reached a majority-verdict of 
furiosity.®"^  Erskine had debated successfully a difficult case before Lord Braxfield, 
the judge who had previously negated defence counsel during the sedition trials. 
Douglas’ defence revisited conflicts between Tory and Whig lawyers which were 
most evident during sedition hearings.
Political ideologies did not govern the course and outcome of all British insanity 
and idiocy defences. Only a minority of the English trials examined ever included 
legal representatives and adversary lawyers did not always hold to opposing 
politics, even in 1790s Scotland. The Yorkshire Assize hearing of Granville 
Medhurst, in 1800, featured opposing lawyers of Tory inclination.^^ Medhurst’s 
defence was led by Edward Law, the leading contemporary northern circuit 
barrister whose practice was assured. The case was prosecuted by James Park, a 
King’s Counsellor who was the pre-eminent prosecuting barrister of the northern 
circuit at the turn of the nineteenth century. Law and Park were professional rivals 
who appeared in a highly-publicised case which featured a local, wealthy 
gentleman. Lawyers could advertise their skills, enhance their professional
Henry Erskine (1746-1817).
JC 12/22.
York Herald July 2“^  1800. Law reconsidered his Whiggish allegiance during the 1790s; Pitt’s 
Tory administration promoted Law to Attorney-General and Seijeant o f  the County Palatinate o f  
Lancaster in 1793. Law was raised to the bench in 1802 and adopted the style o f  Lord Ellenborough. 
PN B  XI pp.657-662. Park was less overtly political, but also received Toiy patronage. Park was 
raised to the bench o f  Common Pleas in 1816. PN B  XV pp.216-217.
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prospects and guarantee future practice by appearing in such spectacular, high- 
profile hearings. British pleaders could accept cases because of professional 
considerations.
The activity o f pleaders at court
When barristers participated during insanity and idiocy trials, greater 
consideration was paid to formal legal procedure and theory. Counsel could also 
made explicit references to the evidential rules which governed the admissibility of 
witnesses and the value of their testimony. Historians have argued that such 
barrister activity marked the advent of “adversarial” criminal procedure in England. 
It is contended that criminal trials were restructured and reconceptualised by the 
presence of counsel.^® The appearance of lavyyers altered the roles and input of the 
other principal actors of the courtroom drama, most notably the prisoner, witnesses 
and bench. This thesis can be tested in the context of northern English insanity 
defences and compared with contemporary Scottish trials.
Professional and political prejudice from the bench could nullify a pleader’s 
efforts within the courhoom. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, Eskgrove 
was engaged in a persistent series of confrontations with the belligerent Scottish
Landsman “Rise” pp.500-502. Langbein “Trial Jmy” pp.30-36. Beattie “Scales” p.229. 
Lemmings, Professors p.208.
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advocate, Henry Brougham, at the Justiciary Courts. Brougham delighted in acting 
as a robust defence advocate before Eskgrove, who developed a strong antipathy for 
the man he monikered “the Harangue”.^  ^ Such rivalries could influence the Court’s 
decisions. Brougham earned the enmity of Eskgrove and the general distrust of the 
Scottish bench by acting in a manner which was perceived to be disrespectful to his 
legal superiors. These professional obstacles further damaged Brougham’s early 
career in Scotland. Already starved of patronage, promotion and practice owing to 
his piquantly Whiggish politics, these added professional impediments drove 
Brougham from both Scotland and (temporarily) the legal vocation.^^
The internal politics of England’s legal profession also moulded barrister 
activity during trials. Professional prejudice was not always to the detriment of a 
lawyer or his case. Thomas Erskine’s famous defence of James Hadfield at the Old 
Bailey in 1800 was regarded as an extraordinary piece of advocacy.®  ^The presiding 
bench allowed Erskine considerable latitude to challenge legal theories surrounding 
criminal responsibility. Erskine was a legal client and courtroom favourite of Lord 
Kenyon, the principal judge in Hadfield’s case.^ ®® This relationship may explain 
why Kenyon received the case for Hadfield’s insanity so readily. Hadfield’s case 
did not occur at the Northern Assizes, but it was suggestive of how personal and 
professional favouritism could play an important role within Britain’s courtrooms.
Cockburn Memorials (1856) pp.83-86.
Brougham left Scotland in 1806, He served as a spy for Wilberforce in Spain before returning to 
England, entering the political sphere and being called to the English bar. Chalmers Eminent 
Scotsmen (1834) 3 (supplement) pp.571-574.
^  Moran “Origin” pp.502-506.
PN B  VI p.855.
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Professional pleaders appeared infrequently at England’s Northern Assizes, but 
their presence could have a striking impact upon criminal hearings. Aggressive, 
confrontational conflicts of proof were more likely to take place when opposing 
lawyers were present at England’s Assizes. This characterised an “adversarial” 
courtroom, as did lengthy debates about evidential standards and points of legal 
theory.^®  ^ Within such antagonistic processes, litigants bore responsibility for 
producing proofs, increasingly through the medium of specialist legal advocacy. ^ ®^ 
The northern English insanity trials which featured a confrontation between 
barristers certainly contained these different elements, as did cases where only a 
single legal party was represented in court. The amplified appearance of barristers 
after 1800 therefore both reflected and informed the development of “adversarial” 
practice in England.
Legal representation could restrict the voice of English and Scottish prisoners at 
court. Scottish prisoners did not usually speak after pleading, because lavyyers 
conducted their case. English prisoners without counsel were allowed to make 
statements in their own defence, but they rarely cross-examined witnesses and did 
not enter into lengthy legal debates concerning criminal responsibility and the 
nature of proof. English prisoners who left their defence to counsel could be 
restricted to acting as “witnesses” to their case, rather than conducting it.
Landsman “Rise” pp.500-502. 
Idem.
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Stephan Landsman has argued that more witnesses were involved in English 
trials where lawyers were employed to organise and represent Old Bailey cases/®^ 
Legal professionals could undertake concentrated searches for suitable evidence and 
provide extensive lists of potential witnesses. The average number of testimonies 
per Northern Assize insanity trial which lacked counsel was six. Unusually high 
numbers of testimonies were heai'd in some English insanity defences which 
included legal professionals. At least sixteen witnesses took the stand during 
Jonathan Martin’s sensational trial at York Castle in 1829, which was almost three- 
times the average. ^®"^ But, in general, similar numbers of witnesses were examined 
in court whether pleaders were present or not. Barristers represented both prisoner 
and prosecution during James Rice’s hearing in July 1776 and a total of five 
witnesses gave testimony at that hearing. ^ ®^ At the same Assizes, six testimonies 
were delivered at John Sutcliffe’s trial, which involved no counsellors. The 
presence of legal representatives did not automatically affect the numbers of 
testimonies which were adduced during Northern Assize insanity defences.
It need not follow that an “adversaiial” trial involved a greater number of 
courtroom testimonies, even if the hearing did become a highly confrontational 
affair between counsellors. When lawyers organised a case (either in a pre-trial or 
courtroom capacity), they utilised strategies which tailored the evidence to best suit
Landsman “Rise” p.530. On the rare occasions where southern Scottish pannels lacked counsel, 
the numbers o f  testimonies produced were not greatly affected, either. Most Scottish civil court 
cognitions only involved two or three witnesses, although a longer list o f  possible deponents could 
also be arranged.
London Morning Herald 2"^  April 1829. The average number o f  courtroom testimonies per 
Northern Assize insanity or idiocy defence was 6,
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.3-6.
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their brief. Where legally trained individuals were involved in England and 
Scotland, they chose the most persuasive testimony to underpin their arguments and 
destroy the opposition’s case.^ ®® A legion of witnesses was not required necessarily 
to prove a case.
British pleaders employed the cross-examination of deponents to craft cases. ^ ®^ 
Lucid prisoners asked questions at court, but few provided effective cross- 
examinations.^®^ In 1823, Andrew Ryding’s attempts to examine witnesses were 
observed to be unusual and hence newsworthy.^®® A pleader’s oral prowess, as well 
as their legal knowledge, could guide British criminal trials. Barrister Withers used 
cross-examination to promote his defence of James Rice, who was aiTaigned for 
murder at Yorkshire in July 1776.^ ^® Withers challenged the factual assertions of the 
prosecution witness, constable Anthony Thompson. Prompted by astute questions 
from a prosecuting lavryer, Thompson stated that Rice had been “in liquor”, which 
exacerbated criminal transgressions in English law.*^  ^ Thompson had also declared 
that Rice had “put on the appearance of madness” when arrested to avoid 
responsibility for his crime. When the prosecution rested, Mr. Withers took 
Thompson to task:
Houston “Professions” p.20. |
Baker “Procedure at Criminal Law” pp.36-37. Landsman “Rise” p.534. Eigen Witnessing p.9. |
Lemmings Gentlemen and Barristers p.208. i
See my section on the role o f  the prisoners. Such a conclusion, o f  course, may be skewed by the j
available sources. The same point is made concerning trials in general by Beattie “Scales” p.232, j
Landsman “Rise” pp.534-7 and Lemmings Gentlemen and Barristers p.208. I
Lancaster Gazette. August 21 1823. Cumberland Racquet. August 25* 1823. I
* Trials ... Lammas 1776 (1776) pp.4-5. j
Smith Trial bv Medicme p.85. |
'^7Wp.4. I
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Mr. Withers: Do you know if [Rice] had got any liquor?
Thompson: I was not with him, but he had got liquor.
Withers: Did you, yourself, see him take any liquor?
Thompson: When I first went to him there was a man bringing him a jack of gin. 
Withers: How did he behave himself?
Thompson: He went very readily with me to the house [where he was confined 
initially].
Withers: What reason had you to believe he was drunk?
Thompson: I did not say he was drunk.
Withers: Did the soldiers beat him much?
Thompson: They did it to make him be still; I do think he was a man in his 
senses when I took him.
Withers’ consistent badgering of the witness produced a definitive statement 
that Rice may have imbibed gin, but he was not robbed of his senses through 
alcoholic intoxication. So neither the prisoner’s bizarre actions (such as running 
into tlie sea fully clothed) nor the murder could therefore be attributed to 
drunkenness. Thompson maintained that Rice had been sane when arrested, but the 
admission that Rice was sober allowed for the possibility that the prisoner had been 
mentally distracted. The impact of Mr. Withers’ aggressive cross-examination was 
resonant a yeai” later, at Rice’s final trial in 1777. Thompson again bore testimony 
and the prosecution lawyer, Alan Chambré, asked.
Chambre: Upon the whole, did he appear to behave as man in his senses or 
not?
Thompson: I cannot say; but sometimes I thought he was very sensible, but I 
will not swear to say, I will not run the risque to swear he was so.^ ^^
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1777) p.lO.
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Following Mr Withers’ verbal barrage in 1776 and a year of reflection, Thompson 
altered his estimation of Rice’s mental condition. Thompson’s uncommitted 
response hindered Chambré’s prosecution in 1777. Hostile cross-examination could 
affect the testimony produced in northern England from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, just as at the Old Bailey.
Mr Withers’ activity illustrates that legal representatives were not restricted 
merely to questions about the law during cross-examinations, for questions could 
challenge factual assertions too. In practice, the boundary between “fact” and “law” 
could be indistinct. Lawyers were adept at cloaking factual criticisms with 
arguments about points of law. Such practice was again evident at Rice’s trial in 
July 1776. Prosecutor Chambré introduced three witnesses to prove that Rice’s 
insanity was a deceptive sham.^^  ^ All three of these testimonies focused plainly 
upon Rice’s state of mind “when Thomas Westell was killed”. No questions, either 
from Chambré, the judge, juiy or Withers probed the prisoner’s fitness to stand 
trial. Yet in his summary, Mr Withers argued deftly that the trial ought to be 
postponed on legal grounds, addressing the courtroom, “May it please your 
Lordship, and you. Gentlemen of the Jury, to indulge me with a few words in behalf 
of this poor unfortunate prisoner now at youi* bar. The question for you to try is, not 
whether this poor man was insane or no, at the time when the melancholy affair 
happened, but whether he is now in a state o f insanitÿ\^^^ Withers’ reference to the
Beattie “Scales”
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.4-5. 
Ibid, pp.5-6. My emphasis.
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“melancholy affair” evoked impressions that the murderer was insane, for 
“melancholy” could mean both mad and sad.
The main thrust of Withers’ argument contended that the relevant point of law 
was Rice’s ability to stand trial, not his state of mind when committing the offence. 
Withers then outlined the law regarding criminal responsibility, which dictated that 
prisoners could not be tried whilst they were insane.^W ithers continued by 
drawing attention to the “insensible” appearance of the prisoner and summarised the 
strong evidence of insanity provided by the gaoler and gaol surgeon. Withers 
toyed with Chambrè’s case and then delivered a swift coup de grace, declaring 
astutely that “none of their witnesses speak to any time during [Rice’s] 
confinement” and that “the prosecutor has not called a single evidence to prove that 
this man is not now insane”. Chambrè’s case was outflanked and routed by 
Withers’ adroit argument. The jury found Rice insane and his case was postponed 
until the following Assizes.
Withers’ pursuits also demonstrate that barristers could summarise cases to 
juries, despite regulations restricting such activity in England. Summations were 
allowed because they focused upon points of law; Withers’ précis addressed legal 
principles of criminal responsibility and protested that the prosecutor’s case was 
inelevant. Defence counsel could manipulate successfully the law concerning 
insanity to counter legally represented prosecutions. Withers’ assertions were
117
Idem .
119
Idem.
Beattie “Scales” pp.253-254.
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grounded in legal theory, but he denigrated implicitly the “facts” produced by 
prosecution witnesses. In practice, courtroom pleaders could extend their role 
beyond objections which concerned points of law.
Evidential tenets evolved during the long eighteenth century. British counsel 
paid close attention to the “rules of evidence”, selecting their proofs careftdly and 
scrutinizing those laid against their case. Fierce debates could arise concerning the 
value which ought to be attached to certain testimonies and testifiers. Legal 
counsellors recognised that community consensus proved persuasive in the 
authentication of prisoners’ mental conditions through to 1830. By the late 
eighteenth century, Britain’s bars also highlighted the shortcomings of “hearsay” 
testimony and promoted the corroborative value of expert opinion. These 
developments have been considered elsewhere in this thesis, but lawyers’ 
perceptions of the worth of expert evidence deserves further attention. It has been 
contended that medical authority in the courtroom was promoted by lawyers, rather 
than by a proactive and aggressive medical profession that sought to wrestle the 
identification of mental conditions from the legal profession. Joel Eigen has argued 
that, from 1760, England’s barristers promoted the value of expert opinion during 
Old Bailey insanity defences. Barristers also initiated and endorsed the 
qualitative weight of medical testimony at the Northern Assizes fi’om at least the 
1770s onwards.
Eigen W itnessing p. 133.
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At James Rice’s hearing in July 1776, defence counsel Withers challenged 
directly the lay person’s ability to authenticate insanity. Upon arresting Rice, 
constable Thompson deemed that the prisoner was drunk rather than insane.
Thompson added that soldiers had beaten Rice “to make him be still”. Initially,
Withers specified that the witness never saw Rice “get any liquor to make him 
drunk”. Addressing the jury. Withers destroyed Thompson’s evidence, 
“[Thompson] perceived some inconsistencies in [Rice’s] behaviour, that induced 
him to suppose he was drunk; but in fact he was in a state of insanity ... 
Gentlemen, he has told you a great deal respecting the soldiers beating the prisoner, 
which made [Rice] sober: Will beating make a drunken man sober? No, but I appeal 
to you all, that beating will frequently strike awe upon a man who is insane, and 
will make him quiet and sulky, and shew himself more rational than at other 
times”.W i t h e r s  challenged explicitly this lay person’s ability to distinguish 
between insanity and drunkenness. The defence counsellor continued to pick apart 
lay testimonies, highlighting how Rice’s behaviour, speech and appearance were 
indicative of insanity. By challenging lay evidence. Withers reinforced the 
detached, long term observations of the expert witnesses that he adduced. Gaoler 
Clayton and gaol-surgeon Stillingfleet were convinced that Rice was insane and 
unfit to plead. The barrister’s activities enhanced the qualitative value of expert 
opinion, suggesting that it was more persuasive in the authentication of mental 
conditions than untrained lay persons. Withers contended that lay persons could I
imisinterpret the mental state of prisoners. II
Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1776) pp.3-7. 
^^/W p.6.
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English and Scottish counsel operated in some similar ways, such as the cross- 
examination of witnesses. Scottish defence and prosecution advocates summarised 
cases more regularly than English barristers. Concluding “addresses” followed a 
coherent pattern, whereby synopses were delivered firstly by the Advocate-Depute, 
then on the pannel’s behalf and finally by the judge. Advocates could reinforce their 
arguments with a succinct supposition of the evidence and their case immediately 
before the verdict was considered by the “assize”. Such reviews endued and 
fortified the comtroom deliberation of a prisoner’s mental condition.
The “Romano-Civilian” influences upon Scottish procedure meant that 
advocates could also act distinctly from English barristers. Justiciary Court hearings 
began with legal debates between advocates (the “relevancy”), before the “assize” 
was empanelled formally. During furiosity trials, these opening discussions focused 
upon legal theory and evidential criteria. English barristers argued in the presence 
of a jury, but Scottish lawyers could debate confrontationally the “relevancy” of 
cases before the judge, rather than the jury.
The trial of Thomas Towart, at Ayr in 1713, illustrates this aspect of Scottish 
procedure. Towart was indicted for the gruesome murder of John Miller, a five year 
old son of a family in Amlaird with whom he had lodged. After Towart had been 
unshackled, Advocate-Depute Thomas Hamilton opened his case by “repeating the
JC 17/4 and 13/4.
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lybil” of murder laid against the prisoner. George Smollet, the solitary defence 
counsel, denied the libel as produced and then criticised Towart’s “extrajudiciall” 
confession as insubstantial evidence. More specifically, Smollet attempted to 
introduce a defence of fmiosity, describing how Towart had been, “bound in 
Chains, and did goe up and down the Countray like a madman not speaking or not 
answering to the purpose when spoke to”. Smollet added that, “by the civil court 
madmen are putt in the same Class with Infants and are not punishable for what 
they do”.^ ®^ The prosecution responded that Towart’s flight from the scene was 
indicative of sanity and that he “behaved in his right witts”.^ ^^  Smollet reacted with 
a strong invective, drawing upon Mackenzie’s Matters Criminal and arguing that “a 
man once furious and distracted ought to be presumed still to be distracted except it 
could be proven that he had again come to his reason”. Towart had committed a 
capital crime, but Smollet demanded that the sentence ought to be “restricted to ane 
arbitrary punishment”, rather than death. The bench allowed the defence of 
furiosity to be argued before the “assize”. Towart was eventually found guilty and 
hung for his crime, but Smollet succeeded in persuading the judge that the 
prisoner’s insanity was a relevant defence.
JC 13/4.
George Smollet o f  Inglistoun, (1708-1744).
^^ J^C 13/4.
Idem.
Idem. This echoed Mackenzie Matters Criminal (Edinbuigh 1678) I, I, VIII p. 16: “Yet, when a 
Man is once proved to have been furious, the Law presumes that he still contmues furious, till the 
contrair be proved, for Madness is but too sticking a Disease; and is seldom ever cured ... and this 
presumption should rather hold in the committing o f  Crimes, than in any thing else; for the 
committing o f  a Crime, looks liker the madness, than the lucid Intervals.”
Idem.
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The “viva voce” manner by which the defence and prosecution advocates in 
Towart’s case delivered their relevancy arguments marked a change from late 
seventeenth century practice. At the High Court trial of Philip Standsfield in 1688, 
the prosecuting advocate George Mackenzie had dictated a written account of the 
relevancy. This was the regular form of procedure until 1695, when arguments 
began to be presented “viva voce”, with written informations being entered 
afterw ards.T h is enhanced reliance upon oral delivery marked a key development 
in the role of Scottish counsel. It also signified a shift away from the dominance of 
written legal processes which typified Continental, Romano-Civilian traditions. 
After 1695, the pleader’s ability to improvise oral arguments was tested more fully 
at court.
JC 2/7, Edinburgh, February 1688.
Smith “Criminal Procedure" p.439. This latter form o f  process was ratified within the Heritable 
Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act o f  1747; 20 Geo II c43.
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How the involvement ofpleaders affected the outcome o f hearings
English litigants who employed counsel were not guaranteed to be successful in 
their cause. In 1806, Peter Atkinson stood accused of assaulting and intending to 
mmder a fellow-servant, called Betty Stockdean, at Swillington in the West Riding 
of Yorkshire. No prosecution banister appeared, but Atkinson was represented by 
Mr Williams, who attempted to prove that the prisoner had been insane when 
attacking his victim. Williams could find no persuasive evidence of Atkinson’s 
troubled mind to reinforce his case. The lawyer found a single comment made by 
Betty Stockdean in her deposition, where she refened to her attacker as being 
“crazed”. This unsubstantiated evidence was very poor proof of insanity and did not 
impress judge or jury. Williams’ bogus defence failed and Atkinson was found 
guilty. The use of lawyers did not guarantee success, even when the courtroom 
opposition lacked counsel.
Mr Williams’ fallacious legal argument raises a critical issue concerning mental 
distraction as a criminal defence: that madness might be shammed by prisoners or 
argued craftily by lawyers to avoid guilty verdicts. Successful, deceptive pleas of 
insanity are difficult to detect, unless contemporary reports doubted the veracity of 
the defence. Williams’ efforts illustrate that fraudulent insanity defences were 
undertaken. It seems likely that such nefarious manipulations of legal principles 
were successful infrequently, because insanity defences required a consensus of lay
133 A S S I45/43. York Herald March 22"  ^ 1806.Idem.
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evidence (possibly, but not necessarily, reinforced by “expert” opinion) to be 
convincing. Fears about the dissimulation of insanity persisted in Britain, but it was 
also believed widely that troubling mental conditions did exist and rendered 
prisoners unaccountable for their actions. In the vast majority of successful insanity 
and idiocy defences, the weight of testimony meant that prisoners were perceived to 
suffer truly from debilitating mental conditions.
Despite Williams’ failure in 1806, tlie use of defence counsellors decreased the 
chances of insanity defences failing at the Northern Assizes. The prisoner’s insanity 
was proven in around ninety-percent of cases where barristers led the defence. Only 
sixty-four percent of such defences succeeded where the prisoner lacked counsel. 
English defence lawyers countered prosecution barristers successfully. Such 
“adversarial” confrontations between lawyers only occurred in eight northern 
English trials before 1830, all after 1775. The prisoner’s mental distraction was 
proven in every single case, even when prosecutors outnumbered defence counsel. 
Defence barristers were employed to counter prosecution lawyers in a tiny 
proportion of cases, but they did so effectively. The success of defence barristers in 
pleading insanity or idiocy may have encouraged prisoners to utilise such legal 
representatives at the Northern Assizes. By comparison, only five of the thirty-three 
southern Scottish defences which were conducted by an advocate failed, with the 
prisoner bemg found guilty and fully responsible for their actions. This meant
Houston “Class, Gender” pp.58-59.
Furiosity and fatuity could, o f  course, be argued in full or partial mitigation o f  punishment. These 
figures include both types o f  defence; I have interpreted a “success” by a defence Advocate to
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that around fifteen-percent of Scottish furiosity and fatuity defences which were led 
by advocates were unsuccessful between 1708 and 1829. These findings suggest 
that defence counsellors could have an important impact upon British insanity 
defences.
Lawyer representation 
(1756-1829)
Dominance 
(Number of trials):
Dominance 
(Proportion of trials):
Prosecution: 13 53%
Defence: 8 28%
Appeared in equal numbers: 5 19%
Table 9.4. Dominance o f  legal representatives in northern England, 1756-1829.
The exceptional success of defence lawyers during northern English insanity 
and idiocy defences might suggest that prosecution lawyers had little positive 
impact upon verdicts. Even when prosecution lawyers were present and prisoners 
lacked legal representatives, guilty verdicts were not produced regularly. But 
prosecuting lawyers had not necessarily “failed” when prisoners were found to be 
mentally incompetent. Verdicts of mental ineptitude could secure the custody of 
offenders, potentially for the remainder of their lives. Mr. Stanhope’s motions to 
secure the “safe custody” of James Ridley and John Windle during the 1750s were 
indicative of such an ag en d a .S tan h o p e’s argument reflected desires that the 
responsibility for the supervision of dangerous lunatics should be affixed to the
include those cases where guilt was asserted but punishment was mitigated owing to “partial” 
insanity.
ASSI 41/4 and ASSI 42/7, Yorkshhe, March and July 1755 and March 1756. Stanhope’s role was 
reminiscent o f  a civil court action, which might suggest that the initial activity o f  criminal court 
barristers during insanity defences was borrowed from civil court practice and traditions.
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offender’s parish of legal settlement, as directed by England’s poor laws.^^  ^ The 
prosecutor’s strategy could wish to ensure that the prisoner could not re-offend, 
rather than seeking blindly a guilty verdict. Such actions were informed by the legal 
principle that mentally disturbed persons should not be held responsible for 
transgressions.
Political considerations could also affect the potency of a prosecution led by 
barristers. The prosecuting lawyers at Jonathan Martin’s trial in 1829 were 
instructed to press for a verdict of insanity, rather than proving the prisoner’s 
guilt. Martin had clambered nimbly into York Minster one February night and set 
fire to the edifice. Martin held to extreme religious beliefs and had wished to purge 
the Church of what he perceived to be idolatious, immoral sinfulness. To 
conformists and less radical non-conformists alike, Martin’s actions represented the 
dangers which religious enthusiasm posed to the social fabric and spiritual order. 
An insanity verdict held the greatest potential to diffuse a case which carried such 
religious and political potency. Martin’s insanity could explain his radical religious 
beliefs and destructive behaviour. Some witnesses doubted that Martin was insane, 
but the most persuasive testimonies proved the prisoner’s delusions. Newspapers 
accepted the verdict and there was no public outcry against any alleged injustice. 
Insanity was perceived to exist and was understood to have afflicted Jonathan 
Martin, ensuiing that he became an exhibit of wonder and pity at St Luke’s Hospital
Bartlett Poor Law o f  Lunacy pp.33-36, 112-121 and 246-49. See Houston “Poor Law" for a i
Scottish commentary.
Trial o f  Jonathan Martin (1829). ,
D. Hempton, Religion o f  the People. Methodism and popular religion c l 750-1900. ( 1996), p.50. j
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in London until his death in 1838.^ "*^  The prosecution may have desired an insanity 
verdict, but the prisoner’s distuited mental condition was not invented to suit their 
case.
Prosecuting lawyers did not necessarily act in partisan mamiers during insanity 
and idiocy defences. English prosecutors could be consulted by the judge about the 
admissibility of defence counsellors. Where they acquiesced, prosecuting baiTisters 
acted discretionarily and accommodated the interests of the accused. Even where 
the only attendant barristers appeared for the prosecution, they could argue 
impartially that the prisoner was mentally disturbed. To take one example from 
March 1828, Margaret Paisley had “no legal advisor” when she stood trial at the I
Westmoreland A ssizes.P ais ley  had confessed to stabbing her child whilst sharing
i
a cell of the Milnthorpe Poor House in October of 1827.^ "^  ^ The prosecution was |
I
undertaken by Mr. Courtenay, “at the instance of the Parish Officers” and he began
i
by addressing the jury with the persuasive evidence of the murder itself.
Thereafter, Mr Courtenay sought to prove that Paisley had been mentally distracted, 
rather than pressing for her guilt. Courtenay concluded his opening statement by 
“humanely suggesting that the act was that of an insane person” and then produced 
evidence “which left no doubt of the unfortunate person’s insanity”.P a i s l e y ’s 
hearing resembled an inquisition to prove her mental imbalance. There was no
Jonathan Martin (1782-1838), P N B  XII pp. 1172.
Cumberland Pacquet. March 11* 1828.
Carlisle Patriot. Maich 8^ 1828. Cumberland Pacquet. Maich 11*^ ' 1828.
Cumberland Pacquet. March 11**‘ 1828. The parish officers. Governor and staff o f  the Poor House 
may have desired a verdict o f  insanity to somehow absolve them o f  any blame for driving the 
prisoner to commit the crime.
Idem.144
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doubt that Paisley had attacked her child with a penknife, but Courtenay recognized 
that she was insane and therefore could not be held accountable for her actions. In 
tribunals such as these, where the prosecuting lawyer was unopposed by counsel 
and there was no living victim to compensate, the barrister did not automatically 
adopt an “adversarial” approach.
Nor did Scottish trials always acquire “adversarial” tones. Advocate-Deputes 
could ensure that prisoners received legal assistance, as occurred in the trials of 
James Blaikie (Jedburgh, 1752) and Janet Thompson (Ayr, 1761).^ "^  ^ These public 
prosecutors upheld the principle that Scottish prisoners were entitled to legal 
counsel. Prosecuting advocates could also instigate and prove the “pannePs” fatuity 
or furiosity defence, rather than demonstrating that the prisoner was guilty. 
Advocate-Depute John Grant argued that prisoner John Burton was delirious and 
incapable of being tried for housebreaking and theft at Jedburgh in 1747.^ "^  ^ Grant 
did not pursue the victims’ interests ahead of the dogma that Burton was mentally 
unfit for trial. Scottish fatuity and furiosity hearings did not feature automatic 
confrontations between lawyers, who introduced conflicting legal cases at court.
JC 12/7 and 12/10. 
JC 12/5.
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Conclusions
Autogenous legal traditions and procedures meant that legal counsel had 
different quantitative impacts in England and Scotland during the long eighteenth 
century. Victims and defendants were represented regularly by lawyers at 
Scotland’s Court of Justiciary. The consistent presence of public prosecutors in 
Scotland was evocative of contemporary Continental legal systems and reflected the 
strong influences of “Romano-Civilian” traditions upon Scots law. Defence counsel 
was involved from an earlier date in Scotland than in many European codes, 
however. Forthcoming work ought to consider whether Scotland exported as well as 
imported practices and theories, in both the British and European theatres of law.
Legal representatives were involved in a far smaller proportion of criminal 
hearings in England, including the Northern Assizes, when compared with 
Scotland’s Justiciary Court. English barristers were most likely to be allowed in 
cases which promulgated points of law, such as criminal responsibility and the 
evidential criteria which were needed to prove mental incapacity. In England’s 
sanction-specific legal environment, lawyers might appear according to the kind of 
offence committed and the sentence faced by the prisoner. Prosecuting counsel was 
most evident in “Pleas of the Crown”, which carried capital sentences. Most 
prisoners who were represented legally had also committed capital transgressions, 
particularly murder. Formal post-trial discretionary measures were limited for
. J
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murderers, so counsel was allowed because the prisoner’s fate could be sealed by 
the courtroom debate and jury’s verdict.
The social and economic status of English prisoners impinged upon whether 
they employed couifroom counsel. A broader section of English society was willing 
and able to retain barristers by the early nineteenth century. Such social 
characteristics also determined the numbers of representatives who appeared during 
cases in both Scotland and England. The enhanced supply of circuiteering counsel 
also encouraged demand for their services by the late eighteenth century. Barristers 
and advocates could select circuits and appear during criminal cases owing to 
political and professional considerations. High-profile cases, such as well- 
publicised insanity defences, could enhance a lawyer’s occupational prospects. 
Britain’s legal professions were also riddled by micro- and macro-political 
divisions. Political concerns and ideologies could dictate the presence of particular 
lawyers during some criminal cases. Legal professionals could politicise hearings 
by importing intersected legal and political conflicts into the courtroom with them, 
alongside personal amities and antipathies.
English and Scottish counsel operated in similai' ways during insanity and 
idiocy defences. Within the context of evolving standards of evidence, both bai's 
sought selective and persuasive testimonies to prove cases “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”. British counsel could cross-examine witnesses and summarise their 
arguments, although advocates undertook the latter more regularly than barristers.
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Legal representatives could be restricted formally to legal debates, but the boundary 
between “fact” and “law” was indistinct where the prisoner’s mental state was 
debated. British bars could denigrate implicitly the factual assertions of witnesses. 
Britain’s counsellors also operated in divergent manners, owing to distinctive legal 
procedures. At the Court of Justiciary, advocates could open hearings with fierce 
legal debates during the “relevancy”, which was settled by the judge rather than the 
jury. England’s barristers always argued in presence of a jury, but Scotland’s 
advocates could act conff ontationally before the “assize” was empanelled.
Counsel activity affected the contributions of other courtroom participants. 
Prisoners were less directly involved in the presentation of their cases when legally 
represented. Opposing counsel could counteract one-another’s arguments. In 
England, the involvement of counsel altered the structure of criminal trials and 
marked the advent of “adversarial” legal p r o c e s s e s . A  barrister’s courtroom 
impact could be directed by the presiding judge’s personal opinion regarding the 
role and necessity of counsel. But some judges did not lead trials so vociferously 
when counsel were present. English judges were not restricted to being passive 
umpires before 1830, but the establishment of proofs could be driven by counsel 
rather than bench. Evidential discussions typified “adversarial” contests between 
counsellors. Legal representatives initiated and augmented perceptions that expert 
testimony canied enhanced qualitative worth at court. From at least the 1770s, legal 
representatives at the Northern Assizes instigated doubts that lay persons could 
authenticate mental afflictions and suggested that jurors ought to pay heed to expert
Landsman “Rise” p.501.
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opinion. Similar developments have been charted at the Old Bailey from the 
ITôOs.^ "^  ^ These findings indicate that the emergence of medical testimony during 
insanity defences was driven by legal professionals, rather than a remedial 
profession which sought actively to wiestle the identification of mental afflictions 
from lay persons.
Counsel represented one cog in the mechanics of Britain’s criminal processes 
and a component that was largely inactive in England. Nevertheless, the assessment 
of the prisoner’s mental capacities could be shaped by such counsellors in Britain. 
Conclusive analysis regarding “success-rates” of defences which were led by 
counsel is tempered on two accounts. Firstly, abortive arguments by English 
counsel may have gone unrecorded in the source materials examined. Secondly, 
prosecutors might seek to prove the prisoner’s mental incompetence rather than 
establish their guilt. The use of legal representatives did not guarantee the litigant’s 
success at court, although British defence counsel were effective in proving the 
prisoner’s mental affliction and countering prosecution-lawyers. The apparent 
success of English defence counsel duiing insanity and idiocy defences may have 
propagated the acceptance and necessity of defence barristers in other kinds of 
criminal trial by the 1820s.
This study opens avenues for future research. The courtroom role of Britain’s 
bars has been considered, but the pre- and post-trial activities of legal professionals
148 Eigen W itnessing p. 133.
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demand closer attention. Further research upon the lower echelons of the legal 
occupation must be examined to imderstand their relationship with the superior 
courts and courtroom pleaders. This thesis treats England’s Northern Assizes and 
the south circuit of Scotland’s Justiciary Court as “global” entities, providing 
comparisons to the broad trends which have been published for Edinburgh and the 
Old Bailey. This approach obscui'es the regional differences in lawyer participation. 
Source material may obscure barrister activity, but printed narratives suggest that 
very few insanity defences that were entered at the Cumberland or Westmoreland 
Assizes included pleaders before 1830. Further, localised research is required to 
appreciate the vocational labour of legal professionals within a provincial context.
Jackson, ““It begins with the goose and ends with the goose”: Medical, Legal and Lay 
understandings o f  Imbecility in Ingram v. Wyatt, 1824-1832”, SHM. 11, (1998), pp.361-363.
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Mentally disturbed prisoners and the coordination o f their 
criminal hearings.
“Please you, my Lord Judge, to hear a poor prisoner: - Why you see here, I  am 
a poor outlandish man, and !fancy that I  have been in a very bad condition...
Some histories of crime have portrayed criminal defendants as passive victims 
of the criminal processes, unable to shape their hearings significantly? Such 
interpretations have been deconstructed by research which has shown that 
defendants could interact with legal proceedings and influence criminal hearings? 
Joel Eigen has demonstrated that Old Bailey prisoners were involved in the 
coordination of their own insanity cases? Provincial English and Scottish prisoners 
could also manage and present criminal defences. Prisoners did not have to be 
mentally incompetent at court for insanity defences to be successful. Observers 
could perceive prisoners to be “in their sound mind and senses” whilst on trial, but 
to have been mentally distracted whilst committing crimes.
Michel Foucault’s challenging thesis highlighted the study of the sufferers as a 
viable avenue of research within the broader history of mental affliction? Foucault
' Trials ... Lammas Assizes (1777) p.9.
 ^McLynn Crime and Punishment passim
King Crime and “Punishing assault” passim.
 ^Eigen Witnessing p. 161-181.
 ^ Foucault also suggested that historians must focus upon physical indications, such as the prisoner’s 
appearance and behaviour, as well as their speech. Foucault Madness and Civilisation. See also 
Gordon “Histoire de la Folie” p.37. A. Ingram Madhouse o f  Language. Writing and Reading 
Madness in the Eightenth Centurv. (1991), pp. 10-12. A. Still and I. Velody “Introduction” in Still 
and Velody (eds.) Rewriting the Historv o f  Madness. Studies in Foucault’s “Historié de la Folie”. 
(1992), p.3.
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also suggested that a rational discourse could not be entertained between persons 
who suffered from insanity and persons who did not. According to Foucault, insane 
persons were deemed to be incapable of employing intelligible language? This 
theory was replicated by “anti-psychiatrist” scholars, such as Thomas Szasz, who 
argued that the concept of mental distraction was invented and applied oppressively 
to control persons who failed to conform to social norms.^ According to these 
theses, sane persons perceived sufferers from insanity to be devoid of rational 
values.
This study tests these hypotheses in the context of provincial criminal defences 
of insanity. Following Allan Ingram’s analysis of eighteenth-century literature, it is 
questioned whether sanity and insanity was so clearly distinguished by an ability or 
inability to employ rational discourse.^ Contemporary understandings of the 
transitory nature of insanity suggest that sufferers from mental afflictions could 
interact rationally during extended periods of lucidity. ■ Mentally afflicted persons 
could therefore construct criminal defences reasonably during lucid spells. Roy 
Porter has also criticised Foucault’s thesis for failing to recognise that insanity 
could be understood as the misapplication of reason (as argued by Locke, for 
instance), rather than the complete loss or absence of this mental faculty.'  ^
Contemporary concepts of “delusion” and ideas that insane persons might appear to
Ingram Madhouse pp.4-l8.
 ^ Szasz Myth p. 10 and Manufacture pp. 14-18.
® Ingram Madhouse pp. 10-14.
Porter “Foucault’s Great Confinement” pp.l 19-122. Gordon “Rewriting” p. 180 has defended 
Foucault’s work in this respect and argued that he did consider madness as the error as well as the 
loss o f  reason. Once again, the faulty and incomplete translation o f Foucault’s original thesis has 
confounded academics but sparked a lively series o f  debates.
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argue rationally, but from false premises, will be considered. Such theories 
contended that insane persons might use structured and intelligible language, but 
towards unreasonable goals.
Prisoners who were unfit mentally to stand trial were incapable of pleading or 
engaging rationally with legal processes. British defendants were expected to plead 
either “guilty” or “not guilty” at the outset of their hearings and a failure to do so 
could lead to their mental state being investigated.*^ In 1777, a Yorkshire jury 
believed that James Rice’s silence at the bar was indicative of insanity. * * Inability to 
employ language rationally or intelligibly could also signal that the prisoner was 
idiotic or insane. At Appleby in 1829, William Luss ranted upon a nautical theme, 
exhorting imaginary crewmen to “Heave the lead”, instead of pleading. Luss’ verbal 
pandemonium convinced onlookers of his mental distraction.*^ A sudden change of 
plea could also suggest mental confusion.*^ David Brown altered his plea to 
“guilty” at Jedburgh, against the advice of his counsel, who had presented a sound 
defence of mental.incompetence.*"* This irrational action was indicative of Brown’s 
imbecility. It was perceived that persons who were mentally afflicted at court could 
not make reasonable choices and did not comprehend the nature of legal 
proceedings.
Eigen Witnessing pp. 165-166. Houston Madness pp.357-359. 
' Trials ... Lammas Assizes r i777’> p.9.
Carlisle Patriot March 7*^* 1829.
Idem.
Kelso Mail September 22"** 1828.
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Richard Routledge’s failed insanity defence, at Cumberland in 1824, reinforced 
perceptions that persons who were troubled mentally at court were incapable of 
coordinating systematically their defences?^ The court assessed Routledge’s mental 
state after he declared “I pay turnpike!” instead of pleading directly. At the end of 
the trial, Routledge was aware that no persuasive testimony of his insanity had been 
offered. Whilst the jury “turned to deliberate”, the prisoner instructed that further 
witnesses be adduced to prove his mental unfitness to stand trial. A reporter noted 
that Routledge organized his defence rationally and therefore “conducted himself 
... not at all like a mad man”. The judge recognised this and advised the 
deliberating jury, “1 think if you look into the dock, gentlemen, you will see enough 
to determine the question”. Routledge was found sane and guilty of sheeptheft. 
Routledge had been conscious of his failing defence of insanity and was able to 
manage his case reasonably. These actions had betrayed Routledge’s dissimulation.
Contemporaries understood that insanity could be a transient affliction. It was 
recognised that prisoners could be insane whilst committing crimes but return to 
their senses afterwards and therefore be capable of organising their defences. In 
1795, William Douglas shot and killed Archibald Little in Park, Dumfriesshire.*^’ It 
was argued successfully that Douglas was insensible whilst perpetrating the crime. 
Douglas had no recollection of “having been in company with ... the defunct 
[deceased] any time this day and [knew] nothing of the matter, and had nothing to
Carlisle Patriot August 28 ‘ 1824. 
JC 1 2 /2 2 .
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do with the man’s death”?^ Such a loss of memory was equated with unsoundness 
of mind. Douglas’ sanity returned whilst he lay in gaol and he coordinated his own 
defence. Douglas requested “Letters of Exculpation” and signed a list of sixty-six 
witnesses to prove his insanity. Only sane persons were deemed capable of 
endorsing such binding legal documents. Douglas was also sane at his court 
hearing, for his fitness to plead and receive judgement was never questioned. 
Douglas’ case illustrates contemporary British perceptions that insanity could be an 
ephemeral condition. Prisoners afflicted by insanity could enjoy lucid spells and 
could therefore engage rationally with legal proceedings and coordinate their 
defences in a structured, reasonable manner. British prisoners who received verdicts 
of insanity could be highly active within the legal process of authenticating their 
mental state.
Some sufferers from insanity, such as Douglas, were not robbed permanently of 
their abilities to reason and converse intelligibly. This challenges Michel Foucault’s 
sweeping assertion that no viable discourse could exist between the sane and 
sufferers from mental afflictions.'^ Douglas was able to interact normally once he 
returned to his senses. Douglas could recount, using comprehensible language, how 
his affliction rendered him senseless. Prisoners who organised or presented their 
own insanity defences were not “labelled” involuntarily as sufferers from mental 
afflictions. Insanity was not always authenticated via an oppressive discourse and
n jQ 26/282
'8 Foucault Madness and Civilisation (transi) passim. See also Midelfort “Madness and Civilization 
pp.249-251. Ingram Madhouse pp.5-6.
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against the interests of the afflicted person, as contended by “anti-psychiatrist” 
scholars?^
Apart from coordinating defences and pleading, British prisoners could also 
speak in their defence whilst evidence was adduced. Prisoners made statements, 
such as explaining their affliction, describing crimes or questioning witnesses, in 
around one-half of Old Bailey insanity defences between 1760 and 1843. *^' Similar 
activity was recorded in twelve of the forty-nine detailed narratives that were 
discovered for northern English trials after 1775. By comparison, few Scottish 
“pannels” spoke after entering their plea because legal counsel participated 
regularly on their behalf. Of the thirty-five southern Scottish hearings studied, only 
Anne Millar offered her own defence, that she had “become disordered in her 
Judgement Occasioned by a Surprize”. '^ The sources could mask prisoner 
contributions, however. Minutes fail to mention such details, whilst narratives 
might only record instances where the prisoner’s defence was effective or 
noteworthy. On occasion, newspapers reported that prisoners “said nothing” in their 
defences, when they had actually provided abortive, unintelligible or unpersuasive 
arguments at court. Despite such problems, it seems likely that few of the English 
and fewer still of the Scottish prisoners provided lengthy cross-examinations or 
arguments at court before 1830.
Szasz Myth p. 10. Manufacture pp. 14-18. 
Eigen Witnessing pp. 165-166.
JC 12/6, Ayr 1749.
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British defences which were presented by prisoners differed strongly to those 
presented by legal counsel. Typically, lawyers produced detailed cross- 
examinations of witnesses and summaries of their cases. Defendants entered rarely 
into such activities. When Andrew Ryding presented an energetic defence at 
Lancaster in 1823, newspapers noted that such activity was extraordinar y amongst 
prisoners, insane or otherwise.^^ Ryding provided a protracted explanation for why 
he had assaulted Samuel Horrocks, MP, with a blunted cleaver, on a Preston street, 
in broad daylight. Ryding, a cotton-spinner, blamed Horrocks for the economic 
plight of his occupational colleagues. In the context of contemporaneous “Luddite” 
disturbances in north-west England, Ryding had committed a spectacular and 
politicised crime.^^ Ryding also questioned witnesses and even had the temerity to 
ask Horrocks, “Do you think ... that you were in your right mind or not [when 
being attacked]?”.
Ryding’s courtroom activities were paradoxical because they spoke both of 
insanity and rationality. He used intelligible language to conduct his defence and 
“displayed extraordinary acuteness, consistency and discrimination” whilst cross- 
examining witnesses.^"* On the other hand, Ryding’s performance at court was also 
perceived to be confused and indicative of mental distraction. Ryding’s 
examinations served no specific, discernable purpose as he shifted between proving 
his own sanity and insanity. When strong evidence of Ryding’s madness was
Lgnçaster Gazette August 2 1823. Cumberland Pacquet Augiisi 1823.
I breakers o f  the early-nineteenth century, ( 1972). Bailey, The
Lancaster Gazette August 2 1823.
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produced by his mother, Andrew accused the witness of lying and asked the judge 
to “stop the examination, and strike out all she had said”?^ This led observers to 
note that, whilst Andrew was capable of constructing rational sentences, he was 
incapable of employing them towards rational objectives. This irrationality 
convinced the jury that Ryding was insane at court.
As a medical witness summarised, Ryding suffered from “delusion”, or the 
misapplication of reason. The prisoner was convinced that his brutal assault upon 
Mr. Horrocks was justified because he blamed Horrocks for the economic hardships 
of all cotton-spinners. Observers noted that this reasoning was based upon false 
premises; firstly, that Horrocks was indeed responsible for lowering wages and 
secondly, that physical retribution could be justified in such circumstances. In 
Ryding’s case, the prisoner’s mental debility was recognised despite his use of 
intelligible language. By the early nineteenth century, insanity was not purely 
associated with verbal pandemonium or unintelligible verbal expressions. As Joel 
Eigen has suggested, the concept of delusion had become embedded into the 
English legal consciousness by the 1820s, where it was both offered and accepted 
as a sound criminal defence.
This study reveals what expected of British prisoners who were of sound, as 
well as unsound mind, in court. Prisoners were required to enter intelligible legal 
pleas at the outset of their trials. Failure to speak or confused pleas might signal
^  Idem.
Eigen Witnessing pp.49-51.
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mental discomposure. Beyond the plea, British prisoners were expected neither to 
speak at length in their defence nor systematically cross-examine witnesses. Such 
activities were normally reserved for legally trained professionals.
Hearings were postponed owing to insanity or idiocy because the prisoners were 
incapable of interacting reasonably with either other human beings or legal 
processes. Persons so afflicted were not classified as being mentally disturbed 
against their preference, for their condition robbed them of their will and 
discrimination. As the concept of delusion evolved in Britain, there was a growing 
awareness that insanity could also be understood as the misapplication of reason. 
Defences of “delusion” were accepted in both England and Scotland by the 1820s. 
Regarding criminal responsibility, the line between the rational criminal and the 
transgressor who acted on the basis of false reason was fine, but necessarily distinct.
Insanity could be evanescent. Sufferers could enjoy long spells of lucidity, when 
they operated as (and related to) persons who were not troubled mentally. Some of 
the prisoners studied could employ rational, structured language which was 
understood and accepted by sane persons. The mentally afflicted could therefore 
interact correctly with persons who had never experienced mental distress. 
Prisoners could be in their “sound mind and senses” at court and argue successfully 
that they had been insane at the time of committing an offence. In these types of 
defence, English and Scottish prisoners could coordinate their legal case and 
attempt to prove their own insanity by employing rational arguments. These
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defendants were not passive victims of criminal processes, nor was the label of 
insanity affixed to them against their will.
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Conclusions
Mental afflictions were perceived to be genuine pathologies in Britain between 
1660 and 1829. This thesis reinforces criticisms of “anti-psychiatric” historical 
interpretations, which contended that insanity and idiocy were purely socio-cultural 
constructs. Concepts of mentally troubling afflictions were not employed carelessly 
within Britain’s legal environment. They were not utilized to “label” all conduct 
which was abnormal, or all persons who refused to conform to cultural norms 
regarding their demeanour or activity. Terms such as “insane” and “idiotic” were 
applied most regularly in a specific way, to describe persons who displayed 
repetitive or incessant archetypes of abnormal and unacceptable behaviour, but who 
were incapable of choosing to act ant-socially. The context of a prisoner’s speech, 
appearance and conduct framed and informed interpretations of their mental state. 
Also, appreciations of noimal or typical conduct were reflected inversely through 
perceptions of abnormal demeanoui*.
British juristic works provided imperative guidelines relating to mental 
afflictions and criminal responsibility. Despite different legal traditions, influences 
and processes, English and Scottish legal traditions trusted to some broadly similar 
concepts. It was understood that mentally distracted or imbecilic persons could lack 
the ability to reason and control their will; it was understood that such persons 
could not form intent and could not be held responsible for their actions. Both legal
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codes also distinguished cleaiJy between “insanity” and “idiocy”, broad terms 
which indicated a variety of specific mental pathologies. It was recognised that the 
insane were persons who had lost temporarily, if repetitively, their faculty of reason 
and ability to control their will. By contrast, it was proposed that the mental 
aptitude of idiots had never developed beyond those of infants and that this 
condition was irrecoverable. In some cases, persons might regress into a state of 
idiocy which was also appreciated to be a permanent and irremediable affliction, 
unlike insanity which was perceived to be both transient and, in some instances, 
tractable.
England and Scotland owned some distinctive features regarding crime and 
mental abnormality. In both theory and practice, Scots Law maintained to the 
principle of “diminished responsibility”, whereby a less than fully debilitating 
forms of mental affliction were understood to reduce the culpability of the afflicted, 
thereby earning them a moderation of sentence. England’s theoretical conceptions 
of criminal responsibility were narrower than Scotland’s. English juristic tradition 
rejected notions of “diminished responsibility” and insisted that the mentally 
afflicted could only earn a complete acquittal if it were proven that they were 
robbed utterly of their ability to reason and form intent. Scottish and English law 
were therefore based upon divergent conceptions of criminal responsibility and 
mental afflictions.
429
Scotland’s “Rule of Proportions” was employed recurrently in practice at the 
Justiciary Courts during the long eighteenth century. In contrast, England’s narrow 
juristic principles of criminal responsibility were not followed regimentally at the 
Assize courts. Theorists argued that “melancholics” were not deserving of relief at 
law because their condition was less than fully debilitating. By the late eighteenth 
century, at least, juristic opinion was rejected as “melancholy” was treated readily 
as sound proof that the afflicted prisoners were robbed totally of their intent and 
responsibility. By the early nineteenth century, some prisoners were granted post­
trial mitigation of sentence because they suffered from partially incapacitating 
mental difficulties (such as “weak-mindedness”). English theories of criminal 
responsibility were confronted directly by such activity. Alternative concepts of 
criminal responsibility may have persisted amongst English and Scottish jurists, but 
such differences were not always so evident in practice during criminal trials. This 
suggests that there were no static, monolithic legal inteipretations and 
understandings of mental distraction and imbecility in England and Scotland during 
this era.
Legal treatises established how the prisoner’s mental incompetence could affect 
the criminal process, from the moment of arrest through to execution of sentence. 
Most regularly, insanity and idiocy were argued in exculpation of crimes. In such 
cases, British jurors deliberated whether the prisoner had been sane at the crime and 
therefore responsible for his or her actions. Also, trials could be postponed owning 
to the prisoner’s mental affliction. Persons who were non compos mentis at their
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hearings could not be tried or punished for their offences whilst their insensibility 
lasted, even if it could be proven that the accused had been of sound mind whilst 
committing the transgression. These discrete types of “insanity defence” have been 
analysed independently. Such classification has reaped dividends, for distinctive 
courtroom dynamics could govern the outcome of pleas that sought to exculpate 
prisoners and those that sought to adjourn tribunals.
Joel Eigen has argued that Old Bailey proceedings were dominated by legal 
professionals, particularly judges, and their perceptions of criminal responsibility 
between 1760 and 1843. The judiciary could also be proactive during northern 
English and southern Scottish insanity and idiocy defences. Britain’s judiciary 
could be especially vocal during these particular hearings, because the alleged 
mental incompetence of the prisoner raised important issues regarding criminal 
accountability. Judges could examine witnesses and extract testimony which 
addressed directly the criteria for insanity and idiocy. Benchers also imparted their 
estimations of the prisoner’s mental capacities within their conclusive summaries. 
Such activity was informed by the judiciary’s function as the expounder and 
clarifier of points of law. This aspect of judicial activity became more important 
after 1660, as stricter evidential mles evolved in Britain and “adversarial” processes 
emerged during some English trials. In the context of defences “in-bar-of-trial” at 
Scotland’s Justiciary Court, the judiciary was established as the primary decision- 
taker after 1801. In these hearings, the remit of Scotland’s bench resembled 
stereotypical interpretations of Continental judges, who operated within
431
“Inquisitorial” procedural frameworks. Scottish practice may have become more 
“Anglicized” in some respects during the long eighteenth century, but the ruling in 
1801 demonstrates that Scots Law did not shed inexorably vestiges of “Roman- 
Civilian” influences.
This study of provincial defences of idiocy and insanity offers an alternative 
interpretation of the courtroom dynamics than Eigen’s proposals for the Old Bailey. 
It should not be expected that procedures were identical at the provincial Assizes 
and the Old Bailey, or that interpretations of one of these jurisdictions can be 
supplanted upon the other. Provincial English and Scottish judges led, rather than 
dictated, verdicts dmfrig insanity and idiocy defences. Trial jurors, who were the 
ultimate assessors of the prisoner’s state of mind in the vast majority of British 
criminal cases, could be proactive and self-informing. Juries could reach similar 
conclusions to the bench, independent of coercion. A verdict of “insanity”, or 
“guilty”, could therefore represent a concordance of judgement, which was based 
upon commonly understood perceptions of the criminal responsibility of the 
mentally afflicted, rather than dictation from the bench. English and Scottish 
historiographies have emphasised that consensus reigned between bench and jury 
during the assessment of mental conditions. In some provincial hearings, however, 
judges and jurors could reach conflicting evaluations of the prisoner’s mental state 
and criminal responsibility.
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Judicial activity could be constrained in other ways. In contrast to England, 
Scottish legal counsel had a regular impact upon trials through the manipulation of 
evidence and legal arguments. The standard participation of prosecution and 
defence advocates affected the role of Scotland’s judiciary, which was less 
inquisitive than its English counterpart during the production of proofs. Northern 
Assize criminal hearings were restructured when barristers became embroiled in 
proceedings. These trials could resemble “adversarial” confrontations between 
lawyers, relegating the bench to a more passive role in couif. Conversely, some 
judges counteracted aggressive advocacy, especially where only one litigant was 
represented. In England, judicial tolerance of partisan legal representation was 
guided by personal, political and professional ideologies regarding the respective 
roles of judge and counsel at court. The evaluation of a prisoner’s mental state 
could be informed strongly by the testimonies imparted at court, whether the final 
decision was taken by judge or jury. British evidential evolutions were driven by 
legal professionals. Evidential prerequisites were debated most regularly where 
barristers appealed during English trials. Scottish hearings opened with the 
“relevancy”, where judges ruled upon specific points of law (including necessary 
proofs) that were raised and debated by opposing advocates.
Fundamental evidential developments affected the way in which insanity and 
idiocy were identified at court. By the mid eighteenth century, greater pedagogic 
and practical value was attached to “expert” testimony. Deponents with experience 
in either medical matters or “mad-doctoring” were classed as “expert” witnesses.
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who could impart “opinion testimony” that was based upon occupational skills and 
knowledge. “Gaolers” were also expert witnesses because they were experienced in 
authenticating mental afflictions amongst their prisoners. Persuasive expert 
testimony was buttressed by long term and frequent observations of prisoners as 
they lay in gaol awaiting trial. Medical and custodian evidence was adduced 
regularly where prisoner’s mental fitness to plead had to be evaluated in both 
England and Scotland by the early nineteenth century. After 1801, at Scotland’s 
Justiciary Court, procedural changes meant that the bench’s assessment of the 
“pannel’s” mental condition was informed by “expert” testimony (from gaolers and 
generic medics), but not lay evidences. Such experts were not elevated to the status 
of sole advisors to England’s courts before 1830, but their evidence was used to 
authenticate the prisoner’s fitness to plead at the Northern Assizes from at least the 
late eighteenth century onwards.
This emergence of “expert” testimony did not represent aggressive efforts, by 
medical professionals, to wrestle the process of identifying mental afflictions from 
lay and legal persons. The enhanced participation and value of “expert” testimony 
were driven by Britain’s legal occupations and developments in legal procedure. An 
increased attention to evidential standards meant that legal professionals sought out 
“expert opinion” to prove a prisoner’s mental capacities “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”. Despite such evidential evolutions, the efficacy of lay testimony persisted. 
“Hearsay” was not always curbed successfully from lay testifiers. Even in the 
1820s, British jui'ors regained second-hand, neighbourhood interpretations of the
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prisoner’s mental state to be persuasive, clinching proof. Medical and “alienist” 
testimony played restricted roles in the authentication of mental afflictions within 
England and Scotland’s criminal courtrooms, particularly concerning the proof of 
the prisoner’s mental condition at the time of committing a crime. Most often, 
medical testimony legitimised lay or community evaluations of the prisoner’s 
mental state in Britain. Even in the 1820s, the lay person’s capability of identifying 
mental disorders was challenged rarely by medical testifiers, either implicitly or 
explicitly. In most British trials, lay witnesses continued to dominate the assessment 
of the prisoner’s mental faculties in quantitative and qualitative terms through to 
1830.
Criminal records provide priceless indications of how the “lower” and 
“middling” orders of society, both male and female, conceived of mental afflictions 
and criminal responsibility. These conceptions were not merely imposed upon 
proceedings by persons of superior standing. Community interpretations of the 
prisoner’s mental abilities were matched regularly by courtroom assessments. 
Legal decisions regarding the prisoner’s mental state both reflected and were 
legitimised by broad perceptions of justice and criminal accountability. In contrast 
with England, Scotland’s procedural change of 1801 could remove this element 
somewhat. Decisions made by the judge, informed by “detached” expert witnesses, 
could actually reject lay and communal interpretations of the prisoner’s mental 
abilities.
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The study of provincial prisoners suggests that insanity and idiocy were not 
perceived universally to be experienced by women. These afflictions were not 
merely “female maladies”, at least within the context of provincial British criminal 
trials. This thesis also suggests that the authentication of mental disturbance at court 
was not an oppressive discourse, driven by male professionals, that sought to label 
indiscriminately women who failed to conform to social norms as being “mad” or 
“imbecilic”. Females were under-represented as deponents. Indeed, there were 
instances where male testimony was preferred over female. But women were 
capable of imparting persuasive testimony, which might challenge the content and 
context of male evidences. Male and female prisoners could have their mental 
conditions authenticated by witnesses of the same sex, who were also of roughly 
similar social and economic standing to the accused. Additionally, women could 
provide important evidences regarding male sagacity and vice-versa. Contemporary 
perceptions of noimality and abnormality were influenced by a wide range of 
“contingencies”. The study of an afflicted person’s gender provides one 
methodology for historians to consider, but such analysis needs to be employed 
shrewdly and with reference to other determinants, such as social status, wealth, age 
and the person’s relationship with the law and religion.
England’s Northern Assizes and the southern circuit of Scotland’s Court of 
Justiciary have provided some fresh avenues of historical enquiry regarding 
criminal defences of insanity and idiocy, as well as conceptions of criminal 
responsibility. The materials relating to these circuit comts allow an engagement
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with the principal historiographical debates concerning mental afflictions, as well as 
crime and the criminal courts. This study also raises some new questions which 
need to be addressed. Pre-trial decision-making processes, both formal and 
informal, ought to be investigated further in the context of criminal defences of 
insanity and idiocy. How and why victims and prosecuting officials might apply 
discretionary measures to mentally incompetent persons must be examined. Some 
broader issues regarding courtroom dynamics also need to be considered in a 
provincial context and in comparison to other British and European countries and 
their colonies. Although counsel was restricted in England, for instance, barristers 
did pervade insanity defences from the mid eighteenth century onwards. Further 
research is required to ascertain whether barristers were more regularly involved in 
provincial criminal trials than was once thought, or whether insanity defences were 
exceptional in this case. Finally, there is scope to expand the comparative basis of 
this research to other parts of Britain and the Continent. Relative analyses of the 
developments in Welsh and Irish criminal defences of insanity and idiocy during 
the long eighteenth centuiy are long overdue, whilst published English interest 
needs to expand beyond the confines of the Old Bailey. With recent interest in the 
“Atlantic World” in mind, it would be fascinating to observe how English and 
Scottish concepts of mental distraction and criminal responsibility were 
transplanted to the American colonies. Did Scottish emigrants maintain to notions 
of diminished responsibility in lands which adopted and adapted English Common 
Law?
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